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Abstract
The thesis explores the relations between histories of violence and cultures of secrecy in 
Peten, northern Guatemalan in the aftermath of the Peace Accords signed in 1996 by the 
Guatemalan government and guerrilla insurgents. Informed by ethnographic research 
among displaced constituencies with experiences of militancy in the guerrilla 
organisation Rebel Armed Forces, the thesis traces the contours of dispersed and 
intermittent guerrilla social relations. It explores histories of govemmentality in Peten 
and their relations to state-sponsored violence, insurgency and repression; the incitement 
and replication of ambivalence in social relations; the production of socialities and 
subjectivities marked by secrecy; guerrilla ethics and aesthetics of sociality established 
through generation and circulation of substance; phenomenologies of guerrilla prosthetic 
embodiment and subjectivity.
Violence and conflict are shown to be deeply implicated in guerrilla secret 
socialities and subjectivities. In turn, the social and cultural field appears as a site of ever- 
increasing partiality. In an effort to apprehend and represent the shifts in perspective thus 
engendered, the thesis asks what presuppositions make partial subjectivities and 
socialities amenable to experience, reflection and representation. Through 
anthropological knowledge practices, social and cultural realms appear plural, complex 
and relative. However, when anthropology is located within the history of Western 
metaphysics, it is clear that traditions of anthropological enquiry have imagined partiality 
to be the culturally specific manifestation of a universal human condition, cognitive 
structure or interpretative capacity. Since Nietzsche and Heidegger, progressive 
weakening of Western metaphysics and erosion of the foundations of thought have made 
these presuppositions problematic. Further, they have engendered the conditions of 
possibility for anthropology to move beyond the enumeration of potentially infinite 
partial perspectives grounded in strong universalist assumptions. Anthropology that 
accepts the weakening of Western metaphysics imagined as the advancement of nihilism 
may apprehend and represent constant shifts of partial perspectives in anti-foundational 
terms, thus also realising its nihilist vocation.
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‘Nosotros estamos y  no estamos ’
‘We are there, but we are not there’
(Turcios Lima, 1967)
'Hay cosas que no se saben, y  nosotros nunca las dijimos' 
‘There are things that are not known, and that we never told’ 
(Comandante FAR, 2000)
‘\Las preguntas no son las indiscretas, si no las respuestas! ' 
‘Questions are never indiscreet, but answers are!’ 
(Comandante FAR, 2000)
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Introduction
When I arrived in Guatemala in October 1999, the country was in the grip of the 
electoral campaign for the first ‘free and democratic’ national elections since the 
signing of the Guatemalan Peace Accords between the Guatemalan Government and 
the umbrella guerrilla organisation Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemaltecaf 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) on 29 December 1996. Peace 
negotiations were punctuated by innumerable setbacks, 1 but eventually they
• • • • 9culminated m a series of successive Peace Agreements. The Guatemalan Peace 
Accords nominally ended a period of thirty-six years of conflicto armado intemo, or 
civil conflict.
This thesis explores the relations between histories of violence and cultures of secrecy 
in Peten, northern Guatemalan in the aftermath of the Peace Accords signed in 1996 
by the Guatemalan government and guerrilla insurgents. Informed by ethnographic 
research among displaced constituencies with experiences of militancy in the guerrilla 
organisation Rebel Armed Forces, the thesis traces the contours of dispersed and 
intermittent guerrilla social relations. It explores histories of govemmentality in Peten
1 Peace negotiations were inaugurated by the ‘Procedures for the Establishment o f a Firm and Lasting 
Peace’ convened in Esquipulas, Guatemala, August 1987. A second phase o f Peace negotiations began 
in March 1990 and produced the ‘Basic Agreement on the Search for Peace by Political Means’, known 
as the ‘Oslo Agreement’. This was followed by the ‘Agreement on Procedures for the Search for Peace 
by Political Means’, known as the ‘Mexico Agreement’, and ‘Agreement on a General Agenda’, both 
signed in April 1991. The ‘Framework Agreement on Democratisation in the Search for Peace by 
Political Means’, known as the ‘Queretaro Agreement’ was signed in July 1991 and concluded the 
second phase o f negotiations (cf. Sieder 1999, Jonas 2000).
2 The Guatemalan Peace Accords encompass a framework and eleven Agreements: (i) ‘Framework 
Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government o f Guatemala and 
the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteco’ signed in Mexico, D.F. January 10 1994; (ii) 
‘Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights’, signed in Mexico, D.F., March 1994; (iii) ‘Agreement 
on Resettlement o f the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict’, signed in Oslo, Norway, 
June 1994; (iv) ‘Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights 
Violations and Acts o f Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer’, signed in Oslo, 
Norway, June 1994; (v) ‘Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous People’, signed in Mexico, 
D.F., May 1996; (vi) ‘Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation’, signed 
in Mexico, D.F. May 1996; (vii) ‘Agreement on the Strengthening o f Civilian Power and on the Role 
of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society’, signed in Mexico, D.F., September 1996; (viii) 
‘Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire’, signed in Oslo, Norway, December 1996; (ix) ‘Agreement on 
Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime’, signed in Stockholm, Sweden, December 1996; (x) 
‘Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration o f the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca’, signed in Madrid, Spain, December 1996; (xi) ‘Agreement on the Implementation, 
Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements’, signed in Guatemala, December 
1996,’ (xii) ‘Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace’, signed in Guatemala, December 1996 (The 
Guatemalan Peace Accords 1996).
12
and their relations to state-sponsored violence, insurgency and repression; the 
production of socialities and subjectivities marked by secrecy; the incitement and 
replication of ambivalence and indeterminacy in social relations; guerrilla relatedness 
and the ethics and aesthetics of sociality established through generation and 
circulation of substance; phenomenologies of guerrilla prosthetic embodiment and 
subjectivity.
Revelation and Denouement
On 24 April 1998 the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala 
published its report, Guatemala: Never Again (ODHAG 1998). In four volumes, the 
Report detailed the findings of research conducted in the dioceses of the Catholic 
Church across the country. It focused on detailed analysis of approaches, methods and 
techniques of violence and terror, and the histories of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. In the fourth tome, it named the victims of the conflict. Grounded 
in interviews with over fifty thousand people, the Guatemala: Never Again report 
attributed the great majority of violations to the Guatemalan Army. On 28 April 1998, 
four days after the release of the report, Bishop Juan Gerardi was assassinated.
In 1999 the United Nations-sponsored Commission for Historical Clarification 
(Comision de Esclarecimiento Historico, CEH) published the report Guatemala: 
Memory o f Silence (CEH 1999). The document was produced in collaboration with 
the warring parties. Again, the conflict appeared in all its dazzling organisational 
detail, stem linear periodisation and chilling causal certitude. Unlike REMHI 
(ODHAG 1998), however, in the Commission for Historical Clarification report 
anodyne prose and methodical revelation featured alongside systematic omission. The 
‘memory of silence’ would not provide information on the grounds of which criminal 
prosecutions may be undertaken. The names of victims and perpetrators would not be 
disclosed, and impunity would be assured.
The Past in the Present
The Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) was established on 7 
February 1982. It brought together the four insurgent organisations operating in the 
country, namely the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres! Guerrilla. Army of the Poor
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(EGP), the Organization del Pueblo en .4rm<xs/Organisation of the People in Arms 
(ORPA), the Partido Guatemalteco del Tra^o/d/Guatemalan Workers’ Party (PGT) 
and the Fuerzas Armadas RebeldesfRebel Armed Forces (FAR). The history of 
guerrilla organising in Guatemala, however, had begun over twenty years previously. 
The first embryonic and yet foundational rebellion took place on 13 November 1960, 
when discontented Army officers sought to mobilise elements of the Guatemalan 
Army and stage an insurrection (CEH 1999, Volume 1:124, Handy 1984:230). Among 
them were Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, known as ‘El Chino’, Alejandro de Leon, Luis 
Trejo and Luis Turcios Lima. The latter, also an officer of the Guatemalan Army, had 
been sanctioned for publicly criticising Army corruption and mistreatment, and had 
been sent to the Military Base of Poptun, Peten. On 12 November 1960, however, 
Turcios Lima was in Guatemala City and joined the rebellion (Fernandez 1968). The 
officers were unable to mobilise large numbers of sympathisers in the Army files, and 
sought refuge in El Salvador (Fernandez 1968).
On 26 February 1962 the insurgents released a declaration where they identified as 
the Frente Rebelde Alejandro de Leon Aragon 13 de Noviembre (MR-13). New 
guerrilla actions followed, and slowly proliferated. In 1962 a guerrilla column 
appeared in the western region of Huehuetenango. The local population apprehended 
the insurgents and turned them in to the Army (CEH 1999, Volume 1:125). 
Meanwhile, members of the PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) and PUR 
{Partido Union Revolucionaria) assembled Frente 20 De Octubre. Many were killed 
in a confrontation with the Army. Among the survivors was Rodrigo Asturias, known 
by his nom de guerre Gaspar Ilom, who would later be co-founder and leader of the 
Organization del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA) (CEH 1999, Volume 1:128,).
Electoral fraud and intimidation marred the national elections of 1961. Civil unrest 
followed, with mass mobilisation and protests in Guatemala City led by students and 
unions. Unable to regain control of the capital, President Ydigoras Fuentes greatly 
extended the mandate of the Army. According to the Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH 1999, Volume 1:127), such episodes of popular mobilisation and 
the increasing prominence of the Army were decisive factors in the establishment of 
the military confrontation that was to grip the country for over thirty years (ibid: 127). 
Students responded by assembling the guerrilla group Movimiento 12 de Abril, and
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although the organisation was short-lived, many of its members would join the 
insurgent organisation that was bom in 1962. In December 1962, the PGT {Partido 
Guatemalteco del Trabajo) called upon the guerrilla groups MR-13, Movimiento 20 
de Octubre and Movimiento 12 de Abril to devise a common strategy. At the meeting 
it was decided that the four organisations would seek to overthrow the government 
through armed struggle. The Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces) were 
bom (CEH 1999, Volume 1:128, Handy 1984). FAR would be responsible for 
military aspects of the struggle, and PGT would continue to lead political fronts.
The leader of MR-13 Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, with Rodolfo Payeras, Cesar Montes, 
Luis Turcios Lima and many others converged in the newly established FAR. FAR 
guerrilla operations took place in the eastern departamentos of Zacapa and Izabal, but 
by 1963 internal conflicts between FAR and the Trotskyist group close to M-13 
increased (Turcios Lima 1968, CEH 1999). Following substantive disagreements as to 
the aims, objectives and methods of the struggle, M-13 and FAR split. Despite the 
schism, in 1965 FAR regrouped, headed by Luis Turcios Lima. FAR now 
encompassed members of the Juventud Patridtica del Trabajo and Frente Guerrillero 
Edgar Ibarra (FGEI). An ambitious military guerrilla campaign followed, but during 
intense activities, Comandante Turcios Lima was killed in a car accident (CEH 1999, 
Volume 1:145, Fernandez 1968). He was twenty-five years old.
Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima lived on in the memories of the ex-combatants I met in 
Peten. They were revered figures. Two FAR guerrilla columns operating in and across 
Peten during the 1980s and 1990s were named after them, and the political 
programme published by FAR in 1988 featured a photograph of a young Turcios 
Lima on its cover (FAR 1988). Following the death of Turcios Lima, Camilo Sanchez 
had been in command of FAR, but in August 1968 Sanchez was captured and 
command was handed over to Pablo Monsanto (CEH 1999, Volume 1:146). Pablo 
Monsanto was to head FAR until December 1996. In 1968, FAR attempted to make a 
way into the departamento of Alta Verapaz, but the population did not respond 
positively. The following year, FAR attempted to reach Alta Verapaz and El Quiche 
from Peten, again with limited success. The northern departamento of Peten thus
3 An extraordinary account of Turcios Lima’s death was offered by ‘Tita’, the woman who was 
travelling with Turcios Lima on the day, but who survived the crash (cf. Montes 1968:122-141). She
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became their base and key area of operations. Until 1979, FAR did not engage in 
public operations and concentrated its efforts on organising support among 
campesinos4 in Peten and among students and workers in the capital (CEH 1999, 
Volume 11:248-9).
Between 1971 and 1979 ORPA underwent a process of organization that resulted in a 
public declaration of its existence on 18 September 1979 and subsequent operations in 
the departamento of San Marcos, Solola, Quetzaltenango and Chimaltenango (CEH 
1999, Tomo II: 261-4). The EGP was founded on 19 January 1972 by Rolando Moran, 
who had been militant in previous guerrilla efforts and grew to control large areas of 
the departamento of Quiche. The PGT, FAR, EGP and ORPA had different 
approaches to the struggle. FAR, EGP and PGT declared a Marxist Leninist 
orientation, with FAR and EGP closer to orthodox Marxism (CEH, Volume 11:236). 
The operations of both FAR and EGP were informed by the foquista theory of 
revolution of Guevara and Debray (Vinegrad 1998), but FAR was distinctive in its 
hermetic hierarchical structures and militaristic leanings, when compared with the 
EGP’s emphasis on mass participation (cf. CEH 1999). ORPA, on the other hand, 
placed emphasis on the racist structure of Guatemalan society rather than on class- 
based analysis and was less militaristic in orientation (CEH, Volume II: 237). Since 
1982, the four guerrilla organisations operated under the aegis of the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. Nevertheless, each maintained its distinctive 
identity, in terms of area of influence, organisational structure, military operations and 
political organising. In the period after the Peace Accords, the sense of belonging to 
FAR was very much felt by the ex-combatants I met in Peten, where I conducted most 
of my fieldwork.
The first document related in earnest to the Peace Accords was signed in 1991 in 
Queretaro, Mexico. The document bore the signatures of Comandante Gaspar Ilom 
(ORPA), Comandante Rolando Moran (EGP) and Comandante Pablo Monsanto 
(FAR). Carlos Gonzales of the PGT also signed all subsequent Accords. The four 
leaders underwrote the Accords by their respective nommes de guerre, but by 
December 1996, when the final Peace Agreement was drawn, they signed the
noted that insurgents as well as Army officers attended the funeral.
4 Campesinos may be translated as ‘agricultural workers’ but it refers more broadly to the rural
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document with their civilian names. Their nommes de guerre were given in brackets 
(Guatemalan Peace Accords 1996:293). As established in the Accord on the Basis for  
the Incorporation o f the Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity to Legality (Peace Accords 
1996:217-37), the URNG was thus set to transition from illegal and clandestine status 
to a legitimate political party. URNG leaders were turning from comandantes 
guerrilleros to party leaders and elected politicians. The process was fraught with 
difficulties for all URNG associates, and notably for ex-guerrilleros/as in the rural 
areas and the population who had actively supported the struggle, las bases. Many 
had undergone the process of demobilisation as laid out in the Accords and overseen 
by the newly established United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA).
Demobilisation
In February 1997, in preparation for demobilisation procedures, the URNG handed 
over the names of 3,570 of its members, qualified as iefectivos\ to the United Nations 
Mission (MINUGUA). Information concerning weapons of various kinds was also 
made available and the guerrilla voluntarily disclosed the location of land mines. 
MINUGUA proceeded to establish eight ‘concentration points’ located in different 
areas of the country, where guerrilleros/as would gather to demobilise. Each 
‘concentration point’ benefited from a surrounding area of six kilometres in diameter 
where access to the Guatemalan Army was forbidden. Further, entrance to the 
‘security areas’ by the Guatemalan Police had to be cleared with the United Nations 
Military Observers. As stipulated by the ‘Agreement on Definitive Ceasefire’ (Peace 
Agreements 1996), the URNG had underwritten a commitment to present all its forces, 
including combatants, intelligence, logistics and medical personnel, as well as its 
leaders, el mando. By 24 March 1997, the guerrilla forces had gathered at the 
‘concentration points’ for a total of 2,928 persons (MINUGUA 1997). As chronicled 
in their report, the United Nations Mission expressed disquiet, as 642 persons seemed 
not to have appeared. MINUGUA (1997:4) reported that meticulous explanations 
were provided by the URNG to justify the low turn out, and their reasons were 
accepted. The table below illustrates the numbers of combatants who demobilised in 
each location, with the guerrilla organisations noted.
population.
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Table 1: Demobilised Personnel of the URNG
Place Organisation Number
Abejas Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA) 250
Sacol Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) 642
Claudia I Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) 342
Claudia II Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA)/Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo 224
Mayalan Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) 428
Tzalbal Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) 499
Tuluche I
Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres 
(EGJ3)/Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo 
(PGT)
285
Tuluche II Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) 258
Total URNG 2,928
(Adapted from MINUGUA 1997:11, Annex II).
Not all ex-guerrilleros/as I got to know during my fieldwork had reached the 
‘concentration points’ and formally demobilised. However, all of those who did 
concentrated in Sacol. Following disarmament procedures, the ‘concentration points’ 
were turned into training camps. International Organisations established literacy and 
health programmes, as well as the somewhat euphemistically termed ‘professional 
training’ schemes. The aim of the programmes was to equip people with skills to 
facilitate their transition from clandestine combatants to civilian life. On 2 May 1997, 
a ceremony was held in Sacol to finalise the process of demobilisation. As individuals 
left the ‘concentration points’, they were issued with identity cards and a 
‘demobilisation certificate’ (certificado de desmovilizacion), commonly referred to by 
ex-combatants as carnets de desmovilizacion.
Many, however, did not know where to go next. Others, having gone back to their 
communities to be met by threats and hostility, returned to the ‘concentration points’. 
MINUGUA thus set up four ‘refuges’ (refugios) where these ex-combatants could 
stay on, receive further training and organise a final resettlement (MINUGUA 1997). 
The ex-combatants I met in the field referred to these locations as albergues. From 
Sacol, they were moved to Papalja, Coban, Alta Verapaz. They remembered the 
months in temporary accommodation as times of extreme uncertainty, frustration and
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fear.
No access to land or land tenure provision was made for ex-guerrilleros/as.5 Ex­
combatants who were able to establish contact with relatives joined their families. 
Some, however, considered that their only option was to cluster with fellow ex­
combatants and purchase land at market price on which to settle. In 1999, in the 
aftermath of demobilisation, FAR ex-combatants represented a dispersed constituency. 
They all held great hopes for the forthcoming elections. Violence, intimidation and 
vote rigging marred the electoral process in 1999. Nevertheless, they were declared 
overall ‘free and fair’: the International Community soon endorsed the electoral 
results. The Frente Republicano Guatemalteco!Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) 
won the presidential race in the second round and Alfonso Portillo was elected 
President. General Efrain Rios Montt, the man who had risen to power through a coup 
d’etat in 1982 and was considered by many to be responsible for the genocidal 
counter-insurgency campaigns mounted by the Guatemalan State and Army against 
civilian population in 1982-1983 (CEH 1999), was installed in Congress. Ex- 
comandantes guerrilleros such as Pablo Monsanto won a seat in Parliament, others 
worked for the party machinery in the capital. The majority of ex-combatants 
dispersed across the country. Many of those who had been in the FAR files resettled 
in Peten.6
Secrecy, Violence, Conflict, Ethnography
In 1999, the Commission for Historical Clarification’s Guatemala: Memory o f Silence 
(CEH 1999) seemed predicated on an ethos of disclosure. It endeavoured to break the 
silence, bring to light the histories of the conflict and provide the basis for 
reconciliation. From its inception, however, the Commission for Historical 
Clarification relied extensively on concealment, as its mandate did not extend to 
provision of information that may be the ground for criminal prosecutions. As argued
5 This was the result o f more than an oversight. During the negotiations related to the relevant Peace 
Accord and in times o f interim cease-fire, the guerrilla organisation ORPA kidnapped a wealthy 
Guatemalan woman and asked for a conspicuous sum o f money in return for her release (Jonas 
2000:52-3). The kidnapping greatly affected the URNG’s bargaining power at the negotiating table, at 
the time when the Accord for and on behalf o f their own combatants was at stake (Jonas 2000). Many 
ex-combatants thus deeply resented ORPA, and Gaspar Ilom in particular. They argued that the lack of 
discipline and lax leadership of ORPA had been detrimental to them all and the cause o f much hardship.
6 Many FAR ex-combatants resettled in Peten, but some settled elsewhere.
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by Wilson (1998), Peace Accords-sanctioned interdiction of any linkage -  between 
the findings of the Commission for Historical Clarification and the operations of the 
criminal justice system -  produced a partial truth which, failing to be paired with the 
‘other half of prosecution procedures, was perhaps, no truth at all. The report 
Guatemala: Memory o f Silence (CEH 1999) may have broken the silence with regard 
to the histories of insurgency and the mechanisms of counter-insurgency, but at the 
same time it perpetuated the silence which would warrant impunity.
The ethos of partial disclosure of the Commission for Historical Clarification, as 
much as the programme of open denunciation of the Office of Human flights of the 
Archbishop of Guatemala’s Report Guatemala: Never Again (ODHAG 1998), seemed 
at odds with my first experiences of fieldwork in Peten. Linear periodisations of the 
violence inflicted by the Guatemalan State against the insurgent and civilian 
populations, like those relating to guerrilla organising, were also proving difficult to 
locate. Despite a general consensus on the accuracy of dates, places, and names where 
these were provided (CEH 1999, ODHAG 1998), in the early stages of fieldwork the 
disjunction between the accounts of the conflict offered in the Reports, and people’s 
own experiences and memories, grew ever starker. To the extent that the Reports 
increasingly seemed partial and hegemonic accounts, the secret socialities of ex- 
guerrilleros/as and their experiences gradually emerged as predicated on a different 
and more profound partiality.
The thesis explores the multiple partialities engendered in the experiences of itinerant 
and multi-sited fieldwork in Peten, northern Guatemala, in an effort to represent social 
relations and subjectivities, marked by histories of violence, and cultures of secrecy. 
This is an account of the multiple perspectives that emerged in the course of my 
relations with the ex-combatants of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes. Partialities of 
violence and secrecy trouble anthropological and popular representational practices 
(Das et al 2000, Daniel 1996, Nordstrom and Robben et al 1995). They require that 
researchers grapple with the culturally and historically specific effects of fear and 
terror (Taussig 1980), and related relational ambiguity and ambivalence. They present 
the ethnographer with the seemingly paradoxical task of denouncing violence and 
suffering, whilst refraining from disclosing individual identities, specific incidents or 
deeds (Daniel 1996). Ethnographies of violence and conflict must simultaneously
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expose and conceal. They are inherently partial -  peculiarly so.
In the thesis I strive to represent violent histories, secret socialities, and partial 
subjectivities as they unravelled in and through Peten. I do so through juxtaposition of 
different texts and experiences, and reflect on how the proliferation of perspectives 
thus engendered may be replicated in -  and make a replica of -  the field of 
anthropology. Whilst partial perspectives produced through ethnography constantly 
offset each other, I argue that anthropology should also continuously decentre and 
defer (in and through) its own representational practices and theoretical models. In 
this sense, writing ethnography coincides with writing theory. Further, ethnographic 
juxtapositions represent a series of reflections on what anthropological thinking may 
be, and how ethnographic writing and anthropological thinking may constantly ‘out- 
contextualise’ each other (cf. Strathem 1999).
In Chapter One, The Problem o f Context, I address the question of ‘contextualisation’ 
as a key analytical strategy relied upon in anthropology to produce the ‘object/subject’ 
of enquiry. I argue that histories of the anthropology of Guatemala have relied on the 
intersection of notions of ‘indigeneity’ and ‘place’ in their context-making efforts. 
The preponderance of such tropes have produced different nativist accounts which are 
essentialist and ahistorical. These can be contrasted with selected anthropological 
accounts of the conflict that disrupt nativism, and expose histories of violence and the 
movements such histories engender. Anthropological efforts to contextualise the 
Other produce a series of out-contextualisations.
I am interested in anthropological analytical practices, and the effects of out- 
contextualisation, in accounting for the relatively peripheral place the northern region 
of Peten has traditionally occupied in the anthropological imagination. The task is one 
of devising a representational frame through which the context of ‘Peten’ may emerge. 
In Chapter Two, Multi-sitedness and Desarraigos (Displacements), I focus on 
histories of colonisation and the inception of violent govemmentality in Peten, from 
the mid-twentieth century to the ethnographic present. Through textual juxtaposition, 
I strive to give a sense of the plurality of experiences in the departamento and make 
the conflict emerge surreptitiously, as it did during my fieldwork in people’s own 
accounts.
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In Chapter Three, Towards Weak Description and Thick Nihilism, I address 
anthropology’s analytical models and, following Derrida (1970), consider the place of 
anthropology within Western metaphysics. A re-inscription of anthropology within 
the Nietzschean-Heideggerian genealogy of ‘weak thought’ reveals the nihilist 
vocation of anthropology. ‘Weak description’ and ‘thick nihilism’ inform the 
articulation of anthropological hermeneutic practices which are reflexively aware of 
partiality and provisionality of all interpretation. I argue that ‘weak description’ and 
‘thick nihilism’ may be analytical modes through which histories of violence and 
cultures of secrecy may be understood through, and represented in, anti-foundational, 
transitory, and impermanent hermeneutic practices.
In Chapter Four, Secrecy, Scale and Anthropological Knowledge, I consider ex­
guerrilla secrecy as it emerged in the course of my fieldwork and the partialities thus 
engendered. I discuss practices of naming in the insurgency, and related partial 
socialities and relationalities. I argue the secrecy poses a challenge to anthropological 
representational practices, while also providing the opportunity for the articulation of 
anthropological knowledge that moves beyond simple enumeration of multiple 
perspectives to think socialities, relationalities and subjectivities marked by secrecy in 
post-plural scales.
In Chapter Five, States o f Violence and Ambivalence, I consider further articulations 
of secrecy and partiality with specific reference to state-violence and its effects on 
social relations and subjectivities. I refer to three stories which offer poignant analysis 
and exegesis of the arbitrary yet systematic operations o f state actors as well as views 
about the complicity of agents of foreign power, and their adverse effects on human 
creativity and ingenuity. Further, I trace guerrilla deployment of merographic 
connections in post-plural scales.
In Chapter Six, Guerrilla Sociality, Substance and Moral Orders, I consider multiple 
partial accounts of guerrilla life in Peten. I note that in one account, the guerrilla was 
imagined as constituted by three substances, namely combatants, supplies and 
information. Further, food production, circulation, preparation and consumption 
illustrated how guerrilla sociality and relationality may be articulated and constantly
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renewed. Whilst these practices coincided with a moral order based on sharing, there 
existed moral orders based on distinct forms of relatedness. I illustrate this point with 
reference to the short-lived practices of matrimonios por las armas, ‘marriages by 
arms’ as an example of how the guerrilla was envisioned through the idiom of family 
relations. In the conclusion I consider views as to the dissolution of guerrilla moral 
orders in the ethnographic present.
In Chapter Seven, Prosthetic Aesthetics, I offer a reflection on the phenomenologies 
of guerrilla embodiment and subjectivity, and argue for a conceptualisation of 
‘prosthetics’ that may relinquish dependence from Cartesian-inspired dualisms and 
that may instead be grounded in multiple and complex experiences of ethnographic 
subjects’ prosthetic embodiment. I argue that guerrilla and anthropological post-plural 
scales supplement each other’s prosthetic aesthetics.
Ethnographic Candour and Reticence
Fieldwork was itinerant and multi-sited (Marcus 1998), in my initial efforts to locate 
‘the object/subject’ of interlocution, and the subsequent course that the agentic 
‘object/subject’ determined I follow. During my fieldwork I conducted a total of 121 
interviews. Most of these were semi-structured interviews, and some were informal 
conversations. I attended meetings convened by women’s groups, community groups 
and indigenous rights groups, some of which I recorded with the permission of the 
organisers. I convened three meetings and recorded the proceedings with the 
permission of the participants. I also interviewed individuals who had held positions 
in the local government agency of FYDEP prior to 1990 and got acquainted with 
Non-governmental Organisations who worked with returnees (COMADEP) and with 
the ex-combatants (Fundacion Guillermo Toriello, ADEPAC, CIEP).
The total number of ex-guerrilleros/as interviewed was sixty-one, of which twenty- 
seven were women and thirty-four were men. Age of ex-guerrilleros/as ranged from 
twenty to sixty-eight years old. All had been affiliated to the ox-Fuerzas Armadas 
Rebeldes. A small number had been involved in the organisation since the 1960s. 
Many were sons and daughters of combatants killed in the conflict and whose families 
had a long history of guerrilla activism. The youngest interviewees may have not 
been active in military operations, but had lived a clandestine life with their older
23
relatives. Some interviews were recorded following numerous informal conversations 
with the interviewees, some occurred through sheer serendipity. On one occasion, an 
individual agreed to speak to me in one capacity, but during the interview revealed his 
guerrilla affiliation and determined that the interview dealt with that, rather than with 
the issues we had previously agreed to discuss. In addition to the ex-combatants with 
whom I conversed in an interview setting, I met and got to know many more, but did 
not record our conversations. Most Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes ex-combatants who 
were interviewed identified as Ladino, but Mam, Q’eqchi’, Achi’ and Kaqchikel 
ethnicities were also represented among interviewees. Many other interviewees were 
not ex-combatants, but guerrilla sympathisers.
All names, pseudonyms and nicknames that appear in the thesis have been changed. 
The practice of re-naming subjects in order to protect their identities and ensure 
confidentiality is well established in traditions of anthropological inquiry (cf. Pitt- 
Rivers 1954). In the present research however, re-naming practices are grounded in 
understandings of ‘confidentiality’ that are historically specific and culturally nuanced 
(cf. Caplan 2003, Fluehr-Lobban 2003). The re-naming practices I deploy are 
intended to graft onto the complex naming practices used by subjects themselves. As 
discussed at length in the thesis, guerrilleras and guerrilleros often had numerous 
names, pseudonyms and nicknames. They named and renamed themselves, and each 
other, for multiple purposes, and I rename them accordingly. Many of the names and 
pseudonyms featured in the thesis are drawn from the novels of Jose Flores (Flores 
n.d., 1995,1997a, 1997b). ‘Jose Flores’ is the pseudonym for the writer of four novels 
that deal with the civil conflict; specifically, with experience of the Fuerzas Armadas 
Rebeldes in Peten. Numerous apocryphal stories about Jose Flores circulated among 
URNG associates in Guatemala City in 1999-2000. Some involved tropes of gender 
and other reversals, but none dared to question the veracity of the writer’s accounts. 
Jose Flores, his own vivid narrative, the stories about him, and rumours about his 
sources, captured and shaped my ‘ethnographic imagination’ (cf. Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1992, Moore 1994b). Many of the individuals who feature in the thesis thus 
bear the names of the characters of Jose Flores’ novels.
Nicknames (<apodos), on the other hand, often involved capturing a trait of the person 
7 This interview is discussed in Chapter 4.
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and were metaphorical and allegorical. Some were secret in the sense that they were 
known only to those involved in the guerrilla organisation. Some became public to the 
extent that individual combatants were known to communities by their nicknames and 
not by their pseudonyms. Some were long-lived, others transient, other still survived 
only in the memory of the nickname holder. In my account, I have changed all the 
nicknames except those bestowed upon me. I have tried to maintain a sense of the 
metaphorical, allegorical and ironic associations and emphasis featured in the original 
nicknames. I have also been consistent when referring to individual biographies and 
have refrained from creating composite characters imagined as the synthesis of 
different individual experiences. Where subjects appear composite, on whatever level, 
this is not as a result of montage, or any other textual technique.
Itinerant and multi-sited fieldwork in as large a region as Peten (36,000 square 
kilometres), could not strive, or indeed wish, to cover the ‘vastness’ through which 
this territory is and has been imagined. I travelled across Peten following the routes of 
guerrilla secrecy. I visited some communities regularly, others sporadically or only 
once. I never got to many of the places and the people I wanted to reach. On 
occasions, I reached villages to find that those I wanted to meet had left a few hours 
prior to my arrival. They were not expected to return any time soon, as they had set 
out to reach the US/Mexican border. Nevertheless, some communities had the 
kindness to welcome me on a regular basis and endure my questions. To them, I 
promised to give full anonymity. I am aware that, four years on, conditions have 
changed and the visibility of some of these communities and subjects has since 
increased. Nevertheless, and for the purpose of the present analysis, I consider the 
first agreement between us as binding. Thus, no geographical or other details are 
given when discussing particular settlements. This does not mean that particular 
communities were not instrumental to the present research, just that I am reticent 
about their identities.
Heteroglossia
Guatemala is a multi-cultural and multi-lingual country. The official language is 
Spanish, but there exist numerous Mayan and non-Mayan languages spoken in the 
country (Tzian 1994 cited in CEH 1999, footnote 5, Appendix 9, Chapter 1).
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Although the exact number of languages is disputed, the Academia de las Lenguas
O Q
Mayas notes the existence of twenty-one Mayan linguistic groups, each with 
relative sub-groups. To these are added Xinca and Garifuna (COPMAGUA 1995). 
Equally disputed is the number of indigenous languages spoken in the region of Peten. 
As a receptacle of migratory population displaced from other areas of the countries, 
Peten is linguistically as well as culturally diverse. Itzaj and Mopan speakers have 
traditionally been considered autochthonous to the region, the former usually said to 
be located around the lake Peten Itza in central Peten and the latter in and around the 
town of San Luis in southern Peten (cf. Reina 1964, 1967a, 1967b, Reina and 
Schwartz 1974, Schwartz 1971, 1983, 1990). Despite their long-standing presence in 
southern Peten, Q’eqchi’ speakers on the whole are not considered native to Peten by 
non-Q’eqchi’ persons. Many of them nevertheless are, and consider themselves to be, 
Petenero. Further, they are no longer confined to the southern lowlands. Q’eqchi’ 
speakers are increasingly settling in eastern, western and northern Peten. The 
linguistic make-up of the region is yet more complex when one considers populations 
deemed to be ‘internally displaced’ (‘desplazados intemos *) and those returning from 
exile in Mexico {‘retornados'). In these communities, many Maya languages are 
represented, including K’iche’, Mam, Kaqchikel, Q’eqchi’, Poqomchi’ and Q’anjobal. 
In turn, Spanish monoglots who identify as Ladino feature regional accents, 
inflections and lexical variations.
The material featured in the thesis was gathered for the most part in Spanish. This 
includes interviews and conversations with polyglots whose first language was not 
Spanish. Being already proficient in Guatemalan Spanish, while in Peten I learnt 
Q’eqchi’ using available textbooks and dictionaries (Eachus and Carlson 1980, 
Proyecto Linguistico Francisco Marroquin 1999, Stewart 1980). Whilst I was never 
fluent in the language, I experimented with gathering material in Q’eqchi’ and briefly 
collaborated with Q’eqchi’ speakers for translation of selected texts. Due to ethical 
questions, I resolved to discontinue collaboration with translators, although the 
experiment was useful in terms of language training. Material on Q’eqchi’ culture and
8 The Academia de Lenguas Mayas was founded by Maya writers and intellectuals with the aim to 
record, preserve and foster Mayan Indigenous languages in Guatemala.
9 The Mayan linguist groups are K’iche’, Mam, Kaqchikel, Q’eqchi’, Poqomchi’, Q’anjobal, Tz’utujil, 
Ixil, Poqomam, Chuj, Popti’, Ch’orti’, Achi’, Sakapulteko, Akateko, Awakateko, Uspanteko, Mopan, 
Tektiteko, Itzaj (Tzian 1994 cited in CEH 1999, footnote 5, Appendix 9, Chapter 1).
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practices featured in Chapter One and Chapter Two was gathered mostly in Spanish, 
whilst translation for sections in Q’eqchi’ was produced on the day of the 
conversations and in collaboration with the interviewees.
For Q’eqchi’ words, I follow the orthographic rules endorsed by the Academia de Las 
Lenguas Mayas. Where authors do otherwise, I retain their respective orthographic 
choices. Although this may appear confusing at times, I think it would be unwise to 
collapse histories of orthographic usage in favour of contemporary conventions. I 
believe it is important to retain a sense of changes in orthography over the years, as 
these are implicated in broader shifts in conceptualisation of the meanings attached to 
‘indigeneity’ in the country. Thus, insistence on contemporary conventions is part of 
ever more politicised expressions of indigeneity (CEH 1999, COPMAGUA 1995, 
Wilson 1995). The new orthography developed by the Academia de las Lenguas 
Mayas aims to provide an orthographic system common to all Mayan languages 
spoken in the country. It aims to reduce dependence from Spanish and is linked to 
efforts made by indigenous rights groups to include indigenous languages in school 
curricula, and to establish schools where learning occurs in indigenous languages as 
first languages, with Spanish as second language. Thus, where authors render the 
Academia de las Lenguas Mayas-endorsed orthography of Q ’eqchi ’ (cf. Siebers 1999, 
Wilson 1995) as Kekchi or K'ekchi, be it in works published prior to (Adams 1965) or 
following the establishment of the new standard orthography (Schwartz 1990, Pedroni 
1990, Ruiz Puga 1994) differences are maintained. Names of geographical localities 
have not yet been standardised in accordance with the new orthography, so they are 
given in the old orthography; as they appear on maps; and as they are in current usage.
On occasions, conversations that were held in Spanish between myself and subjects 
whose first language was an indigenous language featured peculiar syntactic 
structures. Rather than considering the syntax of sentences in Spanish unsteady or 
inexact, I strive to reproduce the shifts in syntax in my English translations. In-depth 
analysis of these exchanges might reveal speakers’ reliance on distinctive Mayan 
syntactical structures. While linguistic analysis falls beyond the scope of the present 
study, I nevertheless strive to reproduce the distinctive expressive styles of individual 
speakers, with their peculiar syntax as well as lexicon. Spanish lexicon is also variable 
in a multicultural and multilingual region such as Peten. This is the case not only
27
among Mayan language polyglots, but also among Spanish monoglots who come 
from different regions of the country. I strive to give a sense of such variations in my 
English translation. Further, I indicate Q’eqchi’ or Spanish terms in brackets where I 
feel there are subtleties of tone, reference or inflection that may be lost in translation.
Individuals with different biographies, but with a history of militancy in the Fuerzas 
Armadas Rebeldes, shared a common lexicon. I have chosen not to translate some of 
these expressions. For instance, Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes combatants, militants and 
sympathisers referred to each other as compafieros, and companeras for the feminine 
inflection. Similarly, when ex-guerrilleros/as referred to their experiences of 
clandestine life, they often said they were en la montafia. This expression 
complements and exceeds the meaning of being en la selva, that is, in the forest. It 
stands for clandestine life in the guerrilla in general, with all the phenomenological 
specificities of the case. I consider these terms and idioms so imbued with the shared 
experiences of struggle to be untranslatable. I hope the thesis as a whole may give a 
sense of what it may have meant to be a companera and to live a clandestine life en la 
montafia.
In the thesis I have referred to English translations of texts which were not originally 
written in English, where translations were available. This is the case for works by 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Vattimo. Where translations were not available, as 
for early seminal texts by Vattimo (1983), I have provided my own translation. Some 
Heideggerian terminology is given in German, e.g. Verwindung, with explanation 
noted.
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Chapter 1 
The Problem of Context
They make slaughter and they call it peace.
(Tacitus, in Hardt and Negri, Empire, 2000:3)
Metaphysics has constituted an exemplary system of defence against the threat of writing. 
What links writing to violence? What must violence be in order for something in it to be 
equivalent to the operation of the trace?
(Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1974:101)
1.1 Introduction
The chapter explores social, cultural and historical trajectories that are implicated in 
the contexts of the present research.1 In my proposed route through the literature, I 
wish to consider how the discipline of anthropology has produced and imagined the 
Guatemalan context historically. Anthropology, as a tradition of social and cultural 
enquiry that developed in the late 19th century and early 20th century, is 
epistemologically grounded in the contextualisation of knowledge (Strathem 1995a, 
1995b). Anthropologists have provided interpretations of local cultures through 
contextualisation. In turn, disciplinary hermeneutic efforts have become context- 
dependent (Dilley 1999:1-2), to the extent that a strictly a-contextual anthropology 
now appears improbable (Moore 2004). Analytical strategies of contextualisation are 
inextricably tied to systems of representation. In representation, ‘context’ is produced 
as an object of scrutiny (Strathem 1987:276, 1995:160, Dilley 1999:3, 2002), at the 
centre of the anthropological gaze.
Anthropological context-making practices can be considered in relation to other key 
concept-metaphors (Moore 2004). ‘Culture’, for instance, may be amenable to
1 The analysis provided in this chapter is greatly indebted to D illey’s (1999) work on the problem of
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multiple genealogies (cf. Knauft 1996, Kuper 1999). Historically it has been premised 
on contextualisation understood through cultures imagined as local, integrated and 
coherent wholes (Dilley 1999:3, cf. Moore 1999). Through a multiple and multiplier 
effect, contextualisation has highlighted the local quality of Western presuppositions 
and produced, in this relational dimension, knowledge of, and about, ethnocentrism 
(Strathem 1987, 1995b, Dilley 1999).2 Dilley argues that ‘[e]ver since Malinowski, 
anthropologists have chanted the mantra of “placing social and cultural phenomena in 
context”, an analytical strategy adopted to throw light on [...] and make some sort of 
authentic sense of, ethnographic material’ (1999:1). Despite its relational dimensions, 
context-making as process and practice has been assumed to be a transparent and 
unproblematic source of authenticity -  of phenomena and/or interpretations. 
Assumptions about the ‘positivity’ of context (Fabian 1999) and the transparent 
quality of ‘culture’ have been the subject of critical scmtiny in recent years, through 
critiques of anthropological representational practices (Clifford 1988, Clifford and 
Marcus 1986), and analyses informed by post-colonial theory (cf. Asad 1973, Huggan 
1994, Prakash 1992, 1994). Both fields link the operations of anthropology to those of 
power. Nevertheless, the exercise is by no means exhausted. Neither is it exhaustible, 
when one considers that context- and culture-making have not been the exclusive 
prerogatives of anthropologists (Strathem 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). Rather, ‘context’ 
and ‘culture’, whether allied or discrete, are items of knowledge generated locally, 
with or without anthropologists’ presence (Strathen ibid). Insofar as this applies to 
local uses of those ‘contexts’ and ‘cultures’ produced by anthropology, ‘[t]he uses to 
which anthropological knowledge can be put are, as always, already recontextualised’ 
(Strathem 1995b:3, cf. Jaarsma and Rohatynskyj 2000). This adds a further dimension 
to local context- and culture-making, one in which anthropology becomes entangled 
in complex ways. When viewed in this light, the field of anthropology expands to 
include discourses that may once have been its own, but are now, or indeed have 
always been, locally produced, reproduced and consumed by multiple subjects and in 
multiple contexts. Such local appropriations of anthropological knowledge
context in anthropology.
2 ‘Native knowledge was conventionally contextualised in terms o f integrated local cultures, and 
anthropological knowledge was set against the background o f western ethnocentrism and the 
Malinowskian-inspired vision of the ‘detection o f civilisation under savagery’ (Strathem 1987:256)’ 
(Dilley 1999:3). I take up this point in Chapter 3 in my discussion o f the presuppositions inherent in 
anthropological theorising. For now, it may: suffice to note that Geertz (2000) has acutely argued that 
the ‘discovery’ o f ethnocentrism in not rightfully anthropology’s own.
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prospectively ‘out-contextualise the anthropologist’ (Strathem 1995b: 11).
This chapter investigates the anthropological analytical and representational frames 
that have produced the ‘context’ of Guatemala. Anthropological analyses of 
Guatemala are shown to have been important sites of articulation of debates over the 
status of indigeneity, and to have provided frames for contextualisation of 
contemporary local and national configurations. Thus, analysis of the place accorded 
to ethnicity in anthropological literature is set against those ethnographic fragments 
which profoundly unsettle the historical link between ethnicity, settlement and place. 
The critique of nativism is accompanied by a reflection on context-making practices 
that bring tropes of violence and conflict into focus. I follow ‘violence’ and ‘conflict’ 
and their intersections with ethnicity in general and indigeneity in particular. I do this 
to consider how they may be made to connect or slip disjointedly from foreground to 
the background, in different times and political climates.
I strive to make the contexts of multiple conflicts emerge in a ‘spirit of calm violence’ 
(Bhabha 1995), to reflect on the complex ways in which ‘violence’ may mark the 
subject/object of enquiry in the realm of experience and representation. I am aware 
that neither the routes I trace through the literature, nor the deployments I make of 
ethnographic fragments, are innocent. Routes at once contextualise and out- 
contextualise my position vis-a-vis the ‘subjects’/ ’objects’ of inquiry, namely 
‘anthropology’, ‘Guatemala’, ‘conflict’, and progressively, ‘Peten’ and 7a guerrilla’. 
Awareness of paths that may have been traced before (cf. Hervik 2001, Fischer 1999, 
Smith 1990, Watanabe 1995, Wilson 1995a), and, excessively, the potentially infinite 
paths that may be suggested, is tied to an afterthought. It may be the experience of 
fieldwork that produces the readings proposed here, as I reveal investments in 
revisiting and reinventing the anthropology of Guatemala that I and others in the field 
consumed, to renew the relevance of tropes old and new. Thus, whilst ethnographic 
exchanges emerge as moments of re-contextualisation of anthropological accounts, 
the experiences of fieldwork locate me vis-a-vis the literature, to point to the multiple 
out-contextualisations produced in, and through, me in the thesis.
1.2 Eschatology, Empire, Abjection
The history of Guatemala seems entangled in the histories of empires in (dis-)orderly
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ways. The Spanish Conquest in the 16th century inaugurated a long period of colonial 
domination that came to an end in the late 19th century. Following independence from 
Spain in 1821 and incorporation into the Mexican Empire the following year, 
Guatemala declared independence again, this time from Mexico, in 1824 and took up 
membership of the United Provinces of Central America (1823-1840). With the 
demise of the federation of Central American states, a series of liberal political 
reforms and laissez-faire economic policies assisted the re-colonisation of large areas 
of the country. German entrepreneurs invested in the lucrative coffee exports business 
in the western highlands3, while United States capital took control of the lowlands on 
the Pacific Ocean to the south, and on the Caribbean Sea to the east. A largely United 
States-sponsored genocide waged by the Guatemalan State against the civilian and 
insurgent populations characterized the second half of the 20th century. The conflict, 
or La Violencia4, officially came to an end in December 1996, when the Guatemalan 
government and the guerrilla umbrella organisation Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (URNG) signed the Guatemalan Peace Accords. In post-Peace Accords 
times, the multiple guises of empire are most immediately embodied in conditional 
foreign aid and unrestrained economic liberalisation. The histories and destinies of 
most Guatemalans appear to have been and largely continue to be over-determined.
Cumulative imperial agency seems to have defied the optimism of successive 
periodisations most apparent in local and national narratives of progress, modernity 
and from the early 1960s to the mid 1990s, of revolution. In fact, the hopes invested 
in what appeared to be important dents into imperial eschatology were punctually 
shattered. The decade between 1944 and 1954 presented real possibilities to invert 
imperial logic, as the governments of Juan Jose Arevalo and Colonel Jacobo Arbenz
3 See Grandin 2000, Wilson 1995.
4 Warren (1993:25) notes that lla violencia was a confrontation between military and guerrilla forces. 
From the military point o f view, it was a battle against communism, against an armed and dangerous 
menace within. Guerrilla terror needed to be met with counterterror. The counterinsurgency war began 
with the successful routing o f guerrilla forces in eastern Guatemala in the 1960s. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, during the regimes o f General Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) and General Rios Montt (1982- 
1983), the situation intensified as guerrilla groups mounted attacks on military installations, took over 
towns, and threatened major landowners in the western highlands. [...] From the guerrilla’s point of 
view, this was an armed struggle to challenge the legitimacy o f the state and the exploitation of 
Guatemalan peasants by wealthy landowners and export-oriented commercial elites. They recruited 
combatants from the countryside and sought support from peasant populations. In their terms, this was 
a war of liberation to resolve brutally conflicting class interests in a country with the lowest physical 
quality o f life index in Central America and the third lowest, after Haiti and Bolivia, in all o f Latin 
America’.
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encroached on United States interest in open defiance of the contemporary empire, or 
imperialismo yanqui (Yankee imperialism). Government-led expropriation and 
redistribution of land held by United States capital, in the form of the export- 
agriculture enterprise United Fruit Company (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982), came to 
symbolise the possibility of interrupting imperial workings. In June 1954, however, 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) designed and directed the overthrow of Jacobo 
Arbenz’s government, and gave imperial agency a Guatemalan face (cf. Cullather 
1999). Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas nominally headed the invasion of the country 
and dutifully executed orders issued directly by United States President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. Castillo Armas’ proximity to empire, however, swiftly led to his own 
personal demise. Discontented army officers murdered him and consigned the country 
to over three decades of conflicto armado interno, or armed ‘internal’ conflict.
Periodically, extractive imperial agency has resurfaced to lay claims to land and 
labour, connote the present in spatial tropes of inclusion and exclusion, and qualify 
the violence in terms of intemality. The genealogical character of empire has 
prosthetically bolstered the agency of Guatemalan oligarchies as well as the 
insurrections and insurgencies of abject Guatemalans. Wedges in the narrative of 
apparent historical determinism, the insurgents of the second part of the twentieth 
century rose, seemingly from ‘within’, to defy empire and
‘ tomar el poder e instaurar un Gobierno Revolucionario, Patriotico, Popular, y  Democratico 
que termine para siempre con la explotacion, la opresion, la discriminacion, la represion y la 
dependencia del extranjero’,
that is, ‘seize power and establish a Revolutionary, Patriotic, Popular and Democratic 
Government that may put an end once and for all to exploitation, oppression, 
discrimination, repression and dependency’ (FAR 1988:4, my translation). As many 
of the insurgents pointed out in the ethnographic present and with ethnographic 
hindsight, their actions and reactions were incited by the unswerving, relentless and 
unyielding agency of empire. Whether the agency of these genealogical subjects 
resided within or without was a question -  in the ethnographic present -  that directly 
engaged those who participated in the insurgency. Where the boundaries of
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insurgency and counterinsurgency actually lay is no less relevant to, albeit less 
explicitly, narratives of insurgency. Further, whether abject insurgency occupied a 
place within or outside the project of the nation is a question that still haunts the 
narratives of repression. There has never been any shortage of enemigos internos, or 
‘enemies within’, in Guatemala.5
Social, cultural and historical processes through which dyads such as internal/external 
have been created, boundaries drawn and subjects constituted, deserve further 
attention. The theory of abjection elaborated by Julia Kristeva (1982) is pertinent. In 
Kristeva’s formulation, the ‘abject’ is a subject constituted through specific processes 
of expulsion and exclusion. Specifically, it is through disavowal and repudiation of 
elements of the self that the Other is constituted. In ‘Neither Subject Nor Object’, 
Kristeva writes:
‘[a]long with sight-clouding dizziness, nausea makes me baulk at that milk cream, separates 
me from the mother and father who proffer it. “I” want none of that element, sign of their 
desire, “I” do not want to listen, “I” do not assimilate it, “I” expel it. But since the food is not 
an “other” for “me”, who am only in their desire, I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject 
myself within the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself’ (Kristeva 1982 
cited in Butler 1990:133).
Discourses concerning the sustained temporality of exploitation, the continuity of 
imperial domination and the enduring relevance of imperial eschatology are master 
narratives of abjection that may broadly apply to the history of the country as a whole. 
However, the specificities of systemic control, recurrent imperialist ingerencia 
(interference) and, most importantly, of local discourses, representations, responses 
and resistances have progressively been disentangled from the hegemonic histories of 
nation and empire. 6 What is at stake are multiple and complex articulations of
5 The notion o f the ‘enemy within’ rose to prominence in the context o f the Doctrine o f National 
Security devised by the United States government and implemented in Guatemala in the 1950s (cf. 
Landau 1988, CEH 1999).
6 Of the large body o f relevant work, I would single out research carried in Alta Verapaz (Wilson 
1995), Quetzaltenango (Grandin 2000), Santiago Atitlan (Carlsen 1997), Solola (Green 1999, 2002). 
Lovell (1992) and Taracena Arriola (2002) have cogently addressed these questions with reference to
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abjection in the Guatemalan context, and the historically specific plurality of forms of 
‘identity-differentiation’ (Butler 1990:134) thus engendered. At the heart of these 
efforts are signifiers of ethnicity and, more specifically, of indigeneity. Anthropology 
is and has been in complex ways constitutive of and constituted by the multiple 
systems of representations through which ‘identity differentiation’ and its (ethnicised) 
abjects have come into being in Guatemala.
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1.3 Mestizaje, Blanqueamiento y  Ladinizacion
Projects of creation, normalisation and disciplining of difference have a long history 
in the country. Historiographic research points to the complex processes of 
construction of ethnicity and ‘race’ in Guatemala, thus unsettling the presentist bias 
inherent in some anthropological accounts and complicating some of the assumptions 
on which Pan-Mayan cultural/political activism is predicated. In Guatemala, as in 
Latin America more broadly, the post-colonial project of the nation was from its very 
inception implicated in the ideology of mestizaje, that is an apparently benevolent 
utopian vision of a ‘mix’ of ethnic and racialised differences envisaged to deliver 
fusion and unity in shared sameness. As pointed out by Rowe and Shelling (1991:18, 
cited in Radcliffe and Westwood 1993:14),
‘mestizaje, a word denoting racial mixture, assumes a synthesis of cultures where none is 
eradicated. The difficulty with the idea of mestizaje is that, without an analysis of power 
structures, it becomes an ideology of racial harmony which obscures the actual holding of 
power by a particular group’.
Thus, the colonial systems of social, cultural and racial differentiation, and related 
unequal power relations on which the historical process of mestizaje came to be 
articulated, clearly require careful unravelling. Furthermore, discourses that presented 
mestizaje as coterminous with a project of de-racialisation of ethnic difference
the Western regions of the country, while research by Dary (2003), Dary, Elias and Reyna (1998) and 
Pinto Soria (1993) are concerned with the Eastern regions.
7 Ideologies o f mestizaje, blanqueamiento and ladinoisation in Guatemala are explored below. 
Different national histories o f mestizaje and banqueamiento in Latin America have also been cogently 
analysed, see for instance Wade (1993, 1997, chapter 1) on Colombia and Kingman Garces (2002) on 
Ecuador. Stepan (1991) focuses on nationalism and the eugenic movement in Argentina, Mexico and 
Brazil. Radcliffe and Westwood (1996) consider the intersections between discourses of mestizaje,
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(Nelson 1999, chapter 6) and a levelling of inequality should be subjected to scrutiny. 
This is particularly important in Guatemala, where, as Taracena Arriola (2000) has 
poignantly argued, historiographic and genealogical research on colonial and post­
colonial ideologies of ‘mixing’ increasingly aims to clarify how exactly mestizaje 
may have produced the notion of iladino\ In contemporary usage, ‘ladino’ has come 
to stand as a synonym of ‘mestizo’, or ‘mixed’, and as a term that finds its Other in 
the category indigena, or ‘indigenous’ (Dary 1994). It is therefore important to 
explore the historical routes through which contemporary binary understanding of 
ethnic difference -  most obviously expressed in the ladino/indigena dyad -  may have 
been produced (cf. Morales 2000, Schackt 2000, 2002). The task also entails an 
analysis of the processes through which ladinos have emerged as historical subjects 
and agents, and ladinizacion (ladinoisation) may have been presented as the paradigm 
of the Guatemalan nation in the twentieth century (Taracena Arriola 2000).
During the colonial period a strict racialised system of ethnic differentiation was 
established. In the groundbreaking and extremely influential book La Patria del 
Criollo (1970), historian Severo Martinez Pelaez argued that ethnic and racial 
relations in Guatemala were grounded in the creation and subsequent recognition of 
three groups, namely Spaniards (espanoles), indigenous (indigenas) and blacks 
(negros). Three further categories were soon fashioned and considered to arise from 
the ones noted above. Mestizo corresponded to the product of Spaniard and 
indigenous mixing. Mulato identified those of black and Spanish ancestry, while 
zambo marked those of black and indigenous descent. In point of fact, the 
establishment of colonial racialised taxonomies failed to order, discipline and 
maintain sameness, inciting instead the production of ever more intricate 
representational orders of difference. Mestizaje, envisaged in the first place a 
seemingly uncomplicated process of multiplication of mestizos through the ‘union’ 
of Spaniards and indigenous populations, failed to deliver unmarked and 
undifferentiated singularity, belying instead increasing racialised, cultural, social and 
political diversity and complexity. Such was the complication and ever-widening 
differentiation inherent in mestizaje and specifically in the cross-articulation of
blanqueamiento and gender in Latin American contexts.
8 The gender implications of the colonial and post-colonial projects o f mestizaje have been cogently 
unraveled by Nelson (1999, Chapter 6).
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espanol, indigena, negro, mestizo, mulato and zambo, that the colonial administration 
resorted to the demarcation of castas. Spaniard and indigenous population were thus 
marked off from the newly fashioned categories of pardo and/or ladino. These castas 
referred to generalised racialised groups aimed at accommodating the proliferation of 
racialised difference spurred by foundational colonial racial orderings (Martinez 
Pelaez 1970). Intended to be conveniently set against the populations marked as
• 0  tViSpaniard and indigenous , in the 18 century, ladino and pardo still retained marks of 
earlier racialised distinction, the former referring to those with acknowledged 
Spaniard ancestry and the latter marking off those considered to be of black descent. 
However, masking cultural and social complexities, the 
Spaniard/ladino/pardo/indigenous distinctions worked towards the erasure of ethnic 
and cultural differences among all groups, and notably among ladinos. Differentiation 
among ladinos increasingly distinguished between rural and urban populations, that 
is, between ladinos rurales (rural ladinos) and capas medias urbanas (Martinez 
Pelaez 1970). At the heart of any casta demarcation was nevertheless an ingrained 
and virulent racialisation. In 1820, facing increasing lax attitudes to the application of 
casta taxonomies, a document concerning the constitutional electoral system set out 
to clarify the distinctions in the following terms:
‘W hite (bianco) with indio produces mestizo, and i f  the latter reproduces with white, castizo 
results, w ho i f  united with white will have offspring who may already pass as white. A white 
wom an ([blanca) with a black man {negro) produces mulato, and black and indio gives zambo. 
These are the qualified and commonly recognised races {razas) o f  the country.... Subsequent 
m ixes {mezclas) o f  m ixed persons {personas mixtas) are unending {inacabables) and 
unnamed {innominadas), but generally speaking all persons w ho are not pure Indians {indios 
puros) are named people o f  reason {gente de razon) o ladinos and whites are named 
Spaniards {espanoles)’ .10
9 Taracena Arriola (2002, see also 2000) highlights the fact that the creation o f castas by the colonial 
administration engendered a considerable juridical problem for the colonial administration. The 
colonial project was predicated on the motto ‘Two Spains in America, a Republic of Spaniards and a 
Republic o f Indios ’. It was therefore unclear what juridical space should apply to the new fashioned 
liminal categories o f ladino and pardo.
10 Diputacion Provincial de Nicaragua y  Costa Rica al Ministerio de Gobernacion de Ultramaar, 
sobre la dificultad de applicar el sistema electoral constitucional en un medio dividido en 22 castas, 22
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The taxonomic order is predicated on practices of ‘recognition’, which in turn open 
up the possibility of misrecognition and ‘passing’.11 Passing refers broadly to 
practices, techniques or conditions of the self, identity, and/or subjectivity that are 
attributed to subjects who transverse social identifications to purposely adopt or 
inadvertently be assigned identities other than those conferred to them by socially 
enforced categorisations (Posocco 2004:152). While passing may apply to any social 
taxonomy and dimension of difference, it may be useful to recall that it is a term 
intimately linked to raciological orders and anxieties surrounding ‘whiteness’. 
Theorisations of social practices related to passing arise in the context of analyses of 
United States slave narratives, and Harlem Renaissance literature (cf. Gates 1987). In 
the texts in question, African-American subjects who pass as white are said to expose 
the processes though which blackness and whiteness are socially fabricated. Further, 
as transgression of racialised social orderings often enables progression across 
hierarchies of gender, sexuality and class, the intimate relation between negotiations 
of social taxonomies and access to power and privilege is also exposed (Ahmed 1999, 
Posocco 2004). Processes of fabrication of whiteness, blackness, indigeneity and their 
‘unending’ and ‘unnamed’ permutations are clearly marked out in the passage above. 
Whilst the possibility of upward mobility is less explicitly articulated, the 
demarcation of ‘people of reason’ on the one hand, and ‘pure indigenous’ on the other 
hand suggests that a certain plasticity may apply to the realm of the former, and less 
so if at all to the latter.
Taxonomic plasticity and mobility aside, it is important to note that ‘passing’ is 
nevertheless dependent upon normative claims to authenticity, and ostracism, 
repudiation or violence may befall those deemed at any stage to be ‘inauthentic’ 
(Ahmed 1999, Butler 1993, Posocco 2004). As argued by Butler (1993), whether 
passing entails any voluntarism on the part of subjects engaged in purposeful 
manipulations of social identities is open to question, as any transgression and 
subversion occur within a highly regulatory and normative terrain (cf. Butler 1993, 
Posocco ibid). The latter position is endorsed by Ahmed (1999:101), who notes that
de noviembre de 1820, cited in Taracena Arriola (2002:4, my emphasis).
11 Practices associated with ‘passing’ are discussed further in Chapter 5, and specifically with reference 
to the distinction between the guerrilla and the Army.
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passing is consistently predicated upon -  and enabled by -  assumptions concerning 
the readability of the body and the visibility of identity. It is the existence of socially, 
historically and culturally specific scopic regimes and related social taxonomies that 
creates the conditions of possibility for passing to occur. For subjects to ‘pass’, there 
has to be a presumption of ontologies of the subject and of difference grounded in 
essentialism. When understood in these terms, rather than as the mimetic ability of the 
subject to adopt identities of choice, passing appears as a technique that is ‘exclusive 
and exclusionary’ (Ahmed 2002:108), in that some subjects may not be able to pass 
(ibid 101), and identities may be predicated on grounds other than visibility.
With the benefit of attributed ‘reason’ in post-independence times, and throughout the 
19th century, ladino constituencies rose to prominence in economic, political and 
social arenas. Benefiting from increased access to land and trade, local ladino elites 
negotiated access to political space with the criollo population of Guatemala City. In 
uneasy alliance with those whose power and influence was predicated on claims of 
direct Spaniard ancestry, namely the urban criollos, ladinos were increasingly defined 
in the negative as ‘non-indigenous’ (Taracena Arriola 2000).
The complex liminal position of ladinos was also expressed in the racialised terms 
that continued to mark inter-ethnic relations in Guatemala. As argued by Casaus Arzu 
(1995), urban criollos actively participated in establishment of a pigmentocracy that 
would seek to ‘preserve’ and ‘foster’ whitening. As documented historically and 
ethnographically (Casaus Arzu, ibid), criollo families actively sought to ‘preserve’ 
whitening through endogamous practices that foreclosed unions with ladino families. 
They vigorously sought to ‘foster’ whitening through endogamous marriage practices, 
and exogamy aimed at incorporating German families into the lineage. Foreignness 
thus increasingly appeared as the quintessential repository of whiteness (Casaus Arzu 
1995, Nelson 1999, Taracena Arriola 2000), and criollos were marked as whiteness 
bearers and producers. Ladinos, excluded from whitening practices, relied on their 
non-indigenousness to stake their claims to power and influence. According to Casaus 
Arzu (1995), the project of mestizaje (mixing) was therefore undermined by the 
contemporary criollo project of blanqueamiento (whitening). In the 19th century, any 
project of mestizaje if there was ever one in Guatemala, was truly defunct. The 
nation-state never really undertook a project of homogenisation of difference, but
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instead actively pursued the whitening of criollos, and the separate and distinct 
whitening of ladinos, who may aspire to mould themselves in the image of the criollo 
elite, while always failing complete mimesis (Casaus Arzu 1995). As cogently argued 
by Taracena Arriola (2000), ladino identity seems therefore never to have been 
directly predicated on criollo whiteness, but rather, on a sense of hispanicised 
character, civilised conduct, and most importantly, on an inherent opposition to 
indigenous primitivism. The process of ladinoisation was therefore also summarily 
contradictory, and always haunted by ladinos’ Other, i.e. the indigenous. In the last 
instance, the various political, economic and social projects pursued by the 
Guatemalan nation-state in different historical periods were consistently implicated in 
the creation, maintenance and reinvention of difference, and never pursued 
homogenisation. These genealogies of the ladino!indigena dyad inform the 
Guatemalan imaginaries of ethnic difference, and anthropological accounts alike. 
They provide the conditions of possibility for the spatialisation of that element which 
is not ladino. As apparent in the map below, what is increasingly marked out in 
contemporary Guatemala is indigeneity, in all its riveting diversity. The map of 
indigeneity is also a representation of the ambivalence inherent in ladino identity, as it 
is unclear whether it is its hegemonic character that makes it transparent, or whether it 
may be so ephemeral as to require its Other to be visibly marked in order to gain 
coherence and intelligibility.
See Map 2, page 296.
1.4 Ethnicity as Telos
Presence and absence, appearances and disappearances, and process of ‘identity 
differentiation’ depend on systems of representation through which indigeneity has 
been articulated in Guatemala. In contemporary Guatemala, the Pan-Mayan 
movement argues that the population of the country comprises four peoples whose 
histories and cultures are viewed as distinct, albeit intertwined (COPMAGUA 1995). 
The Pueblo Maya, estimated to amount to 60% of the population, is said to share a 
common ancestry in the Ancient Maya civilisation that inhabited the whole of 
Guatemala, the southern part of Mexico, eastern Belize, eastern Honduras and 
northern El Salvador in pre-Columbian times. The Maya linguistic groups currently 
present in Guatemala are all viewed as part of the Pueblo Maya, namely K’iche’,
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Kaqchikel, Tz’utujil, Sakapulteko, Sipakapense, Uspanteko, Q’eqchi’, Poqomam, 
Poqomchi’, Mam, Tekiteko, Awateko, Ixil, Q’anjob’al, Akateko, Popti’ (Jakalteco), 
Chuj, Ch’orti’, Itzaj, Mopan (COPMAGUA 1995, Cholsamaj Press quoted in Nelson 
1999). The Pueblo Ladino, approximately 39% of Guatemalans, is commonly 
identified as comprising the ‘hispanicised’ section of the population, who may more 
or less vocally acknowledge a direct Hispanic ancestry (COPMAGUA 1995, Dary
1994). Recent translations of Ladino as ‘white’ (Warren 1993:51, note 4) imply a 
reference to the hegemonic status of Ladino identity in the national context vis-a-vis 
Maya communities constmed as marginalised minorities. While emphasising the 
asymmetry inherent to Maya/Ladino ethnic relations and highlighting the fact that the 
ruling economic and political oligarchy may or may not identify as Ladino, this 
definition obscures the realities of exploitation, poverty and political 
disenfranchisement faced by many rural and urban Ladinos. The Pueblo Garifuna is 
said to amount to about 1 % of the population residing in the western department of 
Izabal, in the areas Livingstone and Puerto Barrios. Their presence can be traced back 
to the Garifuna migration from the Caribbean Island of San Vincente and later to 
Guatemala in the late XVIII century. Culturally, they regard themselves as 
encompassing Arawak, Caribe and African traits (COPMAGUA 1995). Lastly, the 
Pueblo Xinka, reported as being in danger of extinction (Cholsamaj Press cited in 
Nelson 1999), is said to have an unclear history yet to be unravelled.
In the context of contemporary multicultural and multilingual Guatemala, indigeneity, 
by virtue of its very existence, is often marked as oppositional (Warren 1998). After 
all, indigenous ethnicities are said to have withstood Conquests, national ideologies of 
mestizaje, blanqueamiento and ladinizacion (mixing, whitening and ladinisation), the 
genocide of La Violencia (CEH 1999) and multiple social, economic and political 
inequities. Tropes of indigeneity and survival are prominently interlocked in 
contemporary articulations of Pan-Maya identities and politics (Fischer and McKenna 
Brown 1996, Warren 1998). Since the early 1990s, and most notably in post-Peace 
Accords times, the movimiento Maya has testified to the increasingly visible Pan- 
Mayan activism and mass political mobilisation. Through disciplinary propensity for 
all indigeneity however marked, anthropology has made important contributions to
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definitions of the status of indigeneity.12 Engaging with colonial, post-colonial and 
neo-imperialist dynamics, the discipline has produced a multiplicity of accounts that 
are intimately implicated in the delineation of teleologies of ethnicity. 
Interconnections between a multiplicity of unilinear teleological forms of historical 
discourse (Vattimo 1992), in which history is prefigured as a process of purposeful 
development towards a final end, call for critical analysis.
1.5 A ‘Special Relation’: The Chicago School and the Instituto Indigenista 
Nacional
In the aftermath of the 1944 revolution, the Guatemalan Government of Juan Jose 
Arevalo established the Instituto Indigenista Nacional.
‘By means of the accord dated 29 August 1945, the Instituto Indigenista Nacional was 
founded in Guatemala City, with the objective of investigating and studying the very 
important problem of the indigenous {problema del indigena), with the aim to find, in 
collaboration with other institutions of the State, solutions to the different aspects of the 
problem’ (Instituto Indigenista Nacional 1945:9, my translation).
Two years after its creation, the Instituto Indigenista amended its constitution and 
expanded its mandate. In 1946 a comprehensive and empirically based study of the 
Distribution o f the Contemporary Indigenous Languages in Guatemala was 
published, authored by the Instituto’s president Antonio Goubaud Carrera (Goubaud 
Carrera 1946). Goubaud Carrera trained in anthropology at the University of Chicago 
(Gillin 1952). He graduated in 1943, and is held to be the ‘first professionally trained 
Guatemalan anthropologist’ (Gillin 1952; Mendez-Dominguez 1975). In the 
introduction to the work, and in accordance with the aims of the Institute, Goubaud 
Carrera noted the usefulness of a study focussing on ‘the geographical distribution of 
languages as they appear located today in the different regions of the country’
12 For instance, see Adams, R. N. (1956a, 1956b, 1970, 1995), Annis (1987), Beal et al (1943), 
Brintnall (1979a, 1979b) Colby and van den Berghe (1969), Fischer (2003), Green (1999, 2002), Hale, 
C.R. (2002), Hendrickson (1995), Nelson (1999), Pitt-Rivers (1969), Redfield (1939, 1956, 1957), 
Reina (1966, 1967a, 19967b) Schackt (1986), Smith (1990), Stoll (1993, 1997) Tax (1937, 1942, 1947, 
1949, [1953] 1963, 1964), Tumin (1952), Van den Berghe (1968), Warren (1978) Watanabe (1990,
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(1946:5, my translation). As with the ethos of the Instituto more broadly, the
emphasis in Goubaud Carrera’s study was both empirical and taxonomic. In point of
fact, research at the Instituto was attuned to research strategies at Chicago
University’s Anthropology Department. The ‘special relation’ (Mendez-Dominguez
1975:541) that existed between the Chicago School and the Instituto Indigenista
Nacional was largely based on research collaborations between Sol Tax, his
Guatemalan research assistant and later researcher Juan de Dios Rosales (cf. Rosales
1959), and Antonio Goubaud Carrera, (cf. Goubaud Carrera, Rosales and Tax 1944).
Rosales, as well as Goubaud, had trained at Chicago (Mendez-Dominguez 1975). The
collaboration between Sol Tax and the Guatemalan scholars of the Instituto
1 ^  •Indigenista Nacional produced important ethnographic works that were to constitute 
the basis for future (re-)configurations of the ethnographic record.
According to Mendez-Dominguez (1975), Sol Tax exerted great influence over his 
colleagues and was instrumental in setting the direction and emphasis of the 
anthropology of Guatemala produced by North American and Guatemalan 
ethnographers. A pioneer of anthropological research in the country, Tax influenced 
the analytical and empirical frame of contemporary anthropological engagements as 
much as those to follow. Mendez-Dominguez (1974:542) points out that 
anthropologists looked to establish ‘(i) definition, delimitation and characterisation of 
the people under study; (ii) delimitation of social units; (iii) processes of change’ 
(Mendez-Dominguez 1975:542). Thus, it may be contended that the work of Tax and 
that of the Instituto Indigenista Nacional during the Arevalo and Arbenz 
administrations and beyond, were centred on the interrelated problematics of 
taxonomy, mapping and teleology of ethnicity in Guatemala.
A primary example of the process of forging a taxonomic order is the Distribution de 
las Lenguas Indigenas Actuates de Guatemala (Goubard Carrera 1946:12). With 
reference to the Q’eqchi’, for instance, the text marks the presence of Quekchi in Alta
1992, 1995a, 1995b, 2000,), Wilson (1 9 9 1 ,1993a,‘ 1993b, 1995, 1998), Zur (1998).
13 Of relevance here are the publications of the Instituto Indigenista Nacional from 1946 to the late 
1970s (1948a, 1948b, 1948c, 1949a, 1949b, 1979) as well as Adams (1952). The Instituto Indigenista 
Nacional issued a periodical, Guatemala Indigena and a Bulletin. The Seminario de Integracion Social 
Guatemalteca publications were also under the Instituto’s remit (Adams, R. N. 1956b, 1959, Britnell 
1958, Carmack 1979, Freyre 1959, Gillin 1958, Goubard Carrera 1964, McArthur and Ebel 1969, 
Mendelson 1965, Mendez Dominguez 1967, Paul 1959, Solorzano 1963, Stoll, O. 1958, Termer 1957,
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Verapaz and in Peten and Izabal. In Peten, Quekchi figures in San Luis and Sayaxche 
and it is interesting to note that these markers of ethnicity in the southern and western 
regions of the departamento will substantively disappear in later analyses (Schwartz 
1990). 14 As for Peten, Goubard Carrera also lists Lacandon in the area of San Jose, a 
category to be later transformed into Itza by Schwartz (1990) and Itzaj by the Maya 
Indigenous Movement (COPMAGUA 1995). The taxonomic order of the 
Distribucion de las Lenguas Indigenas Actuates de Guatemala did not exclusively 
produce linguistic/cultural categories of indigeneity. Crucially, it tied linguistic and 
related cultural taxonomic orders to place. This is obvious in the way the taxonomic 
order established a link between ethnic markers and municipios, or administrative 
centres. To a significant extent, this was an effect of Sol Tax’s preoccupation with 
‘social units’, and more specifically with the municipio as social unit (Tax 1937, 
1941,1942, 1951).15 Mendez-Dominguez summarises this point sharply:
‘An oversimplified statement of Tax’s views could take the following form: there are Indian 
populations that can be defined and understood in relation to other terms, such as municipio; 
they can' be delimited by self-identification and observable features; and they can be 
characterized by surface as well as covert aspects of culture. In this statement, social- 
relational aspects are seriously considered neither at the definitional level nor at the 
delimitational level, but only at the level of characterization (...) Goubaud Carrera ... set 
himself the task of finding characteristics that make a person Indian. He surveyed the criteria 
people of various communities used to classify them. Hence his conception is descriptive and 
necessarily based on surface features, but instead of using the third person’s (a 
nonparticipant’s) criteria or those of the first person (self-identification), he used those of the 
second person, the community. Goubaud’s work therefore holds up to criticism the notion that 
“Indian” exists as an entity in itself, objectively determinable, social-relationally free, and
Wagley 1957, Wisdom 1961).
14 By ‘substantive disappearance’ I mean that texts may mark Q’eqchi’ presence in maps, while 
simultaneously excluding them from the analysis (see Schwartz 1990). There is no record of work on 
Peten that considers Q’eqchi’ culture to be Petenero, or to pertain to the social and cultural life o f the 
departamento in however abject a position.
15 The ‘municipio as social unit’ is also amenable to further classification. In Tax’s work (1937) the 
key distinctions are between closed-corporate and open communities.
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potentially definable by a single synthetic structure of meaning. Rosales used to say that if 
you had a town without Indians, people would invent them’ (Mendez-Dominguez 1975:542, 
my emphasis).
See Map 1, page 295.
During the 1940s and 1950s, both Tax (1942, 1952) and his senior colleague Robert 
Redfield (1956) sought to provide cultural rather than racial understandings of 
ethnicity. They sought to identify a number of sociological categorisations by which 
ethnicity may be articulated in a specific locale (Smiths 1990:26, footnote 1), and so 
did their Guatemalan colleagues. ‘Big and little traditions’ in Guatemalan 
anthropology (Mendez-Dominguez 1975) produced taxonomic and teleological orders 
that were culturalist, constructionist and to some extent relational, but also invariably 
socio-structuralist and nativist. Furthermore, Wade (1997:43) points out that pluralism 
and harmony connoted Tax’s understanding of ethnic relations.
The products of the collaboration between Tax, Redfield, Goubaud and Rosales were 
to be extremely influential for future anthropologists and readers of anthropological 
texts. Conversely, the issue of influence of individual practitioners on intellectual 
genealogies and traditions remains a vexed one. Taxonomic orders and related 
anthropological imaginings were produced through complex personal and intellectual 
exchanges and collaborations. Sol Tax had received his doctorate from the University 
of Chicago under Radcliffe-Brown’s supervision (Rubinstein 1991, Sanjek 1994). He 
had then joined the Carnegie Institution’s Mayan Indians research project on which 
Robert Redfield also worked. At Chicago, Redfield had been a student of Radcliffe- 
Brown and Malinowski, who had taught in the anthropology department between 
1931 and 1937. Since then, Redfield had been very responsive to a Malinowskian 
approach to fieldwork, a direction which was strengthened by the relationships 
established during his research in Yucatan with his collaborator Villa Rojas.
‘Preferring “objective” observation and survey work, Tax felt comfortable questioning key 
informants, but Redfield repeatedly pushed him to settle in one location where he could
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improve his Quiche language skills and attend more to the pulse of ongoing interaction. This 
Malinowskian use of the unpaid informant (or actor) and focus on speech-in-action, Redfield 
reveals [in his letters], was one impressed upon him by his Mexican collaborator Alfonso 
Villa Rojas in their work in Yucatan, where Villa Rojas, but not Redfield, understood the 
local language. Villa Rojas, a schoolteacher when Redfield met him, had gone on to conduct 
fieldwork and write ethnography on his own, and he visited Tax in Guatemala in 1937. A 
similar trajectory for Antonio Goubaud Carerra [sic], a Guatemalan with some college 
education and an enthusiasm for anthropology, was urged on Redfield by Tax after meeting 
Goubaud in 1934’ (Sanjek 1994:930).
The genealogical line of early efforts in the anthropology of Guatemala bifurcated: 
one led back to Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, the other to Villa Rojas. As 
anthropologists carved out a space for the discipline in academic and government 
institutions,16 the labour of ‘identity differentiation’ stretched to their experiences of 
fieldwork. In epistolary exchanges with Redfield, Tax noted the remarkable hostility 
to North Americans he was encountering in Guatemala during his fieldwork 
(Rubinstein 1991), a reaction he attributed to the influx of tourists, landowners and to 
the unauthorised presence of a film crew shooting a Tarzan movie (Rubinstein 1991, 
Sanjek 1994:931). Thus, it seems that the cultural-typical and relational quality of 
identity was not just the ethnically marked Guatemalan subjects’, but also the 
anthropologists’.
1.6 O f Essences and Classes
During the 1960s and 1970s the anthropology of Guatemala was still preoccupied 
with the study of ethnicity, although analyses were increasingly focused on ethnicity 
understood as the product of group or class relations. Those influenced by the work of 
Frederick Barth (1969) dismissed ideas concerning the relevance of cultural traits and
16 For an account of the relatively untroubled careers o f Sol Tax and Robert Redfield in the 1940s and 
1950s, notably during McCarthyism, see Price (1998, 2004). The FBI held a file on Robert Redfield, 
but both Redfield and Tax continued to work in the years o f anti-Communist witch-hunts. Work at the 
Instituto Indigenista Nacional also continued during successive administrations and into the years of La 
Violencia (see footnote 4).
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resorted instead to an analytical focus on group boundaries. As pointed out by Wade 
(1997:60), Barth-inspired analyses rendered ethnicity situational. In this view, 
ethnicity was profoundly relational and not biologically nor culturally essentialist. In 
Guatemala, the work of Colby and van den Berghe (1969) in the Ixil-speaking area of 
the departamento of Quiche was influential in this respect.
Those undertaking Marxian-inspired analyses, on the other hand, stressed the mutual 
constitution of ethnic, class and colonial relations. Whilst social and economic change 
may determine a shift from colonial to class relations, ethnic distinctions endured 
across systems of exploitation and domination (Stavenhagen 1975). Smith (1990:4) 
added that racialisation should also be included in the analysis, insofar as local 
theories of heritage and descent had produced different systems of racialised 
hierarchy at different times (Smith 1990:4, cf. Casaus Arzu 1995, Nelson 1999), and 
may thus be mobilised in historically specific systems of inequality. Nevertheless, 
Marxian approaches did not conceive of class relations as being more salient than 
ethnic relations. Rather, an interest in inequality and exploitation brought to the 
attentions of anthropology two key institutions seen as the site of articulation of both 
ethnicity and class, namely the community and the state (Smith 1990:12). An interest 
in the community as a social unit was not new, having been pioneered by Tax and 
Redfield in the 1930s and 1940s, but the addition of the notion of class produced 
different forms of cultural and historical contextualisation.
‘(1) There was little or no “class” difference between Indians and ladinos until the plantation 
period [early plantation period 1870-1944]; only Indians were subject to tribute, but both 
Indians and ladinos were mostly self-employed, producing small surpluses for trade, rather 
than tenants on large estates [...]. (2) With the development of coffee plantations, many 
Indians were reduced to the position of a “semi” or seasonal proletariat, while ladinos became 
either tenant farmers in eastern Guatemala or a full-fledged proletariat on the plantations; 
while most urban production remained artisanal, most “managerial” or “middle” positions in 
production (both rural and urban) were monopolised by ladinos. (3) The coffee oligarchy, 
only some of whom existed as important families in the colonial period, was mostly “white” 
and “capitalist” (rather than seigniorial) in their economic intentions and means. (4) A major
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element in the maintenance of Indian cultural identity has been Indian resistance to full 
proletarianisation and to capitalist relations of production within the community. And (5) in 
this respect, Indians feel little class identity with ladinos’ (Smith 1990:25-6).
Interestingly, in this account ethnicity is viewed as salient in the colonial (1540-1800) 
and independence (1800-1870) periods, but class is not. During the plantation period 
(1870-1944), processes of production of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘class’ are understood to give 
rise to an indigenous semi-proletariat, a fully proletarian ladino constituency and a 
‘white’ oligarchy. Further, the permanence of indigenous identity is explained in 
terms of indigenous refusal to undergo the full proletarianisation that exclusive 
engagement in the plantation economy would entail. Indigeneity thus depends both on 
refusal, and on practices that -  by sustaining forms of community organisation other 
than those of capitalist relations of production -  ultimately stave off assimilation and 
ensure cultural survival. This may give a sense of Marxian-inspired anthropological 
contributions to an understanding of cultural dynamics understood as coterminous 
with ethnicity, vis-a-vis the dynamics of political economy viewed in terms of class 
relations. The common ground among different analyses actually rested on the 
production of anthropological knowledge as pre-eminently local, and the relevance of 
anthropological analytical constructs such as ethnicity and class in terms of 
historically specific and geographically delimited communities. Marxian 
anthropology of Guatemala (Smith et al 1990) was thus marked by an acute 
awareness of the local character of these processes and the problematic status of any 
generalisation.
‘Class relations in Guatemala have almost always been mediated by the state, rather than 
existing as stark relations between oppressed and oppressor. In addition, relations of 
exploitation have varied widely by region, and in each region class relations have been 
mediated by culture (ethnicity) and community in different ways’ (Smith 1990:26).
Boundary- and class-based orientations had rather different analytical implications. 
The former implied that social change would entail possible dissolution of indigeneity 
through processes of acculturation and ladinoisation, while the latter stressed the
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relation between the permanence of indigeneity and the perpetuation of systems of 
exploitation. An intermediate position between the content-free boundary approach 
and the Marxian focus on relations of production, underscored by the common theme 
of exploitation, is that of Guatemalan historian Martinez Pelaez, whose work I have 
already discussed. In his book La Patria del Criollo Martinez Pelaez (1970) 
contended that indigeneity was fully a product of the colonial encounter and thus 
fundamentally inauthentic in its post-colonial manifestations. La Patria del Criollo 
represents a foundational text for debates over the status of indigeneity in Guatemala, 
and for histories of insurgency. In the ethnographic present, Martinez’s text was the 
oft-cited basis for analyses of the ‘Indigenous Question’ and critiques of indigenista 
quarters. Critiques of Pan-Maya cultural activism viewed as overwhelmingly 
concerned with pressing state institutions to recognised matters of ‘cosmovision' 
(cosmovision, cosmology, worldview) set out in the ‘Agreement on Identity and 
Rights of Indigenous People’ (Peace Accords 1996), rather than focused on pursuing 
the claims outlined in the ‘Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and 
Agrarian Situation’ (Peace Accords 1996) and specifically on the land question, were 
underpinned by references to La Patria del Criollo. Whilst anthropological and 
historical texts were mobilised to bolster different positions along the political 
spectrum, local contextualisations of the analytical categories of ‘class’ and 
‘ethnicity’ troubled anthropological narratives concerning their status and relations.
1.7 Symbol, Discourse and Practice
From the 1980s to the 1990s, anthropological analyses developed critiques of 
essentialism alongside a number of more or less nuanced social constructionist 
positions. Anthropologists documented a complexity and multiplicity of local 
discourses and practices, striving to represent ethnographic subjects’ historical agency 
and responses to social change (Nelson 1999, Wilson 1995, Watanabe 1992). Whilst 
the shift from socio-structural and structural concerns to discourse, representation and 
practice was preceded by forays in symbolic anthropology (Warren 1978), important 
ethnographic community-based studies moved beyond essentialism and a-historicism. 
Watanabe’s (1992) ethnography of the Mam-speaking town of Santiago 
Chimaltenango, and Wilson’s work with Q’eqchi’ communities in Alta Verapaz 
(Wilson 1995) are cases in point.
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In his ethnography of Q’eqchi’ ethnic revivalism, Wilson (1995) adopted a radical 
social constructionist position when he gave an account of Q’eqchi’ religious 
practices related to tzuul taq’as, or spirits of the mountains, in Alta Verapaz. Wilson 
showed how beliefs and practices related to tzuul taq’as were not some essential 
cultural trait, residues of a pre-colonial past, or post-colonial inventions. Rather, they 
were self-consciously revivalist practices, which took into account historical events 
such as the violence that was sweeping the region. In other words, they were linked to 
Q’eqchi’ subjects’ responses to the historical conditions they inhabited. It is Hervik’s 
contention (2001), that despite their propensity for contextualising and historicising 
the experiences of subjects and communities in their respective geographical areas, 
both Wilson (1995) and Watanabe (1992) deployed essentialist and ahistorical 
analytical strategies, in that they called upon materials from the regions of Chiapas 
and Yucatan, ‘sometimes centuries apart’, to produce their contexts, thus making 
‘uncritical use of cross-regional, cross-temporal sources. At this level of ethnicity, 
Mayan-ness becomes essentialised across time and space and against all warnings’ 
(Hervik 2001:345).
Hervik’s rebuke (2001) is interesting in several respects. For one, it shows 
anthropological context-making efforts and strategies develop in the direction of ever 
more localised analyses, to the point that the purpose of any cross-regional, cross­
temporal and, one suspects, cross-cultural comparison seems to be invalidated. Not all 
anthropology may be willing to forego comparison (Gingrich and Fox 2002), in an 
attempt to defend forms of contextualisation envisaged as ever more local and myopic 
in scope. In point of fact, anti-essentialism need not be predicated on the dimension of 
the local alone, and certainly not on visions of the local imagined as narrow 
parochialism. Interdiction on movements across time and space, be they experiential 
and/or textual, works against attempts to make sense of complex local configurations. 
Thus, what is foregrounded in Hervik’s rebuke (2001) is a pernicious form of 
essentialism and a denial of the ways in which all anthropological subjects, here 
including the anthropologist, in fact do move across time and space, albeit in ways 
that are thoroughly local. Were one to point to essentialism in Wilson’s analysis, this 
would not centre on the matter of comparison, but rather on the analytical categories 
Wilson deploys to give a sense of Q’eqchi’ culture. Chief among these, I would single
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out ‘production’, ‘reproduction’, ‘gender’ and the ways in which Wilson (1995) 
figures their relations in the ethnography. It is anthropological subjects themselves 
who expose essentialism, as they out-contextualise the anthropologist. To illustrate 
this point I set Wilson’s representations of Q’eqchi’ culture against my own 
ethnographic fragments.
Wilson (1995) notes that the Q’eqchi’ are agriculturists by vocation but also traders. 
Household organisation takes a number of forms encompassing nuclear and extended 
models. The intense ritual calendar centres around the agricultural cycle and Q’eqchi’ 
‘traditional’ religious practices are mainly concerned with the tzuul taq’as, or 
‘mountain spirits’, i.e. beings that inhabit features of the landscape such as caves and 
hill tops.17 While features of Q’eqchi’ culture as wide-ranging as the importance 
accorded to maize cultivation and notions of personhood have been addressed in 
anthropological research (cf. Estrada Monroy 1990, Siebers 1999), only two 
monographs actually deal systematically and exhaustively with such issues (Cabarrus 
[1979] 1998, Wilson 1995). Wilson’s book also deals with the notion of awas, a term 
that has complex connotations and one to which a number of cultural practices are 
related.
Wilson (1995) notes that among the Q’eqchi’, awas amounts to a polysemic concept 
that has contextually variable applications and meanings. Crucially, awas occurs in 
maize and in humans and the concept therefore applies to the sphere of agricultural 
production and the sphere of human reproduction. Awas usually indicates the 
breaching of a boundary and the mixing of elements that should be kept apart and as 
such, according to Wilson (1995, chapters 4 and 5), awas fits the definition of taboo 
offered by Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger (1966). When such boundaries are 
breached or transgressed, adverse effects ensue. In the context of planting, 
transgressions of ‘awas taboos’ exemplified by men having sexual relations when 
they should instead be abstaining (Wilson 1995:63-64), lead to crop failure brought 
about by disease or wild animals. On the other hand, awas also affect human beings
17 It is often noted (Cabarrus [1979] 1998, Estrada Monroy 1990, Pedroni 1990, Wilson 1995) that 
beliefs in tzuul ta q ’as mean that Q’eqchi’ culture is closely related to the landscape. One question I 
explored during the course of my fieldwork was what may actually happen to Q’eqchi’ sacred 
geographies in conditions o f displacement. In other words, what happens to the tzuul taq'a when one is 
forced to abandon one’s place of residence and flee to a new area? I address the question in Chapter
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as a category of illness that develops during gestation. Should a pregnant woman be 
repulsed by an object or person, or desire a foodstuff without being able to obtain it, 
the newborn shall exhibit a condition related to the offensive object or act. Awas are 
therefore primarily thought of as ‘inherited’ conditions that befall newborn babies 
(Wilson 1995:125).18
As noted by Wilson (ibid), during pregnancy Q’eqchi’ women are accorded particular 
privileges such as eating all available foodstuffs that they may fancy. Further, they 
may actively object to any behaviour they may find offensive, as it is advisable that a 
pregnant woman be in a state of kalkab ’il, or inner peace. As kalkab ’il is also the 
ideal condition for people who take part in ritual practices, notably planting-related 
ritual activities, Wilson argues that a number of elements in Q’eqchi’ culture point to 
specific relation between the realms of production and reproduction, maize and 
humans.19 Failing to reproduce the flare and elegance implicit in Wilson’s writings 
and line of enquiry, his conclusion could be summarised by the following equation, 
whereby the relation between the human realm and the realm of maize rests on both 
being affected by awas conditions, all conducive to the idea that in Q’eqchi’ culture 
production and reproduction are coterminous and humans and maize are part of a 
single system.20
WOMEN : CHILDREN = LAND : MAIZE
A WAS IN HUMANS A WAS IN MAIZE
Two.
18 In the rare cases when awas occur in adults, they only befall pregnant women (Wilson ibid).
19 Tn sum, production and reproduction are conceptually united. In humans and maize, awas affect 
different parts of the reproductive/productive process in complementary ways. In maize, awas taboos 
are present only during the prefertilization and fertilization (planting) periods. In humans, only the 
periods o f gestation and parturition are surrounded with awas. These distinctions point to a basic unity. 
The creation o f people and maize are part o f a single system, for humans and maize awas together 
encompass the whole process of prefertilization, fertilization, gestation and birth.’ (Wilson 1995:130, 
my emphasis).
20 ‘The pregnant woman is like the land during planting, and therefore both are treated with care and 
seriousness [...] Both are lo q ’, sacred. Extremes o f behavior and irreverence can cause a child to be 
bom with awas or the maize crop to fail. In corns and humans, awas illnesses create and emanate from 
a preoccupation with the mother/earth matrix that produces the growing child/plant. [...] Given the 
overt association between women and land, we would expect a clear identification between children 
and com. The two are the two entities that suffer from awas illnesses. [...] Like land and women 
during the planting, the equation of maize and children means they are kept apart, in this case in the 
sphere o f awas illnesses’. (Wilson 1995:128-129, my emphasis)
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Wilson’s elegant chapters on awas in maize and humans constitute an extremely 
interesting piece of anthropological analysis. By focusing on awas Wilson aims to 
illustrate how the realm of human beings and maize are a crucial part of Q’eqchi’ 
cosmology as well as critical points at which notions and practices related to 
production and reproduction are articulated. However, given his rendition of awas in 
humans, his argument may be subjected to scrutiny. As noted above, Wilson seems to 
assume that awas are passed on to the children through the mother. Furthermore, 
Wilson focuses on female pregnancy and elaborates on the particularities of such a 
state without ever wondering whether men play a role in the process. When he asks a 
man about his pregnant wife, the man replies he does not know (Wilson 1995:133).21 
Wilson’s arguments were part of the context of my own fieldwork to the extent that I 
discussed awas (and other conditions) at any suitable opportunity. In the exchange 
that follows, I conversed with a Q’eqchi’ man.
S: What happens during pregnancy? I ask because I have been told several times that it
is not only the woman who is pregnant, it’s the man too.. .Do you have children?
I: No, I don’t have children as yet. I understand what you are saying, for instance, I also
asked my mother why is it that the man too is considered to be pregnant (tambien al 
hombre se le considera como embarazado), and of course, it has nothing to do with it, and she 
says, well, it’s because it [the new life] is being formed, and it is of both of them, it’s not only 
the woman’s, the being exists because the man exists, because there can’t be another life 
without woman and man, and so life has to be there. For instance, in the case of the woman, it 
is said that what the woman feels, logically the man has to share (compartir), because it is 
understood it is a couple.
S: And if the man misbehaves (se porta mat), something happens...
I: Something happens. So, it [the new life] will suffer the damage (dano).. .for this there
are awas. The man, as from when the woman becomes pregnant, the man as much as the
21 However, are all Q’eqchi’ men unaware or unwilling to discuss pregnancy? Might it not be that 
Q’eqchi’ men whose wives are pregnant cannot discuss the issue for specific reasons, and other men 
should therefore be asked instead? Further, is it certain that men are thought to have nothing to do with 
the pregnancy process?
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woman have to uphold great formality and many secrets22 {guardar mucha formalidad y 
muchos secretos).
S: What you are saying is very important, because, so far, those who have written
about awas say that the responsibility for children getting awas is the woman’s, that if the 
woman bums an ants’ nest, awas sank23 will arise, that if women walk in the moonlight, re li 
poo24 will arise [...], in any case, you say the man has some responsibility in the matter as 
well.
I: Oh yes. As I told you, the man as much as the woman have to look after
themselves (cuidarse), during the months of pregnancy. For instance, if the man enjoys 
walking at night, or walking the streets, then, as I told you, the man as much as the woman 
don’t have to go out at night because if the man goes out at night, that’s why there is that 
illness, aam a'aj15, which is nowadays known as asthma. It’s a sound they [the newborns] 
make here in the throat. So, when the man spends his time walking around at night, you know 
that that spiders make their webs on the paths, and the man goes by and destroys them, the 
spider had worked hard and the man starts [destroying them], so, how shall I put it? It’s a 
mistake made by the man with regard to the animal. For that purpose/reason there is 
the awas aam a*qj.
S: Oh, I see, it’s an awas...
I: It’s an awas, so it comes from there that the man has to share (compartir) the
suffering of the pregnant woman...
As I discussed Wilson’s ethnography in the field, Q’eqchi’ men discussed awas with
9 f \me as something very relevant to their lives and their experiences. In point of fact,
22 ‘Formality’ refers to morality and rules o f conduct. ‘Secrets’ refer to public secrets (cf. Taussig 
1999). More specifically, ‘secretos’ constitute a pool of knowledge that allows individual to deflect the 
negative effects implicit in certain actions, contingencies, etc.
23 Sank means ant in Q’eqchi’.
24 Poo means moon in Q’eqchi’.
25 Aj aam means spider in Q’eqchi.
26 This is an example o f another conversation between two Q’eqchi’ men and I.
S: And look, about awas, always on the topic of children, can you explain to me the matter of awas?
D: Well, there are many types of awas, when one talks of awas, when the woman is already in that 
state, the woman and the man, when his wife is pregnant, they will have to look after themselves
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men’s (mis-)behaviour during pregnancy seemed to have potentially as much as an 
effect on the health of the future child as women’s conduct. Describing pregnancy, 
some Q’eqchi’ men and women suggested that pregnancy was both male and female, 
in the sense that when women were pregnant, it was ‘as i f  men were pregnant too. In 
as much as my Q’eqchi’ interlocutors were very clear about this ‘as i f , they were also 
adamant about the fact that responsible behaviour on the part of the future father was 
a pre-requisite for an awas-free newborn. Future mothers and fathers were therefore 
said to be subjected to a series of interdictions, e.g. do not go out at night, and were 
awarded some privileges, e.g. eat all the desired food that is available. These 
fascinating insights into Q’eqchi’ gestation theory deserve to be considered vis-a-vis 
the tradition of anthropological engagement with local understandings of procreation 
(cf. Aijmer 1992, Canessa 1999, Delaney 1991, Diemberger 1993, Franklin 1997, 
Malinowski 1932, Shapiro and Linke 1996). This would no doubt provide a further 
level of contextualisation.
Nevertheless, the Q’eqchi’ view that awas may be passed on to children by both 
mother and father exposes the profound essentialism in Wilson’s rendition of 
Q’eqchi’ culture as depending on an equation of land with women on the one hand, 
and maize with children on the other hand. Whilst it seemed that not only women 
reproduced but also men, Wilson’s renderings of Q’eqchi’ concepts of production and 
reproduction appeared incomplete vis-a-vis subjects’ own contextualisations. What 
was exposed in these ethnographic conversations on the matter of awas were Q’eqchi’
very much (cuidarse mucho), they won’t have to go out at night, neither the man or the woman, 
the woman has to carry her matches...
S: And garlic...
D: And garlic, and even...
S: Here? [pointing at the waist]
D: Yes, here, and even, a cloth if it’s a woman, I mean, the woman has to wear her her her...
S: Fustang (undergarment worn under the corte, the traditional skirt)?
D: Her red fustang ...
S: Red...
D: Or red underwear, she has to, to defend herself from the evils (malos), and the man must not 
whistle at night, also the man has to carry his things too, as the woman carried hers...
JA: And desiring things, for instance, as I was saying, if  one says, be the woman or the man, I feel 
like eating pork scratchings, or I feel like eating something, but if  they only desire it [and don’t fulfill 
the desire], that’s where the awas arises...
S: That’s why when one is eating in front o f a pregnant woman always has to offer...
JA: That’s how it is ...
D: One has to give a piece.
S: But also to the man?
D: Yes.
55
views as to the duogenic character of gestation, as much as an anthropologist’s 
presuppositions as to the masculine gendering of production and the feminine 
gendering of reproduction, the latter grounded in the tiresome anthropological folk 
model, ‘the pregnant woman is like the land’ (Wilson 1995:129).
Wilson’s ethnography (1995) presents the realms of tzuul taq’as and that of awas in 
gendered terms, with practices related to tzuul taq ’ as corresponding to a domain of 
male involvement, and those related to awas coinciding with women’s domain. This 
gendering of domains was radically problematised during my fieldwork. Whilst 
listing types of awas, interlocutors mentioned awas futbal (football). As only 
Q’eqchi’ men played football in the community in question, a was futbal confirmed 
that what were perceived to be exclusively male activities may cause the condition. In 
sum, what was revealed were local re-fashioning of awas theory and practice, as 
much as the refractory essentialisms of anthropological analyses and their (gendered) 
presuppositions. In turn, these essentialist residues may not be intrinsic features in and 
of themselves. Rather, they emerge and are produced as anthropological knowledge is 
recontextualised and consumed, and as it inevitably out-contextualises the 
anthropologist.
1.10 La Cadena del Artuncio: Anthropologies of the Conflict
From the late 1980s to the present, a new genre of anthropological enquiry in 
Guatemala developed in response to the violence that was sweeping the country, and
• • 27in some instances engulfing anthropologists alongside their interlocutors. 
Foundational in this respect was the publication of the work of anthropologist and 
Jesuit priest Ricardo Falla. Quiche Rebelde, an account of responses to Accion 
Catolica (Catholic Action) in San Antonio Ilotenango, departamento of Quiche was 
first published in Guatemala in 1978. In Masacres de la Selva, Falla (1992) provided 
an account of the massacres that took place in Ixcan in the early 1980s. He views the 
labour of anthropology to be participant observation once removed, and his role to be 
to tell what others have seen, in la cadena del anuncio, or a ‘chain of annunciation’.
27 Anthropologists were literally engulfed in the histories of La Violencia in Guatemala. Guatemalan 
anthropologist Myma Mack was killed in 1991. Victor Montejo was a school teacher who was forced 
to flee the country in the 1970s. In the United States he trained as an anthropologist and has written 
extensively about his experience o f the violence (1987, 1991, 1999).
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‘Why write a book about massacres? It seems a negative and denigrating effort. Why 
remember those crudities and cruelties without narration (sin cuento)? The witness offers us 
the key. The testimony which emerged from the bottom of his emotive memory -  “I will 
never forget” -  announces a reality which is existentially positive for him: I am alive. His 
testimony is good news. Whilst ever more terrible/horrific is the narration of what he 
witnessed (presenciar), more marvellous is the reality that he announces: I am alive. This 
book [Masacres de la Selva] assumes the finality of this and hundreds more of these 
witnesses, who want to tell the people of Guatemala and the nations of the world: we are 
alive, incredibly, we are alive. (...) We [writers, anthropologists?] are only intermediaries of 
the announcement. We are not immediate witnesses of what we are going to narrate. But we 
have been entrusted with the task by fate or history, whatever we may want to call it, of 
transmitting what the immediate witnesses have seen, smelt, touched, heard, felt, interpreted, 
thought, fought...We cannot silence it, because they have narrated it as a marvellous 
story/history (historia maravillosa). (...) In this chain of announcement, faith (fe) is an 
indispensable element which transverses all the testimonies, because the good news cannot 
but be accepted voluntarily. In the first instance, it is to believe the witness himself, because 
he believes that it is worthwhile to narrate his testimony. But there is a further important 
aspect of his faith. It is not so much that he may believe in what he is seeing, in the fire and 
the slaughterhouses (<destazadores). What he sees and hears, he experiences directly. But on 
narrating it, he realises that for many, it will be difficult to believe that human beings 
(hombres) may be capable of dehumanisation so gruesome as the one they have witnessed, 
because to himself and to many of the victims it has been laborious to believe that the Army 
would commit such crimes, and, as we shall see in many testimonies, that absence of faith 
cost them their lives’ (Falla 1992:ii-iii).
As a result of Falla’s work, exhortations for an antropologia comprometida (Manz
1995) that is a theoretical and methodological anthropological practice that refuses the
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‘luxury of indifference’28, were taken up by many anthropologists (Carmack et al 
1988, Manz 1988, Thompson 2001). The analyses of the violence thus produced 
represent the inception of a new mode of doing anthropology and one that is ‘on the 
move’, as it accompanies the displacements forced upon communities by the violence 
inflicted by the Guatemalan Army during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Antropologia comprometida also establishes a new complicity between and among 
anthropological subjects, as they become linked in ‘chains of annunciation’ (Falla 
1992). Ethnically marked subjects feature in these analyses as the designed victim of 
genocidal state violence.
Stoll (1993) gives a rather different view of La Violencia and the place of ethnicity
• • • * ♦ » • 90and indigeneity within it. In his controversial study of the Ixil triangle Between Two 
Armies (1993), Stoll represents the conflict as a confrontation between two parties, 
namely the Army and the guerrilla. He argues that as innocent indigenous population 
got caught between the two, their social conditions and political status was adversely 
affected by the operations of the guerrilla. Whilst -  before the confrontation -  there 
were forms of negotiation between subordinate Ixiles and landowning ladinos, and 
some possibility of upwards mobility for Ixil subjects, with the advent of the conflict 
these largely disappear (Stoll 1993). The representational frame here is the bipolarism 
of the Cold War, and as Gledhill (2001) has poignantly argued, Stoll ultimately 
recolonises ethnicised subjects under the banner of giving voice to indigenous 
agency.30
Despite revisionist accounts (Stoll 1993, 1999), on the whole, anthropologists have 
laboured to develop frames for an understanding of experiences of La Violencia in 
local contexts (Carlsen 1997, Wilson 1995) -  accounting for the conflict from the 
perspective of a community or a region. Others have engaged with the violence after 
the fact, and dealt with fear, terror and their effects on memory for gendered 
constituencies of widows (Green 1999, Zur 1998). The urban perspective proposed by
28 Ricardo Falla (Manz 1995) argues that anthropologists should not be only superficially committed 
and sympathetic to their respondents. Rather, his 6-year long fieldwork with the Communities of 
Population in Resistance Ixcan (CPR Ixcan), that is, civilian population escaping army repression and 
hiding in the Ixcan forest, is an example o f how it is possible to address directly the needs o f the 
community and involve one’s respondents in the research process.
29 The ‘Ixil triangle’ refers to the three Ixil speaking municipios o f Nebaj, Chajul and Cotzal, 
departamento o f Quiche.
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Nelson (1999), who focuses on violence and body politics in the national imagination, 
complements these subtle ethnographies of the violence in rural areas.
Movement, displacement and deterritorialisation have become ever more relevant to 
anthropological practices of contextualisation (cf. Thompson 2001), as analyses
' j  1
increasingly deal with the movements engendered in, and through, the conflict. 
Furthermore, anthropological context-making has become increasingly multi-sited in 
its analytical practices, as it strives to represent the violence and invoke a sense of 
complicity and solidarity among ethnographic subjects.
1.11 Conclusion: Incommensurability and Out-contextualisation
In the ethnographic present, anthropological texts were in the process of becoming 
important interlocutors of the Pan-Mayan movement and other constituencies, often 
representing a record against which to validate cultural practices. Richard Wilson’s 
(1995) elegant ethnography of Q’eqchi’ knowledge and ritual practice related to 
maize and tzuul taq ’a (beings of the mountains) had just been published in Spanish, 
and the influence of this text was felt beyond the boundaries of Alta Verapaz. In 2000, 
on a visit to the Q’eqchi’ school and cultural centre Aj Awinel in El Estor, Izabal, I 
was asked whether a copy of Wilson’s book recently translated into Spanish could be 
made available. The text was perceived by the Q’eqchi’ teachers and activists as an 
important tool in the work of ‘recuperation’ of Q’eqchi’ culture, work the school was 
committed to.
Consumption and circulation of anthropological texts (and their authors) followed 
disparate routes in the ethnographic present. Between 1999 and 2000, anthropological 
and historical research carried out by Norman B. Schwartz (1990) was the primary 
reference for the operations of local and international non-governmental organisations 
and multi-lateral agencies in Peten, Guatemala. This point is also noted by Sundberg 
(1998), who highlights the normative character that anthropological writings have 
acquired in the region: ‘[f]or cultural and historical data, NGOs tend to rely on 
anthropologist Norman Schwartz’s (1990) work, Forest Society, which seems to have
30 Stoll’s position is echoed in Yvon Le Bot’s study (1992).
31 For literature on returnees, see Taylor (2002), Rousseau et al (2001), van der Vaeren (2000), while 
Gonzalez (2000) and Stepputat (1999) follow movements from local perspectives.
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acquired prescriptive status in Peten’ (Sundberg 1998:7). Forest Society had thus 
become a repository of ‘truths’ about regional ethnic identities and relations and a 
record against which ethnic conflict and ethnically marked disputes over land were 
understood. Through explicit assignation of authenticity and environmental 
knowledge to the ‘autochthonous’ populations, and implicit attribution of foreignness, 
environmental ‘ignorance’ and hence ‘destructiveness’ to migrants who have most 
recently come into the region, Forest Society directly informed the validation of 
demands of those groups who had come to be considered rightful residents, at the 
expense of those who were increasingly deemed to be ‘invaders’ (cf. Sundberg 2003). 
Interestingly, Forest Society (Schwartz 1990) and the region that is its subject, namely 
Peten, both have been consistently out-contextualised in anthropological analyses. 
They have been placed out of context, and demoted from reviews of the history of 
disciplinary engagement in the country.32
Anthropological research is thus deeply implicated in the production of essentialist 
taxonomies of ethnicity and related topographies. When ‘the local’ is spatially and 
conceptually qualified in terms of indigenous ethnicity, situated contrapuntal histories 
and specific eschatologies are made to encroach and redefine imperial and national 
logics. Mostly centred on and around cabeceras (administrative towns) of 
departamentos (administrative regions), representations of the local in question often
'X'Xbelie a certain nativism. Anthropological and indigenista narratives thus 
occasionally converge to stress the importance of diversity, plurality and indigeneity 
as records of Guatemalan counter-hegemonic histories. Opposing imperial 
eschatologies, they illuminate plural narratives and experiences, aim to counteract 
epistemic violence, and in the case of indigenista intellectuals and activists, claim 
their rightful space in the consciousness and apparatus of the nation.34 However 
culturalist, both sets of discourses also participate in the solidification, normalisation 
and prescription of (ethnic) difference in contemporary Guatemala.
Anthropological research is also intimately implicated in the delineation of the
32 Forest Society is hardly ever cited by anthropologists working in Guatemala, although it constitutes a 
key reference for geographers (Carr 2001, Sundberg 1997, 1998, 2003, 2004) and NGO staff working 
in Peten.
33 The notable exception is the work of Charles D. Thompson (2001) on the Jacaltecos and their
relation to borders that bleed.
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eschatology and empire. Through disciplinary propensity for all indigeneity, however 
marked, anthropology has made important contributions to debates concerning the 
ethnicised and racialised political economy of imperial agency. Anthropology’s 
concerned with defining the status of indigeneity vis-a-vis imperial dynamics has 
produced numerous analyses. These include a sustained engagement with analysis and 
representation of multiple experiences of the conflict. Different approaches to the 
contextualisation of indigeneity, nonetheless share a teleological vocation. In turn, 
through analytical attention to the status of indigeneity, anthropological discourses 
have produced multiple eschatologies and teleologies. Ethnically marked and 
unmarked subjects have been envisaged as products of and incited into existence by 
colonial and imperial agency. Alternatively, ethnicity has been viewed as marker of 
that which empire has routinely failed to annihilate.35
As noted by Strathem (1995a), culture as an item of knowledge is part of local native 
discourse as much as anthropological discourse. Since the pioneering work of Ricardo 
Falla, anthropological and ethnographic subjects have developed complicit relations 
through which denunciations of violence and terror have been possible. With these 
accounts, a complex field of experiences and interpretations has emerged, itself the 
subject of local re-appropriations. An effect of this has been the out-contextualisation 
of the anthropologist (Strathem 1995a) and the exposure of anthropologists’ culture as 
somewhat different from anyone else (Strathem 1995a: 11).
Out-contextualisation works on a further register in that it produces 
incommensurability. In the case of the anthropology of Guatemala I have reviewed, I 
noted how critiques of essentialism resulted in denials of the analytical viability of 
comparison, thus making local experiences incommensurable. The contextualisation 
of local experiences marked by tropes of indigeneity has also produced the 
simultaneous out-contextualisation of experience in local contexts that are connoted 
as non-indigenous. This explains the absence from my review of anthropological 
engagement with the region of Peten. The northern departamento has been regularly
34 On the politics o f indigenismo see Warren 1995, 1996, 1998.
35 Anthropologists are fully historical subjects and as such, they participants observers to the fullest of 
extents (cf. Price 2000, 2004). This history has just begun to be unraveled, and for Peten, it is yet to be 
written. Future research may wish to focus on the archaeological campaigns organised by Pennsylvania 
University in the 1970s and early 1980s and the anthropologists associated with them.
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out-contextualised by anthropology, partly through its perceived non-indigenous and 
sparsely populated character. I have surreptitiously introduced Peten into my 
discussion of local appropriations of anthropological texts. In turn, anthropologies of 
the conflict have out-contextualised the historical experiences of guerrilla militancy. 
In the chapter that follows, I strive to contextualise what has been out-contextualised 
in anthropological analyses, that is, what has been placed out of view or deemed 
unworthy of attention. I am aware that my context-making practices may produce 
incommensurability,36 but it is anthropological subjects themselves who ultimately 
out-contextualise the discipline and myself.
36 ‘If different knowledge practices produce different forms of incommensurability, then their 
foundational or transcendent concepts (their instruments) will also have different work to do’ 
(Strathem 1995b:ll).
Chapter 2 
Multi-sitedness and desarraigos
2.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the ‘contexts’ of the present research and the ways in which 
different cultural texts may illuminate contrasting and often contradictory aspects and 
interpretations of social life in the Guatemala. Through juxtaposition, partiality and what 
is or has been ‘out of context’ is brought into the descriptive frame (Strathem 1987; 
Fardon 1995). In my analysis I aim to delineate ‘plurality in context’, through reflections 
on the contextual and located character of selected accounts and the systems of 
representation that may be said to underpin them. Accounts and fragments of social 
reality relationally contextualise each other while also pointing to what has been out-
•y
contextualised and kept out of view. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of heterogenous 
cultural texts -  as much as their mutual out-contextualisalisation -  gives a form to the 
multi-sitedness of my fieldwork. In other words, the complex social reality of Peten is 
here contrived to reveal itself in the pieces and parts of the itinerant, and multi-sited, 
research practices, through which Peten contextualises/ed itself in that elusive and open- 
ended interval that was/is the temporality of the field/work (Hastrup 1990, 1995).
In this chapter, I take issue with the systemic models of analysis and representation of the 
social and cultural realm, and the exclusions they engendered. I note that the 
anthropology of Guatemala has deemed Peten to be ‘out of context’ in the sense of being 
unworthy of attention or tangential to national, regional and international dynamics. 
Conversely, I explore how Peten, rather than being peripheral vis-a-vis national, regional 
and international contexts, has in fact been enmeshed in complex relations with the 
nation-state and regional and global geopolitical realities. To reflect on the relation
1 ‘Desarraigo’ literally means ‘displacement’.
2 Juxtaposition is a textual strategy which is not deployed here with the intent of providing a solution to the 
problem o f context. The problem of context is preeminently epistemological, a point which is taken up and 
explored further in chapter 3.
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between Peten and the nation-state, I discuss the administrations of Juan Jose Arevalo 
and Jacobo Arbenz and note how these impacted configurations of social life in the 
departamento, notably through policies of colonisation. Further, I note how the forest of 
Peten was the training ground for the counter-revolutionary forces that staged the 
invasion of Cuba in 1961, thus challenging accounts that have represented Peten as 
peripheral vis-a-vis national and international events. In point of fact, the region of Peten 
was a site of early militarisation and counter-insurgency. I procede to document the 
establishment and operations of the government agency in charge of the development of 
the region between 1960 and 1989, namely the Fondo de Fomento y  Desarrollo de Peten 
(FYDEP) and argue that since its inception, FYDEP amounted to an organism of 
oligarchic self-govemance, which was under direct control of the Guatemalan Army. As 
such, a focus on FYDEP allows for the delineation of processes of relentless and 
progressive militarisation of the departamento in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Further, I consider the operations of FYDEP and specifically FYDEP’s role in overseeing 
the colonisation of Peten as a project of govemmentality, through the accounts of FYDEP 
personnel.3 I argue that -  through a consideration of different orders of connections that 
have produced Peten historically as a site of govemmentality -  histories of insurgency 
begin to contextualise themselves. Defying linear periodisations of the conflict, I 
conclude by noting contemporary forms of violent govemmentality in the guise of 
conservationist agendas and document the displacements they generated in the 
ethnographic present.
2.2 El Peten
The departamento of El Peten is the northern region of Guatemala which has consistently 
occupied a relatively peripheral location in both a capital-centred national imagination 
and highlands-oriented anthropological gazes. Contemporary Peten amounts to roughly 
36,000 square kilometers enclosed by the Guatemalan highlands of Alta Verapaz to the 
south, the departamento of Izabal to the southeast and the periodically disputed borders 
with Mexico to the northwest and Belize to the northeast. Envisaged as a vast, remote and
3 Accounts are drawn from memoirs that FYDEP personnel have produced (cf. Samayoa Rivera n.d.) as
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sparsely populated rainforest punctuated by innumerable Ancient Maya archaeological 
sites4, Peten was for the most part of the 20th century a relatively distant outpost.5 ‘To the 
untrained eye, that is, to most of us, as late as 1970 Peten looked like a tropical rainforest 
-  much of it still does’ wrote Norman Schwartz in 1990, adding that in order to envisage 
the Petenero landscape, one would best ‘keep in the mind’s eye an image of a tropical 
lowland frontier’ (Schwartz 1990:10). To many Guatemalans, Peten was an inhospitable 
and inaccessible place, where some thought ‘las tierras no sirven\ that is, even land, the 
most disputed of resources in the country, was ‘no good’ (Samayoa Rivera n.d.:l 1).
The sense of the singularity of Peten, seemingly apparent in its distinctive landscape, was 
substantiated by further notable Petenero differences vis-a-vis the national context. In the 
first instance, the region had hosted specific histories of resistance to the Conquest and 
localised post-Conquest colonial arrangements. Between 1700 and 1821, colonial 
administration and control of this ‘frontier military district and penal colony’ (Schwartz 
1990:42) were in the hands of criollo families who took residence in the town of 
Remedios. The colonial centre of Remedios was built on the site of Tayasal, which, in
6 7turn, had been the pre-Conquest Itza capital. Tayasal, vividly remembered by Peteneros 
in the ethnographic present for the fierce and prolonged resistance organised by the Itza 
against the Spaniards, was the last city to capitulate to the Conquistadores in 1697. In
well as from interviews and conversations with ex-FYDEP employees I conducted in the field.
4 A comprehensive history of archaeological campaigns in Peten is yet to be written. The most well known 
institutional presence in the departamento was the fifteen-year long archaeological investigation (1956- 
1970) undertaken by the University of Pennsylvania Museum (UPM) at the ancient Maya site of Tikal.
5 When I visited Peten for the first time in 1978, access by land from Guatemala City was an arduous 
journey that took longer than twenty-four hours. Fokker planes would also transport goods, people and 
information from Guatemala City to the airstrip on the shores of the lake Peten Itza, central Peten.
6 Schwartz (1990:32) notes that the Itza were ‘a Mayanized people of non-Maya origin who had migrated 
to settle in Yucatan. Between 1200 and 1450 Itza groups moved south from Yucatan to Peten, where they 
dominated previously established people’. I retain the orthography deployed by Schwartz (1990) in this 
section, when referring to his work.
7 During the course of my fieldwork, the resistance of Tayasal was discussed by many Peteneros living on 
the shore of the lake Peten Itza. While the processes of constitution of remembrance of the past are plural 
and complex, the fact that the Peteneros in question resided on the very site where Tayasal is said to have 
been located may be important. After a heavy rainfall, children perused the soil searching for fragments of 
pottery and obsidian and commented on Tayasal periodically resurfacing.
It should be noted that the Spanish conquest of Yucatan was undertaken between 1527 and 1546 and 
control o f much of Guatemala and Verapaz had been achieved by 1527 (Schwartz 1990:33). Although 
uprisings were frequent, the fierce resistance put up by the Itza o f Tayasal is noted with pride by the 
present-day inhabitants of the towns and villages on the shore of the lake Peten Itza.
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the post-conquest aftermath, criollo families settled on the shores of the lake Peten Itza in 
the new colonial town of Remedios, ruled over this remote ‘hinterland within hinterlands’ 
(Schwartz 1990:39). Distance from the metropolitan colonial centres throughout the 
colonial period made it possible for Peten to enjoy relative independence from the 
Bourbon administration. Peten’s difference, however, is represented as reaching far back 
to pre-Conquest times. Schwartz, for instance, notes that pre- and post-Conquest 
‘indigenous’ populations living in Peten had affinities with the Yucatan region, rather 
than with the Guatemalan highlands or the Pacific Coast (Reina 1964, 1967a, 1967b, 
Reina and Schwartz 1974, Schwartz 1990:31-76). In historical and anthropological 
accounts (Schwartz 1990, Soza 1970), Peten has consistently been represented as sui 
generis and peripheral vis-a-vis the colonial and post-colonial national contexts.
Between the 1870s and the 1970s Schwartz (1990: 202) argues that the development of 
the chicle industry, namely the extractive economy of the sap of the chico zapote tree, 
proved a remarkably lucrative activity for the prominent descendents of colonial criollos 
in Peten, and for the nation’s coffers alike. Formally tied to the nation through the office 
of the Gobernacion and the figure of the Gobernador, and substantially connected 
through fiscal ties, Peten paid tributes to the national government. Fiscal contributions 
however failed to secure any notable dedicated investment in the region. As noted by 
Schwartz (1990:203), ‘[ojver the years, very little of the revenue from chicle was used to 
invest in productive activities. Fiscal linkages were as limited as production linkages’. 
Relative isolation and general disengagement from national political developments, 
according to Schwartz, continued virtually unaltered in the 20th century, and during the 
progressive decades of the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations. Schwartz (1990:191) 
argues that
‘Arbenz’s land reforms, important as they were elsewhere in Guatemala, had no effect on 
underpopulated Peten. There, until the 1970s, there was no pressure on the land, and few 
highlanders rich or poor had any interest in the distant northern lowlands. For example, between 
1945 and 1954, there were 1,497 local agrarian committees set up in Guatemala, but not a single
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one in Peten’ (ibid: 191, my emphasis).
With the exception of the establishment of Suchilma (Sindicato Unico de Chicleros y  
Laborantes de Madera), the chicleros (rubber tappers) and woodcutters union which 
operated fairly independently for about a decade and successfully ended debt peonage in 
the chicle industry (Schwartz 1990:191-2), Peten is said to have maintained its peripheral 
position vis-a-vis national affairs. Schwartz (1990) consistently maintains that Peten’s 
marginality vis-a-vis the national political context often worked in the interests of the 
local population, as this meant that the population in Peten was spared some of the 
violence and strife that befell the rest of the country at times of national and civil unrest. 
However, this line of argument and analysis fails to address and account for the manner 
in which violence, surveillance and control may have functioned in Peten in ways that 
were thoroughly Petenero, and indeed thoroughly local, yet no less brutally productive 
and capillary. 9
Schwartz’s own texts contain the traces of these local histories as well as pointers to the 
complex configurations of power in the departamento, and their effects. By way of 
example, the historical realities of unionisation of rubber tappers and woodcutters in 
Suchilma may be considered. Schwartz (1990:191) concedes that the unionisation effort 
was fully a product of the progressive reforms that were being implemented in the 
country as a whole during the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations (1945-1954). 
Nevertheless, Schwartz swiftly forecloses any productive evaluation of the historical 
experience of union organising, noting that Suchilma was from its inception viewed by 
many chicleros themselves as a corrupt organisation that had detrimental effects on the 
overall demand for chicle.
The ambivalence that seems to have characterised the relation between chicleros and the 
union is extremely interesting, and a number of factors are highlighted by Schwartz 
(1990:192) as having played a part in the relative failure to establish class consciousness 
and solidarity among chicleros. First, chicle extraction was often an individualised and
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isolated activity ill-suited to collective action in the sense of cooperation in productive 
activities and union organising efforts. Second, the combination of subcontracting 
relations and kinship ties often determined individuals’ ability to endorse the union free 
from pressures from kin and/or managers. Third, hierarchical relations based on 
subcontracting were interchangeable, and as individuals were not entirely in consistent 
and univocal hierarchical relations to one another, unionisation based on specific and 
stable subordinate status was unlikely (ibid). Fourth, the overwhelming majority of 
Suchilma leaders, as ‘direct descendants of the old colonial Creole and Creole-Ladino 
families’ (Schwartz 1990: 332, note 43), were securely tied to the local system of 
racialised oligarchic power. Fifth, in the period following 1954, and mirroring national 
patterns of anti-union violence and repression, reprisals from contractors against union 
supporters became more overt (Schwarz 1990:192). Schwartz goes on to say that
‘[fjinally, in recent years, Suchilma has been partly subsidised by FYDEP [Fondo de Fomento y 
Desarrollo de Peten], so even aside from the auti-uuion stance of the government, Suchilma 
has not been free to press hard for worker interests’ (ibid: 192, my emphasis).
The above is no minor detail and the nature of Schwartz’s ‘asides’ no small matter. What 
emerges so vividly -  while being so conspicuously made to pass as insignificant -  is, 
first, the important sense in which Peten was in fact linked to developments in the nation 
as a whole, notably during the progressive decade of the Arevalo and Arbenz 
administrations (1945-1954), and its violent, counter-revolutionary aftermath.10 Second, 
noting the eventual subordination of Suchilma to the Fondo de Fomento y  Desarrollo de 
Peten (FYDEP), Schwartz points to the violent system of local govemmentality 
established in Peten in 1960 through the creation of FYDEP.11 Understanding the
9 Foucault (1980:38-39).
10 In 1980 Peckenham noted that ‘SUCHILMA, the chicle workers’ and woodcutters’ union, has made 
significant progress in the past year, enough to threaten the bosses’ power base. In April 1979 
SUCHILMA’s leader, Alfonso Torres Castro was violently seized from his house in San Benito by the 
police. His wife and children were beaten in the process. His arrest had been ordered by Waldemar 
Amador, a local resident with a reputation for exploiting chicle workers’ (Peckenham 1980:176).
11 For studies of govemmentality in other regions of Guatemala see, for example, McCreery (1990), Sieder 
(2000), Stepputat (2001) and Watanabe (1995b). These authors deal with different historical periods and
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operations of FYDEP seems therefore critical to an analysis of social life in the 
departamento, and key to any attempt at tracing local histories of violence, surveillance, 
repression and control. In turn, however, the creation of FYDEP and its violent 
operations in the three decades that followed require that the peculiarity of relations 
between the national government and Peten in the period prior to 1960 be considered.
thWith reference to the mid-20 century, it is important to note that in the aftermath of the
Revolucion de Octubre and during the short-lived administration of Juan Jose Arevalo
(1944-51), Peten became of increasing importance to the proposed national programme 
10of land reform. As noted by Bell (1993) in his comprehensive and insightful analysis of 
the place of Peten in the progressive reforms of President Arevalo, the region was seen as 
the ideal receptacle for landless indigenous populations from the highlands. Under the 
aegis of the national programme of land reform and redistribution, the project of 
colonization of Peten seemed ‘acceptable to Jinqueros (landowners), i.e. the landowning 
elite, as this did not affect their fincas (properties) directly but did respond to the national 
interest meeting both military and Guatemalan international political objectives’ (Bell 
1993:23, my translation). The movement of indigenous population to the lowlands of 
Peten aimed to contribute national economic development and increase agricultural 
productivity through the opening of new agricultural areas. Romeo O. Samayoa Rivera, 
Major (Army Major), agro-engineer and FYDEP employee describes Arevalo’s 
contribution thus:
‘During the government of doctor Juan Jose Arevalo, man of travel, of great administrative ability 
and with a clear mind focused on bestowing on his country progress, well-being and prosperity, 
[Arevalo] met with his staff (asesores) with the objective of promoting the incorporation of such
geographical locations and may not explicitly frame their respective analyses in terms of a study of 
‘govemmentality’. Nevertheless, I take their contributions to inform a focus on local histories of 
govemmentality in Guatemala.
12 This is an important point which is glossed over by Schwartz (1990) in his monograph on the social 
history of Peten. In 1980 Fiedler (1980:120-121) noted that ‘Peten colonisation is not a new concept; thirty 
years ago, for example, the Arbenz government implemented a programme. But even if  we restrict 
ourselves to looking only at the legacy of the current effort, the starting date is 1964’. Colonisation of Peten 
in the 20th century therefore did not begin with FYDEP, but rather, with the progressive administrations of
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Petenero territory into Guatemala, given that it [Peten] lay completely forgotten ...[T]hat is how 
overnight the Colonia Agricola de Poptun [Agricultural Colony of Poptun] was bom... The 
colony was created as a political measure and with the objective of realising that the Peteneros 
could feel to be Guatemalans, a labour of approximation/approachment (acercamiento) and 
productivity, as for hundreds of years [Peten] lay forgotten, lost, ignored, sad and relegated to a 
second position, and what is worse, with no means of transport but the plane, and with only God 
the Almighty living with and in the hearts of its [Petenero] people’ (n.d.:24).
Arevalo’s ‘labour of approximation’ and the task of creation of a feeling of belonging to 
the nation-state amounted to projects which ultimately sought to promote ‘social 
progress’, but as Bell (1993) points out, failure to achieve any discernible degree of 
success by the end of Arevalo’s presidential term, the project of colonisation was largely 
halted, and indeed inverted, during Arbenz’s presidency. Peten did figure in Arbenz’s 
government programme as a possible site of development (Bell 1993: 24). The Revista 
Agricola published by the Minister of Agriculture in 1953 notes how,
‘In the context of the plan of cattle farming rehabilitation (plan de rehabilitacion ganadera) 
proposed/promulgated by the Government, the magnificent opportunities offered by the northern 
region of the country have not been neglected, notably some areas of the vast Peten. On these 
grounds, since 22 January of the present year, and following relevant studies, free export and 
trade of live cattle, refrigerated meat and subproducts of the same industry have been granted for 
the forthcoming 10 years in the departamento of Peten’ (Villegas Rodas 1953: 52).
Government policy in support of the budding cattle farming industry in Peten was 
supported by a visit of the Agriculture Minister and a team of professionals and officials, 
to oversee cattle farming activities around La Libertad. For most of the Technical
Arevalo and Arbenz, when it was linked primarily to nationalist political strategies, and only tangentially to 
substantive land reforms. The mid-1960s are discussed in the next section.
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Com m ission, this was their first encounter with Peten.
‘At half past nine the bird of steel {pajaro de acero) rises and directs its course northwards. The 
Major of the aviation pilots {pilotos aviadores) Arturo Guirola flies it with magisterial ability. We 
relish in the splendid luminous morning. It has been some time since we desired to know the 
fabulous territory of Peten. And it was when we least thought of and expected it, that such 
welcome privilege was presented to us. We had read and heard a lot about this area {jiron) of the 
nation {patria), so much so that our appreciation at a distance was entangled in most instances in 
the brambles (maranas) of the florid jungle {de nutridas selvas) populated by wild beasts {fieras) 
and tribes of anthropoids {tribus de antropoides\ such is the myth/legend of the Lacandones {tal 
la leyenda de los lacandones)’ (Villegas Rodas 1953:53).
The account of the ministerial visit combines emphasis on the modernity of the present 
(‘the bird of steel’, numerous mentions of ‘jeeps') with the optimism of a modernity to 
come. However, it was the strategic military role of Peten in the dispute of the territory of 
Belize that came to the fore during Arbenz’s term. Guatemalan claims to sovereignty 
over Belize were tinged with anti-colonial zeal during Arbenz’s presidency. According to 
Bell (1993), the territorial dispute over Belize did not impinge directly on the interests of 
the military, the landowners or the Church and was therefore a rather uncontroversial 
policy (Bell 1993:25). With the exception of nationalist arguments that it was in the 
national interest to regain the territory of Belize, and that such policy could only be 
pursued from Peten, the region largely languished at the periphery of the nation-state 
during the 1950s (Bell 1993).
With its mixed results, the Arevalo administration and its failed programme of 
colonisation of Peten is significant in two respects. First, the colonisation effort 
represents the antecedent to successive programmes of the 1960s. More generally, the 
Arevalo administration marked the inception of visions of development and modernity in 
Peten, endeavours also pursued during Arbenz’s term through the construction of the
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road between Flores and the newly established Colonia of Poptun (Samayoa Rivera n.d.: 
27). Second and most importantly, through the emphasis on the strategic and military 
importance of the departamento vis-a-vis territorial disputes with Mexico and Belize, the 
Arevalo administration created the conditions for the installation of the Army in Peten. 
The prominent role of the Guatemalan Army in the social, cultural, political and 
economic life of the departamento was to continue through the years of La Violencia, 
past the Peace Accords of 1996 and into the ethnographic present. In 1960, the 
departamento managed to secure de facto administrative independence through the 
creation of the Empresa Nacional de Fomento y  Desarrollo Economico del Peten 
(FYDEP), the National Enterprise for the Economic Development of Peten. An 
institution nominally created to promote and oversee the economic development of the 
region, between 1960 and 1989 FYDEP in fact amounted to an organism of oligarchic 
self-governance with considerable direct ties to the military. Although Arevalo had 
heralded plans for the colonisation of Peten in the 1940s, it was left to FYDEP to 
spearhead the venture in earnest.
2.3 FYDEP, Govemmentality and the Military
In the second part of the 20th century Peten exercised a remarkable degree of 
administrative autonomy from the nation state. Pace Schwartz (1990), (physically) 
remote, (symbolically) peripheral and (administratively) disconnected as Peten may have 
been, the salient historical link between its local institutions and the Guatemalan Army 
would suggest that Peten was tied to the nation, albeit in peculiar ways.13 For one, it 
should be noted that the Empresa Nacional de Fomento y  Desarrollo Economico de 
Peten (FYDEP) was established by General Ydigoras Fuentes in 1959 (Samoya Rivera 
n.d.: 27) in a highly poignant political climate. Colonel Ydigoras Fuentes had risen to 
power following the murder of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Castillo Armas had 
nominally headed the infamous overthrow of the Arbenz government organised by the 
US Central Intelligence Agency in 1954 (Ball et al. 1998, CEH 1999, Landau 1993, 
Schirmer 1998). Subsequent to the coup d'etat in 1954, the programme of social reform
13 Clark (2000:423) defines FYDEP as ‘a military sub-unit that governed Peten from 1959 to 1989’, but 
does not elaborate in any way as to the reasons and modalities of the relation between FYDEP and the
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and land redistribution proposed by the Arbenz government was violently quashed and 
repression ensued under Castillo Armas. The social democratic and communist 
leadership that had supported the progressive administrations of Arevalo and Arbenz 
(1944-1954) was exiled, imprisoned or murdered, 14 and the Guatemalan Workers Party 
(PGT) was banned. All political opposition was brutally suppressed and the country 
entered a protracted period of military dictatorship and weak civilian rule. The rule of 
both Castillo Armas and Ydigoras Fuentes were marked by a fervently embraced and 
violently enforced anti-Communist stance. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
Guatemala assumed a pre-eminently strategic role for United States foreign policy and 
became instrumental to US plans to circumscribe the perceived communist threat gaining 
ground in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. The successful ousting of Cuban 
dictator Batista and the related rise to power of Fidel Castro in 1959 were a cause of 
serious concern for the United States government. Under Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala, 
and Peten in particular, became a training outpost for those CIA-supported Cuban exiles 
who were to stage the 1961 invasion of Cuba (CEH 1999, Landau 1993, Vinegrad 1998).
‘Following the triumph of the Cuban revolution the CIA secured the support of the [Guatemalan] 
government presided by Miguel Ydigoras, installing a military base in the proximity of San Juan 
Acul, Sayaxche, to train the Cuban exiles who were to invade the Bay of Pigs in 1962. The 
lagoon that goes by the same name served as landing place for the hydro-planes PBY which were 
used as means of transport. Before international disquiet and the discontent of important sectors 
of the country, Ydigoras indicated that the rationale for North American military presence was to 
train the Guatemalan Army in counter-insurgency tactics, due to a supposed Cuban intention to 
invade the country’ (FEDECOAG 1993: 11, my translation).
Peten was therefore an early site of counter-insurgency, and the training ground for the 
counter-revolutionary Cuban exiles and the Guatemalan Army. Having landed at the Bay
military.
14 For a detailed and harrowing account of the fate that befell Arbenzistas in Quetzaltenango, see Grandin 
(2000, chapter 8).
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of Pigs, the Cuban exiles were swiftly defeated by Castro, and Cuba became a crucial 
point of reference for those militant Guatemalans with communist, Arbenzista and 
socialist orientation (CEH 1999, Landau 1993, Vinegrad 1998). Despite the success of 
the Cuban revolution, in Guatemala the repressive climate of the late 1950s and early 
1960s produced the Empresa de Fomento y  Desarrollo de Peten (FYDEP), the institution 
appointed with the task of bringing modernity to the region. As noted by Schwartz 
(1990:252),
‘[w]hen it was organised, FYDEP was charged with responsibility (1) to build an infrastructure to 
foment agricultural, industrial, and touristic development in Peten; (2) to administer and exploit 
Peten’s resources, except oil, for domestic and overseas markets; (3) to sponsor colonisation and 
to provide landless peasants with land and thereby increase production of food staples; (4) to 
settle farmers along the Usumacinta River in an effort to bar a proposed Mexican hydroelectric 
project from flooding Guatemalan soil and to prevent Mexican colonists from encroaching on 
Guatemalan land; and (5) to promote medium-scale capitalized cattle ranching in south-central 
and central Peten. The area north of parallel 17° 10' (roughly 33 percent of Peten) several small 
forest reserves in the south, a thin strip of land running along Peten’s southern border, a military 
zone in the southwest, and a number of archaeological parks -  a total of roughly about 1,517,023 
hectares -  were exempted from colonisation’ (Schwartz 1990:253).
This is confirmed by Government documents published in the decade that followed.
‘In June 1959 the Decree 1286, Law of Creation of FYDEP (Empresa Nacional de Fomento y 
Desarrollo Economico de Peten) was emitted. This has as its goal (finalidad) fomenting and 
developing in adequate form the natural riches of that northern departamento in order to achieve 
its effective integration (efectiva integracion) in the national economy by means of the use 
(explotacion) and scientific preservation (preservacion cientifica) of its forests (bosques) and 
other natural reserves; its improvement (saneamiento), colonisation (colonizacion),
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industrialisation (industrialization) and other policies and activities which may contribute to such 
aims. FYDEP, in accordance with the above law, depends directly from the Presidency of the 
Republic’ (Secreteria General del Consejo Nacional de Planificacion Economica, Programa de 
Inversidn Publica y Agricultura Para La Republica de Guatemala (1965-1969), July 1965:14).
However, it has been argued that along with the forward-looking emphasis on fomento 
(fomentation, improvement) and desarrollo (development), the creation of FYDEP was 
borne out of the perceived necessity of ordering the migratory flows directed to the 
departamento, as landless campesinos trickled from the southern and eastern coasts, and 
to a lesser extent, from the highlands of Alta Verapaz, in search of land. Thus, FYDEP 
was from its inception a reactive initiative that sought both to induce (FEDECOAG 
1993:12) and regulate/control the movement of land-thirsty populations displaced from 
other regions of the country. With its ‘direct dependence’ on the Presidency of the 
Republic, FYDEP amounts to a quintessential project of govemmentality.15
In Michel Foucault’s own definition, govemmentality refers to ‘[t]he ensemble formed by 
the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that 
allow the exercise of this very specific albeit very complex form of power, which has as 
its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its 
essential technical means apparatuses of security’ (Foucault [1978] 1994:219). According 
to Foucault, govemmentality developed in the West during the course of a transition from 
the ‘state of justice’ of the Middle Ages to the ‘administrative state’ in the fifteen and 
sixteen centuries (Foucault ibid). This resulted in the rise to prominence of 
govemmentality’s peculiar exercise of power in the form of sovereignty and discipline. 
Thus, ‘government’ depends on ‘the formation of a whole series government apparatuses 
[and] the development of a whole complex of knowledges [savoirs]' (Foucault [1978] 
1994:219-220).
Foucault’s interest in govemmentality and its analytical focus on the ‘how-to-govem’
15 For an example of studies of govemmentality in Latin America, see Poblete (2001).
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problem (Burchell et al 1991:7) suggests that any analysis of the establishment of 
FYDEP should explore not only the processes through which institutions of government 
were established, but also the practices, discourses and knowledges in and through which 
institutions and subjects were created. What is at stake in such a Foucaultian-inspired 
analysis is the range of practices through which FYDEP exerted control over the 
population, and, in turn, how the population was constituted as subject of 
govemmentality, and how specific subject positions may be forged as a result. Poblete 
(2001:138), following Foucault, has noted that ‘[pjower and its exercises manifest as 
objects of study within a continuity of macro- and microphysical domains (Poblete 
2001:138). When considering the creation of FYDEP in the context of the political 
climate in the country in the mid-twentieth century, it is unambiguous that FYDEP 
embodied peripheral govemmentality. FYDEP set out to provide a vision of a planned 
future of development and sponsor, regulate and supervise the extractive economy that 
would strengthen the links of the region to the capitalist world system, and to a lesser 
extent, to the nation. Likewise, the task of FYDEP was, literally and metaphorically, to
‘evitar la anarquia en el territorio mas grande que Guatemala posee\ that is,
‘avoid anarchy in the largest territory of Guatemala’ (Samayoa Rivera (n.d. :2).
That FYDEP’s mission was to stave off real or imagined ‘anarchy’ is particularly 
significant when one considers that the creation of the local was, from its very inception, 
under the aegis of the army. This relationship is most transparent when one considers the 
figure of the ‘Promotor i.e. the Head of FYDEP, a subject position that came into being 
with the establishment of the organisation and that from its creation was the prerogative 
of military personnel who took up the brief for the duration of the national legislature. 
The first Promotor del FYDEP,16 Colonel Oliverio Casasola y Casasola headed the 
institution until 1969, while in 1978, with the election of the President Lucas Garcia, the 
office of Promotor was assigned to Colonel Jorge Mario Reyes Porra. Remarkably, given 
the prominence and visibility of the relation between the governance of FYDEP and the
16 ‘The Promotor’ is one of the subject positions that come into being with the establishment of FYDEP. In 
the section below, I explore the question further, noting that the ambivalent status of Promotores through
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Guatemalan Army, Schwartz’s (1990) ‘social history’ of Peten leaves the question largely 
unexplored, thus failing to place the creation of FYDEP within the histories of
17militarisation in Peten. Histories of insurgency and counterinsurgency that marked the 
region from the early 1960s to 1996 and into the ethnographic present, and the 
interlocked experiences of migration and displacement, were thus demoted from the 
anthropological and historical record. Nevertheless, the intimate relation between FYDEP 
and the Guatemalan Army presented itself rather unambiguously during my fieldwork. 
As a high-ranking ex-FYDEP employee recalled during our conversation,
‘[FYDEP] was a government, the law bestowed upon it the faculty of a government here at the 
local level, as if it were a nation-state {como si fuera un estado), though it was a departamento. It 
was a government within/inside another {era un gobierno dentro de otro), according to the law. A 
government that administered all resources, land, and woodlands of Peten. So the interesting 
aspect was that the funds (recursos) that Peten generated would remain here as 
works/infrastructure {aqui se quedaban en obras). They built hospitals, roads, schools, health 
centres, support to municipalities and leaders, administer woodlands, logging concessions 
{concesiones madereras) were properly overseen {controlar). In the end, the only 
shortcoming/defect (defecto) was that it forever depended on the military government of 
Guatemala {gobierno militar de Guatemala), hence they would appoint army personnel
the account of a FYDEP employee.
17 Schwartz (1987) considers the role of FYDEP in the process of colonisation of Peten and notes Handy’s 
suggestions that FYDEP may have fostered a ‘latifundia style development’ (Handy 1984:216-7) in the 
region. With reference to the role of the military in the process, Schwartz notes that ‘military officers have 
benefited from FYDEP’s programmes. Many officers, coming from upwardly mobile middle, rather than 
traditional elite, sectors, wish to acquire land, but opportunities to do so in the highlands have been 
preemepted by established nonmilitary elites [...] The Peten and the Northern Transversal, where 
traditional oligarchies have not established complete preeminence, are well suited to officers’ ambitions; 
land is available and inexpensive [...] Given the increasing “regnancy” of the military (Adams 1970) from 
the late 1960s to 1985, there was little chance than an agency that helped officers realize their goals would 
be easily dismantled. (Schwartz 1987:176). Schwartz (ibid) concludes that ‘[military interests need not 
prohibit reform within FYDEP, as opposed to radical change’ and lists a number of regional factors as a 
reason for the complex intersection of interests that contribute to Army’s. As for this, I wish to point out 
that Schwart’s account is given from the perspective of the military. In its appeasement and defence of 
upwardly mobile military/FYDEP personnel vis-a-vis the influence of established elites, Schwartz’s 
analysis reveals its partiality.
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(imilitares) to work here as promoters of development (promotores de desarrollo) [...] The 
creation of FYDEP was necessary, starting FYDEP was very necessary because of the state of 
abandonment (abandono) in which [Peten] was, hence one had to have a manager here (entonces 
habia que tener un administrador aqui), [a manager] of this huge finca (de esta enorme finca), to 
be able to look after it and develop it. That is how the government created the law in 1956 [sic], I 
recall’.
Don Alfonso added that, ‘the interesting aspect is that it [FYDEP] did accelerate development. 
Because of the abandonment in which Peten was, the central government did not have the 
capacity to attend to Peten, and Peten ran the risk to be kept marginalised and suddenly perhaps to 
annex itself to Mexico (El Peten corria el riesgo de mantenerse marginado y de repente de 
anexarse a Mejico), such was the rumor (rumor). With that new law they nominated a person to 
direct/oversee the complete development of the whole of Peten and started the process to bring 
Peten closer to the country/nation (y se empezd a organizarse para acercarlo al pais) -  to 
incorporate it to the development of the country (al resto del pais para incorporarlo al desarrollo 
del pais). What’s interesting is that this was actually achieved. The only point still pending was 
this road which was covered with asphalt, but a great deal was done for Peten and that’s how 
entry to migrants begun to be granted (y fue que se empezd a permitir a la entrada de migrantes), 
the majority of them campesinos to work the land. For the [situation with] maize was 
unusual/curious (por que aqui el maiz era curioso), this was part of the country and the maize 
used to be brought over from Guatemala by plane when there was famine (carestia), and beans 
came from Chiquimula (y el frijol venia de Chiquimula). So much land and there was no one who 
could devote themselves to agriculture (y tanta tierra y no habia gente que se dedicara a la 
agricultura), so few of them, because the main activity was chicle and wood logging. So there 
were many needs here’.
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2.4 Modernity, the Human Wall and Paralelo 1718
According to Romeo O. Samayoa Rivera, Major (Army Major) and agro-engineer who 
worked for the Empresa Nacional de Fomento y  Desarrollo de Peten (FYDEP) for seven 
years in the capacity of Head of the Department of Colonisation,
‘In June 8th 1965, the Cabinet (Jefatura de Gobierno) at the order of the Colonel Enrique Peralta 
Azurdia issued the decree with the force of law (decreto ley) 354 through which all institutions 
then dedicated to Colonisation and Agrarian Reform were ordered to give utmost priority to the 
formation of a Human Wall (Muro Humano) to defend our border shared with Mexico, by means 
of settlements of people from the whole of the republic who voluntarily wished to go and settled, 
organised in cooperatives, on the banks of the rivers Pasion and Usumacinta, thus halting the 
construction of the famous plants [hydroelectric plants] Boca del Cerro and Agua Azul, which 
would have flooded a third of Peten, thus destroying the land (suelo), the forest of fine thousand- 
years-old woods and the archaeological riches which are so plentiful in the region. Such 
nationalist mandate was thus undertaken and the construction of the project nocuous for 
Guatemala was halted’ (Samayoa, n.d.: 3).
The period of colonisation inaugurated in 1965 amounted to a ‘nationalist directive’, that 
is, a political strategy aimed at defending national territory from the perceived threat of 
plans for technical development projects proposed by the Mexican government. With its 
dependence on the creation of a ‘human wall’, the colonisation of Peten constitutes a 
quintessential project of govemmentality, in that a subject population had to be first 
amassed, and then fashioned into appropriate subjects of development and modernity. 
The subjects of govemmentality that may allow for the construction of the human barrier
18 The title of this section is inspired by the account of the colonisation of Peten offered by Romeo O. 
Samayoa Rivera in his memoir Colonizacion de EL PETEN: Paralelo 17. Samayoa Rivera, whose titles 
include that of Major (Army Major) and agro-engineer, worked for 7 years for the Fondo de Fomento y  
Desarrollo (FYDEP) as Head of the Department o f Colonisation. His recollections of his time in office are 
gathered in a book that I found on the shelves of a bookstore in La Antigua, Guatemala. No publisher 
details and date of publication are indicated, thus suggesting that Samayoa Rivera may have financed and 
overseen the publication and distribution of his work.
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needed first to be drafted from other areas of the country. The process of fashioning of 
these subjects of colonisation was underpinned by a discourse19 that implied processes of 
reification through which subjects were turned into objects, in an initial move that turned 
people into tools at the service of the national strategy of defence. In turn, the constitution 
of the ‘human wall’ depended upon the establishment of a discourse and ethos of 
colonisation. FYDEP official Romeo O. Samayoa Rivera envisioned the project of 
modernity that colonisation entailed as follows:
‘Colonisation of a territory means progress and entails: communications, interchange, schools, 
markets, hospitals or health centres, terror, horror, death, life, violence, changes to the modus 
vivendi of the populations ...[Colonisation] makes of the territory something large, mighty, 
powerful (pujante), though with great sacrifices and the miracles of the Creator ... Colonisation is 
change, innovation, life, progress, new faces, new peoples, agriculturists, craftsmen, traders, 
usurers, speculators, petty thieves, dealers, loose women (mujeres de la dulche [sic] vida), 
murderers {matones), thieves {ladrones), all of them living together, some for good {bien), some 
for ill {mal), villages rise which were never seen before, with names that were never heard before, 
signs appear overnight and villages disappear through the art of magic (por arte de magia) ’ 
(Samayoa Rivera, n.d. 5).
In Samayoa’s vision, colonisation amounts to the constitution of material infrastructure 
(schools, markets, hospitals and health centres), and a social ontology (communications, 
interchange, change, innovation, progress) to which correspond specific states of being 
(terror, horror, death, life, violence, change). The image of colonisation is connoted by 
dynamism, difference and pious moral relativism. While it is clear that the project of 
colonisation is firmly the product of human agency (peoples, agriculturists, craftsmen, 
traders, usurers, speculators, petty thieves, dealers, loose women, murderers and thieves), 
aided by peripheral divine miracles, settlements are established overnight, and
19 See the quotation given above, as an example.
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disturbingly, may disappear just as swiftly. The phenomenology of colonisation, with 
its embodied, social and moral ontologies is underpinned by the production of multiple 
subjects, chief among them, the colonist.
‘The colonist is an individual who is willing to gamble it all (el todo por todo), lose what he’s 
got, abandon it, trade it, give it with the only aim to better his life and the life of his family, 
without caring for what he leaves behind. Men willing to bake under the sun, to leave one’s life 
behind for an ideal of conquest and freedom, but who always will be [...] colonist[s], no matter 
what race (raza), colour, creed or religion, language, all that matters is the courage for seeking 
new horizons and risk one’s life to better his family which is all to him, that’s how the colonists 
of Peten reached those inhospitable lands’ (Samayoa Rivera n.d.:5-6)
The colonist, firmly gendered in the masculine, is marked by a moral disposition which 
makes him mobile across space and moral universes. Premised on courageous risk-taking 
alone, the subject position of the colonist is, in principle, open to anyone. The colonist 
thus seems to move across and beyond the complex systems of production of difference 
and subordination which Samayoa himself identifies as implicating ‘race’, ethnicity, 
religion, and language. This is a rather radical vision that defies local and national 
raciological orders and is said to be the genesis of the sociality of colonisation. In the 
biblical imagery that characterises Samayoa’s narrative, the sociality of colonisation 
comprises people, domestic animals and goods. However, it is through the prescription 
issued by the Government and executed through the figure of the FYDEP Promotor that 
colonisation is initiated, the first settlements established and families counted.
‘The golpe de Estado came, and the man who took power, Coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, 
business man (emprendedor) aware that that territory [of Peten] could accommodate many 
landless Guatemalans (Guatemaltecos carentes de tierras) across the Republic; it was intolerable
20 It is unclear from Samayoa’s prose what exactly may be at stake in the processes through which villages 
are made to appear and disappear through the art of magic. Whether this is a flight of fancy, foreboding of 
violence to come, or a meditation over the violent character of colonisation is an open hermeneutic
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{insoportable) for campesinos to resist the pressure and temptation to migrate to that territory 
unknown to Guatemalans, full of surprises, magnitudes and miseries, the rumor (voz) spread to 
the cry: “Colonisation”, tuned to a celestial clarion and started the migration: pilgrimage 
(romeria), caravans of people who arrived on foot from the mountains of Coban, others from the 
Southern Coast and their lorries, vehicles, carts, the swarms/crowds (enjambres) of campesinos 
even arrived by plane, with their whole families and animals: dogs, cats, pigs, chickens, 
sometimes cows and donkeys loaded with useful goods, to start a new life, people who walked 
hundreds of kilometers, for weeks, to reach the promised land ... the Government ordered the 
Promotor [Head of FYDEP] that colonisation were started with sixty-four families, who arrived 
and settled in the village of Colpeten, on the road to Poptun (Samayoa n.d. :29-30).21
In view of this, it is important to consider the ways in which the colonist materialises in 
Samayoa’s narrative as a subject of colonisation in general, and as the product of 
govemmentality practices in particular. Vision was often clouded; subjects responsive to 
the incitement of colonisation were soon so numerous they required govemmentality’s 
forceful intervention.
‘The pressure from colonists was so great, that if we did not take immediate action, people could 
occupy in disorderly and anarchic fashion any land that they wished and it would have turned into 
a battle field, they would perch where they liked, as if they’d been a swarm of butterflies on the 
sides of rivers or roads [n.d.: 31] (...) The Department of Colonisation worked intensely day and 
night, with a group of agronomists (Peritos Agronomos), topographers, drivers, tracing the 
perimeters of Jincas, collecting groups of people - the agronomists and their secretaries drew up 
acts (levantar actas), filling in forms to request land (formularios de solicitud the tierras) and at
question.
21 I singled out the formation of Colpeten under direct instruction of the Government and practical 
overseeing of FYDEP because in the early 1980s, Colpeten was one of the villages that produced a 
substantial number of members of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes. Most of the FAR combatants who 
originally settled in Colpeten were brutally killed.
82
the same time giving placement to the families in orderly fashion and giving them instruction 
(p la ticas) as to how they should behave (comportamiento), their duties, their obligations to their 
neighbours and to their new home (:31)... That is how the planning and execution of projects was 
bom, to be able to have ordinance (ordenamiento) and settlement (alojar) of families in specific 
sectors, looking to group them in homogeneous, ordered and disciplined form where they would 
live for ever and ever, amen’ (Samayoa Rivera n.d:33).
A team of professionals was thus fashioned and enlisted to manage the influx of 
population and a number of practices instituted to order and discipline the process of 
colonisation. Practices included administrative procedures through which subjects were 
made into applicants for land concessions (titulos). Aiming at perpetual homogeneity, 
govemmentality would instruct the colonists in the kind of sociality they would have to 
uphold. This process of mastering movement and difference was not without its 
problems: what was presented was the refractory quality of difference, marked, in 
Samayoa’s narrative, by indigeneity and religious affiliation.
‘The problems of colonisation were multiple and complex, each family represented a 
responsibility for our Department [.] I recall that we founded a village of Catholic Apostolic 
indigenas and Cobaneros [i.e. Q’eqchi’], and the village would not make any progress; an 
injection (inyeccion) of more indigenous people {gente indigena) became necessary, but from 
other departamentos where they really did work, unlike the aforementioned. (...) the village 
grew, and is now prosperous’ (Samayoa Rivera n.d.:41)
Paternalism, and an ethic of responsibility, are held with a prescription to achieve 
tangible ‘progress’. Failure to do so required prompt intervention and the ‘injection’ of ad 
hoc population. In the above passage, ‘stasis and failure’ and their antinomies, ‘progress 
and prosperity’ are marked -  both ethnically and in terms of religious affiliation. Despite 
Catholic Apostolic Cobaneros, who are said to be lagging behind due to their slack work 
ethic, govemmentality’s intervention -  through the addition of indigenous population of
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unspecified provenance and Evangelical religious affiliation -  turns the fate of the 
community on the prescribed track. Govemmentality’s social engineering causes strife 
and unrest.
‘I recall that in the Municipio of San Luis lived 150 indigenous families (familias indigenas) who 
thought they were the owners and masters of the place, occupying land which they wanted 
without the assent of the law, and without respecting anybody. That municipality is rich in 
resources such as cocoa, chicle, hule, chico zapote , fruit, cattle farming, pig farming (ganado  
vacuno y porcino), birds of all types, wild animals (animales de monte), game (caceria), good 
rivers and it is nothing less than the golden door to enter Peten [.] On a daily basis pilgrimages 
(rom erias) and swarms (enjambres) of families would arrive carrying sick, tired and hungry 
children full of warms (lom brices). [...] That is how San Luis begun to be populated with 
hardworking people {gente trabajadora) who really were willing to gamble their lives (jugarse el 
pellejo), while the mayor of the place and the indigenous people {los indigenas) who wanted to 
rule the place started to mistreat (tratar mat) and quarrel (pelear) with the newcomers whom they 
called foreigners {extranjeros), wanting to remove them forcefully from the land they had been 
assigned by [FYDEP’s Department of] Colonisation [.] [T]hese misnamed (m al llam ados) San 
Luisenos, goddamned indigenous people {indigenas rejodidos) and their mayor, another old indio 
(indio viejo samarro) met in the salon social22 which was a large insalubrious shed {ranchon de 
mala muerte) with rough and dilapidated furniture, and in that very place they were making plans 
for the slaughter {matanza) of the intruders {intrusos) at blows of machete {filo de o f  machete), 
not caring whether it was children, women or elderly people (ancianos)[.] [T]hey wanted to 
despoil them of their properties and make [the properties] their own, together with the mayor who 
was one like them {que era otro igual a el). They hated to death {odiaban a muerte) white people
22 In Peten, many rural communities and urban neighbourhoods have a salon social, that is a space 
dedicated to community meetings and communities activities. A salon social usually consists o f a thatched 
building with four posts.
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{la gente blanca) who did not speak their dialect {el dialecto), and for that reason they would call 
them foreign intruders {extranjeros intrusos). My intelligence service {servicio de inteligencia) 
informed me of what those dangerous people were plotting {tramar), in view of the seriousness of 
the matter, they called me via radio from San Luis to the capital and the Delegate of Colonisation 
informed me of how dangerous {peligroso) the municipio was becoming and that my presence 
was urgently needed. Given the seriousness of the problem I requested a special flight from the 
Fuerza Aerea  [Military Air Force] giving them all sorts of explanations on how delicate the 
matter was and they offered to take me to Poptunf.] [I] immediately made the connections via 
radio with the delegate in Machaquila, who immediately offered to meet me on landing in the 
company of another employee who spoke el dialecto, and the delegate in San Luis was informed 
and told to be ready for my arrival, the trip lasted about two hours, it was in the precise moment 
when the indial [mass of indigenous people, derogatory] was listening to their leader {lider) 
cacique and mayor {cacique y  alcalde), that we plunged upon them {habiendolos sorprendido) [.] 
On arrival, I noticed that many people were armed with sharp machetes, some sitting on benches, 
others on the floor and some in the proximity of the door. My accolade {comitiva) entered [the 
ranchon] like a whirlwind and we sat at the table {mesa directiva), pushing to one side numerous 
indios shucos [‘dirty indians’, strongly derogatory] who were talking like mad {hablaban como 
locos). I asked to speak and asked the mayor to be my translator unaware of the ‘pava  que era ’ 
[the sort he was] [.] I gave them a complete explanation of the work/programme of colonisation 
in the whole of Peten and specifically there with them, what our plans and programmes of work 
were and that the authoctonous people {oriundos) or residents {vivientes) of the place had no 
more right {mas derecho) of any of the new colonists {nuevos colonizadores), but that all had to 
be done in orderly fashion {ordenadamente), that we invited them to fill in their documents 
{documentos) and we would give them in ownership {propriedad) the sites where they were 
currently living or had cultivated plots (cultivos) [.] The mayor translated at his whim {a su 
antojo), lamenting my words {malogrando mis pa labras) and setting me against them
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(poniendome en contra de ellos), the FYDEP employee who knew the dialecto  told me: 
“Ingeniero, this character (individuo) is fooling you (lo esta fregando), he is telling them 
everything differently (les esta diciendo todo cambiado)” [.] The natives (nativos) were very 
angry and brandished their machetes signaling strife (a son de pelea). Seeing that attitude I pulled 
out my revolver 38 corto, I placed it on the table, removed the mayor from the table and imposed 
a new translator who told them that everything that the former translator has said were all lies 
(mentiras) and that I had six shots in the barrel (seis tiros en la recam ara), that the first person to 
cause any problems (problemas) was a dead man (hombre muerto) [.] The natives (nativos) 
started to understand (entender) what I had said clearly {mi exposicion clara), without false 
pretext {tapujo) and they calmed down their rage (se calmaron los animos), and in that instant 
two girls came in to sell pieces of zapote ,23 I indicated that they should be distributed to 
everybody and met the cost myself and this saved/rescued the situation. If it had been otherwise, 
we would have faced a zafarrancho with many casualties {muchos muertos). People understood 
the tragedy (tragedia) that may have ensued and how malicious {m al intencionado) the mayor 
was, so much so that he was filling their heads with lies {llenandoles la cabeza de mentiras) [.] 
Hence, they gave their consent {anuencia) and assurance {seguridad) that they accepted 
colonisation with enthusiasm {de buena gana), and that in the event of any problem arising, they 
would come to speak in person with the Delegate in the area, and that they would not count in any 
way in that character {individuo) who was placing them in a bad position {que lo estaba poniendo  
en mal). Thanks God and since that day everything proceeded well, there was harmony {armonia) 
and we would see the locals {los oriundos) regularly in the offices of the agronomist, as they 
would call on the perito  so that he would give them land {tierras) with its respective contract and 
they were no longer nomads {dejar de ser nomadas). In the end they entered the loop {el aro) and 
the consolidation {consolidacion) of all the problems of San Luis was achieved with no regard for 
{sin tom ar en cuenta) creed, colour, size, religion, language and ideology, as assistance {asesoria)
23 Fruit of a tree of the Sapotaceae family.
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was the same for one and for all {parejopara  u n o y  unopara  todos) [...] and the best thing was 
the injection of people from the Eastern regions {gente oriental) that the town received, new 
people {gente nueva) with different ideas, different and more developed customs {otras 
costum bres mas avanzadas), hardworking people {trabajadores de p e lo  en pecho), peoples 
(gentes) who would occupy mountainous lands full of infestations {plagas), snakes {culebras), 
tigers {tigres) and where there was only mud {lodo) [to start with]’ (Samayoa Rivera n.d:44).
Samayoa’s account is remarkable in the way it gives a sense of the violence inherent in
i
the process of colonisation of Peten, FYDEP’s encounter with the residents of San Luis, 
and the process through which govemmentality’s order was established. In the 
ethnographic present, conversations with ex-FYDEP employees confirmed Samayoa’s 
narrative. Don Militon, for instance, pointed out that migrants came looking for land 
{buscando tierra). ‘Esa era la ilusion de todos \  that is, land was everyone’s illusion. Don 
Militon differed from Samayoa in some respects, however. Moved by a similar ambition 
to document his experience of work in Peten, and aware of the historical weight of his 
role in the FYDEP Department of Colonisation, Don Militon harboured 
anthropological/ethnographic concerns. Based in the municipio of Dolores, he had taken 
an interest in the migrants who had settled there. In the course of our conversation, Don 
Militon argued that in Dolores, people had come mainly from Jocotan, Camotan and 
Chiquimula and added:
‘Here, they are pure Chorti {puros Chords). They don’t speak their language (idioma), nor do 
they practice/speak of their religious ceremonies {ceremonias religiosas). These people don’t tell 
you anything {soltar). They don’t want anyone to know {querer dar a conocer), not so much out 
of fear (m iedo), but rather out of selfishness {egoismo), I think. Many are nomads, they do not 
settle down {nomadas, no se  asientari)\
See Plates 1, 2 and 3, pages 298, 299, 300.
87
2.4 Cooperatives, Catholics and Comuneros
In the mid-1970s, the cooperatives that had been created as a ‘human wall’ -  to stave off 
the perceived threat of Mexican annexation -  were organising as Comunidades Catolicas 
(cf. CEH 1999). The impetus for this new form of community association was given by 
Catholic priests based in Peten, whose religious practice was informed by Liberation 
Theology.24 In an interview, a catequista and later guerrillero remembered his religious 
and political concientisation thus:
‘There was a group of priests here in Peten, the majority of them were from Spain and some from 
the United States. They stayed with the people (con el pueblo), giving them orientations 
(<orientandoles) towards... well, they would say that they raise up in arms {que se levantaran en 
armas), but in the courses (cwrsos) they would administer to us they would say that one had to 
fight because the kingdom of God was here on earth and we should not wait for anything beyond, 
on the contrary, that is here that we have to construct the kingdom of God {reino de Dios). Let’s 
try to better our condition (vivir mejor), to live well, to live in peace, God is just and God gave 
the world for everybody, not for one individual alone. So that is how we progressively raised our 
consciousness (<conscientizandose) [acquired class consciousness]’.
Cooperatives, however, were soon the target of Army intimidation to the extent that 
many resolved to flee over the border and into Mexico. A resident in one of the 
cooperatives remembered events during our conversation.
‘Of those who lived here, many left. They said, we don’t like the cooperative, so we will leave, 
and they left and the conflict started among those who stayed behind, there were those who
24 Liberation Theology developed in Latin America via a fusion of Marxism and readings of theological 
texts from ‘below’, which is from the perspective of the poor. Gutierrez, author of A Theology o f  Liberation 
([1971] 1988) argued that theology should be re-interpreted in local contexts and praxis, and in the 
struggles for social change and social justice.
wanted/supported the [idea of the] cooperative, and those who did not want cooperatives. Many 
left, others resisted, and others still went to live on the other side of the stream. And in the 
meantime, the issue of the conflict, of the war, was already there more or less, what were the 
questions of politics (asuntos politicos), not so much the army, but rather the guerrilla, well one 
would hear, I heard it very often, as one would hear that people were gathering on behalf of the 
guerrilla. And that at the same time, it was said that there were orejas (ears) and that there was a 
group that was working cooperatively [as a cooperative], and that the army was controlling that 
group the most, and that there was a list (listado) they had of a group already, and more than 
anything else, we started realising that it was us’.
Surveillance and intimidation were soon replaced by violent Army incursions into 
villages. As the resident of a cooperative on the Usumacinta river recalled,
‘The time came when I had my trabajadero25, and I was working and I had my milpa26 this high, 
around the month of June, when I went back [to the village] at about ten in the morning, everyone 
had left for the other side, for Mexico, because in Arbolito [cooperative] they had already 
massacred, and as they were saying that there was a list here, that the army had a list and that 
most of all was the group of, because they would not call us ‘cooperativistas ’, they would call us 
1 comuneros’, 'comuneros' they would say, they would not say the word ' comunis ta ' directly, and 
rather ‘comuneros', they would say. I, seeing that people had left, we also left for the other side, 
to Mexico. June 1981 is when we had to leave for the first time. On the other side, a person 
arrived who had been wounded in Arbolito, he arrived there with us, they had fired a shot here 
and it had exited here, but he didn’t die, but he had spend eight days in the jungle, wounded, and 
when they managed to locate him, he had worms already, it was very difficult to cure him. Well, 
there the Mexican authorities got us out, because when we returned here [they were sent back to
25 Cultivated plot of land.
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Guatemala], there was nobody left there [in Mexico], the people who got there got there by plane, 
we were thrown back here’. 27
Despite the violence suffered at the hands of the Army, community leaders recalled that 
at the time, they had no knowledge of la guerrilla. As they put it, 'para nosotros la 
guerrilla todavian no existian directamente\ that is, ‘for us, the guerrilla did not exist 
yet’. Three months later, however, they were forced to flee their communities again under 
the threat of army violence. The army had mistaken a man for a guerrillero and had 
ordered him to lead them to the campamento guerrillero. As the community leader 
remembered seeing the neighbour approach in Army uniform, it was clear to him they 
would have to leave everything behind and move fast. As they ran into the forest, fellow 
villagers gathered (concentrar en la selva) and eventually came across the guerrilla. The 
guerrilla, however, said they could not protect them. It was September 1981.
2.5 Routes in the ethnographic present
In contemporary Peten, most people come from somewhere else. For some Peteneros, 
this ‘elsewhere’ may be a few kilometres around the lake. They may live in San Benito, 
the urbanised conglomerate that extends up to the northwestern shores of Lake Peten Itza, 
and yet have come from El Remate, a village on the northweastem shore. They may say 
that once upon a time they were able to live off the land. The fertile soil for the milpa 
produced two cosechas (harvests) a year and other crops such as frijol (beans) and ayote 
(pumpkin) could be cultivated in the rancho and sold to the wealthy families of Flores, or 
in the market in Santa Elena. On the site of their gran platanal (plantain cultivation, 
approx. 30 trees) is now the incongruous cricket ground-like meadow of the Hotel 
Camino Real International. Years before, pressure to sell the land to the local developers 
and subsequent explicit threats (amenazas) resulted in that meagre one-off payment that 
supported the move to San Benito. Manual wage work thus replaced subsistence 
agriculture, and yet from the canoa (canoe), one can still see some of the plantain trees on
26 Maize crop.
27 For an in-depth analysis of the movements of the populations living in the cooperatives on the 
Usumacinta river in the early 1980s, see Van der Vaeren (2000).
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the lakeshore.
The distance people may have travelled to come and settle in Peten may have been a 
much longer journey that extended beyond the administrative boundaries of the 
departamento. For Surenos (southeners), those ‘de Oriente' (from the eastern regions) or 
Q’eqchi’ from the highlands of Alta Verapaz, the jouney may have been undertaken long 
ago, and people may care to mention a departamento and the municipio (municipality), 
rather than the town or aldea (village/hamlet) of ‘origin’. People in Peten may also have 
come from Europe or the United States. The long-standing presence of itinerant tourists 
has most recently acquired a new type of fellow foreign migrant. Post-1996, personnel of 
multi-lateral and non-governmental agencies have also come to settle more or less 
permanently and in relative comfort. Tourists, however, stick to their own routes, to and 
from Ancient Maya archaeological sites and to and from Mexico and los cayos (quays) of 
Belize, while gringo personnel roam around in four-wheel drives and reach the most 
remote aldeas on ‘serious business’. Like colonial officials, they take great pride in 
illustrating the extent and purpose of their worthwhile activities, aided by sinister maps 
tracking their ‘coverage’ and influence. What gringos share is access to privileged forms 
of travel.
Peten is and has been a site of more or less permanent residence, of struggles over land 
and resources, of legal and illegal trades, and, crucially, of travel. In and through Peten, 
people move willingly or unwillingly, voluntarily or forced, for different reasons and to 
different effects. Goods are bartered, traded and smuggled. There are routes of commerce 
to and from aldeas (villages), the cabecera of Flores (administrative capital of the 
region), the municipios and market towns of Santa Elena, San Benito, Santa Ana, 
Dolores, Poptun, San Luis, San Francisco, Sayaxche and La Libertad. People venture 
further afield, beyond the boundaries of the departamento to Izabal, Alta Verapaz and 
Guatemala City, and to Mexico and Belize. Three transport companies manage the 
human traffic from Peten to the capital, en route exposing social stratification based on 
the class of travel one is able to afford. One may travel on buses La Pinita or purchase a 
ticket for any of the differently priced buses La Fuente del Norte. Wealth affords you a
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trip on La Linea Dorada. The fast, colossal and air-conditioned Golden Line buses with 
uniformed attendants are deemed to guarantee gringo tourists what is culturally 
acknowledged to constitute adequate comfort and security. Were there asaltantes
» • 98(assailants) or ladrones (thieves) along the road, one cannot see how they would dare 
come in the way of the Golden Line. On La Pinita, one can travel through La Libertad, 
chasing oil pipelines to Betel. In the direction of Frontera Corozal, and Mexico, one is 
likely to move in the company of mojados, the illegal migrants (literally, ‘wet ones’) led 
through Peten by coyotes, the ringmasters leading the way to the ultimate trial, the United 
States/Mexican border.
Whatever the vehicle, many are and have been on the move. Migration in Peten consists 
of numerous displacements out of which people fashion a sense of permanence, 
subjectivity and sociality. To localise these multi-sited constituencies and trace histories, 
subjectivities and socialities, I also travelled. As noted by a Roman Catholic priest during 
our conversation,
‘The reality of Peten is extremely complex. We should not reduce reality to the single factor of 
the war. There are a number of other factors that mark the contemporary reality of Peten. Perhaps, 
the overwhelming factor is not war, but rather ‘displacement’ (desarraigo), that is, the 
configuration of a society, of some social collectives here in the departamento, an arrangement 
where social groups from the whole country are being joined, social groups that have come here 
due to different factors and for different reasons. Some came here searching for land, others have 
arrived fleeing from violence from Oriente or other parts of the country, they have come from 
Alta Verapaz to seek refuge from violence, others are fugitivos de la justicia (fleeing from the 
justice system), i.e. this is a refuge for people who have crimes on their shoulders. I think these
28 Asaltos entail stopping vehicles and stealing travelers’ belongings under the threat of weapons. During 
the conflict, asaltantes were said to be FAR guerrilleros/as gathering funds for the struggle, an accusation 
always robustly rejected by ex-guerrilleros/as themselves. Following the Peace Accords, asaltos in Peten 
have not decreased. Routes to the archaeological sites are prime targets, but the roads to El Naranjo and 
Guatemalan City are not immune. While I was in Peten, asaltantes stopped two buses on their way back 
from Tikal, kidnapped two foreign tourists and killed a Guatemalan tourist guide. Asaltos, like maras
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are the important factors’.
Tropes of indigeneity and settledness are antinomies of the ethnographic context I 
encountered. When these tropes surfaced, they did so independently of each other. In 
fact, desarraigo, or ‘displacement’ was the trope most commonly deployed by my 
interlocutors, across the peripheral and transverse region of migrants that makes up Peten. 
Indigenous and ladino ethnicities on the move constantly redraw the bounds of ethnos 
and of place. In July 2000 an ex-comandante of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes drew an 
image of Peten for me (reproduced below) while discussing the history of the guerrilla 
organisation and his own involvement in the insurgency. In trying to make sense of the 
movement and fluidity of the comandante's narrative, I added my own notes on the edges 
of the drawing after the interview, conscious of the fact that any attempt to fix what had 
been said and what the drawing represented, was an inept ethnographic stratagem.
See Map 3 , page 297.
In Peten I set out to follow a displacement within displacements. In 1999-2000, that is 
four years after the signing of the Peace Accords and about eighteen months after the 
dismantling of the temporary residence camps set up and overseen by the United Nations 
Mission to Guatemala (MINUGUA), ex-guerrilla combatants were on the move. Many of 
those who for some time in their lives held association with the Fuerzas Armadas 
Rebeldes (FAR) settled in Peten. Most of these, while lacking a definite locus of 
belonging were ‘coming home’ to the selva (jungle) that had housed them during the war 
years. Others had not attended the concentracion and never left Peten. Others still were 
travelling through the region having come from homes across national borders. A small 
number of those who had been active in the urban fronts or in the files ensconced in the 
Universidad San Carlos (San Carlos University) were visiting the land where their 
compaheros y compaheras had fought for years en la montaha (clandestinely), for the 
first time. Others still, having spent the years of La Insurgencia (The Insurgency) 
attending to matters other than la lucha armada (armed struggle), were reunited with
(youth gangs) are possibly two of the most feared types of crime in Post-Peace Accords Peten.
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militant relatives and were contextually and privately acquiring quasi-ex-guerrilla status. 
Ex-combatientes of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes appeared as a quintessential^ 
displaced, itinerant, porous and opaque constituency in a migratory region with old and 
new disputed external and internal borders , the latter being the reminder that while 
subjectivities may be in transit and socialities may be secretive and partial, the 
eschatology of empire had not disappeared:
‘porque los enemigos estaban latentes, como estan ahora en lo que es la vida politica, ellos 
nunca han descansado ni van a descansar\
‘as the enemies were latent/lurking then as they are now in political life. They have never 
rested and never rest’, as a dispersed ex-combatant poignantly said.
In these contexts, multi-sitedness stands for a reflexive awareness of the specific 
ethnographic and theoretical strategies through which anthropological knowledge comes 
into being (Marcus 1998). Multi-sitedness calls for a reconfiguration of the concept- 
metaphor of the ‘field’ in and through which ethnographic practice is undertaken, in 
spatial, temporal, methodological and epistemological terms. The delineation of what 
may constitute the ‘field’ of field-work as much as the ‘field’ of anthropology is a 
complex undertaking that relies on specific analytical and representational strategies to 
conjure up the object, subject, space and time of study (Clifford 1988, chapter 1, 1997, 
Fabian 1983, Fardon 1988, Hastrup 1990, 1995, Moore 1997). Multi-sitedness, as theory 
and practice (Marcus 1998) must however necessarily confront the fact that the task of 
providing a context for the intelligibility of ethnographic subjects is already marked, if 
not overdetermined by numerous teleologies and eschatologies. Thus, I take multi- 
sitedness here to refer to both an itinerant form of fieldwork that follows a fundamentally 
displaced constituency, i.e. a research practice that ‘followed the people’ (Marcus 1998) 
and a theoretical practice that traces routes through subjectivities and socialities marked
29 The new disputed internal borders in question are those of the Maya Biosphere. The relation between the 
creation of this Natural Reserve in 1990 and the agency of Empire, in the incarnation of USAID is explored 
below.
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by plural histories of conflict and cultures of secrecy, thus ‘following metaphors’ 
(Marcus 1998). I travelled through Peten following el desarraigo, the traces of 
insurgency and guerrilla secrecy.
302.6 Widows, lavado and death
Ethnography is a fragment of social reality (Clifford 1997), a shred of lived experience 
which, through specific representational practices, acquires a certain uncomfortable 
degree of permanence. One of the notable questions that arise out of the crystallization of 
the ‘field’ is confronting previous processes of sedimentation with related silences and 
disavowals. In the case of women who, following the Peace Accords and in the context of 
an increasingly visible, and hence easily surveilled civil society participation, identified 
themselves collectively as ‘widows’, the conflict features prominently in their narratives 
of displacement. In the 1980s, at the height of the counterinsurgency campaign waged by 
the Guatemalan government and army against insurgents and civilians, migrants who had 
come from the East of the country in search of land, or fleeing earlier waves of army 
violence, were making a living out of agricultural and/or commercial activities (milpa 
and tiendas) in Peten. However, their lives soon became embroiled in La Violencia. 
Personal rivalries or disagreements sometimes triggered episodes of violence, as personal 
disputes came to be settled by denouncing opponents to the Army as guerrilleros, and 
Army repression followed. Often, the suffering, intimidation, and murder, inflicted by the 
army on these settlers was seemingly random. Women remembered their experiences in 
conversations with me.
‘In the beginning, we dreaded everything, with that fear, that apprehension, that trembling. 
Before, in the time when they would kill people, we didn’t sleep. Before, they would haul up 
dead people into lorries, they would go and wash the lorries on the shore of the aguada around 
here, they would kill many people. In those times, on the Naranjo route, they would kill many 
people, they would even destroy their animals, it was a great pity to see people in this
30 Literally ‘washing, laundry’, it refers to the laundry hand washed by women in exchange for a small 
payment.
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predicament.’
* * *
‘We suffered greatly before, when there were those slaughters of people (<matazones), we lived
down below in a cooperative, we left and emerged in Sayaxche, and on and on and we came over
here, but after that, they killed my two sons, so we stayed. They got it wrong, they were looking
for somebody else, but they said it was them [my sons]. We were afraid before, the soldiers had
us, if only you had seen it, we could not even talk or anything.’
* * *
‘We suffered greatly in those times, we used to go from one place to the next fleeing the
shootings (fir ozones), we were in a finca and then came here, always in Peten, we were in a finca
far away, as one, being poor, has to work hard, so we were working there and had to come in this
direction, leaving everything behind...Was that the army? Well, one could not work it out
(iatinar), what we really feared were the shootings, we were not sure. Now my work is to look for
laundry, and when I have no laundry, I prepare food, tamales to sell.’
* * *
‘It happened to me in 1981,1 was living in the parcela of one of my sons-in-law. My son-in-law 
has an enemy (enemigo) to whom he owed 200 quetzales, so it was that man who started the 
trouble (fregada) ... so the man who charged my son-in-law 200 quetzales said, he went to 
accuse [L’s son-in-law] of being a guerrillero and in the night they came for him, but they did not 
find him, they found my son, because we were living in the same parcela. So it was him [L’s son] 
whom they killed, they came at two in the morning, that was in ‘81, at two in the morning, they 
dragged him out of the house, they dragged him out of bed, they killed him in the patio 
[courtyard] just like that, as they did not find my son-in-law, they killed him [L’s son] unjustly. 
And from this it went on, because they told us that if we did not leave, they were going to kill us 
all. This happened around La Nueva Libertad. And the one who betrayed us, it was him who 
came to hand him over. Imagine, I recognised him, that man [on the night of the murder], that it
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was him, the enemy of my son-in-law. “So, he is not here? Then kill that boy”. Well then, the 
army therefore killed my son. What they said was that they were going to come back for us, so 
what we did was that we left, we left all that we had there to waste, the house and everything else, 
and they took much of what was there, as my daughter had a tienda (shop), they took all the 
money off her, they took everything there was in the tienda, they put everything in costales 
(sacks) and they took everything with them and they left us with nothing, utter thieves, and they 
killed my son, and four more from La Nueva Libertad, there in front of the house they killed them 
too, together with my son. Imagine how hard (duro) was that year, ’81. So we fled, we went to 
Mexico for two years, and when Rios Montt came to power, we were told that one could draw 
near (arrimar), so we came back, after about two years.’
2.8 Q’eqchi’ Revuelto31 and Tzuul Taq’as in the Lowlands
Through apparent ethnographic serendipity and along the routes of ex-guerrilla secret 
socialities, I once met Oscarito, a Q’eqchi’ FAR ex-combatant. He recalled a visit to Alta 
Verapaz, while in the FAR files and gave an account of the ethnic configurations taking 
place in Peten.
‘One day, during the war, I got to Alta Verapaz [from Peten]. Everything looked different 
(idiferente) there. So I said to a man [in Q’eqchi’], may I have two chillies, and the man gave me 
four. I can’t speak Q’eqchi’ very well, I said, I come from Peten. That’s okay, the man said, to 
say “two”, you say wiib. Ah, so I said to him, I have almost lost/forgot (perder), as I can’t speak 
Q’eqchi’ anymore. And how is Peten, the man asked me. Ah, it’s very pretty (bonito), just like 
the area around Panzos [in Alta Verapaz]. We have to recognized we cannot speak properly 
anymore... they are pure Q’eqchi’ (puro q ’eqchi ^  in Alta Verapaz, we speak scrambled Q’eqchi’ 
(Q’eqchi’ revuelto). We are all scrambled up (revueltos) in Pet6n’.
31 Literally, ‘scrambled Q’eqchi” .
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According to Oscarito, Peten was a site of scrambled ethnicities and scrambled Q’eqchi’ 
indigeneity. On my way to visit an acquaintance, I sat on the camioneta (bus) and 
followed the unravelling of oil pipelines on the side of the road, to my destination. Once 
in the village, I looked for the person I had come to see and eventually ended up talking 
to one of the elders. Don Luis told me there were five tzuul taq 'as in the vicinity. Four 
were located within a two-kilometre radium, the closest at five hundred metres from the 
settlement. A fifth tzuul taq'a, Dona Rosa, was known to exist but the location had not 
yet been revealed. Don Luis told me the names of the tzuul taq 'as and said he would take 
me to the cueva (cave) Don Andres. On the way, we picked up Eulalio, who also wanted 
to go. The three of us walked in southwesterly direction for about half an hour across 
slightly hilly terrain, extricating ourselves through milpa and monte. We reached a small 
hill, and don Luis pointed to an opening on the slope, paused and took off his shoes. Out 
of his bag he drew candles and a bundle of pom (incence). He gave a candle to me and 
one to Eulalio. He held one himself, did the sign of the cross and said he would recite a 
Padre Nuestro, Ave Maria and Gloria. He prayed very quietly, did the sign of the cross 
again and entered the cave. Don Luis lit our candles, kneed down, and started to pray. I 
lost sight of Eulalio. While Don Luis prayed, he lit the pom and the cave was slowly 
filled with scent and smoke. He prayed for about ten minutes, then stood up and showed 
us the spots where they lay the candles when they ‘did mayejaid. He said he started 
using coloured candles after having attended a cursillo (course, workshop) in La 
Libertad. Before then, the candles he used were the colour of untreated wax. He showed 
us the spots for the candles and said they were located at the four cardinal points, entrada 
y  salida del sol, entrada y  salida del aire, entrance and exit of the sun, and entrance and 
exit of the air/wind. We walked around the cave and inspected the stalactites. Don Luis 
showed us a trap for tepezcuintles . He said people discovered the cave while hunting. 
Don Luis told me that only the chekel winq (male elders) visited la cueva don Pedro, 
while las senoras no conocen hasta alia, the ladies don’t know the site. I wondered about
32 Mayejak refers generally to religious offerings and celebrations.
33 Large rodent that lives in the wild.
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34my status, ixq (woman), winq (man), young or old, or just foreign. Perhaps gringa 
overrides gender and age in some instances. Don Luis was seventy-two and had lived in 
the village for eleven years. During the war, he said, the mayejak had been banned. 
However, when he moved to the village, he knew the tzuul taq’as were alive (vivos). He 
had known through a dream. The identities and locations of the tzuul taq’as were 
revealed to the chekel winq and chekel ixq in dreams. Don Luis told me that having 
attended a cursillo (course, workshop) in La Libertad, he did not like the idea of using 
candles of different colours. The sacerdote Maya (Maya priest) said there is no God 
(Dios), only tzuul taq ’a, and that they should only be concerned with the tzuul taq 'a. This 
we did not like, said Don Luis. To find out more about the dream, I should speak to Don 
Colax.
Whilst Oscarito had pointed to the ‘scrambled’ character of Q’eqchi’ identity in Peten 
and the loss of linguistic proficiency, Don Luis had dreamt the location and names of the 
tzuul taq’as soon after settling in the community in Peten. Don Luis worried about 
Q’eqchi’ culture, but did not strictly fear a progressive ladinoisation and related loss of 
Q’eqchi’ cultural and linguistic proficiency. Rather, his unequivocal dissent focused on 
formulations of Pan-Mayanist indigenismo with its newly fashioned religious orthodoxies 
and homogenised Pan-Mayan religious practices. He objected to the suggestion that 
candels used in religious practice should be of different colours, when he had always 
used plain wax candles. Similarly, he did not see why practices related to the tzuul taq ’as 
should be at odds with his belief in God, as the indigenista Maya priest had argued.
Histories of insurgency, counterinsurgency and multiple desarraigos (displacements) in 
and through Peten have been consistently demoted in anthropological records. With 
opacity and transience in mind, the anthropology of Peten must address the multiple 
histories of violence and the related cultures of secrecy that have unraveled from the 
second half of the 20th century to the ethnographic present day. It is through multi­
sitedness, as a methodological and analytical strategy, that contingency and partiality
34 Gringa implies foreigness in Guatemala. I explore the complex relationalities at stake in the term gringa 
in Chaper 4.
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emerge to qualify the ethnographic subjects, including the anthropologist. Multi-sitedness 
also requires that ad hoc epistemological and representational strategies be devised to 
counteract ontologies of presence and make space for partial, scrambled, complex and 
unelucidable ethnographic subjects.
See Plates 4 and 5, pages 301,302.
2.9 Contemporary Desarraigos: The Maya Biosphere
Histories of govemmentality in Peten and their links to violence, conflict and 
displacement did not end with the dismantlement of FYDEP in 1989. In 1990, the 
Guatemalan Government with the support of international donors, notably USAID, 
created the Maya Biosphere with the objective of preserving the tropical humid forest and 
the important archaeological remains scattered across it. A government institution was 
also established, namely the Consejo de Areas Protegidas (CONAP) to oversee the 
complex administration, management and surveillance of the newly ‘protected’ 
territories. The Maya Biosphere includes eight core areas known as zonas nucleo, where 
no human settlement is permitted. Among these are the archaeological site of Tikal, the 
National Park Laguna del Tigre and the National Park Sierra del Lacandon. A buffer zone 
known as zona de amortiguamiento and a multiple uses zone, known as zona de usos 
multiples where human activity is permitted, are also part of the Biosphere and fall under 
CONAP’s remit.35 CONAP’s operations are complemented by the operations of local and 
international non-govemmental organisations (cf. Sundberg 1998). Overall, the Maya 
Biosphere covers 21,000 square kilometres, equivalent to 68% of the overall surface of 
Peten (Griinberg 2001). Analyses concerning the rationale and management of the Maya 
Biosphere are often predicated on discourses about the ‘advancement of the agricultural 
frontier’ (cf. Effatin and Gramajo 2002, Griinberg 2001, Hayes, Sader and Schwartz 
2000), and the ‘population explosion’ that has seemingly characterised demographic 
patterns in Peten in the last thirty years. In fact, population estimates for the region of
35 As one of the ex-combatants pointed out, the head of CONAP in 2000 was a Capitan, an Army Captain. 
The local institutions of Peten were in the process of being re-militarised. As the combatant argued, el 
ejercito no se desmovilizo, hicieron la pantomima, per el ejercito no se desmovilizo, the Army did not 
demobilise, they did the pantomime, but the Army did not demobilised.
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Peten are highly contested and profoundly politicised. In current debates, they are 
underpinned by discourses concerning the progressive disappearance of a ‘forest society’ 
(Schwartz 1990) of sparse native populations engaged in shifting agriculture and forest 
extraction activities such as rubber tapping, and the relentless expansion of the 
agricultural frontier at the hands of land-thirsty migrants construed as responsible for 
deforestation, soil erosion and dented biodiversity (Sundberg 2002).36 As an example of 
typical neo-Malthusian hysteria, Grandia (2000) argues that the population of Peten has 
grown exponentially in recent years and may have surpassed the half million mark. Citing 
government statistics Carr (2001:365) states that ‘[s]ince the 1960s, the population of 
Peten has grown explosively from a few chicleros (rubber tappers) to approximately 
600,000 people’. Most demographic growth is imputed to migration of landless 
campesinos to Peten from other areas of the country in search of land.
In 2000,1 was told that three comunidades had been evicted from the Zona Nucleo of the 
Maya Biosphere. Moved to a ‘temporary’ site, the municipal authorities had promised 
that sufficient water would be supplied to the community with a water-carrier, until an 
agreement was reached as to a satisfactory resettlement. When I visited them, the 
representatives of the communities explained that they had been evicted from core areas, 
where no human activity was permited under the law that governs human settlement in 
and around the Maya Biosphere. I was told the three communities had been settled there 
for four years. They had first fled their villages following a massacre and since then, they 
had moved across the land, looking for a place where they could plant and harvest maize.
36 Consider the synopsis offered by the ‘Time-series Forest Change, Land Cover/Land Use Conversion, and 
Socio-economic Driving Forces in the Peten District, Guatemala’ carried out within the Land-Cover and 
Land-Usage Change (LCLUC) interdisciplinary scientific theme of United States National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA)’s Earth Science Enterprise (ESE):‘Until recently, the Peten has supported a 
low population relative to the more crowded and heavily deforested southern highlands of Guatemala. The 
traditional life of these people has included mainly shifting cultivation agriculture and the harvest of non­
timber forest products. This "forest society" of the Peten (Schwartz, 1990), and the livelihood of its people, 
is inextricably linked to the fate of the forest. This forest, despite legal protection, is being destroyed at an 
alarming rate. Forest is continually being cleared and its resources greatly taxed as human migration and 
the expansion of the agricultural frontier threatens the people and environment of the northern Peten (Sader 
et al., 1997). A thousand years ago, a postulated combination of factors including population growth, 
political instability and warfare, overuse of resources, climate change, and environmental destruction likely 
led to the collapse of the ancient Mayan civilization. A similar combination of factors threatens the forest 
and its inhabitants today, despite a much lower population and a much shorter time frame (Sever, 1998)’ 
(from NASA website).
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For a time, they had settled in a finca, but Army repression was still raging, and many of 
their relatives had died there,
‘We have suffered greatly, as if we were a pregnant person desiring things that we don’t have 
within our reach, when I think of that it gives me tristeza. The Army took us out and we went to 
the monte, they persecuted us as if we were animals’.
As we talked, it emerged that many of the men had been guerrilla combatants. One of 
them asked whether I wanted to see his carnet de desmovilizacion, and I replied that of 
course it was not necessary. We spoke of those both of us knew and I was told to give 
their regard to some of the ex-combatants I was due to see. The news of communities 
being evicted from the Maya Biosphere was not unusual in the ethnographic present, 
although the sight of three entire villages being made new refugees was new to me. 
Rolando, ex-FAR combatant, had spoken of how communities had been made into 
‘invadors’ and were evicted from their homes. We were discussing how difficult the 
resettlement had been for communities of returnees from Mexico, when he said:
‘This was the first problem with the communities of returnees, the quality of food [aid] was 
terrible {terrible), the maize that would arrive was not good to eat {llegaba el maiz que no era 
bueno para comer). And, now, imagine, there is a group who is currently being moved, and 
without any support/aid (apoyo). Well, there is support of sorts, from the Fondo de Tierra and 
CONAP, who are interested that they move (salir) from where they are because they are in a 
protected area {area protegida). They [Fondo de Tierra and CONAP] say that they will support 
the move {translado), and perhaps some aid enough for how many families there are. There are 
between fourty-two and fourty-four families. They were settled within the Buffer Zone {zona de 
amortiguamiento). They had to leave their village, as they were accused to be invadors {los 
acusaron de invasores). They wanted to evict them {desalojar), but they were fighting not to have 
to leave {estaban luchando de no salir de alii). And despite the fact that they [Fondo de Tierra
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and CONAP] would evict them, they [the community] would return to the site. They cultivate 
maize and earn a living with the logging trade (venta de lend). They are wood loggers (cortan la 
madera). So that when one visits, one sees all the trunks (lend) there, on the side of the road, 
that’s how they make a living’. 37
In 2000, Peten was the site of new displacements brought on by the regime of 
govemmentality that had replaced the FYDEP era. There appeared to be new systems of 
govemmentality and new practices of surveillance. For instance, an international non­
governmental organisation held a database of profiles of 196 settlements located within 
the Maya Biosphere, detailing name and type of settlement, ethnicity, language, 
provenance, community organisation, date of foundation, access to water, health, 
education, economic activities, land tenure, accessibility, population, etc. The Base de 
Datos Sobre Poblacion, Tierra y  Medio Ambiente en La Reserva de la Biosphera Maya: 
Peten, Guatemala (Griinberg and Ramos 1999) was published with the aims of 
‘documenting the great diversity of sociedad campesina in the north of Peten, which is 
part of the ecosystems of the region and which is transforming them in their new habitat; 
promote a realistic vision of the agricultural and cattle-farming frontier of Peten to realise 
agrarian policy which is consistently directed towards socio-environmental consolidation 
of Peten; divulge knowledge about comunidades campesinas who migrated to Peten in 
search of a permanent space for life and peace’ (Griinberg and Ramos 1999, 
Introduction). It can’t have occurred to the authors that their seemingly benevolent aims 
were in fact the mark of the role increasingly assumed by NGOs in surveillance of the 
population, and that the database itself may amount to most elegant intelligence. In any 
case, everyone’s activities in Peten were being surveilled from space.
See Plate 6, page 303.
37 The law that regulated the activities of Fondo de Tierra had just been published and circulated in 2000 
and was still provisional. In 2001 a full lregulamento‘ was expected, to make the operations of the Fondo 
de Tierra work in practice. As it happens, this community was finally granted access to some land and 
relocated to a jinca. The new settlement had no transport links of any sort, and people had to procede on 
foot to reach the community, or any neighbouring settlemt. In May 2004, I was told that land had been 
granted to the community in conjunction with a project to grow plantain. Despite the generally insalubrious 
conditions of the site, the quality of the soil was extremely good, and the plaintain crop had yielded an 
extremely satisfactory harvest. However, given the location of the settlement, it had been impossible to
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2.11 Conclusion
One of the tasks of anthropology has been, historically, understanding and representing 
the partiality, complexity and disruptions of regions like Peten. In traditions of 
anthropology, social, cultural, and historical, processes -  like those which characterised 
social life in Peten -  have been figured through coherent wholes and entities, strong 
narrative histories, and discrete geographical locations. In my figuring of the social 
reality of Peten, I have opted for a different analytical strategy and one which seeks to 
represent the overlapping complexities that produced the region of Peten. However, 
histories of colonisation, militarisation, violence and displacement have not been equated 
with any notion of social breakdown. Rather than relying on meta-narratives that 
presuppose continuity and that posit permanence and stability as necessary conditions for 
the functioning of the social realm and for its representation, I have stressed complexity 
and ‘plurality in context’. The emphasis on multiple, rather than singular, teleologies of 
social change -  their multifaceted interactions and effects -  is still underpinned by 
theoretical models. Anthropologists have imagined plurality in different perspectives and 
scales. Their theories have been systemic: they have imagined the social and cultural 
realm to be made up of coherent units such as the ‘community’, the ‘ethnic group’ and 
the ‘municipio’. Systemic models are being progressively supplanted by theoretical 
models that emphasise fragmentation within and between units -  with the effect that units 
increasingly appear to be porous entities which contain plurality within, and produce 
plurality without, in complex ways (Moore 2004). In the next chapter I consider the limit 
of the anthropological claim of plurality, and I explore the condition of possibility of 
post-plural scales and their potential for anthropological theory and practice.
trade the crop.
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Chapter 3 
Towards Weak Description and Thick Nihilism
‘From the basis of what we ... call the centre (and which, because it can be either inside or 
outside, is readily called the origin as end, as readily arche as telos), the repetitions, the 
substitution, the transformations, and the permutations are always taken from a history of 
meaning [sens] -  that is, a history, period -  whose origin may always be revealed or whose end 
may always be anticipated in the form of presence. This is why one could perhaps say that the 
movement of any archaeology, like that of any eschatology, is an accomplice of this reduction of 
the structurality of structure and always attempts to conceive of structure from the basis of a full 
presence which is out of play’.
(Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play, 1970:248)
‘Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests?’
(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, [1901] 1967, Book One, Paragraph 1)
‘Those who fancy themselves free of nihilism perhaps push forward its development most 
fundamentally’.
(Martin Heidegger cited in Rabinow 1983:52)
‘If anthropology is permanently in crisis, then the reason may plausibly be sought in the audacity 
of the ambition to write ethnography at all’.
(Richard Fardon, Localizing Strategies, 1990:22)
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3.1 Introduction
‘Nihilism is a modem term and a modem problem. It rises as an issue in society and in reflections 
on society is roughly coincident with the rise of modem social sciences. If, following Nietzsche, 
we see nihilism as the equating of all beings, the levelling of meaningful differentiation, the 
transvaluation of all values, then it might appear logical that anthropology should have escaped 
this cultural process. A field whose very foundations rest on the existence of an Other -  different 
ways of being human -  ought to be the locus of the preservation of difference. I will argue (...) 
that, despite itself, American cultural anthropology has had the opposite effect’ (Rabinow 
1983:52).
In the previous chapters, I traced the contexts in and through which the anthropological 
object/subject of study of the present research comes into being. In this chapter, I wish to 
explore the conditions of possibility of anthropological inquiry in greater depth. As noted 
previously, anthropology, with its preoccupation with difference, however marked, has 
historically relied upon specific knowledge practices in order to conjure up its object. 
According to Rabinow (1983:52, see quotation above), since the early twentieth century, 
the discipline has been founded on the recognition of the ‘existence of an Other’. This 
longstanding disciplinary preoccupation has engendered a number of epistemological 
positions and related knowledge practices which have sought to identify, describe, 
explain and often enfranchise multiple culturally marked Others. Following the 
pioneering work of Franz Boas, twentieth century anthropology’s claims for the 
recognition of the inherent humanity of the Other were coupled with the dictum that the 
Other be understood in its own terms.1 Thus, modem anthropology marked out a plurality
1 In Chapter 1 I commented on the role of Malinowski’s work in establishing the canon for anthropological 
practices of ‘centring’ and ‘contextualisation’ of the Other in British social anthropology. In the present 
Chapter, I discuss the work of Franz Boas and his influence on traditions of American cultural 
anthropology. Were the founders of the disciplines to be inscribed within a history of metaphysics - and 
hence, within a history of nihilism - differences as well as similarities between them would require 
analysis. Both Boas and Malinowski worked against evolutionism, the former developing diffusionism and 
the latter functionalism. Despite their differences, both made arguments for the Other to be understood in 
its own terms.
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of Others, to which corresponded a plurality of worldviews (Rabinow 1983, Stocking 
1974). The status of anthropology as a science rested not simply on taxonomic ordering, 
but also on pluralisation of values. Such pluralisation arose from the proposition that each 
Other coincided with a culture, and each culture with a specific value system. The 
multiplicity of value systems was no longer to be arranged in evolutionary and/or 
ethnocentric classifications. Rather, ‘each culture was seen as distinctive, each people had 
its own genius -  there was no way to rank them’ (Rabinow 1983:56). Although 
ethnocentric hierarchical orderings no longer obtained, it was the task of the 
professionally trained anthropologist to discern the individual elements that made up each 
culture and to elucidate the coherence and rationale of culturally specific value systems. 
This ensured that each culture appeared as one of a plurality of legitimate manifestations 
of humanity. Nevertheless, it was the prerogative of the anthropologist, rather than 
culturally marked subjects themselves, to point to cultural wholes, their constitutive 
elements, rationales and inner workings (Rabinow 1983:56). Granted that there were 
many cultures -  and as many value systems -to be understood in their own terms, 
evaluation, or judgement, of the Other’s worldview according to Western standards was 
invalidated. The challenge to ethnocentrism spearheaded by Franz Boas was therefore 
also a potent argument for cultural relativism (Rabinow 1983). The articulation and 
defence of cultural relativism were enshrined in traditions of American cultural 
anthropology that spanned most of the twentieth century (Rabinow ibid). Cultural 
relativism infused symbolic anthropology and became a cornerstone of the interpretative 
anthropology devised by Clifford Geertz (1973, 1983, 2000). In sum, modem 
anthropology sought to make the Other intelligible, contextualised and commensurable, 
while also making a case for alterity’s radical irreducibility to and incommensurability 
with the Same. Since Boas, taxonomy and pluralisation have engendered forms of 
relativisation.
It is Rabinow’s contention (1983) that the epistemologies and related knowledge
2 Note how relevant this is for the traditions of Guatemalan anthropology up to the mid-twentieth century 
discussed in Chapter 1.
3 Through anthropology, cultures have appeared to some extent commensurable, cross-culturally 
intelligible and grounded on a shared humanity, yet at the same time incommensurable in the sense that
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practices deployed by cultural relativist anthropology to mark out the Other on the 
Other’s own terms, in fact resulted in various kinds of erasure of difference. 
Paradoxically, given the progressive intentions of its practitioners4, the recognition of 
alterity produced simultaneous disavowals of the Other. In order for alterity to be 
apprehended, anthropology engendered a suspension of some of the claims made by the 
Other, notably claims as to the truth and seriousness of the Other’s cultural statements 
(Rabinow ibid).5 The flattening out of difference engendered in cultural relativism 
Rabinow considers a symptom of nihilism. In his definition, nihilism amounts to a 
‘cultural process’ that produces ‘the equation of all beings, the levelling of meaningful 
differentiation, the transvaluation of all values’ (Rabinow 1983: 52, see also quotation 
above). A feature of modernity, nihilism is an inexpedient consequence that befalls 
anthropology, mostly despite practitioners’ intentions. In other words, anthropologists 
may have set out to clear a space for alterity, but in the process, they unwittingly reduced 
alterity to the Same. They did so through specific knowledge practices which were 
deployed to mark out the Other, but that resulted in certain erasure of alterity, marred as 
they were by the cultural symptom of modernity, namely nihilism.
Rabinow’s analysis points to a number of interrelated questions, namely (i) the status of 
cultural relativism in (cultural) anthropology and its consequences for disciplinary 
understandings of alterity; (ii) the status and implications of knowledge practices related 
to identification and contextualisation of alterity, that is, knowledge practices through 
which the Other is made into an object of knowledge, identified, explicated and 
contextualised; (iii) the processes of (historical/cultural) determination of anthropology as 
a discipline steeped in modernity, and thus marked by ‘cultural processes’ such as 
nihilism; (iv) more broadly, the issues of how exactly may nihilism have befallen 
anthropology, and what the place of nihilism may be within the discipline.6 Rabinow
each culture has been made to appear unique, specific and irreducible.
4 Rabinow (1983) argues that the progressive intentions of Franz Boas, notably his anti-racist stance, were 
not matched in the cultural relativism espoused by Clifford Geertz. While the premise of cultural relativist 
arguments was eminently political in the mid-1930s, Rabinow (ibid) suggests this was no longer the case 
for the 1970s and with regard to the work of Geertz in particular. I discuss this point in greater depth in the 
section on ‘Anti-anti Relativism and Nihilism as Event’, below.
5 1 discuss this point in greater depth in the section on ‘Anti-Nihilism and the Double Negative’, below.
6 Thus, one of the tasks at hand is to anthropologise anthropology, or to think anthropologically about
(1983) frames these questions in terms of an analysis of anthropology as the site of both 
relativisation - as in the claims for the recognition of the existence of multiple, relative, 
discrete and self-determined cultures and related value systems - and universalism - as in 
the premise that cultural multiplicity may be underpinned by a shared and universal 
human condition. In what follows, I propose a shift or re-orientation of the ways these 
questions may be said to shed light on each other. To begin with, it seems important to 
engage with processes of determination of anthropology as a discipline concerned with 
locating the Other and making its values intelligible, as well as with pointing to a 
plurality of non-rankable Others and their values. I propose to address the dual 
labour/predicament of ‘centring’, ‘contextualising’ and ‘commensurability-creation’ on 
the one hand, and ‘relati vising/decentring’, ‘out-contextualisation’ and 
‘incommensurability-creation’ on the other hand, and to do so through a distancing effect 
that recasts the project(-s) of anthropology within a history of Western metaphysics.
I discuss Derrida’s reading (1970) of Levi-Strauss’s texts ([1949] 1969) as an elegant 
critique of metaphysics that takes place at the very site of anthropology. The detour 
through Derrida (1970)7 allows for a close reflection on how anthropology engenders 
moments of ‘centring’. Derrida (ibid) argues that in the work of Levi-Strauss 
anthropology produces ‘centres’ through the incitement of ‘structure’, most notably in the 
form of the analytical distinction between nature and culture. In turn, anthropology 
appears as a site at which the structurality of structure is destabilised by ‘events’. 
‘Events’ such as the ‘incest prohibition’ are categories that by appearing at once natural 
and cultural, both universal and particular, expose the sense in which the centre of the 
structure is not amenable to structurality. The centre of the structure is a site of play, a 
(non-)locus of continuous and multiple permutations (Derrida 1970). Through the lens of 
deconstruction, (anthropological) processes of simultaneous centring and decentring, and, 
in turn, of univeralisation and relativisation of alterity are highlighted. As argued by 
Derrida, there is yet a further sense in which anthropology decentres. By pointing to other
anthropology.
7 A number of issues are at stake here, namely a) what exactly does Derrida add to the analysis; b) what the 
place of anthropology may be within Western metaphysics; c) why consider the place anthropology within 
the history of Western metaphysics; d) why question the nature and status of the discipline of anthropology.
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centres, anthropology in and of itself constitutes an ‘event’ that effects a decentring of the 
self-referential quality of Western metaphysics. Deconstruction thus allows for a 
reflection on processes of centring and decentring that take place in and through the 
discipline of anthropology. Further, I argue that by recasting anthropology within 
Western metaphysics, deconstruction in turn permits a consideration of anthropology’s 
place within a history of nihilism.
The task of elucidating what the place of anthropology may be within Western 
metaphysics inspired by deconstruction informs my exploration of some of the issues 
flagged up by Rabinow, but produces a notable expansion of the field under 
consideration. I take Derrida’s critique (1970) and his detection/production of ‘events’ 
and instances of ‘rupture’ in Levi-Strauss’s texts ([1949] 1969) and in Western 
metaphysics, to inform my own interrogations of the presuppositions inherent in the 
anthropological enterprise in general, and in hermeneutics-infused anthropology in 
particular. Specifically, focussing on Clifford Geertz’s programme of ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz 1973), I critically consider how the position of anthropology within Western 
metaphysics may be implicated in anthropological knowledge practices related to 
‘centring’ alterity, making it intelligible and contextualised. Drawing on critical 
scholarship on hermeneutics-infused anthropology (cf. Greenblatt 1999, Marcus 1999, 
Ortner 1995, 1999), I note that three important questions emerge from an analysis of the 
potential and limitations of ‘thick description’. First is the problem of ‘ethnographic 
refusal’ understood as a ‘refusal of thickness, a failure of holism or density’ in 
anthropological accounts (Ortner 1995:174). This, I argue, leads on to questions as to 
what the status of ‘ethnographic refusal’ may be, and how one may produce intelligibility 
when the Other resists and/or engages in the ethnographic encounter through negation 
and disavowal. Second, I consider how ‘thick description’ marks out social and cultural 
wholes, thus effecting contextualisation. I problematise hermeneutic practices of ‘scale 
hopping’ and argue that they rely on the establishment of equivalence among entities 
which present themselves in different scales, thus reducing hermeneutics to a metatheory 
of generalised and universal interpretative phenomena (Vattimo 1997). Third, I ask what 
may be at stake in anthropological hermeneutic practices which, in an effort to ‘thicken’
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ethnography, produce/incite pluralisation and multiplication of the social and cultural 
realm, and of social and cultural subjects. The three interrelated questions of refusal, 
equivalence and pluralisation are by no means exhaustive. Yet, they are profoundly 
relevant to the material presented in the chapters that follow. Most importantly, they are 
suggestive of instances of ‘rupture’ in Geertz’s texts. I argue that what presents itself as 
‘rupture’ in Geertz’s work is the ‘event’ of nihilism. In an effort to elicit and pursue the 
point, I review Geertz’ explicit denials, rebukes and disavowals of nihilism and set these 
against Rabinow’s (1983) accusatory glare. As I was reminded in the field, one is to be 
suspicious of those who say too much. Disclaimers often constitute assertions. Beneath 
the apparent controversy over (cultural) relativism, and despite themselves, both Geertz 
and Rabinow operate with double negatives and ‘push nihilism forth most fundamentally’ 
(Heidegger cited in Rabinow 1983:52).
To say that nihilism constitutes an ‘event’ in hermeneutic-infused anthropology is to 
consider anthropological knowledge practices (and its practitioners) in a non trivial sense 
historical. It is to re-inscribe anthropology as substantively located within a history of 
Western metaphysics, and thus a history of nihilism and of Being (cf. Nietzsche 1974; 
Heidegger [1962] 2002, Vattimo 1997). In other words, it is to re-inscribe anthropology 
within a Nietzschean/Heideggerian horizon. In Vattimo’s terms (1981, 1983, 1991, 1992, 
1997), hermeneutics is a narrative of modernity and as such, it is located within the 
histories of nihilism and Being which legitimate it and give it its provenance (Vattimo 
1997:12). Since Nietzsche and Heidegger, the history of Being has been characterised by 
a progressive weakening of strong structures such as Reason, Truth, Man. Nietzsche 
moved from the announcement of the death of God (Nietzsche [1887] 1974), and the 
negation of the value of Truth. The Nietzschean announcement of the death of God does 
not amount to a ‘metaphysical enunciation of the non-existence of God; it aims to be the 
acknowledgement of an “event”, given that the death of God is, first and foremost, the 
end of the stable structure of Being, and hence [the end] of any possibility to enunciate 
whether God exists or does not exist’ (Vattimo 1983:21, my translation). According to 
Nietzsche, the announcement of the death of God coincides with a form of nihilism, that 
is, with the “‘devaluation of the highest values” and the real world’s becoming a fable.
I l l
There are no facts, only interpretations; and this too is an interpretation’ (Vattimo 
1997:12), Grounded in readings of Nietzsche’s opus, Heidegger’s ontology focuses on 
the question of ‘Being’. Moving from the ontological distinction between ‘beings’, that is 
entities that are, and Being, that is the underpinning of entities’ being, Heidegger argues 
that ‘Being’ is most usefully understood as ‘Dasein Linking the question of Being to 
temporality, Heidegger suggests that Being is always already being-in-the-world, and 
thus can only be grasped in terms of ‘becoming’ (Heidegger [1962] 2002). Following 
Heidegger, Being is no longer viewed as the stable and immutable grounding of 
metaphysics and ontology, or as the overcoming (Uberwindung) of dialectics. Being in 
Heideggerian terms is historical in the sense of its location within a ‘horizon’ and a 
‘legacy’. According to Vattimo, Heideggerian ontology is a ‘weak ontology’ in the sense 
that it is the product of a radical rethinking of the meaning of Being which results in 
‘taking leave of metaphysic Being and its strong traits’ (Vattimo 1988:85-6). In the light 
of the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics and Heideggerian weak ontology, Vattimo 
argues (1997:7) that ‘there can be no recognition of the essentially interpretative 
character of the experience of the true without the death of God and without the fabling 
of the world, or, which amounts to the same thing, of Being. In short, it seems impossible 
to provide the truth of hermeneutics other than by presenting it as the response to a 
history of Being interpreted as the occurrence of nihilism’. The foundations of Western 
thought thus appear to have been progressively weakened. This has engendered the 
conditions of possibility for post-metaphysical ‘weak thought’ (Vattimo 1983). ‘Weak 
thought’ takes leave from strong categories of traditional metaphysics, and accepts post- 
Nietzschean lack of foundations, absence of certitudes and demise of truth. Whilst strong 
categories may be abandoned in weak thought, they are not replaced by as categorical an 
absence. Neither does ‘weak thought’ supersede traditional metaphysics in linear 
developmental succession. Rather, following Heidegger, Vattimo argues that weak 
thought proceeds from an awareness of its own temporality, one that occurs within the 
horizon of a weakening metaphysics, and not beyond it. In other words, ‘weak thought’ 
stands for the philosophy of postmodemity concerned with the ‘fictionalised experience 
of reality, namely hermeneutic ontology’ (1983:xxii, emphasis in the original). Granted 
that Being can only be in terms of continuous becoming, ‘[o]ntology is nothing other than
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the interpretation of our condition or situation, since Being is nothing apart from its own 
“event”, which occurs when it historicises itself and when we historicise ourselves’ 
(Vattimo 1983:3, my translation). As summed up by Snyder, [t]he philosophy of 
hermeneutic ontology or ‘weak thought’ primarily relies upon a strategy of 
‘destructuration’. This strategy requires that the governing discursive forms of Western 
culture, and all their claims to possessing the truth or to operating according to scientific 
logic, be revealed -  through a nihilistic analysis that “destructures” or “deconstructs” 
them -  to be only interpretations’ (Snyder 1988:xxii-xxiii).
I propose to analyse the project(-s) of anthropology and the present research in and 
through ‘weak thought’ to recover a place for anthropology within the Nietzschean 
history of nihilism and the Heideggerian history of Being, thus recovering a sense of 
anthropology’s nihilist vocation and temporality. I note that as weak thought and nihilism 
occur within a horizon, they are inherited and have left traces I can pursue. Traces of 
anthropological ‘weak thought’ are to an extent ‘already there’, albeit unmarked and 
unclaimed. Since the mid-1960s, Marilyn Strathem has been concerned with, inter alia, 
questions of partiality, relationality and relativisation (cf. Strathem 1972, 1981, 1988, 
1991, 1995a, 1999). Strathem’s analyses eschew strong metaphysical claims to delineate 
fictionalised experiences of reality instead. Insofar as they may be said to defy ‘strong 
thought’, scientism, objectivity and realism, Strathem’s texts make explicit the artifice of 
anthropological knowledge practices.8 Strathem’s texts may thus be read as ‘weak’ in the 
nihilist sense of the term proposed by Vattimo. Whilst they clearly operate within a 
horizon, namely the tradition of anthropology, they continuously call disciplinary 
categories and theoretical presuppositions into question. Strathem exposes a progressive 
weakening of anthropological foundations, which may be considered to be contiguous 
with the advancement of anthropological nihilism. Strathem (cf. 1988, 1999) is 
concerned with the veracity and materiality of the ethnographic encounter, as much as 
with the task of bringing into view the labour of fabrication that coincides with it, and 
with ethnographic analysis and interpretation. Her concern with ‘fabrication’, which one
8 See also Moore’s discussion of a feminist anthropologist’s ‘anthropological imagination’ (Moore 
1994:129-150).
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could rephrase in Nietzschean terms as ‘fabling’, is deeply analytical. Rapport 
(1997:658), notes that in Strathem’s work, ‘complexity of phenomena -including their 
contradictoriness -  need not give way in analysis to any more systematic representations 
of division and conjunction’. Strathem is able to ‘maintain a sense of the provisional and 
tentative nature of anthropological accounting’, and does so through polemics, namely 
‘the continual overflowing of extant analytical categories, so that the social world is 
continually apprehended anew’ (Rapport 1997:658, my emphasis). It is provisionality and 
tentativeness which I wish to inscribe within a genealogy of ‘weak thought’, as they 
inform the contingency of my ethnographic accounts. Overflow is also important. In the 
forthcoming chapters, I hope to be able to show that the anthropological subjects of the 
present research continuously spill over. They overflow in and through their names and 
the ‘epistemic murk’ (Taussig 1986) of subjectivities and sociality marked by 
experiences of the conflict. They pour out of their own accounts, and by so doing, they 
tell tales of how they have exceeded their own frames as much as the frames of others. 
Along with the ethnographer, they conjure up further analytical categories and relations, 
making sense of complex encounters and experiences. Overflow of subjectivities and 
socialities often occurs through refusal, containment and negative relationalities. The 
thesis is thus borne out of an attempt at apprehending the constant shifting of positions 
thus engendered, and representing the shifts of positions throughout. Juxtaposing 
anthropological and ethnographic texts, in Chapter One I sought to give a sense of the 
shifting contexts and perspectives that make up the field of the anthropology of 
Guatemala. Through the artifice of switches in perspective, in Chapter Two I aimed to 
bring into view what I deemed had been left ‘out of context’, namely Peten. Thus, I also 
highlighted ‘plurality in context’. The task of the present chapter is to explore the 
presuppositions that make these shifts amenable to experience, reflection and 
representation. As the point is the shifting of positions all the way through, and how we 
may have come to think merographically (Strathem 1999:246), what follows is an 
alternation of perspectives through which the site of anthropology is made to appear. It 
seems obligatory to begin obliquely.
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3.2 A Critique of Metaphysics on the Site of Anthropology
‘Language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique’
(Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play, 1970: 254)
In Structure, Sign and Play, Derrida (1970) proposes to subject the concept of structure in 
Western metaphysics to critical scrutiny. Derrida notes that structure is predicated on a 
centre or origin whose uniqueness produces the structurality of the structure, but is not 
itself amenable to structurality. Whilst the establishment of a centre may enable a certain 
free-play of relative elements, it is at the centre that free-play is inhibited, lest the 
structure lose its structurality. Indeed, Derrida points out that ‘the centre is, paradoxically, 
within the structure and outside it’ (ibid:248, emphasis in the original). While coherence 
seems to ensue from the centring of the structure, the recognition that the centre is both 
part and alien to the structure leads to a re-evaluation of how coherence obtains. 
Coherence is not the product of centring, but it arises from the contradictory condition of 
the centre and ‘the force of a desire’ that a centred structure be maintained, despite the 
free-play with which it is connoted and through which it is constituted (ibid:248). Derrida 
argues that ‘the repetitions, the substitutions, the transformations and the permutations’ 
(ibid) actually connote the structure, as the desire for coherence and immobility conjures 
up the presence of a centre. This ‘determination of being as presence’ is said to 
characterise the history of metaphysics in the West (Derrida 1970:249, see also 
Heidegger [1962] 2002, Nietzsche [1930] 1969). Within the history of Western 
metaphysics, Derrida points to the ‘event’, or ‘rupture’, that in his view has accompanied 
the origin of the structure as predicated upon a centre or presence that requires to be 
constantly reinstated. The recognition of the origin and the structure on the one hand, and 
the claim to a centre and presence on the other hand, incite the elucidation of the 
principles through which centred structure and central presence come into being.
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However, as the deferred centre and claim to presence need continuous restatement, the 
centre appears to be a ‘non-locus’ which is the site of permutation.9
Derrida inscribes his analysis of ‘structure’ and its relations to metaphysics of presence 
within a Nietzschean/Heiddegerian genealogy that provides critique and deconstruction 
of Western metaphysics (ibid 250). What is of specific interest here, however, and what I 
wish to highlight, is the propinquity at least, and the (deferred) centrality at best, of the 
subject of anthropology to Derrida’s arguments. Derrida actually addresses ethnology and 
not anthropology directly (ibid: 251).10 However he does incisively point to the fact that 
within the history of Western metaphysics, the birth of ethnology may be taken to 
constitute an ‘event’ or a ‘rupture’, that is, a moment of dislocation predicated on 
ethnology’s challenge to ethnocentrism.
‘One can assume that ethnology could have been bom as a science only at the moment when a de­
centring had come about: at the moment when European culture -  and, in consequence, the 
history of metaphysics and of its concepts -  had been dislocated, driven from its locus, and forced 
to stop considering itself as the culture of reference ... One can say in total assurance that there is 
nothing fortuitous about the fact that the critique of ethnocentrism -  the very condition of 
ethnology -  should be systematically and historically contemporaneous with the destruction of
9 ‘From then on it became necessary to think the law which governed, as it were, the desire for the centre in 
the constitution of the structure and the process of signification prescribing its placements and its 
substitutions for this law of the central presence -  but a central presence which was never itself, which has 
always already been transported outside itself in its surrogate. The surrogate does not substitute itself for 
anything which has somehow pre-existed it. From then on it was probably necessary to begin to think that 
there was no centre, that the centre could not be thought in the form of a being-present, that the centre had 
no natural locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number o f sign-substitutions came 
into play. This moment was that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that in which, in the 
absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse -  provided we can agree on this word -  that is to 
say, when everything became a system where the central signified, is never absolutely present outside a 
system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of 
signification ad infinitum' (Derrida 1970:249).
10 I argue that in view of Derrida’s characterisation of ethnology as ‘critique of ethnocentrism’, it is 
unproblematic to bring his arguments to bear on anthropology in general. Conversely, it could be contested 
that the problem lies not so much in the distinction between ethnology and anthropology, but rather, that 
the very characterisation of either or both in terms of anti-ethnocentrism is inaccurate, as not all 
ethnologies/anthropologies sought to pose such a challenge (see for instance Geertz 2000:42-67). This 
point is to an extent addressed by Derrida, who eschews any voluntarism in the practitioners and recasts the
116
the history o f metaphysics’ (Derrida 1970: 251-252, emphasis in the original).
The equation of ethnology with/a challenge to ethnocentrism may extend Derrida’s 
arguments to the discipline of anthropology as a whole, and to distinct national 
ethnologic and anthropological traditions. Indeed, Derrida’s characterisation of ethnology 
as a science centred on a challenge to ethnocentrism is founded on the identification of 
the discourse, or the horizon, to use a Heideggerian term, within which ethnology and 
anthropology came into being. The intentions of individual practitioners, or the 
orientations of specific traditions are not the point, as it is within the discourse and 
horizon of Western metaphysics that ethnology/anthropology effect(-s) rupture. 
Ethnology displaces a centre, namely the self-referential quality of Western culture, and 
by pointing to other possible centres, it ruptures the Western metaphysics of presence. In 
turn, the struggle with ethnocentrism does not exempt ethnology from the conditions of 
Western metaphysical discourse. Rather, ethnology operates within the very structure it 
sets out to challenge. Thus, the critique of ethnocentrism is always implicated in 
ethnocentrism, without any voluntarism or historical determination.
‘Ethnology -  like any science -  comes about within the element of discourse. And it is primarily 
a European science employing traditional concepts, however much it may struggle against them. 
Consequently, whether he [sic] wants to or not -  and this does not depend on a decision on his 
[ric] part -  the ethnologist accepts into his [sic] discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the 
very moment when he [sic] is employed in denouncing them. This necessity is irreducible; it is 
not a historical contingency’ (Derrida 1970:252).
Derrida illustrates his arguments with reference to the work of Levi-Strauss, and 
specifically the axiomatic distinction between nature and culture proposed in The 
Elementary Structures o f Kinship (Levi-Strauss 1967). According to Levi-Strauss the 
distinction between nature and culture may be said to depend on the definition of ‘nature’ 
as the ‘universal and spontaneous’ and ‘culture’ as that which is culturally or normatively
question in terms of the discourse within which ethnology and anthropology emerge. See below.
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determined.11 Having established the premises of the argument, Levi-Strauss famously 
highlights an ambiguous item, a ‘scandal’ which belongs to both nature and culture, 
namely the incest prohibition.
‘Let us suppose then that everything universal in man relates to the natural order, and is 
characterised by spontaneity, and that everything subject to a norm is cultural and is both relative 
and particular. We are then confronted with a fact, or rather, a group of facts, which, in the light 
of previous definitions, are not far removed from a scandal: we refer to that complex group of 
beliefs, customs, conditions and institutions described succinctly as the prohibition of incest, 
which presents, without the slightest ambiguity, and inseparably combines, the two characteristics 
in which we recognise the conflicting features of two mutually exclusive orders’ (Levi-Strauss 
1967:8-9, my emphasis).
Thus, in Derrida’s analysis of Levi-Strauss’s text, ‘ [t]he incest-prohibition is universal; in 
this sense one could call it natural. But it is a prohibition, a system of norms and 
interdicts, in this sense one could call it cultural’ (Derrida 1970:253). In view of this, 
Derrida argues that the incest prohibition only appears as a ‘scandal’ when the 
nature/culture opposition is to be upheld. However, Derrida suggests that the incest- 
prohibition may not be regulated by the binary opposition and may in fact transcend it. 
The conditions of possibility of the nature/culture opposition, and of the philosophical 
genealogy that depends on it, are therefore predicated on making the origin of the 
structure inconceivable. What is inconceivable and yet fundamental to the nature/culture 
distinction, is the origin of the incest-prohibition. In sum, although the incest-prohibition 
may appear as an incomprehensible scandal, it is on this very scandal that the
11 ‘Culture is not merely juxtaposed to life nor superimposed upon it, but in one way it serves as a substitute 
for life, and in the other, uses and transforms it, to bring about the synthesis o f a new order [...] Where 
does nature end and culture begin? [...] No empirical analysis [...] can determine the point of transition 
between natural and cultural facts, nor how they are connected. [...] Wherever there are rules we know for 
certain that the cultural stage has been reached. Likewise, it is easy to recognise universality as the criterion 
of nature, for what is constant in man falls necessarily beyond the scope of customs, techniques and 
institutions whereby his groups are differentiated and contrasted’ (Levi-Strauss 1967:4-8).
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nature/culture opposition is predicated. Were the nature/culture binary viewed as a 
structure, the structure would have an unknowable origin and an unknowable centre. 
Metaphysical claims concerning the nature/culture opposition make the origin of the 
structure unconceivable.
‘The incest-prohibition is no longer a scandal one meets with or comes up against in the domain 
of traditional concepts; it is something which escapes these concepts and certainly precedes them 
-  probably as the condition of their possibility. It could perhaps be said that the whole of 
philosophical conceptualization, systematically relating itself to the nature/culture opposition, is 
designed to leave in the domain of the unthinkable the very thing that makes this 
conceptualization possible: the origin of the prohibition of incest’ (Derrida 1970: 254).
As in the discussion of Levi-Strauss’s work on myth in The Raw and the Cooked (1969), 
Derrida points to the ways in which the delineation of a structure, e.g. ‘myth’, is 
accompanied by the recognition that the structure has ‘no unity or absolute source’ in that 
myths do not seem to have a clear origin or specified author (Derrida 1970: 257). 
Derrida’s deconstruction of Levi-Strauss’s text/field consistently points to the ways in 
which the text/field asserts specific claims, e.g. the existence of a structure, while 
simultaneously calling those claims into question, e.g. the uncentred and un-markable 
origin of the structure. What comes to light is ‘free play, that is to say, a field of infinite 
substitutions’ which arises out of the finitude/finiteness of the field. The finite field 
crucially lacks a centre and thus can accommodate endless permutations.
I dwell on Derrida’s incisive deconstruction of Levi-Strauss’s text/field to recover an 
important precedent of critique of metaphysics, and one that takes place on the very site 
of anthropology. In turn, Derrida’s reading (1970) of Levi-Strauss’s texts ([1949] 1969) 
provides the necessary horizon from which to approach questions concerning the nature 
and status of the labour of anthropology. In the first instance, the detour through Derrida 
(1970) suggests reflections as to the processes through which anthropology engenders 
moments of centring. The production of ‘structure’ in the form of analytical distinctions 
between nature and culture is a practice of ‘centring’ that inscribes the discipline squarely
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within Western metaphysics. A consideration of how ‘structure’ comes into being also 
exposes (anthropological) processes that simultaneously relativise and universalise 
alterity. In the case of the nature/culture distinction, alterity is made to appear radically 
other, as in the content that the nature/culture distinction may assume in any specific 
culture. For Levi-Strauss, alterity is nevertheless inexorably subsumed under universality, 
given the preponderance of structure (nature/culture) over relative and culturally specific 
content. Conversely, through deconstruction, anthropology appears as a site at which the 
structurality of structure is destabilised through ‘events’. ‘Events’ such as the incest 
prohibition expose the sense in which the centre of the structure is not amenable to 
structurality and is instead a site of play, a (non-)locus of continuous and multiple 
permutations. As argued by Derrida (1970), there is a further sense in which 
anthropology de-centres. By pointing to other centres, anthropology effects a decentring 
of the self-referential quality of Western metaphysics.
Deconstruction allows for a reflection on processes of centring and decentring that take 
place in and through the discipline of anthropology. In turn, by locating anthropology 
within the history of Western metaphysics, deconstruction provides the occasion to begin 
in the task of apprehending the discipline of anthropology in terms of a Nietzschean and 
Heideggerian sense of locatedness and historicity. Anthropology may be considered in 
terms of its position within a history of Western metaphysics understood as marked by 
nihilism. I argue that further deconstructive reading of the field of anthropology, and the 
work of Clifford Geertz (1973, 1983, 2000) in particular, may yield important insights 
into both the critique of Western metaphysics, and the place of anthropology within it. I 
propose to consider Geertz’s programme of interpretative anthropology and outline its 
central claims. Informed by a Derridean deconstruction of anthropological texts, I first 
point to practices of ‘centring’ and ‘contextualisation’ of alterity, and then to ‘events’ or 
instances of ‘rupture’ in Geertz’s text/field. Informed by a review of the tenets of ‘thick 
description’ and Geertz’s ‘anti anti-relativism’, I argue that what ruptures Geertz’s field 
and the project(-s) of hermeneutics more broadly, is nihilism.
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3.3 Hermeneutics, Thick Description and Crypto-Ethnography: Problems with 
Refusal, Equivalence and Pluralisation
‘The concept of culture I espouse ... is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber 
that man [sic] is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture 
to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of 
law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ (Geertz 1973:5).
‘In anthropology, or anyway social anthropology, what the practitioners do is ethnography. And it 
is in understanding what ethnography is, or more exactly what doing ethnography is, that a start 
can be made toward grasping what anthropological analysis amounts to as a form of knowledge. 
This, it must be said, is not a matter of methods. From one point of view, that of the textbook, 
doing ethnography is establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking 
genealogies, mapping fields, keeping a diary, and so on. But it is not these things, techniques and 
received procedures, that define the enterprise. What defines it is the kind of intellectual effort it 
is: an elaborate venture in, to borrow a notion from Gilbert Ryle, “thick description’” (Geertz 
1973: 5-6, emphasis in the original).
‘Winks upon winks upon winks’ (Geertz 1973:9).
In his seminal essay ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ 
Clifford Geertz (1973:3-30) outlines a theory for anthropology as an interpretative 
science. Following the work of analytic philosopher Gilbert Ryle, Geertz considers the 
example of two boys rapidly contracting the eyelids of their right eyes. The thin 
description of the natural experimental sciences would describe the boys’ activity in 
terms of a rapid eyelid contraction of their right eyes. Conversely, thick description 
entertains the possibility that the contraction of the boys’ right eyelids may amount to a 
meaningful gesture. Insofar as this is the case, anthropologists are not just engaged in
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observation. Rather, anthropologists engage in an effort of interpretation that considers 
whether twitches may in fact be winks, and if so, what winks may be about, what they 
may mean in any specific context and social interaction. Geertz argues that the object of 
ethnography is ‘a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures in terms of which twitches, 
winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, perceived and 
interpreted, and without which they would not (not even the zero-form twitches, which as 
a cultural category, are as much nonwinks as winks nontwitches) in fact exist, no matter 
what anyone did or didn’t do with his [szc] eyelids’ (Geertz 1973: 7, emphasis in the 
original). According to Geertz, ‘[w]hat the ethnographer is in fact faced with... is a 
multiplicity of complex conceptual structures many of them superimposed upon or 
knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit and which he 
[s/c] must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render’ (Geertz 1973: 10). In sum, 
according to Geertzian thick description, the task of the anthropologist involves 
‘grasping’ strange, irregular and inexplicit conceptual structures, and ‘rendering’ them
1 9adequately.
Defined in opposition to thick description, the ‘thin description’ characteristic of the 
natural sciences is a formalistic device. It provides a general ‘description’ of an event or 
‘fact’, a description of certain length and width, but one that stops at the surface: two 
boys may be rapidly opening and closing their right eyes. Moving away from epidermal 
understandings of culture, to use an embodied metaphor, thick description aims for 
sonorous, rounded and fleshy depth. Through thick description interpretative 
anthropology produces structure that contextualises the Other and makes the Other 
intelligible.
In the following section, I consider the implications and effects of some of interpretative 
anthropology’s knowledge practices. I explore three interrelated problems, namely 
ethnographic refusal and the negative; scale hopping and the question of equivalence; 
multi-sited imaginaries, crypto-ethnographic discourses and the status of pluralisation.
12 On the adequacy of description, note Geertz’s own and much discussed (cf. Crapanzano 1986, Shankman 
1984) over-interpretation of, for instance, the Balinese cockfight (Geertz 1973).
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3.3.1 Thick Description, Public Texts and the Problem o f Refusal
Culture is a ‘web of meaning’ and thus it is simultaneously understood as semiotic and 
public (Geertz 1973). Eschewing the psychologism inherent in Levi-Strauss’s 
structuralism, for Geertz the hermeneutic quality of culture produces cultural texts that 
acquire significance in the public realm of social discourse. Thus, unlike the minds of 
subjects, cultural texts and social discourse are accessible to the anthropologist.13 As 
noted by Silverman (1990:132), ‘cultural texts and their meanings exist, somewhat 
autonomously in the public world’ and unlike the subjects who produce them, they linger 
in social discourse and are thus amenable to anthropological analysis. The public 
meaning of cultural texts is the subject of anthropological ‘thick description’. Geertz’s 
own thick descriptive practice has been said to often result in a thinning of multi-layered 
thickness and in the reduction of hermeneutic complexity and openness (Silverman 1990: 
135) to broad collective cultural orientations. The reduction of hermeneutics to broad, 
collective cultural themes, while not as problematic when compared to Levi-Strauss’s 
universal structures, nevertheless produces broad generalised Weberian analyses of ‘the 
tones and stresses of culture, public sentiment and emotion’ (Silverman 1990:129).
‘[T]he meaning of the text is an enduring aspect of culture which expands beyond the text proper 
but to which the text semantically points. Geertz argues, therefore, that the meaning of the 
Balinese cockfight references not the cockfight itself but rather the fixed, overarching cultural 
idioms that permeate all Balinese life. The cockfight is merely a single, albeit salient, 
manifestation of these cultural themes’ (Silverman 1990: 132-3).
Further, Greenblatt (1999) argues that the distinction between thin and thick description 
may actually be a spurious one. With the premise that culture, and hence meaning, are
13 With reference to this, Silverman (1990) points out that Geertz is heavily influenced by the work of Paul 
Ricoeur, who wrote that ‘[w]hat has to be understood is not the initial situation of discourse... 
Understanding discourse has less than ever to do with the author and his [sic] situation. It wants to grasp 
the proposed worlds opened up by the references of the text. To understand a text is to follow its movement 
from sense to reference, from what it says to what it talks about’ (Ricoeur 1971, cited in Silverman 
1990:128). See also Tongs (1993).
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always public, thinness refers to knowledge derived from specific kinds of texts, rather 
than a different epistemological position. There are different kinds of cultural texts and 
‘some texts seem more amenable to thick description than others, and consequently, 
“thicker” than others’ (Greenblatt 1999:17). Ortner (1995) adds that not only are there 
different kinds of texts, but there may also be a plurality of thickness. The multiplicity of 
thickness is brought into stark relief in the possible problem of ‘ethnographic refusal’.
‘If the ethnographic stance is founded centrally on (among other things, of course) a commitment 
to thickness and if thickness has taken and still takes many forms, what I am calling ethnographic 
refusal involves a refusal of thickness, a failure of holism or density which itself may take various 
forms’ (Ortner 1995:174).
Ortner (1995:176) suggests that ‘sanitising politics, thinning culture and dissolving 
subjects’ amount to examples of ethnographic refusal. ‘Sanitising politics’ refers to the 
erasure of complexity in ethnographic accounts that focus on ‘politics among subalterns’ 
(ibid: 179). ‘Thinning culture’ refers to tropes of authenticity, timelessness and 
homogeneity through which the Other may be connoted (ibid: 180-3). ‘Dissolving 
subjects’ refers to analyses that, while trying to address complexity, ambiguity and 
contradiction, instead dissolve ‘the subject entirely into a set of “subject effects’” (Ortner 
1995:183). A consequence of this is the denial of the agentic capabilities of subjects. The 
erasure of the agentic character of the Other also points to the override of ‘individuality’ 
inherent in an emphasis on socio-structural and/or socio-cultural and/or discursive 
domains. When domains are understood in terms of collectivities and/or as power effects, 
they are not attuned to ‘the diversity, multiplicity and creativity of individual 
consciousness’ (Rapport 2004: 3; see also Amit and Rapport 2002). Certain dissolution of 
(individual) agentic subjects may therefore obtain.
Each of these three modes of ‘ethnographic refusal’ thus involves one or more of the 
following: ethnocentrism, reductionism, a-historical bias, universalist epistemological 
violence. However, these different inflections of ethnographic refusal all pertain to the
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anthropologist. With regard to this, I would argue that what is foreshadowed, but is in no 
sense pursued in Ortner’s analysis is the complex and multi-layered question of the 
possibility that the thickness of some cultural texts and/or ethnographic subjects may be 
their very thinness. The anthropologist may not strictly engender thinness, but rather 
thinness may arise in the context and in the course of ethnographic encounters 
between/among ethnographic subjects, here including, of course, the anthropologist. 
Cultural texts may always be public, but some may be publicly characterised by thinness, 
negation and/or foreclosure. Others still may be marked by their absence.14 In short, the 
public quality of texts may be complicated by multiple refusals, and refusals may refer to 
thick practices of thinning.
One may thus re-inscribe ‘sanitising politics’, ‘thinning culture’ and ‘dissolving subjects’ 
as forms of thinness borne out of the thickness of the ethnographic encounter, and not 
exclusively coterminous with the biases of the anthropologist. The complexities of thick 
refusal, as in the rejection of any engagement in ethnographic dialogue, and of thick 
articulations of the negative, as in the deployment of negation as an expressive 
ethnographic mode, are not adequately theorised in Geertz’s programme of thick 
description. Neither are they adequately thought through in the analysis of multiple 
‘thickness’ provided by Ortner (1995, 1999). Paradoxically, Ortner’s stance appears to be 
squarely anti-theoretical,15 when she states that ‘it does not require sophisticated 
theorising to recognise that every social being has a life of (...) multiplicity16 and that 
every social context creates such shifting between foreground and background (Ortner 
1995:184, my emphasis). Conversely, it may be argued that the possibility of thin and 
thick ‘thinning’ of the ethnographic encounter as negation, as well as of refusals as 
cultural predicaments do in fact require further analysis and adequate theorising. This
14 For an incisive analysis of ‘silence’ see Spivak (1988). JongMi Kim has rightly pointed out that the 
‘absence’ of the project of deconstruction is not equivalent to the ‘silence’ of Spivak’s subaltern subject. 
For a critical discussion of the status of Spivak’s ‘silence’, see JongMi Kim (2004). I am grateful to JongMi 
Kim for this and many more ongoing conversations.
15 Rabinow (1983) traced a useful genealogy of cultural anthropology’s anti-theoretical stance. It was 
Boas’s emphasis on particularism and cultural wholes which established ‘a trend of relativism and 
antitheoretical description’ in cultural anthropology (ibid:54, see also Moore 1999). In this sense then, 
Ortner’s remark is inscribed fully within this genealogy of anti-theoreticism.
16 As an example of a ‘life of multiplicity’, Ortner (1995:184) discusses the ‘multiplex identity as woman, 
as poor and as Muslim’.
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may entail the development of a specific hermeneutic sensibility which confronts the 
status of refusal, absence and the negative specifically and the problematic of nihilism 
more generally.
3.3.2 Thick Description, Scale Hopping and the Problem o f Equivalence
Geertz nevertheless pioneered an important hermeneutic strategy, namely that of 
establishing meaningful relations between ‘cultural fragments’ and ‘wider social worlds’ 
(Greenblatt 1999). With reference to this, Greenblatt argues that it is through foveation, 
i.e. ‘the ability to keep an object (a tiny textualised piece of social behaviour) within the 
high-resolution area of perception’ that Geertz successfully manages problems of both 
scale and focus (Greenblatt 1999:18, my emphasis). Hermeneutic anthropology thus also 
entails an awareness of scale and scale switching,17 and as Geertz explicitly argues,
‘Hopping back and forth between the whole conceived through the parts that actualize it and the 
parts conceived through the whole that motivates them, we seek to turn them, by a sort of 
intellectual perpetual motion, into explications of one another’ (Geertz, 1983: 69, my 
emphasis).18
The hermeneutic movement is one between partible wholes (culture-s) and parts which 
are compelled into existence by the whole (cultural texts). Interpretation, in its perpetual 
motion, is grounded in the assumption of equivalence between the scale of the whole and 
that of the part (cf. Strathem 1999). The ‘perpetual motion’ and related establishment of 
equivalence between scales upon which Geertzian interpretation is predicated is 
suggestive of Gadamer’s hermeneutics (1989) and debates about the ‘hermeneutic 
circle’.19 In Truth and Method Gadamer (1989) argues that hermeneutics, as the science
17 Note that Geertz is aware of scale and scale switching but not as sensitive to perspectivism.
18 This is an important point, especially for an analysis of secrecy. Secrecy and the hermeneutic attempt and 
grasping secrecy, are both partly about scale switching -  in the Strathemian sense explored in more detail 
in Chapter 4.
19 Whilst there exist a long-standing debate on the subject and the respective contributions offered by
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of interpretation, does not simply amount to a scientific methodology geared towards the 
discovery of truth. According to Gadamer, ‘there is no experience of truth that it is not 
interpretative’ (Gadamer cited in Vattimo 1997:4, cf. Gadamer 1976:103).20 As 
hermeneutics seeks to grapple with the nature and status of understanding, Gadamer 
engages in a radical ‘critique of scientism and modem methodologism’ to propose a 
general theory of interpretation (Vattimo 1997:3). For Gadamer (1989), as for Heidegger 
([1962] 2002), subject and object are not discrete entities. Granted that the experience of 
the world occurs within a linguistic horizon, or in and through Sprachlichkeit 
(‘linguisticality’) (Vattimo 1997:3), subject and object are underpinned by a shared
9 1ontology which provides the conditions of possibility for the hermeneutic circle.
‘In its bare essentials the hermeneutical circle designates a reciprocal belonging between 
“subject” and “object” in interpretation, whereby these terms become necessarily invalidated, 
since they originated and developed within a perspective that assumed their separateness and
Dilthey, Gadamer, Heidegger and Ricoeur (Palmer 1969), the hermeneutic circle may be broadly 
characterised by a concern with the act of interpretation of a text, and specifically with the kinds of 
relations between the parts of a work and the whole that may be established in the course of understanding. 
The act of interpretation and the establishment of relations between parts is characterised by hermeneutics 
in temporal terms. It is argued that cumulative production of understanding is achieved as one modifies the 
relations between parts in circular manner and reaches a point of closure. Dilthey and Schleimacher’s 
methodological hermeneutics argued that the meaning of a text coincided with the meaning bestowed upon 
it by the author. In this context, the labour of interpretation of the hermeneutic circle referred to the 
interpretative effort geared towards the recovery of the world-view inherent in the text. In turn, following 
Heidegger’s critique of interpretation as philology and the development of an ontological hermeneutic 
circle ([1962] 2002), for Gadamer, hermeneutics addresses the subject matter o f a text. The temporality of 
the act of interpretation moves the text beyond the historical specificities and intentions of its author. In the 
ontological hermeneutic circle, interpretative and creative agency belongs to both author and reader and the 
latter’s existential recognition of their ‘being-in-the-world’.
20 ‘The universality of the hermeneutic perspective is all-encompassing. I once formulated this idea by 
saying that being that can be understood is language (...) in the last analysis, Goethe’s statement 
“everything is a symbol” is the most comprehensive formulation of the hermeneutical idea. It means that 
everything points to another thing’ (Gadamer 1976:103).
21 This is most apparent in Gadamer’s discussion of ‘historical consciousness’ and ‘aesthetic 
consciousness’ (1989, 1976). With reference to ‘aesthetic consciousness’, note that ‘[t]he consciousness of 
art -  the aesthetic consciousness -  is always secondary to the immediate truth-claim that proceeds from the 
work of art itself. To this extent, when we judge a work of art on the basis o f its aesthetic quality, 
something that is really much more intimately familiar to us is alienated. This alienation into aesthetic 
judgement always takes place when we have withdrawn ourselves and are no longer open to the immediate 
claim of that which grasps us. Thus one point of departure for my reflections in Truth and Method was that 
the aesthetic sovereignty that claims its rights in the experience of art represents an alienation when 
compared to the authentic experience that confronts us in the form of art itself (Gadamer 1976:5).
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antithesis and used them to give expression to these’ (Vattimo 1993:18-19).22
The hermeneutic circle on which hermeneutic ontology is predicated rests on three 
constitutive elements, namely ‘the rejection of “objectivity” as an ideal of historical 
knowledge’ (Vattimo 1993:19); ‘the extension of the hermeneutic model to all 
knowledge’ (ibid); and the ‘linguistic nature of Being’ (ibid). Drawing on Heidegger’s 
Being and Time ([1962] 2002), but consistently blunting Heidegger’s own position,24 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic ontology establishes as foundational the ontological equivalence 
between knower and known in interpretation. As with Geertz’s thick description and 
scale hopping (1973, 1983, 2000), the problem with Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle is that 
in the last instance, hermeneutics is reduced to meta-theoretical pronouncements, that is, 
interpretation is said to coincide with ‘every possible human experience of the world’ 
(Vattimo ibid:4). As noted by Vattimo, ‘[w]hat reduces hermeneutics to a generic 
philosophy of culture is the wholly metaphysical claim (often implicit and unrecognised)
22 Vattimo (1993) notes that Heidegger’s philosophy provides a cogent articulation of the shared ontology 
of subject and object in interpretation. ‘Heidegger viewed interpretation as nothing other than the 
articulation of what is understood, and so always presupposing comprehension or precomprehension of the 
thing; for him this meant simply that knower and known belong to one another reciprocally prior to any 
explicit act of knowing and prior to any recognition of something, so that the known is already within the 
horizon of the knower, but only because the knower is within the world that the known co-determines’ 
(Vattimo 1993:18-19). I discuss this point in greater depth in the section on ‘Weak Thought, Nihilism and 
the Heideggerian Horizon’, below.
23 For Heidegger ([1962 2002] subject and object (both entities, and thus ‘beings’) share an ontology in 
Being, but Being exceeds entities, that is, it is more than just beings. Insofar as this is the case, there exists 
and ontological difference between beings and Being. See discussion of the Heideggerian horizon, below.
24 It is Vattimo’s contention that Gadamer’s hermeneutic ontology constitutes an oversimplication of 
Heidegger’s arguments put forward in Being and Time ([1962] 2002). For instance, ‘the classification of all 
knowledge as hermeneutical [involves] the reaffirmation, though in a novel way, of the notion of the 
historicity of knowledge: it means that historiographical knowledge and every other type of knowing is 
never merely “contemplation” of objects, but rather action that modifies the context to which it belongs and 
of which it becomes part. In developing his ontological thinking Heidegger tends to think this historicity 
radically through the terms of the epochality of Being; for him our knowing is now completely 
saturated with the metaphysical forgetting of Being and this forgetting is defined [emphasis in the 
original] by Being itself, so that it cannot be altered by a mere change of attitude on man’s part. But 
Heidegger’s “hermeneutical” followers generally tend to pick up only the blander and less provocative 
aspects of this discourse. For them, the universality of hermeneutics and the historicity of knowledge 
signify merely that history grows as a perpetual interpretative process. In this “eirenic” perspective, all the 
dramatic force in the Heideggerian idea of metaphysics is lost. Truth and Method, for example, betrays 
little sign of Heidegger’s dramatic vision of the history of western civilisation. This modification and 
attenuation that Heideggerian thinking on the epochal nature of Being and on metaphysics undergoes at the 
hands of his hermeneutical successors has significant consequences for the problem with which I am 
concerned’ (Vattimo 1993:22-3, my emphasis). I discuss the implications of Vattimo’s critique of Gadamer 
and radical reading of Heidegger in the section on ‘Weak Thought, Nihilism and the Heideggerian
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to be a finally true description of the (permanent) “interpretative structure” of human 
existence’ (1997:6, my emphasis). In view of this, what seems to require elucidation is 
the status of the assumed equivalence between that which presents itself in different 
scales, and of the metaphysical pronouncements that may sustain such an equivalence. To 
say that the status of the equivalence between parts and wholes (Strathem 1986, 1999) 
need not be assumed, is to confront the meta-theoretical quality of Geertz’s ‘thick 
description’ and practices of ‘scale hopping’. It is to challenge the reduction of 
hermeneutics to ‘a comfortable meta-theory of the universality of interpretative 
phenomena’ (Vattimo 1997:8).25
3.3.3 Thinning out, Thickening up and the Problem o f Pluralisation
Thick description is, pace archive-centred New Historicism (cf. Greenblatt 1999) very 
much grounded in ethnography and the experience of fieldwork, both understood in terms 
of an ‘attempt to understand another life world using the self -  as much of it as possible -  
as the instrument of knowledge’ (Ortner 1995:173). Ethnography as a practice of the self 
and the ethnographic stance as the broad intellectual and moral positionality of 
anthropology are both grounded in a commitment to ‘thickness’. Ethnographic thickness 
rests on the craft of ‘producing understanding through richness, texture, and detail, rather 
than parsimony, refinement and (in the sense used by mathematicians) elegance’ (Ortner 
1999:174). As argued by Ortner (ibid) the career of thickness in anthropology has been 
mixed, and has often entailed the thinning out of thickness into holism. This point is 
echoed by Marcus, who suggests that despite the calls for thick description and the 
significant impact of Geertz’s work in cultural and social anthropology, a remarkable
Horizon’, below.
25 To follow up on this point, the comfortable meta-theory o f the universality of interpretative phenomena 
is a variation of the universality of ‘humanity’ and ‘structure’ noted earlier. While humanity was universal 
for Boas and structures were universal with Levi-Strauss, interpretation is universal for this formulation of 
hermeneutics. The problem with this is that pluralism is invoked by all concerned (say, Boas, Levi-Strauss, 
Gadamer, Geertz) a pluralism which is nevertheless firmly linked to different universalisms. As noted by 
Vattimo (1988:147), ‘[a]lterity becomes to some degree “regulated”, or as it were exorcised, through 
metaphysically inspired appeal to a common humanity and to a supra-historical essence within whose 
confines all human phenomena -  no matter how different they may appear -  may be situated’. The issue 
with all universalisms is that they are grounded/rooted in Western metaphysics. They are not ‘errors’ as 
such, but they do designate a specific moment in metaphysics, that is, one characterised by ‘strong’ 
thought. In terms of universalism’s contemporary incarnations, the critique of the meta-theoretical 
pronouncements that underpin them is also a critique of liberal (political) theory (cf. Moore 1994b) and all
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degree of thinness still characterises ethnographic practice within the discipline (Marcus 
1998:18). In his own argument for a thickening of ethnography, Marcus notes that, at a 
minimum, ‘the ethnographer should be able to figure out, to describe, and explain very 
complex realities in fairly plain terms before clearly distinct theoretical framings, 
interests, and critiques of ordinary language as political also set in with full force. 
Otherwise, why bother with the arduous sweat of fieldwork?’ (Marcus 1998:18).
Marcus unequivocally singles out three intellectual/research practices, namely ‘figuring 
out’, ‘description’ and ‘explanation’ as routes and aims to be pursued in the ethnographic 
endeavour and, inter alia, as means to sustain ‘what [ethnography] has always done 
especially well, namely understanding and representation’ (ibid: 18). These strategies are 
however complicated by the challenges posed by Marcus’ own ‘multi-sited research 
imaginary’. In Marcus’s definition, a ‘multi-sited research imaginary’ consists of 
‘strategies of quite literally following connections, associations, and putative 
relationships’. Multi-sited ethnographic research thus strives to engage directly with 
movement and shifts in scale. Further, it aims to follow and understand linkages across 
different and yet interconnected entities. In terms of techniques, Marcus suggests that to 
envision a multi-sited research imaginary, one may follow the people, follow the thing, 
follow the metaphor, follow the plot, story or allegory, follow the life or biography, 
follow the conflict (Marcus 1998:89-95, see also Hannerz 2003).
The multi-sited research imaginary and the possibility of transnational ethnographic 
multi-sitedness produce new representations that may ‘lose their depth or rather, their 
thickness’ (Marcus 1998: 245). To recover thickness, however, Marcus critically engages 
with the thin/thick distinction and argues that both thickness and thinness may apply to 
the discourses and practices in which subjects themselves engage. Marcus calls this sort 
of inductive thinness and thickness ‘crypto-ethnographic discourses’. Crypto- 
ethnographic discourses arise out of the process through which ethnographer and 
interlocutor think about a common object, thus producing knowledge that the 
ethnographer then seeks to represent. It is a focus on crypto-ethnographic discourses
the universalisms -  and related epistemological violence thus engendered.
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which is indicated as a way of thickening ethnography (Marcus ibid).
It could be argued that crypto-ethnographic discourses amount to meta-discourses 
produced in the dialogic practice of ethnography. However, despite Marcus’ interesting 
transposition of thinness and thickness within a multi-sited research imaginary, and the 
fascinating question of the production of reflexive and collaborative meta-theoretical 
insights in the fieldwork situation, ‘crypto-ethnography’ does not help elucidate what the 
purpose of thick description may be when the thickness of the ethnography is its very 
thinness. More importantly, Marcus fails to historicise practices of ‘thickening’ and thus 
to address the ‘event’ that I wish to elicit as foundational in Geertz’s work and in 
hermeneutic anthropology more generally, namely nihilism.
The project(-s) of interpretative anthropology, thick description, multi-sited research 
imaginaries and crypto-ethnography are fraught with assumptions concerning, for 
instance, the assumed ‘thin’ status of refusal, negation and absence. Further, assumptions 
concerning the equivalence of ‘scales’ and ‘sites’ introduce questions as to the status of 
both ‘scale hopping’ and multi-sitedness, and the singularities, pluralities and related 
processes of homogenisation and differentiation thus engendered. A set of debates in the 
field of hermeneutic anthropology has addressed some of these questions in terms of the 
value (or lack thereof) of (cultural) relativism. Exchanges between apologists and 
chastisers are of extreme interest in that they point, in my view, to that which ruptures the 
field of hermeneutic anthropology. The ‘scandal’ and ‘event’ in the field of hermeneutic 
anthropology, as in hermeneutics more broadly, is not relativism as such, but rather, 
nihilism.
3.4 Anti Anti-relativism and Nihilism as Event
At the heart of the practice of ethnography and of Geertz’s understanding of 
anthropology is relativism. Echoing Derrida (1970), Geertz argues that anthropology, and 
the relativism imputed to it, have ‘disturbed the general intellectual peace’ (Geertz 
2000:44). Whether anthropology itself may truly constitute an ‘event’ or ‘rupture’ is less 
clear. Geertz points out that the emergence of what Derrida (1970) would call ‘other
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centres’ is not so much a product of anthropology’s labour, but of other centres’ 
themselves. Further, the genealogy of the ‘rupture’ has little to do with anthropology.
‘It is has not been anthropology, such as it is, that has made our field seem a massive argument 
against absolutism in thought, morals, and aesthetic judgement; it has been anthropological data: 
customs, crania, living floors, and lexicons... After all, Montaigne could draw relativistic, or 
relativistic-looking, conclusions from the fact, as he heard it, that the Caribs didn’t wear breeches; 
he did not have to read Patterns of Culture. Even earlier on, Herodotus, contemplating “certain 
Indians of the race called Callatians”, among whom men were said to eat their fathers, came, as 
one would think he might, to similar views’ (Geertz 2000:44).
Re-inscribing Geertz’s statement in Derridean terms, it could be argued that ‘rupture’ is 
an integral part of the history of Western metaphysics, and contemporary ‘relativist bent 
anthropologists’ (Geertz 2000:44) with their decentring practices, are inheritors of an 
horizon that comes into being with the very Western metaphysics that they and those 
before have been implicated in, and at times sought to challenge. Despite possible 
protestations to the contrary, I am inclined to read considerable convergence between 
Derrida’s and Geertz’s respective stance vis-a-vis Western metaphysics. While Derrida 
invokes the ability of anthropology to point to other ‘centres’, Geertz defends the labour 
of relativisation, or ‘relativism’, as he puts it, undertaken in and through the discipline. In 
short, both Derrida and Geertz see anthropology as effecting ‘rupture’. With this in mind, 
and Geertz’s smart ‘anti anti-relativism’ notwithstanding (2000:42-67), it seems a 
‘scandal’ that in his interpretative framework Geertz should firmly and unambiguously, 
and one may add, rather surprisingly, eschew nihilism. Interestingly, Geertz (1973:449, 
quoted below) inscribes his programme of interpretative anthropology within a critical 
tradition that does not take ‘culture’ and ‘interpretation’ at face value. The task is instead 
to point consistently and systematically to constructedness and locatedness (1973, 1983).
‘[A]n extension of the notion of a text beyond written material, and beyond the verbal, is, though
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metaphorical, not, of course, all that novel. The interpretatio naturae tradition of the middle ages, 
which, culminating with Spinoza, attempted to read nature as Scripture, the Nietzschean effort to 
treat value systems as glosses of the will to power (or the Marxian one to treat them as glosses on 
property relations), and the Freudian replacement of the enigmatic text of the manifest dream 
with the plain one of the latent, all offer precedents, if not equally recommendable ones’ 
(Geertz 1973:449, my emphasis).
In typically ambiguous style, Geertz suggests Spinoza, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud as 
possible antecedents to his interpretative programme, but makes clear that among these, 
some positions are less acceptable than others.26 In later writings Geertz returns to the 
genealogical trajectory underpinning his own stance, and notes that the (cultural) 
relativism he defends is indeed located within multiple genealogies. These genealogies 
may all be equally subject to attack, but are not, strictly speaking, the same.
‘Relativism (“[T]he position that all assessments are assessments relative to some standard or 
other, and standards derive from cultures”), I. C. Jarvie remarks, “has these objectionable 
consequences: namely, that by limiting critical assessment of human works it disarms us, 
dehumanises us, leaves us unable to enter into communicative interaction; that is to say, unable to 
criticise cross-culturally, cross-sub-culturally; ultimately, relativism leaves no room for criticism 
at all...[B]ehind relativism nihilism looms”. More in front, scarecrow and leper’s bell, it sounds 
like, than behind: certainly none of us, clothed and in our right minds, will rush to embrace a 
view that so dehumanises us as to render us incapable of communicating with anybody’ (Geertz 
2000:48).
Thus, while it may be the case that for critics ‘relativism, or anything that at all looks like 
relativism (...) is identified with nihilism’ (Geertz 2000:43), Geertz aims to clarify the
26 Note how different Derrida’s qualification of the same genealogy is: ‘It was within concepts inherited 
from metaphysics that Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger worked, for example. Since these concepts are not 
elements or atoms and since they are taken from a syntax and a system, every particular borrowing drags 
along with it the whole of metaphysics. This is what allows these destroyers to destroy each other 
reciprocally -  for example, Heidegger considering Nietzsche, with as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith 
and misconstruction, as the last metaphysician, the last “Platonist”. One could do the same for Heidegger 
himself, for Freud, or for a number of others. And today no exercise is more widespread’ (Derrida 1970:
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status and implications of his relativist position, and questions some of the outcomes 
attributed to it. Rebuking crass characterisations of the history of ideas and the place of 
relativism within it,27 Geertz resolutely defends a relativist stance from charges of 
nihilism. Nihilism need not follow or mark relativism, and ought instead to be clearly 
distinguished from it.
‘[T]he moral and intellectual consequences that are commonly supposed to flow from relativism 
-  subjectivism, nihilism, incoherence, Machiavellianism, ethical idiocy, aesthetic blindness, and 
so on -  do not in fact do so and the promised rewards of escaping its clutches, mostly having to 
do with pasturised knowledge, are illusionary’ (Geertz 2000:42, my emphasis).
Furthermore, Geertz objects to the charge that nihilism may ensue from consuming 
anthropological texts. As he puts it, ‘genuine nihilists’ -  whatever this may mean- are not 
among his acquaintances or his readers.
‘The image of vast numbers of anthropology readers running around in so cosmopolitan a frame 
of mind as to have no views as to what is or isn’t true, or good, or beautiful, seems to me largely a 
fantasy. There may be some genuine nihilists out there, along Rodeo Drive or around Times 
Square, but I doubt very many have become such as a result of an excessive sensitivity to the 
claims of other cultures; and at least most of the people I meet, read, and read about, and indeed I 
myself, are all-too-committed to something or other, usually parochial.’ (Geertz 2000:46).
251).
27 ‘The heights to which this beware of the scabby whore who will cut off your critical powers sort of thing 
can aspire is indicated, to give one last example, by Paul Johnson’s ferocious book on the history of the 
world since 1917, Modem Times, which, opening with a chapter called “A Relativistic World” ... accounts 
for the whole modem disaster -  Lenin and Hitler, Amin, Bokassa, Sukamo, Mao, Nasser, and 
Hammerskold, Structuralism, the New Deal, the Holocaust, both world wars, 1968, inflation, shinto 
militarism, OPEC, and the independence of India -  as outcomes of something called “relativist heresy”. “A 
great trio o f German imaginative scholars,” Nietzsche, Marx, and (with a powerful assist -  our contribution 
-  from Frazer) Freud, destroyed the nineteenth century morally as Einstein, banishing absolute motion, 
destroyed it cognitively, and Joyce, banishing absolute narrative, destroyed it aesthetically [.] ( ...)  Mindless 
tolerance, mindless intolerance; ideological promiscuity, ideological monomania; egalitarian hypocrisy, 
egalitarian simplisticism -all flow from the same infirmity. Like Welfare, the Media, the Bourgeoisie, or 
the Ruling Circle, Cultural Relativism causes everything bad’ (Geertz 2000:49-50).
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It is ‘pasteurised knowledge’ that equates relativism with subjectivism and nihilism, and 
thus with ethical and aesthetic inconsequence and incoherence. Interpretative 
anthropology has none of the former, and plenty of ethical, aesthetic and rational 
judgement, albeit relativist and slightly parochial (Geertz 2000:46). It is therefore clear 
that Geertz’s self-identification is simultaneously a relativist and non-nihilist one. Whilst 
there may indeed be some ‘genuine nihilists’ at the -assumed- core of metropolitan 
privilege,28 one is to take for granted that their stance may have little to do with being 
familiar with anthropological arguments. The discipline is thus saved from (nihilist) 
slander and some form of upright (relativist) credential is restored to it. For all the talk of 
standing ‘against absolutism in thought’ (Geertz 2000:44), and aside from the fact that 
were there nihilists on Rodeo Drive and Times Square, this would be of (anthropological) 
interest, it is evident that Geertz wishes to defend a relativist position while distancing 
himself from charges of nihilism.
‘Looking into dragons, not domesticating or abominating them, nor drowning them in vats of 
theory, is what anthropology has been all about. At least, that is what has been all about, as I, no 
nihilist, no subjectivist, and possessed, as you can see, of some strong views as to what is 
reasonable and what is not, understand it’ (Geertz 2000:63-4, my emphasis).
Nihilism, subjectivism and solipsism are possibly distinct, but, one suspects, intimately 
inter-related ‘scandals’ often accompanied by ‘vats of theory’, all to be resolutely 
deflected in (thick) ethnographic and anthropological hermeneutic practice. It seems 
ironic, then, that such vocal anti-nihilist stance30 should be charged with the very scandal
28 What is ‘Rodeo Drive’ for Geertz? Again, it is a matter of perspectives as much as of ‘imagination’ 
(Moore 1994, 2004, Strathem 1999). For me, ‘Rodeo Drive’ is the road that leads to Santa Monica 
Boulevard, where the subjects of the documentary 101 Rent Boys (Barbato and Bailey 2001, US) try to 
make a living.
29 ‘In the human sciences, methodological discussions conducted in terms of general positions and 
abstracted principles are largely bootless. A few possible exceptions possibly apart (perhaps Durkheim, 
perhaps Collingwood), such discussions mainly lead to intramural bickering about the proper way to do 
things and dreadful results (“relativism”, “reductionism”, “positivism”, “nihilism” (Geertz 2000:122, my 
emphasis).
30 ‘It was not relativism -  Sex, the Dialectic and the Death of God -  that did in absolute motion, Euclidean
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it so vehemently shuns.
3.5 Anti-Nihilism: The Double Negative
As Geertz (2000) makes clear, the problematic of nihilism in cultural anthropology is not 
new. As with most ‘concept-metaphors’ (Moore 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004), the status of 
nihilism in anthropology is highly contested. The nature of the contestation is 
nevertheless firmly, and perhaps aptly, oriented towards negation or containment. 
Interestingly, despite Geertz’s own explicit refutations, his work has been deemed to 
extol, rather than circumscribe nihilism. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, in 
Rabinow’s definition (1983), nihilism is ‘the equating of all beings, the levelling of 
meaningful differentiation, the transvaluation of all values’ (Rabinow 1983:52). 
According to Rabinow, the consequences of a nihilist stance in anthropology are twofold. 
First, nihilism in the guise of cultural relativism leads to a ‘bracketing of truth claims’ 
inherent in cultural statements. Second, and pertinent to Geertz’s own work, nihilism in 
symbolic anthropology relies on the ‘bracketing of seriousness’. In both instances, these 
parenthesising practices are said to invoke diversity and plurality, but ultimately to 
reduce the Other to the Same (Rabinow 1983). According to Rabinow (ibid), 
anthropology has been marked by, and has actively advanced nihilism in specific ways.
3.5.1 The Bracketing o f Truth
Rabinow attributes the ‘bracketing of truth’ to the tradition of cultural anthropology 
inaugurated by Franz Boas and entrenched in Herskovits’ work on ‘The Problem of 
Cultural Relativism’ (1947). Developed as a response to racism and ethnocentrism, 
cultural relativism in anthropology has traditionally sought to make a space for other 
cultures. By so doing, however, some unforeseen outcomes have ensued. For one, 
cultural relativism a la Boas is reductionist in scope, in that ‘all differences are preserved
space, and universal causation. It was wayward phenomena, wave packets and orbital leaps, before which 
they were helpless. Nor was it Relativism -  Hermeneutico-Psychedelic Subjectivism -  that did in (to the 
degree they have been done in) the Cartesian cogito, the Whig view o f history, and “the moral point of 
view so sacred to Eliot, Arnold and Emerson”. It was odd actualities -  infant betrothals and nonillusionist 
paintings -  that embarrassed their categories’ (Geertz 2000:65).
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and denied at the same time. All are treated equally’ (Rabinow 1983:59).31
‘All that is necessary for the cultural relativist to achieve this aim is the bracket of truth claims or 
beauty claims or morality claims of the culture under consideration. In this act of anthropological 
purification -  ridding ourselves of ethnocentrism -  we take no culture at its word. We start by 
bracketing the truth claims or value positions of our own culture and then we do the same for the 
culture we are attempting to comprehend’ (Rabinow 1983:59, emphasis in the original). [In so 
doing,] [A]ll cultural differences have been both preserved and destroyed. First, difference is 
emphasized, the uniqueness of each culture; then it is reduced to the Same (...) The role of 
anthropology is to describe the plurality of these meaningful life worlds. Each way of life is 
worthy of respect because ultimately each is equally untrue. The being of man is all that we can 
affirm. This is everywhere the same. Ultimately difference (although praised) is suppressed: the 
Same is triumphant’ (Rabinow 1983: 59-60, my emphasis).
Cultural relativists beginning with Boas have thus reduced Difference to Sameness 
(Rabinow 1983:61). They may have cleared a space for plurality, but by bracketing the 
multiplicity of truth claims, they have also made each claim to difference ‘equally 
untrue’. To their credit, Rabinow argues (ibid) that they have done so moved by a 
political project that sought to challenge ethnocentrism and racism. Symbolic 
anthropologists, on the other hand ‘have taken a further step in the advancement o f 
nihilism by bracketing the seriousness of cultural statements’ (Rabinow 1983:61, my 
emphasis).
3.5.2 The Bracketing o f Seriousness
The ‘bracketing of seriousness’ of cultural statements in symbolic/interpretative
31 ‘Previously, cultures had been ranked on a Eurocentric scale. But the critical assault of cultural 
anthropology was successful in exposing the ethnocentric bias implicit in all the hierarchies of evaluation 
and classification previously constructed. The motto, echoing Husserl, might well be ‘to the cultures’ 
underlying value systems themselves’ (Rabinow 1983:59).
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anthropology stems primarily from the concept of ‘culture’ it deploys. As noted 
previously, culture for Geertz is always local (1973, 1983), and hence particular. Further, 
it is always public, and hence available to the anthropologist. Rabinow notes however 
that the local and public qualities axiomatically attributed to culture are underpinned by 
certain universalising assumptions. First, for Geertz, ‘[t]here is no culture in general. 
Culture is not some superorganic realm. It is rooted in the evolution of the species’ 
(Rabinow 1983:63). Second, the public quality of culture, while making culture 
amenable to thick description, is predicated on the assumption of a shared hermeneutic 
quality of knowledge and experience. This is said to reduce the multiplicity of knowledge 
and experience to a matter of aesthetics.
[For Geertz], ‘there is a fundamental underlying commonality and a fundamental surface of 
historical and cultural difference. It is that difference we seek to describe (...) What we do as 
anthropologists is construct interpretations of what we take to be other people’s realities. The 
writing of ethnography is what makes us anthropologists. We create fictions’. (Rabinow 1983:65) 
(...) The task of the anthropologist is to report observations, not to answer questions -  the truth 
doe not lie elsewhere any more than it is hidden at home (...) Ethics, science and truth all become 
aesthetic’ (Rabinow 1983:66).
Thus, in the cultural relativism inaugurated by Franz Boas the Other’s truth claims were 
suspended ‘as a way of affirming the universal ground which made all cultures equal 
expressions of an underlying common humanity’ (Rabinow 1983: 67). Interpretative 
anthropology, on the other hand, suspends the possibility that there may be truth claims 
that are not located within a perspective, and that any such claims may be intelligible.
32 ‘There has always been a conflict (or at least an implicit tension) within anthropology between the 
particularities of the peoples we go out to study and the theories we use to describe them. If the theory was 
not general enough, then the risk of mere descriptivism, naive empiricism, was present. The other side of 
the coin, however, is that if  the theory is general enough than we tend to get a rather washed out, this soup 
of “behind these seemingly bizarre customs lies John Doe just like you and me”. The more general the 
theory the less it could do justice to the particulars under consideration. So, culture, for Geertz, is 
irreducible to underlying universals; it is resolutely particular. There is no culture in general. Culture is not
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‘The anthropologist not only remains neutral to the truth claims of a particular culture but now 
brackets the seriousness (in the traditional sense of Western philosophy) of the truth claims 
themselves. (...) The anthropologist is not bracketing meaning, like a structuralist or behaviourist. 
Rather, what is bracketed is precisely the claims of serious speech acts to serious meaningfulness. 
What is suspended is not only the claim to context-free truth, but the claim that such a claim is 
intelligible. The interpretive anthropologist will treat both reference and sense as mere 
phenomena’ (Rabinow 1983: 67, my emphasis).
With reference to this, it may be contended that claims that knowledge and experience 
are hermeneutic, and thus a matter of aesthetics, is in fact not reductionism. Engagement 
with ‘surface’ need not be problematic either. When grounded in a Nietzschean critique 
of metaphysics, the issue ceases to appear as an error. In Aphorism 54 in The Gay 
Science Nietzsche suggests that experience as ‘consciousness of appearances’ may be 
likened to a dream. We may be aware that our experience of the world is akin to a dream 
in that it is neither objective nor directly linked to it. Yet, we ‘still must go on dreaming’. 
Our experience may be sensed as ‘appearance’, and yet, it cannot be falsified in the sense 
that we cannot remove ourselves from it, we cannot shed it as if it were a mask. In other 
words, ‘there is no objective reality, no thing-in-itself; there is only appearance in one or 
another perspective (Nietzsche 1974, Translator’s comment -  footnote 44, 1974:116).33
some superorganic realm. It is rooted in the evolution of the species’ (Rabinow 1983:63).
33 Aphorism 54: ‘The consciousness o f appearance. -  How wonderful and new and yet how gruesome and 
ironic I find my position vis-a-vis the whole existence in the light of my insight! I have discovered for 
myself that the human and animal past, indeed the whole primal age and past of all sentient being continues 
in me to invent, to love, to hate, and to infer. I suddenly woke up in the midst of this dream, but only to the 
consciousness that I am dreaming and that I must go on dreaming lest I perish -  as a somnambulist must go 
on dreaming lest he fall. What is “appearance” for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: 
what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a dead 
mask that one could place on an unknown x or remove from it! [...] Appearance is for me that which lives 
and is effective and goes so far in its self-mockery that it makes me feel that this is appearance and will-o’- 
the-wisp and a dance of spirits and nothing more -  that among all these dreamers, I, too, who “know”, am 
dancing my dance; that the knower is a means for prolonging the earthly dance and thus belongs to the 
masters of ceremony of existence; and that the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge 
perhaps is and will be the highest means to preserve the universality of dreaming and the mutual 
comprehension of all dreamers and thus also the continuation of the dream’ (Nietzsche 1974:116, emphasis 
in the original).
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Unequivocally dismissive of Nietzschean arguments, Rabinow (1983) concludes that 
despite efforts to produce thick descriptive accounts of other cultures, the programme of 
interpretative anthropology is in fact profoundly reductionist, a ‘pure description’. Whilst 
interpretative anthropology may provide a description of what the Other thinks is true, or 
serious, ultimately it pronounces all statements relative, and thus neither true nor 
serious.34 In this sense, then, Geertz’ relativism engenders a flattening of difference, a 
reduction of the Other’s claims to truth and seriousness to discourse, and the opening of 
anthropological endeavour to potentially any individual willing to reduce the Other to the 
Same, under the aegis of (anthropological) nihilism.
‘Ultimately, when this new purified phenomenological anthropology has come of age, we will 
understand that culture is discourse, that there are many variants of it, that a heightened 
conversation is our goal. We will be able to bring this project to fruition when not only a small 
number of Westerners have become anthropologists but presumably everyone else as well. When 
the Navajo comes of age, and learns to translate his [sic] frame of reference into what can only be 
our frame of reference, then the long strangeness between us will have ended -  and so will all 
difference as well’ (Rabinow 1983:68).
3.5.3 Double Negatives
I consider Rabinow’s position (1983) to be anti-nihilist and anti-Nietzschean, and as such 
extremely interesting in its locatedness. For one, nihilism appears in Rabinow’s text as 
either coupled with fascism (1983:69), or as opposed to humanism (1983:70). Rabinow 
(1983:72), with Foucault in mind, ventures to propose ‘a rethinking of humanism, 
nihilism, and the relation of truth to power’ (1983:72), but does little, if anything, to this 
effect. What Rabinow does unequivocally is to condemn Geertz for broadening the reach
34‘The possibility o f pure description of another culture from the outside is now possible. What Geertz once 
referred to as “a scientific phenomenology of cultural forms” has found its method. We observe what the 
natives think is true, i.e. what they take seriously. We construct an account of their universe, their frames of 
meaning, and we converse with it. We bring it into our conversation. The anthropologist thus succeeds in 
studying what is serious and truthful to Others without it being serious or truthful to him [sic]. As we have 
been told, there are no truths to be brought back from faraway places. There is nothing specific to be 
learned from other cultures; they have nothing to teach us, anymore than presumably we have to teach
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and scope of nihilism in the project(-s) of anthropology. With reference to this, I would 
argue that neither Geertz, nor indeed Rabinow, do this to any sufficient extent. Nihilism 
may constitute the limit of Geertz’s programme, in terms of occlusion and potentiality. 
Indeed, an inherent nihilistic stance is present in Geertz’s writings. Traces of nihilism-as- 
potentiality lie in his characterisation of anthropological fieldwork.
‘All the familiar rationalisations having to do with science, progress, philanthropy, 
enlightenment, and selfless purity of dedication ring false, and one is left, ethically disarmed, to 
grapple with a human relationship which must be justified over and over again in the most 
immediate of terms’ (Geertz 2000: 33, my emphasis).
‘[T]he whole enterprise [of social scientific research] is directed not towards the impossible task 
of controlling history but toward the only quixotic one of widening the role of reason in it’ 
(Geertz 2000: 37-8, my emphasis).
Despite these affirmative moments, the ‘event’ of nihilism in Geertz’s texts is founded 
mainly on the multiple disavowals noted in the previous section. Most rebukes are linked 
to Geertz’s explicit defence of cultural relativism from charges of nihilism and solipsism 
(Geertz 2000), to the extent that nihilism and its disavowals mark a ‘scandal’ in Geertz’s 
work. Rabinow (1983:52) is therefore right in applying Heidegger’s dictum to Geertz’s 
position, and state that ‘those who fancy themselves free of nihilism perhaps push 
forward its development most fundamentally’. Despite their professed differences and 
mutual accusations, however, both Rabinow and Geertz in fact converge in their 
evaluation of nihilism as something to be eschewed. Both are engaged in the articulation 
of an anti-nihilist position. Insofar as what I call the ‘anti-nihilist’ quality of their 
respective positions is a negation of nihilism, and as such a double negative, anti-nihilism 
may amount to an affirmation. One must thus unravel the conditions of possibility and 
related genealogy of this hastening of nihilism that occurs on the site of anthropology. 
Furthermore, nihilism need not be reduced, contained and foreclosed. By tracing the
them’ (Rabinow 1983:67-8).
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intellectual genealogy of nihilism, it may be possible to recover what is disavowed and 
yet advanced by Geertz and Rabinow, namely nihilism as the vocation of hermeneutics 
(Vattimo 1997) and by extension, the vocation of anthropology. This requires a 
reconfiguration of the intellectual genealogy/horizon of the anthropological project(-s) 
and of hermeneutic anthropology in Nietschean/Heideggerian terms. Within this horizon, 
it may then be possible to reclaim nihilism as a legitimate epistemological and 
hermeneutic position. I take Geertz’s call to widen social scientific, and more 
specifically, anthropological horizons (Heidegger), frontiers or limits (Foucault, Derrida) 
to be an invitation to confront what he has left remarkably unexplored, namely the 
quixotic underpinnings of the anthropological enterprise. The hermeneutic and nihilist 
vocation of anthropology may therefore be both its very weakness, and its greatest asset.
[Anthropologists] ‘were the first to insist that we see the lives of others through lenses of our own 
grinding and that they look back on ours through ones of their own. That this led some to think 
the sky was falling, solipsism was upon us, and intellect, judgement, even the sheer possibility of 
communication had all fled is not surprising. The repositioning of horizons and the decentring of 
perspectives has had that effect before’ (Geertz 2000:65, my emphasis).
3.6 Weak Thought and the Heideggerian Horizon
‘This is the kernel of Heideggerian ontology: I have access to Being through, let us say, some 
preliminaries, some conditions of possibility, which are not the a priori conditions of the eternal 
Kantian structural reason, but which are instead the reasons, some enabled conditions (condizioni 
possibilitate) of the reason I have inherited, which have a provenance that is transformed in time, 
and this is the history of Being. This history of Being, however, cannot be interpreted coherently, 
from a Heideggerian perspective, and in my opinion, but as weakening”.
(Vattimo 1996:1, my translation and my emphasis)
The suggestion that the vocation of anthropology may be nihilism -  understood as a
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condition predicated on the absence of foundations, the withdrawal of certitudes and the 
revocability of truth -  requires further discussion. How nihilism may have come to 
occupy such a place, and what its advent may entail for anthropology, seem relevant 
questions. In turn, this sheds light on those processes of thick thinning of anthropological 
description and the related ‘weakening’ of disciplinary structures, foundations and 
centres noted above.
Vattimo has considered these questions in his elaboration of the notion of ‘weak thought’ 
(Vattimo 1981, 1991, 1997; Vattimo andRovatti 1983). Vattimo argues (1983, 1991) that 
the historical provenance of ‘weak thought’ can be traced to the crisis of the 
philosophical and political project of the period between 1968 and the first half of the 
1980s. With reference to European philosophy, the two decades are said to be significant 
in that they mark the demise of a single and universal rationality. Western history can be 
understood in terms of a progressive weakening of ontological categories that have been 
inherited from metaphysics and whose dismantling begins with the work of Nietzsche 
and Heidegger. Interestingly, to trace the history of Being is said not to amount to 
reification. Reification is avoided through recourse to ‘interpretation’ as theorised by 
hermeneutics, that is, a conceptualisation of interpretation that acknowledges that one is 
always located within Being, without ever having to objectifying being to oneself. It is 
Vattimo’s contention that to avoid reification, one can follow Heidegger’s methodology 
and argue one’s position in relation to a provenance, without having to rely on 
‘ metaphysical-obj ectivistic argumentativeness ’.
For Heidegger, Being should not be understood as the stable and immutable grounding of 
metaphysics and ontology, or as the overcoming (Uberwindung) of dialectics. Being in 
Heideggerian terms is historical in the sense of its location within a ‘horizon’ and a 
‘legacy’. The horizon of Being is one of Verwindung, that is, it entails both 
acknowledgement of a legacy and bidding farewell from it (Vattimo 1983:21-22). 
Verwindung is the mode through which thought thinks truth as Uberliferung and 
Geschick (Vattimo ibid:22), that is, as both ‘declining and distorting’ (Vattimo 1983:21), 
rather than as pre-categorical and/or foundational.
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Whilst Heidegger is concerned with articulating the possibility for thinking Dasein 
through temporality and historicity, both understood as marked by ‘dispensations’ of 
Being, or ‘Geschick', ‘weak thought’ re-deploys Heideggerian ‘historical-destinal’
(storico-destinale) argumentativity to recover a sense of the temporal dimension that it 
inhabits vis-a-vis traditional metaphysics. Although ‘weak thought’ cannot transcend 
metaphysics and its constructs, it does nevertheless inherit them in a weakened and 
distorted form. This process of weakening of the foundations of metaphysics may also be 
viewed as the advent of nihilism.
3.6.1 Nihilism and Fabling
As remarked by many commentators, nihilism is a modem problematic (Darby et al 
1989, Egyed 1989, Rabinow 1983, Vattimo 1983, 1997). Whilst different genealogies of 
nihilism may be traced (cf. Volpi 1996), it is in Nietzsche’s work that the question of 
nihilism and its place in modernity have been most subtly and influentially addressed. 
Nietzsche is concerned with tracing the ‘dissolution of the idea of fundamentals’ 
(Vattimo 2002:74), such as God, Virtue, Truth and Justice on which moral-metaphysical 
discourse is predicated. In the context of his discussion of the ‘self-sublimation of 
morality’, Nietzsche proposes that ‘God is dead’.35 The announcement of the death of
35 Two aphorisms in The Gay Science, namely aphorism 108 (Nietzsche 1974: 167) and aphorism 125 
(Nietzsche 1974: 181-2, emphasis in the original) are the first occurrences of the ‘announcement’ of the 
death of God in Nietzsche’s texts. I reproduce Aphorism 125 herewith. '‘The madman. -  Have you not 
heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place and cried 
incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God! -  As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around 
just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? Asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? Asked 
another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? Emigrated? Thus they yelled and 
laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. “Whither is God?” he cried; 
“I will tell you. We have killed him -  you and I. All o f us are murderers. But how did we do this? How 
could we drink up the sea? Who gave the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing 
when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away 
from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there 
still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breadth of 
empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need the light 
lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? 
Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains 
dead. And we have killed him. “How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What 
was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will 
wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals o f atonement, what 
sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves 
not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is bom
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God is not intended to operate according to the logic of metaphysics, and thus does not 
constitute either a metaphysically grounded denial, or affirmation. As argued by Vattimo, 
‘the pronouncement that “God id dead” is not, in Nietzsche’s case, simply a metaphysical 
denial of His existence.36 For it is not a statement concerning the “true structure” of 
reality, in which God does not exist while people believe that He does. Instead, 
conditions have altered and have rendered a fable superfluous, which in other ages was 
useful and decisively important’ (Vattimo 2002:76).
Nietzsche associates the fable of the existence of God, and the related ‘imperative of 
truth’ (Vattimo 2002:77) with the need of fashioning a sense of security in the struggle of 
human existence. Re-framing the question in terms of a history of nihilism, the relevance 
of God, or indeed Truth, refers to ‘the historical period in which the instinct to survive 
leads individuals and peoples to form communities, to institute rules of exchange which 
would enable them, if not master, at least create the illusion of mastering, all that is wild, 
unpredictable and ambivalent: all that is alive’ (Egyed 1989:2).
Hence, Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God constitutes, literally, an ‘event’ 
(Vattimo 2002:85). Eschewing metaphysical pretensions as in the establishment of new 
‘facts’, Nietzsche’s announcement is interpretation. It is ‘an acknowledgement of a
after us -  for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto.” Here the 
madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in 
astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. “I have 
come too early,” he said then; “my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still 
wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars 
requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant 
from them than the most distant of stars -  and yet they have done it themselves." It has been related further 
than on the same day the madman forced his way into several churches and there struck up his requiem 
aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing but: “What after all 
are these churches now if  they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?’
36 ‘[T]he Death of God (the summation of what Nietzsche terms the self-sublimation of morality) is not a 
metaphysical pronouncement on the non-existence of a God. It should instead be taken literally as the 
announcement of an event. To announce an event does not mean, however, that one is “proving” anything. 
Nor does it mean, strictly speaking, that one is seeking any agreement for the announcement (which could 
only be sought on the basis of a historical-metaphysical belief in the rationality of the event). Yet 
announcing an event, allied to describing its immediate circumstances (in this case, a reconstruction of 
morality’s errors and eventual self-sublimation), cannot avoid provoking other events in its tum. And this is 
precisely what The Gay Science also says of the thought of eternal recurrence: “If this thought took hold of 
you, it would transform you as you are [...] it would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight’” (Vattimo 
2002:85).
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course of events in which we are implicated and that we do not describe objectively, but 
interpret speculatively as concluding in the recognition that God is no longer necessary’ 
(Vattimo 1997:6-7). The announcement of the ‘death of God’ thus engenders new 
possibilities. It amounts to an acceptance that ‘fables’ other than God and Truth may be 
entertained and that one may explicitly and self-consciously engage in ‘yam spinning’ 
(Vattimo 2002:76). It is this invitation to opening new horizons for the fabling of the 
world that may arguably constitute a form of anthropologically salient nihilism.
In Nietzsche’s writings, nihilism is no unified or monolithic condition. As noted 
previously, the belief in God that characterises human existence in the historical period 
prior to the announcement of the death of God is itself a form of nihilism, and 
specifically one geared towards the containment of the unpredictability and ambivalence 
of existence in the interest of peace and security (Egyed 1989:2). In turn, the 
announcement of the death of God and the ‘devaluation of the highest values’ 
coterminous with it (Vattimo 1997:12) conjures up two distinct nihilist postures. On the 
one hand is ‘incomplete nihilism’, which Nietzsche identifies with Schopenauer’s world­
weariness (Egyed 1989:2). As argued by Egyed (ibid), ‘[t]he point here is that since 
values are seen for what they are, simple instruments in the service of life, they can no 
longer be valued for themselves, but only tragically’. Nietzsche is notoriously oblique as 
to what ‘incomplete nihilism’ may specifically entail, but according to Heidegger’s 
reading, ‘incomplete nihilism’ may be usefully thought of as simple ‘no-saying’ (Egyed 
1989:3). ‘Completed’, or ‘classical’ nihilism, on the other hand, is a form of ‘yes-saying’, 
that is, one that is not exhausted in the ‘devaluation of the highest values’ (Heidegger 
1977 cited in Egyed 1989:3). ‘Completed nihilism’ articulates a simultaneous 
‘revaluation, a counter movement to devaluing’ (Egyed ibid). It is thus of significance 
that the revaluation in hand does not aim to replace old values with new ones, but 
constitutes instead ‘a complete restructuring of the nature and manner of valuation itself 
(ibid).
The distinction between ‘incomplete’ and ‘completed’ nihilism is critical to a recovery 
of the nihilist vocation of hermeneutics, and for the purpose of the present argument, of
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anthropology. As argued by Vattimo (1989), who rephrases the question as one between 
‘reactive’ and ‘active’ nihilism, such a distinction ‘is salient because it allows us to move 
beyond “nihilism as symptom”, to recover the sense in which nihilism in Nietzsche is 
‘the very basis of the “positive” meaning of [Nietzsche’s] theoretical proposal’ (Vattimo 
1989: 15, my emphasis).
‘If (...) nihilism has the courage to accept that God is dead, i.e., that no objective structure an sich 
is given, nihilism becomes active in at least two sense. First, it does not simply unmask the 
nothingness which lies at the basis of meanings and values -  it also produces and creates new 
interpretations and values. It is only passive nihilism which says that there is no need for ends and 
meanings (...) Second, nihilism is active insofar as it is not simply the “belief that all deserves to 
be dissolve and destroyed (...)”, that all is in vain, but actively operates to dissolve and destroy’ 
(Vattimo 1989:16).
Vattimo argues that ‘active’ interpretations of nihilism are self-consciously hermeneutic 
(1989:17). Nevertheless, one should painstaking discriminate between different 
inflections, and deflect early over-vitalistic glosses (cf. Dilthey, Goethe, Baumler) as 
much as the Deleuzian formulation of ‘authentic’ vital fluxus which is the object of 
fascist ‘canalizations’, or Rorty’s active nihilism as pragmatism. For Vattimo, all these 
versions of ‘active nihilism’ are too vitalistic (1989:17-8) and must be contrasted with a 
‘weak’ inflection which is productive, but neither transcendental nor strongly
3 7metaphysical.
The positive ‘weak’ inflection of active nihilism and its productiveness are important for 
the recognition of anthropological nihilism. Whilst this acceptance is foreclosed in the 
characterisations of nihilism suggested by both Geertz and Rabinow, it is now possible to 
evaluate their respective formulations thoroughly. For Geertz, nihilism is often
37 Weak thought is not concerned with ridding itself free of metaphysics. Rather, ‘weak thought’ aims to 
recover the radicalism inherent in Heidegger’s proposition that any version of metaphysics may be marked 
by historicity, see below.
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coterminous with ethical, aesthetic and logical paralysis (Geertz 2000). Often coupled 
with ‘subjectivism’ and ‘solipsism’, Geertz’s understanding of nihilism may be usefully 
redefined as a form of ‘incomplete nihilism’ and ‘no-saying’. For Rabinow, 
anthropological nihilism takes two forms, namely, the denial of truth and the denial of 
seriousness of the Other’s assertions. Nihilism brings forth a flattening out of difference, 
a reduction of the Other to the Same, and a dissolution of ethics into aesthetics (Rabinow 
1983). Further, nihilism is a ‘cultural process’ that befalls anthropology, often despite 
practitioners’ intentions. Rabinow’s understanding of nihilism thus coincides with the 
reading of nihilism as ‘symptom’ of an epochal malaise given in Vattimo’s ‘reactive’ 
nihilism. When related to fascism, Rabinow’s nihilism often slips into ‘active’ and over- 
vitalistic formulations. Despite remarkable convergence between Geertz and Rabinow as 
far as the eschewal of nihilism is concerned, what still requires elucidation is how a 
recuperation of nihilism may be coterminous with the recovery of the question of Being, 
and how this may constitute not just ‘scandal’, but also an ‘event’ and the very vocation 
of anthropology.
3.6.2 Weak Thought
‘The weakness of thought vis-a-vis the world, and hence vis-a-vis society, is possibly only one 
aspect of the impasse in which thought has found itself at the end of its metaphysical adventure. 
What matters now is to re-think the meaning of this adventure and explore the ways to go beyond
38 ‘European nihilism is chiefly concerned with the resolution of truth into value, which takes the form of 
human belief and opinion, or, as Nietzsche puts it, the form of the will to power. What this means, simply 
put, is that the philosophy of nihilism aims to dissect and dissolve all o f the claims to truth of traditional 
metaphysical thought, in a process that stops only when it reaches the point where these supposed “truths” 
-  such as God or the soul -  are revealed to be no less subjective values, and no less errors, than any other 
human beliefs or opinions (...) Nihilistic thought seeks to show that metaphysical “truths” simply express 
the subjective values of a given individual or social group, not the immutable, unchanging essence of either 
the divine, human or natural world. Thus nihilism attacks rationality wherever it is encountered, whether in 
science, philosophy or art, since the concept of “reason” and “truth” are entirely interdependent in the 
tradition of Western metaphysical thought. The project of nihilism is to unmask all systems of reason and 
o f persuasion, and to show that logic -the very basis of rational metaphysical thought -  is in fact only a 
kind of rhetoric. All thought that pretends to discover truth is but an expression of the will to power -even 
to domination- of those making truth-claims over those who are being addressed by them...In the 
perspective of nihilism, Nietzsche points out, the difference between error and truth is always a delusory 
one; and to do away with one means to do away with the other as well (Snyder 1983:xii).
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it: namely, through negation (negazione) -  not primarily at the level of social relations, but at the 
level of the contents and modes of thinking itself -  of the metaphysical traits of thought, chief 
among them the “strength” (forza), which it has always believed it could confer to itself in the 
name of its privileged access to being as foundation’ (Vattimo and Rovatti 1983:10, my 
translation).
Weak thought is the thought of post-modernity. As pointed out by Antiseri (1995), weak 
thought represents a way out of the strong rationality of modernity, and a break with “the 
illusionary foundational certainties of any metaphysics and totalising essentialism which 
intends to exhibit ‘fundamenta inconcusscC (Antiseri 1995). Weak thought thinks 
reality/Being within linguistic categories, or linguistic horizons, and categories are not 
Kantian eternal, a-temporal fixtures. Conversely, it is argued that the Kantian a priori is 
historical and temporal. Being or reality cannot be accessed but in their immediacy -  we 
have no pre-categorical or trans-categorical access to being (Antiseri 1990). As pointed 
out by Moore (1999), the advent of deconstruction, post-structuralism and post­
modernism is associated with a ‘crisis of representation’, and specifically with a 
progressive polarisation of terms according to dyads such as objectivism/subjectivism, 
empiricism/social contructionism. In the field of anthropology, the crisis of representation 
has brought about ‘an insistence on partiality and partialness of interpretation of all 
interpretations, and a profound questioning of the assumptions and techniques used to 
develop and convey cultural representations and interpretations’ (Moore 1999:5). Further, 
anthropologists have become increasingly aware of the ‘multiple models and or 
discourses within cultures, societies or sets of people. Anthropologists have only recently 
begun to discuss and to document the existence of multiple models, and to look at the 
variation that exists within cultures as well as between them’ (Moore 1994:136). In this 
sense, one notes a splintering of the ‘object/subject’ of study, a new recognition of added 
complexity, diversity and variability and an erosion of the conditions of possibility for 
statements such as ‘The Piro think in such and such a manner’.39 Postmodern and
39 I am referring to a comment made by an anthropologist at the conference Secrets and Lies: A Debate 
Between Psychoanalysis and Anthropology, London School of Economics, 3 November 2001. Geertz’s
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deconstructionist-informed debates have engendered an emphasis on ‘the role of the 
anthropologist in knowledge construction, the importance of positionality, and the 
partialness of all interpretations’ (Moore 1999:8). This, perhaps, is the anthropological 
horizon of weak thought.
3.6.1 The Nihilist Vocation o f Anthropology
Anthropology can thus be re-positioned within a history of nihilism. The expansion of the 
hermeneutic horizon via the paradoxes, retractions, disavowals and double negatives 
noted so far problematises certain presuppositions and engenders new possibilities. A 
questioning of the epistemological foundations of anthropological thought is enshrined in 
a prestigious argumentative tradition, that is, in a history of debate that has most recently 
addressed matters of representation (Clifford and Marcus 1986), and thus unleashed a 
series of epistemological, methodological and interpretative strategies. Clifford resolves 
to engage with surface, ‘hit and run’ ethnography (cf. Clifford 1997, Geertz 2000), 
Marcus calls for multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1999), and Moore advocates the 
development o f ‘composite theories’ (Moore 1997).
‘Theorising is or should be partial in that it should allude to a ‘sense of one’s own biases and 
stakes’, along with a recognition of the limited part those biases may be playing’ ([John] 1996:35- 
6) in the process of theorisation. Theorising and theories for John are always relative, context 
specific and partial. However, they are also simultaneously ‘composite’. Composite theories are 
those which have both rhetorical and historical dimensions; they have ‘explanatory powers as 
well as more inclusive levels of analysis ([John] 1996: 37). Theories are composite because they 
operate in several analytical registers simultaneously and some registers are more abstract than 
others. Contemporary theories in the social sciences can never be truly universal, just as they can 
never be exclusively or indelibly Western. Theories, like their anthropologists, are postcolonial:
statement that (2000:102) ‘the days of simple “the Dangs believe, the Dangs don’t believe” anthropology 
seems truly over’, comes across as underestimating anthropology/anthropologists’ capacity for neurosis and 
nostalgia when it comes to metaphysics. That is, metaphysics periodically re-emerges as neurosis and
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they are “made up of a network of assumptions, disciplinary affiliations, historical 
sedimentations, and global connections that have never been fixed or uniform but that evolve in 
an uneven, power-laden flux”’(Moore 1997:139, my emphasis).
It is Moore’s call that resonates more closely to the present effort, when the composite 
character of theory is qualified as ‘weak’. By thinking the project(-s) of anthropology and 
the present research in and through ‘weak thought’, I thus strive to recover the place of 
anthropology within the Nietzschean/Heideggerian history of nihilism and Being. Yet, 
and as always, the promise of weak thought and nihilism has left traces, albeit unmarked 
and unclaimed. Since the mid-1960s, Marilyn Strathem has been concerned with 
questions of partiality, transience, relationality and relativisation of social relations as 
much as with the intellectual models through which such processes are imagined in 
anthropology and beyond (cf. Strathem 1971, 1980, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1999). In my 
view, her texts defy ‘strong thought’ and strive instead to make explicit the artifice of 
anthropological knowledge practices. Strathem notes that anthropology relies upon 
‘ethnographic moments’ to conjure up ‘ethnographic effects’ (1999).
‘The ethnographic moment is a relation (joining signifier and signified). We could say that the 
ethnographic moment works as an example of a relation which joins the understood (what is 
analysed at the moment of observation) to the need to understand (what is observed at the 
moment of analysis). The relation between what is already apprehended and what seems to 
demand apprehension is of course infinitely regressive, that is, slips across any manner of scale 
(minimally, observation and analysis each contains within itself the relation between them both). 
Any ethnographic moment, which is a moment of knowledge or insight, denotes a relation 
between immersement and movement.’ (Strathem 1999:6, my emphasis).
The ethnographic moment is pre-eminently relational, and connoted by a kind of 
oscillation that occurs in a specific temporal frame. Although ‘immersion’ and
nostalgia.
151
‘movement’ come to define anthropological labour in temporal frames, and they are 
distinguished in terms of the seemingly different intellectual labour they are dedicated to, 
the ‘ethnographic moment’ depends on the ways in which ‘these activities are 
apprehended as occupying the same (conceptual) space’ (Strathem 1999: 262, Endnote 1 
to Chapter 1)
Strathem’s work is characterised by an acute awareness of the knowledge practices 
deployed by anthropologists and the metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological 
claims that underpin them. Her ethnographic accounts do not stake claims to coincide 
with the Other’s perspective. The perspective of the Other is one effect among many that 
is predicated on the perspective of anthropology, itself an effect. ‘Ethnographic effects’ 
arise out of an effort to do anthropology that anthropologises its own labour. Moments of 
centring and decentring are marked by the temporalities of description and analysis.
‘The interpreting subject appears, then, always positioned to act from a point of view, to take a 
perspective on events that is never exactly reciprocated by another. At the same time, society is at 
once regarded as made up of innumerable points of view and as furnishing the individual subject 
with a technology of communication. The subject thus receives certain interpretations, not just 
from others but from society at large, which reveals his or her own ‘extent’ -  for the perspective 
from society is one that no single subject can equal’ (Strathem 1999:237).
Interpretation is however not predicated on equivalence, or a shared ontology of subject 
and object. Instead, the relation established through the ethnographic moment is qualified 
in terms of ‘surplus and displacement’ (Strathem 1999). The multiplication of 
perspectives thus engendered is not taken at face value. Instead, assumptions of ‘fullness 
of comprehension, quantification, multiplication’ are consistently problematised.40 
Likewise, the ‘sense of incompleteness’ emanates from ‘the vision of holism that (...) is
40 ‘But society and the individual subject do not each provide a perspective on the other -  there is no 
mutuality or reciprocity in this regard. They are not homologous abstractions: neither has the dimensions or 
proportions of the other, and modems regard them as different orders of phenomena’ (Strathem 1999:238).
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such an engine to uncovering the unpredictable; [and] from the juxtaposition of 
fieldwork/writing, observation/analysis. However, the sense of incompleteness such 
juxtapositions generate has also some source in Euro-American knowledge practices’ 
(Strathem 1999: 246).
[The merographic connection] points to certain practices of knowledge which presume a limitless 
number of perspectives. Each new angle or perspective eclipses the last; anything may be a part 
of something else, minimally part of a description in the act of describing it. In this view, nothing 
is in fact ever simply part of a whole because another view, another perspective or domain, may 
re-describe it as “part of something else’” (Strathem 1999:246-7).
Strathem’s work is epistemologically, ethically and aesthetically merographic.41 The 
incompleteness and shifting of perspectives engenders knowledge practices of 
multiplication and incompleteness. These are self-consciously deployed in the context of 
permanently shifting awareness of the horizon within which they take shape. To the 
extent that this is the case, Strathem appears to embrace the quixotic element of the 
anthropological enterprise noted but, alas, not followed up by Geertz (2000). Vattimo 
argues that the antidote to metaphysical anthropology, i.e. anthropology which consists of 
descriptions of ‘universal structures of the occurrence of the human phenomenon’ 
(Vattimo 1988:146), rests in taking seriously the historical (geschichtlich) thrownness of 
Dasein (ibid), an opportunity suggested in the work of Marilyn Strathem. I consider 
awareness of the horizon of anthropological knowledge practices a trace of 
anthropological weak thought. These traces provide the condition of possibility to think 
beyond old and new universalisms, be those appealing to universal ‘humanity’, 
‘structure’ or ‘interpretation’. It may thus be possible to forego foundational thinking, to 
follow the effects of constant shifting in perspectives as the horizon for weak description 
and thick nihilism.
I take up this point in Chapter 4.
41 In Chapters 4 and 5 I discuss this question in some depth with reference to various guerrilla merographic 
knowledge practices.
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3.6 Towards Weak Description and Thick Nihilism
‘Intellectual models depend for their impetus on imaginative possibilities they themselves cannot 
provide. What masquerades as the academic is very often the popular in disguise, and we would 
do well to remember that this sophisticated veiling mechanism is merely one of the more 
common-place methods for covering over what we do not wish to have revealed’ (Moore 
1994:150).
‘Description presupposes analysis, and analysis presupposes theory, and they all presuppose 
imagination’ (Strathem 1999:xi).
Dense anthropological description has been a very influential paradigm and Geertz’s 
(1973, 1983, 2000) contribution to anthropological theory invaluable. It is my contention, 
however, that in anthropological studies of those social contexts marked by multiple 
histories of conflict and cultures of secrecy, there may be serious impediments to thick 
description. Whether an ‘ethnographic effect’ may connote my experience of fieldwork in 
Peten, is grounded in the intuition that the thickness of the ethnography may be its very 
thinness.42 With regard to this, it may be argued that thick description may accommodate 
omissions and absences in the analysis and in the interpretative framework, here 
including the ethnographer’s as much as her interlocutors’ lacunae. Refusals, absences 
and silences may be described in the ‘thick’ form they take and in the ‘thick’ 
ethnographic encounters they connote. Conversely, the point is not strictly one of 
devising more inclusive accounts, or more sophisticated textual techniques, through 
which the meaningful weight of what is left unsaid, of that which is not known or of 
socialities and social relations articulated in the negative may be represented. Instead, I 
have defined the analytical and theoretical task at hand as one grounded in a critical 
analysis of the processes of ‘centring’, ‘contextualisation’ and ‘intelligibility-creation’, 
taking place in and through anthropology, and the descriptions it engenders. Further, I
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have suggested that processes of ‘de-centring’, ‘out-contextualisation’ and 
‘unintelligibility-creation’ may also be important. By placing anthropology within the 
history of Western metaphysics, I have contended that not only may ‘centring’ and 
‘decentring’ be apprehended, but it may also be possible to confront and recoup the 
nihilist vocation of anthropology.
It may therefore be possible to think of the anthropological enterprise in nihilist terms, 
and recast anthropological description within the horizon of weak thought. Weak 
description in the present research comes into being and is effectuated in and through a 
complex agentic territory, characterised by overt and covert injunctions to secrecy. 
Interlocutors often place these injunctions upon the ethnographer, as they demand that 
degrees of confidentiality be respected. On the other hand, notably in anthropological 
research on violence and conflict, demands to secrecy often involve a commitment to 
tell.43 It is within this complex predicament that the urgency of secrecy, with the telling 
that is involved, becomes autogenic, self-imposed and adhered to. Weak description is 
therefore also, but not exclusively, a form of self-discipline and suppression. Weak 
description has a component of rhetorical departure from Geertzian thick description in 
the sense that it is inscribed within an anthropology of secrecy and conflict that is self­
consciously complicit with that secrecy-imbued and violence-marked ethnographic 
encounter willed by the anthropologist, but fully driven by the agentic ‘object/subject’ of 
study.44 The routes and structures of these demands for secrecy may be highlighted in 
weak descriptive analyses. Weak description thus also depends on established 
anthropological practices of concealment and camouflage (cf. Pitt-rivers 1954), but goes 
beyond these as it aims to self-consciously explore the complexity of refusal, nescience, 
negative relationalities and socialities. In my definition, and for the purpose of the present 
analysis, weak description implies a taciturn and tergiversating mode of disclosure that 
recognizes the ambiguities, evasions and equivocations that are an important part of
421 owe this point to Henrietta L. Moore.
43 This point is also made by Valentine Daniel (1997). With reference to an interview with an Estate Tamil 
woman recounting the death of her father in war-torn Sri Lanka, Daniel (1997:334) notes ‘the ambivalence 
of her charge to me, to tell and yet not to tell’. However, Daniel’s work is not concerned with exploring the 
connection between the charges to tell and not to tell, on the one hand, and secrecy, on the other hand.
44 Whatever the encounter, Geertz always comes out on top. It was his typewriter he refused to give (Geertz
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cultural translation and cultural analysis. Weak description does not dispel but 
acknowledges the possibility that the thickness of ethnography may be its very thinness. 
Through weak description it is possible to entertain the possibility that keeping secrets at 
times involves telling, telling may be an opaque form of concealment, and silences may 
be oblique narrative modes. Refuting anti-theoretical bias, both within but also 
substantively beyond the horizon of Geertz’s thick description, weak description 
acknowledges that these cultural predicaments in fact require adequate theorising. In 
other words, ‘weak description’ is analytical and theoretical, in that is self-consciously 
positioned within the horizon of nihilism.
It could be argued that in ‘Thinking as a Moral Act’ Geertz (2000:21-41) provides the 
starting point for a weak hermeneutics of ethnography. It may be recalled that 
anthropology’s endeavour is connoted as ‘quixotic’, and the ethnographic encounter is 
said to leave the anthropology ‘ethically disarmed’ (Geertz 2000). I have argued that the 
‘weakness’ noted by Geertz requires that one confront -  embrace/abandon oneself to?- 
that which Geertz continuously eschews, namely, nihilism. In view of multiple 
genealogies of nihilism, what is at issue here is not any nihilist stance, but rather, the 
refractory product of two loose trajectories. At the risk of resurrecting a distinction that 
hermeneutic ontology has exploded, the trajectories may be ironically connoted as one 
thick and one thin. The first is the nihilism that stems from the thick experiences of 
fieldwork, and is, I would argue, already present, or rather, suggested in rather partial 
form in Geertz’s own writings. Ethnographic nihilism is experiential and grounded in the 
thickness of the ethnographic encounter to suggest its very ‘weakness’. ‘Weakness’ may 
be in the experience of being left ‘ethically disarmed’ (Geertz 2000, see also Strathem
1999), or gripped by epistemological and epistemic doubt. A certain thick nihilism marks 
the experience of anthropological research. Thick nihilism is grounded in the asymmetry 
of the ethnographic encounter noted by Geertz (2000:21-41), in the ways its weakness 
mimics the thinness and ambivalence of secrecy, and the impact that these have on 
subjectivities. It is the product of the encounters with the ever-more agentic subjects of 
ethnographic interlocution. The ethnographic encounter and dialogism have been figured
2000) and it was his view of the cockfight we read in The Interpretation o f Cultures (1973).
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as either a ‘conversation among equals’, or as an exchange whose power balance is 
biased in favour of the ethnographer (Geertz 2000, Clifford and Marcus 1986). The loss 
of selfhood for researchers is bracketed in discussions of experiences of entering the 
field, a ‘culture shock syndrome’ with established diagnostics and prognosis (Geertz 
2000) and whose symptomatology encompasses alienation, nescience and skepticism. As 
pointed out by Silverman (1990:139), in Geertz’s writings, interpretive uncertainty is 
moderate and explicitly noted at the beginning of the ethnographic encounter. 
Conversely, the thick nihilism I speak of is not, or at least it is not restricted to, these 
occupational syndromes. It is in part a product of the ethnographic encounter that the 
weakness of thought never establishes interpretative confidence. Instead, epistemological 
doubt -  and the provisionality of all interpretation entertained throughout -  seem not only 
appealing, but the only option.
The present argument takes its lead from an off-centre position, and specifically from 
Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Levi-Strauss. Derrida shows that, by focusing on 
events and ruptures, claims for the structurally of structures are predicated on a centre 
that is in fact a site of permutations and deferrals. Against his own claims, Levi-Strauss’s 
texts/fields contain their own critique and exceed their own arguments. Derrida’s 
deconstruction of Levi-Strauss has informed the critical reading of Geertz’s texts 
proposed here, and specifically bolstered an attempt at exposing nihilism as both 
‘rupture’ and ‘event’ in hermeneutics-informed anthropology. Nihilism, I have argued, is 
not simply the limit of Geertz’s hermeneutic programme, but rather, its very vocation. In 
this light, Geertz’s vociferous denials of nihilism are turned into awkward and partial 
affirmations. A consideration of the place of nihilism within Geertz's hermeneutic 
anthropology raises further questions. Indeed, why should Geertz be so explicitly 
unnerved by the nihilist vocation of hermeneutics? I have argued that part of the answer 
lies in Geertz’s intellectual genealogy which, still in the maelstrom of Western 
metaphysics - and under the spectre of liberal theory -  must somehow cling to 
universalities and necessarily forego and stave off nihilism. Perhaps the nervous fits that 
beset hermeneutics-prone anthropologists when the word ‘nihilism’ is proffered (by 
themselves, mind you) lies in their self-identification as ‘liberal’ (Geertz 2000:74).
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Conversely, consider the different hermeneutic genealogy in the work of Vattimo. 
Vattimo’s work on ‘weak thought’ is predicated on the recognition that nihilism 
constitutes the horizon of hermeneutics. There seem to be important questions at stake in 
nihilism, for those who embrace it, as much as for those who eschew it. The arguments 
provide the horizon of the weak inflection of nihilism I have recovered.
Through Geertz’s denials and Vattimo’s affirmations, I argue that the nihilist vocation of 
hermeneutics must be recovered, and in fact, it has always been ‘already there’. I argue 
that nihilism already engenders important hermeneutic strategies of relevance to 
anthropology in general, and to my anthropology of cultures of secrecy and histories of 
violence in particular. For this purpose, I have referred to the work of Marilyn Strathem 
and some of the epistemological/hermeneutic strategies she has deployed. These, I argue, 
may amount to forms of ‘weak description’ and ‘thick nihilism’. In turn, this has served a 
double purpose. On the one hand, I have re-positioned Strathem’s work within what 
Vattimo calls ‘weak thought’, that is, within the horizon of nihilism and of Being. To 
claim Strathem’s work can be located within a horizon is intended to be an honour, and 
bestowal of philosophical rigour. On the other hand, I have tried to think analytically 
about the conditions of possibility of ‘weak description’ and ‘think nihilism’. These are 
the analytical tools which underpin the analysis that follows. Weak description and thick 
nihilism bear the mark of the genealogical paths I have traced in this chapter. They 
summon up Geertz and Nietzsche, Vattimo and Boas, Heidegger, Moore and Strathem. 
They make a space in which to interrogate the status of refusal, the negative, equivalence, 
positionality, absence and presence as they arise in the discussion of the ethnography that 
follows.
Derrida (1970) argued that ethnology (I say anthropology) is predicated on a critique of 
ethnocentrism. Geertz, seemingly upholding Derrida’s definition of anthropology, argues 
for an ‘anti anti-relativism’ stance (Geertz 2000). Indeed, it could be said that both 
discourses are contributing to the explosion of Western metaphysics of presence (Derrida 
1970) and the dismantlement of subtle and crass self-referential universalisms (Geertz
2000). It is within this critique of Western metaphysics that the Nietzschean definition of
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nihilism -  as the resolution of truth into value -  can be placed at the centre of 
anthropological endeavour, to constantly decentre it. Pace Geertz, weak description and 
thick nihilism bolster the enterprise of ‘thinking as a moral act’ (Geertz 2000) and 
ethnography as a matter of ethics and aesthetics (Geertz 2000) as well. Nihilism thus 
becomes the necessary condition for the articulation of partiality, and related post- 
perspectival anthropology I am concerned with.
With Vattimo and Strathem, I strive to think beyond universality and pluralisation, that 
is, beyond the safe enumeration of potentially infinite positions grounded in a universal 
meta-theory of interpretation. Both authors converge in highlighting the ‘play’ and 
‘shifts’ that constitute the practices of centring and decentring. Further, Strathem takes 
Heidegger’s suggestion to start from ‘the inquirer’ to task (Heidegger [1962] 2002: 24) 
and weaves herself through the weak thought and thick nihilism of her ethnographic 
accounts. What emerges is a constant play, of multiple scales and shifts in multiple 
perspectives, that makes anthropological accounts possible, as well as an explicit effort to 
think in and through these shifts. In the process, the conditions of possibility are 
established for something rather extraordinary to occur, given past and present 
intellectual climates, namely the announcement that the vocation of anthropology is 
nihilism. This entails foregoing any appeal to metaphysical ‘strong’ thought and a 
recognition that the anthropological endeavour is productively marked by both partiality 
and a distinct awareness of its own temporality, and hence its own provisionality.
In the following chapters, I explore the possibility of writing an ethnography which is 
anti-foundational and attuned to the partialities articulated in the field, as much as to its 
own temporal and provisional character. I consider guerrilla subjectivities and those 
social relations marked by secrecy, (Chapter 4), experiential and ontological states of 
violence and ambivalence (Chapter 5), the coexistence and relativisation of multiple 
moral orders (Chapter 6), phenomenologies of guerrilla and anthropology’s prosthetic 
embodied subjectivity and anthropological appendages (Chapter 7).
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Chapter 4 
Secrecy, Scale and Anthropological Knowledge
iIdentifiquese companeral
4.1 Introduction
This chapter opens with a discussion of an ethnographic moment of partial disclosure, 
when I realised that ex-combatants deployed different names for themselves and others 
and that names qualified different, multiple and complex relationalities. I discuss naming 
practices and argue that whatever the scale, through names, pseudonyms and nicknames 
partial relations and connections were established. Connections may have been 
articulated positively through disclosure, or occur through negation and foreclosure, but 
led to connections nonetheless. I also consider names and naming practices in relation to 
secrecy, and the implications of secrecy for guerrilla hermeneutics of the Other, and for 
anthropological knowledge more broadly. I argue that whilst guerrilla naming practices 
may be thought of as holographic, guerrilla secrecy engendered forms of connective 
relativisation. The guerrilla secret subjectivities and socialities, and related partialities 
and connectivities require that anthropology relinquish appeals to a plurality of discrete 
cultural/social entities and/or subjects to envision instead post-plural scales. The scales of 
post-plurality, with their temporal qualities and ever-shifting horizons may be said to 
constitute a form of weak description informed by weak thought.
4.2 Positionality and Difference, Partiality and Connection
In the early stages of fieldwork in a community of FAR Qx-guerrilleros/as and their 
families, I became aware of Qx-guerrilleros/as addressing one another by means of 
pseudonyms (pseudonimos) and nicknames (apodos). Pseudonyms and nicknames 
became of increasing relevance as I tried to arrange and schedule interviews. Abiding by
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1 2 • the initial agreement I had entered in with the Junta Directiva of the settlement in
question, community leaders would arrange for interviewees to be relieved from the
responsibilities of collectively organised daily labour3 so that they may have the time to
1 This agreement was later superseded by a certain ‘randomness’ brought on by the protractedness and 
mutuality of exchanges. Randomness may be an effect of ex-guerrilla secretive post-plural scales, see 
below.
2 In this community, the Junta Directiva was the group of community members randomly selected (sortear) 
out of a pool of candidates. Members of the Junta Directiva were appointed on a fixed-term basis and took 
on legal responsibility for the running of the settlement. To ensure continuity and to limit the loss of 
experienced members, only about half of the Junta Directiva was replaced by new appointments every 
year. In accordance with Guatemalan national law, the structure of the Junta Directiva reflected the legal 
requirements that applied to co-operatives -and any other association or group that wished to manage funds 
and that therefore must seek legal recognition. President, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and two 
administrators (vocales) made up the Junta Directiva. Alcaldes auxiliares (auxiliary mayors) also worked 
closely with the Directiva. In this community, where the population was made up of mainly FAR ex- 
guerrilleros/as and their families, there were a number of additional committees. The Comite de Trabajo 
(Work Committee) for instance, was dedicated to the organisation of collective daily labour. Although 
labour (actividades productivas, productive activities) was organised collectively, the Comite de Trabajo 
allocated time for individuals to undertake household-based work and subsistence agriculture (see note 3, 
below). Other committees were the Comite de Jovenes (Youth Committee) coordinating activities for and 
by the youngsters and the Comite pro-Mejoramiento (Committee for Amelioration) in charge of planning 
the economic and social development of the community. The Comite de Seguridad (Security Committee) 
had responsibility of security matters but also dealt with unforeseen crises such as forest fires encroaching 
on community land during the dry season. The Comite de Mujeres (Women’s Committee) successfully 
lobbied the Work Committee to take into account women’s triple burden of domestic, collective and 
political work. As a result, women who were full members and benejiciarias, that is who had formal and 
legal status as members of the cooperative, were granted shorter collective labour shifts. Temporary 
committees such as the Comite pro-Feria were instituted to coordinate activities for the celebration of the 
first anniversary o f the community.
3 When the community was founded, subsistence agriculture had also been collectively managed. 
Agricultural collectivisation was however short-lived, as agricultural techniques were taken to be a key 
signifier of (cultural) difference. There was general agreement that agricultural work was culturally specific 
and that the plurality of views on how to best approach ‘agri-cultural’ tasks such as planting and harvesting 
was ultimately too difficult to manage collectively, notably in a multicultural community such as the one at 
hand. As a result of the perceived unmanageable quality of ‘agri-cultural’ difference, it was decided that 
plots of land be given to beneficiarios/as, and that households be responsible for their own subsistence. 
Some ex-guerrilleros/as argued that individualisation of ‘agri-culture’ amounted to positive engagement on 
the part of the Ladino majority and an example of Ladino acknowledgement of the ‘agri-cultural’ 
difference among them, and the difference of the indigenous minority - notably of the Q’eqchi’ presence. In 
short, the Ladino majority had allowed for Q’eqchi cultural practices related to the milpa to take place and 
had resisted implementation of policies of assimilation. During the planting season, Q’eqchi’ families 
followed the patterns of labour recruitment noted by Wilson (1995). Q’eqchi’ men went to the fields 
together and all took part in planting each other’s plots. Women worked collectively to prepare the food for 
the celebration that followed the planting. To my knowledge, no yo 'lek (vigil for the maize seeds, cf. 
Wilson 1995) was held. However, having regularly visited the Q’eqchi’ households and asked numerous 
questions about Q’eqchi’ culture and language, the families kindly invited me to attend the feast and I 
followed events with the women. No one else from the community was present at the celebration. When I 
subsequently asked whether anyone knew that the day was of great importance to the Q’eqchi’ families in 
the village, no non-Q’eqchi’ person seemed to know about it. In the light of this, I would argue that the 
decision to overturn collective running of ‘agri-cultural’ activities and opt for atomised ‘agri-cultural’ 
practices may in fact amount to an extremely partial form of Ladino engagement with indigenous 
difference.
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converse with me. I would be told that on a given day, say, Pedrito would be available. I 
would thus look for Pedrito only to find, in the preliminary stages of the exchange, that 
the person I was conversing with was not ‘Pedrito’. On this particular occasion, Pedrito 
introduced himself by a first name, second name, paternal surname and maternal 
surname. He did concede that he had several pseudonyms, but he chose not to elaborate 
on these or answer to the nickname by which he was known in the community. While it 
seemed that individuals were and were not their names4, there were reasons for Pedrito 
not to be Pedrito in the course of the interview.
4.3 Gringa positionalities, Gringa differences
In the first set of interviews in this community, I had the distinct impression that the 
relations between my interlocutors and I were characterised by a formality that went 
beyond mutual lack of acquaintance. Interlocutors would answer questions with the 
deferent attitude and punctilious rhetoric that in Guatemala is often reserved for those 
perceived to occupy a superior position in the multifarious hierarchies (Casaus Arzu 
1992, Grandin 2000, Schwartz 1990) relative to one’s subordinate gendered, ethnicised, 
classed and racialised positionality. I seemed to be eliciting formal responses to the effect 
that I attributed the ensuing relational distance to that hierarchical (mis-)placement on the 
part of subjects already noted by Nelson (1999) in her discussion of ‘gringa positioning’ 
in the context of her own fieldwork in urban Guatemala. Specifically, Nelson’s analysis 
of ‘how being a gringa anthropologist is both power-filled and a wounded body politic, 
and how that identity is formed in relation with multiple others’ (Nelson 1999:41), 
seemed somewhat to the point.5
Drawing on the work of Abigail Adams (1997), Nelson notes that
[gringo] ‘is generally a negative term, and few Guatemalans would be so churlish as to call you a
4 Donald F. Thompson noted that ‘[i]t was not until much later, when I had lived among the Malnkanidji 
... long enough to learn the language, that I found that some of the words I had recorded in good faith as 
personal names were not names at all. They were terms which substituted either while the proper names 
were in eclipse during mourning or used by an informant to avoid the embarrassment, and avert the ritual 
danger of speaking the name of a relative that was tabu to him’ (Thompson 1946:157).
162
gringo to your face [...] Gringo is defined as “disparaging” in the dictionary and carries a burden 
of hatred. A possibly apocryphal origin story attributes Mexican coinage during the U.S. 
invasion, as a way to tell the green-uniformed yanquis to go away (“green-go!”)’ (Nelson 
1999:63).
‘ Gringo’ thus evokes questions of positionality, difference and power in that, as Adams 
(Adams, A. 1997) points out, the term is articulated on the relational grounds between the 
United States and Latin America: ‘a North American is not a gringo until she crosses a 
border’ (Adams, A. 1997 quoted in Nelson 1999:41).
‘“Gringo” is a category produced through interactions, and as such, it works on a variety of 
borders including but not limited to national frontiers, stereotypes of phenotypic difference, 
sartorial codes and -  as “gringa” (marked by the Spanish feminine).- gender boundaries’ (Nelson 
1999:41).
The instantiation of gringo subjectivity and locatedness is therefore enmeshed in the geo­
political hegemonic historicities that link Latin America to the United States (cf. Mirande 
1987), a power-laden relationality that also impinges on transnational relations of 
solidarity between North American activists and Guatemalans in struggle (Nelson 1999). 
More specifically, the derogatory inflection and related ambivalence inherent in the term 
gringo produce, according to Adams, a certain ‘failure of rapport’ (Adams, A. 1997 
quoted in Nelson 1999:63), to the effect that for gringa anthropologists in the field and 
activists alike,
‘open-armed welcome may be more pragmatic than personal, more tied to historically specific 
tactical needs than one’s “niceness”. We often fail in attempts to identify with the Guatemalan 
people and to differentiate ourselves from our government, from tourists [...] Quincentennial
51 read Nelson’s book assiduously during the course of my fieldwork.
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Guatemala offers special challenges for gringa self-fashioning’ (62-3, my emphasis).
The issues at stake in the deployment of the term gringo/a may partly be those of 
identification, location and negative relationality, if not relational ‘failure’ as such. To 
begin with, one may not share Nelson’s identificatory labour to differentiate herself from 
‘her’ United States government and one may instead have to reckon with gringa 
anthropologists’ homogenising assumptions about others’ ‘ownership’, ‘belonging’ and 
‘location’. Further, one may feel compelled to forcefully oppose the discursive sophism 
that makes wounds into Baudrillard-style (1988) simulacra to be attributed to hyper-real 
gringa bodies6, as the sites of hyper-real privilege. At the heart of the question, however, 
is the refractory quality of the anthropologist’s location, subjectivity and positionality in 
contemporary anthropological analysis (Moore 1997), and in related fashion, the 
unelucidable quality of gringa as a category of difference and catachresis.
Thus, while at one level the elaboration of ‘gringa positioning’ in Nelson’s account does 
signal a certain sensitivity to questions of subjectivity and location, this is tied to a new 
set of homogenising assumptions concerning, for instance, the assumed link between 
gringa identity and the United States. In turn, the terms of the argument established by 
Nelson incite a specific order of objections, the most immediate being that of having to 
appeal to the multiplicity of understandings and usages of the term gringa in one’s 
experience in the field. Thus, one may wish to note that in contemporary Guatemala the 
epithet gringo marks European as much as North American bodies and selves and it does
6 Here I limit my observations to the sophism inherent in making gringa bodies suddenly seem wounded in 
a context such as Guatemala (Adams, A. 1997, Nelson 1999). Divergence from Nelson, however, is of the 
theoretical kind and rests on the place granted to positionality in our respective frameworks. For Nelson 
positionality of a specific relational kind is central and it is related to the practice of ‘fluidarity’. 
Concerning ‘fluidarity’, Nelson writes that ‘all identity is formed through articulation, a notion that 
problematises traditions of solidarity that lean on “solid” identities and clear-cut divisions between victim 
and victimizer. Taking the articulatory notion of identity seriously, along with the relationality of gringa 
identity, I develop the concept of fluidarity as a practice of necessarily partial knowledge -  in both the 
sense of taking the side of, and of being incomplete, vulnerable and never completely fixed [...] This 
neologism plays with the idea of solidarity in an attempt to keep its vitally important transnational relations 
open and at the same time question its tendency toward rigidity, its reliance on solid, unchanging 
identifications, and its often unconscious hierarchising’( l999:43-4, emphasis in the original). In my own 
work, the focus on secrecy implicitly problematises Nelson’s argument and explicitly requires that 
relationality. and related partialities be theorised in rather different terms/scales than those allowed for in 
‘fluidarity’. In short, ‘fluidarity’ misses the importance of secrecy in Guatemala.
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so contextually, often with ironic purpose rather than affront. Gringa therefore marks, I 
would argue, bodies and selves who are perceived as foreign and geo-politically 
privileged, as well as female. To further dislodge the link between gringa-ness and the 
United States, and to point to the ways in which one may have strategically tested the 
discursive and relational boundaries of the term, attempted to ‘set the record straight’ 
and/or hoped to deserve any epithet but the relentless gringa calling, I would often say:
*La verdad es, yo soy de Europa ’
On occasions, I tried to substantiate the statement ‘The truth is, I am from Europe’ by 
tracing on the ground unsteady contours of selected continents imagined through dubious 
unearthly perspectives. The improbable quality of those shapes and the relations between 
them forced me to dig myself into even deeper trenches:
‘iSoy de Italia y  de Inglaterra'
So, it turned out, I was from Italy and England, singular European-ness instantly splitting 
into two genealogies of affect and belonging and still not exhaustive of the complexity I 
wished to convey in my refutation of gringa homogenisation. So strong is the desire to 
convey the complexities of one’s sense of affinity, belonging and location, that one 
catches oneself in the act of mobilising essential categories of identity (Braidotti 1994, 
Spivak 1988, 1999) to at once resist gringa anthropologists’ homogenisation as well as 
the quality of gringa-ness imputed by one’s interlocutors in the field. In so doing, 
however, one runs the risk of upholding the fallacious terms on which the debate over the 
status of gringa positionality is predicated, and once again beg the question that, beyond 
differences between ‘anthropologists and their informants, or perhaps between 
anthropologists’, what may need addressing are the differences ‘within each 
anthropologist’ (Moore 1997:131).
Some of my youngest interlocutors in the field were already marking differences 
between, as much as differences within, as to them I was not just any gringa. I was, rather
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aptly, 7a gringa pelona’ , or the gringa with no hair. There was possibly no need on my 
part to try and set any record straight to begin with, as at least my gringa credentials were 
already queer, plural, between and within. In the essay ‘Situated Knowledges: The 
Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Donna Haraway 
has argued for an ontology of the subject that focuses on ‘splitting’ rather than ‘being’ 
(Haraway 1991: 193, emphasis in the original), adding that
‘[t]he topography of subjectivity is multidimensional ... The knowing self is partial in all its 
guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched 
together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another[.]’ (Haraway, ibid).
The multidimensional and multi-layered qualities of difference are therefore not just the 
ground for ever-increasing and ever-deepening differentiation. Beyond enumeration of 
the plurality inherent in gringa positionality, the task seems to lie in analyses of the ways 
in which difference and partiality are not markers of relational failures and relational 
foreclosures. Rather, the task at hand is that of tracing the ways in which difference and 
partiality may be markers of connection, in whatever manner relationality may come to
Q
be articulated.
4.4 Scales of Secrecy
In the light of this, it seems important to further dwell on the aspect of Nelson’s argument 
that focuses on the relational instantiation of the anthropologist’s locatedness in the field. 
In qualified convergence with Nelson, I felt constrained by the way I was being 
hierarchically (re-)positioned/(mis-)placed, and bestowed with status that I thought I did 
not command. I was therefore concerned to find a more or less direct way through those 
asymmetrical orderings and distant privileged relationalities seemingly set up in my
7 In Mexico, La Pelona is an ironic and irreverent nickname for La Muerte, or Death. Others are huesuda, 
pelada, laflaca , dientona.
8 I argue that connection may be variously articulated. With reference to secrecy, see the section on 
relational partiality and connective relativisation below.
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favour by the ever-more agentic subjects of interlocution. Unlike Nelson, however, I 
argue that, in a context characterised by plural histories of conflict and cultures of 
secrecy, no degree or amount of ‘self-fashioning’, even of the relational kind, is to any 
avail, when confronted with the agentic subject (Other).9 The realisation that in the initial 
interview settings those who agreed to be interviewed were not interviewees came only 
retrospectively. In those exchanges, it is very likely that I  was the interviewee - a 
perspective/prospective companeral - and hence the one actually and actively being 
questioned. The first interviews were the last of a series of more or less subtle procedures 
that I retrospectively think I was made to undergo, as in this specific instance the 
community, and indeed Pedrito, considered what degree of concealment and disclosure 
would characterise our relations.
When actually straying on that -assumed- quintessential terrain of closure that Nelson 
herself noted and elegantly marked with parenthetic occlusion in her statement:
‘[I]n Guatemala we encountered ... almost shocking openness (except, of course, as regarded 
guerrilla affiliation)’ (Nelson 1999:43),
‘the pragmatics of open-armed welcome’ seems to require further analysis, premising that 
there may be more to them than historically specific ‘tactical needs’ (Nelson 1999:62-3). 
A glimpse of the proliferation of names and the ambiguous hierarchical strictures of the 
initial ethnographic relationality that I experienced testify to the presence of more or less 
rigidly ‘guarded secrets’10 among the seemingly bounded constituency at hand.
In the essay on secrecy and secret societies Simmel discusses the relative merits of 
discretion as the ‘respect for the secret of the other’ that is exercised through a restraining 
from knowing what the other does not positively reveal (Simmel ibid:452). Simmel notes,
9 Pedrito and Mosquito, ex-combatants whose articulations of secret relationalities with me I discuss below, 
may be taken as examples of over-agentic subjects. Prosthetic agency is discussed in Chapter 7, although 
echoes of prosthetic agentic subjectivities can already be discerned in the discussion of practices of naming 
that follows.
101 borrow the expression from Simmel (1906) whose contribution is discussed below.
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however, that ‘[v]ery often it is impossible for us to restrain our interpretation of another’ 
(ibid:456). Relations may be based on a discreet relationality, and yet be marked by an 
overriding and compelling hermeneutics of the other. According to Simmel, even 
between subjects whose relation to one another is grounded on a shared interest, 
discretion amounts to ‘[an] attachment of secrecy, in which not the attitude of the person 
keeping the secret, but that of a third party, is in question, in which in view of the mixture 
of reciprocal knowledge or lack of knowledge, the emphasis is on the amount of the 
former rather than on that of the latter’ (ibid:456-7, my emphasis). For Simmel, then, 
reciprocally entertained knowledge or lack of knowledge affect our interpretative 
approaches to the other. The way we know or do not know the other affects our attempts 
at knowing the other, where knowledge of the other is a question of how much we do or 
do not know and how much we would want to know or wish we knew. The hermeneutics 
of the Other is therefore quantifiable.
Following Strathem (1991), I argue that quantification and related proportionality of 
knowledge entertained are an effect of scale. Strathem points out that anthropological 
knowledge is characterised by complexity: ‘the more closely you look, the more detailed 
things are bound to become. Increase in one dimension (focus) increases the other (detail 
of the data)’ (1991:xv). Complexity of phenomena and the notion of potentially 
‘increasable complication -  that there are always ‘more’ things to take into account-’ are 
the product of changes in the scale of observation, scaling and scale switching being 
intellectual practices grounded in Western pluralism (Strathem 1991:xiv, emphasis in the 
original). Similarly, it could be argued that quantification and proportionality of the 
hermeneutics of the Other, and the related assumption that there are potentially ‘more’ 
things to be known, are effects of socially, historically and culturally specific practices of 
deductive scale switching.
‘[T]he interesting feature about switching scale is not that one can forever classify into greater or 
lesser groupings but that at every level complexity replicates itself in scale of detail. “The same” 
order of information is repeated, eliciting equivalently complex conceptualisation ... The amount 
of information remains ... despite an increase in the magnitude of detail’ (Strathem 1991: xvi).
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I argue that the notion of scale and the related practices of scale switching are crucial to 
an understanding of secrecy in a context such as the one at hand. A focus on practices of 
naming in the insurgency, and on the routes of guerrilla scaling and scale switching 
allows for a consideration of how complexity and relationality are replicated in the scale 
of nominal detail.
4.5 Nominal Holographies, Complex Relationality
‘Pedrito’ had a different name prior to joining the struggle {la lucha). In Guatemala, at 
birth, a child acquires a first name, often a second name, and the surname of the father 
and the mother. Newborns are registered in birth registers of the cabecera (administrative 
town) whenever possible. Accordingly, Pedrito had first, second and family names that 
had characterised his life prior to joining the insurgency. These were set aside when he 
joined the guerrilla ranks. Throughout his years of militancy up to the ethnographic 
present-day of our exchange, he was known as ‘Pedrito’. ‘Pedro’, his pseudonym proper, 
was bestowed and adopted in an attempt to make his former first, second and family 
names redundant. In a context marked by low intensity conflict (Schirmer 1998), periods 
of brutal state-sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns and permanent social 
surveillance, those joining the insurgency often11 -  but not always- strove to erase the
connection between themselves and the apparatus of conference, management and
12surveillance of identity by the nation state - and, crucially, the regional government. 
Pseudonyms were devised to allow the persons to operate, physically move and negotiate 
their way through multiple systems of surveillance and repression. Long-term and 
seasonal labour migration, compounded by the ever increasing displacement caused by 
the recrudescence of the conflict in the early 1980s, made absences from one’s place of 
residence not uncommon. Early on in life, Pedrito had also been a labour migrant. With 
his family he had travelled from Oriente13 to the Costa Sur14 looking to work in the
II Plurality o f connections to the insurgency and different form of militancy characterised association to the 
guerrilla. Many never erased the connection to their first and second names, and surnames. A case in point 
is given in my discussion of guerrilla secret relationalities and other relationalities, see below.
12 Details o f the administrative independence of the region of Peten are discussed in Chapter 2.
13 Eastern region of Guatemala.
14 Southern coast.
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cotton plantations where labour conditions were said to be promising. His family had 
settled in one of the aldeas at the periphery of a finca algodonera15, on the proximity of 
the sea shore, as only the less fertile soil was left to the labourers to settle in. Pedrito’s 
father had wanted nothing to do with either the army or the guerrilla.
‘The guerrilla used to speak to him, and would say that if he did not want to join their files 
(iincorporarse), all that they would ask of him was that the matter be kept secret (que fuera 
secreto) because the guerrilleros were the very same neighbours. So, of course, they had to keep 
the secret, one could not divulge (divulgando) that the guerrillero was so-and-so, for the very 
situation, because here in Guatemala anyone who got caught would be killed straight away. At 
least in El Salvador there were prisons for political prisoners, while here in Guatemala there was 
no such thing’.
Although his father had not given signs of any specific political propensity, Pedrito left 
his community in 1980 to attend a course (curso) organised by the guerrilla. The 
understanding was that all participants would return to their communities on completion 
of the course. At the end of the six-month period however, the situation had deteriorated 
and safety could no longer be guaranteed. Those who had returned to their villages early 
had been killed and Pedrito decided to stay on, thus becoming a guerrilla migrant and 
moving from Oriente to Peten as a guerrillero, no longer a labour migrant and never as a 
displaced victim of state violence. The latter was the fate of his immediate family, who, 
following the abduction and murder of Pedrito’s father in 1980, moved back to Oriente. 
Pedrito progressively lost his connection to his former name and only visited his town of 
origin and his family after the demobilisation process was formally completed in 1997. 
During the war years, a number of pseudonyms made it possible for Pedrito to seek 
refuge in Mexico when seriously wounded16, and later travel to Sandinista Nicaragua and 
to El Salvador to receive political and military training.17
15 Cotton plantation.
16 Whose bodies, whose wounds and whose hyperreality?
17 Pseudonyms are partly also prosthetics of subjectivity in conflict situations (see Chapter 7).
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Among the companeros/as, however, he was known by his apodo, i.e. the nickname 
Pedrito, meaning ‘small/young Pedro’. As the diminutive form of ‘Pedro’, ‘Pedrito’ is a 
possibly ironic and definitely endearing reference to some perceived qualities of the 
person, in this case the person’s age, demeanour and physical presence on joining the 
guerrilla files. Apodos are of great interest, for they give an insight into guerrilla practices 
of name bestowal, as they evoke the multiple relationalities in which guerrilla names and 
subjectivities came into being. In the way they move across scales, they constitute 
guerrilla nominal holographies:
‘The concept of relation can be applied to any order of connection. It is holographic in the sense 
of being an example of the field it occupies, every part containing information about the whole 
and information about the whole being enfolded in each part... [The relation] requires other 
elements to complete it .. .This makes the connecting functions complex, for the relation always 
summons entities other than itself (Strathem 1995d:17-8).
A prominent ex-guerrilla combatant who for years had held a position of great 
responsibility in FAR once suggested that if I wanted to speak to women ex-combatants, 
I should interview ‘Alma’. As he was due to visit Alma’s community on a business- 
related trip, he offered to personally introduce me to her. I returned to the community on 
my own at a later date to carry out the interview with great discretion, as only Alma’s 
closest family relations knew about her past in the guerrilla.
‘I ask what her pseudonym (pseudonimo) was and she replies Alma. I then ask whether she had a 
nickname {apodo) and she says that yes, she had one. But the guys {Ios muchachos) did not say it 
to my face, they used it among themselves. I ask what the nickname was. They called me 
Hombrote. I ask why they called her so. Well, they gave me that name because from the very 
beginning, I showed physical prowess {capacidad fisica) in as much as combat was concerned, I 
had considerable physical prowess, as much as any man, so the guys were really surprised {se
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admiraban) by it, as men, well, the machismo which was at times deployed (se manejaba) was 
about being macho and all that, so that is where it all came from. (...) I ask whether they really 
never called her Hombrote directly. Well, I heard it but never directly as such, they would never 
call me that, I mean, they gave me that nickname but always with great respect (respeto) because 
they knew that I could get tough (actuar muy redo) with them (contra ellos)\
Alma was one of a relatively small number of women and an even smaller number of 
indigenous women combatants in the FAR files in the early 1980s. Alma’s nickname, 
‘Hombrote’, literally means being manly and a ‘macho’. As she pointed out, ‘Hombrote’ 
with its associations to the term ‘macho’ refers to the culture of ‘machismo’ that she 
identified as significant during her time in the guerrilla. In Latin American societies 
‘machismo’ is usually taken to refer to
‘a way of orientation which can most succinctly be described as the cult of virility. The chief 
characteristics of this cult [sic] are exaggerated aggressiveness and intransigence in male-to-male 
interpersonal relationships and arrogance and sexual aggression in male-to-female relationships’ 
(Stevens 1973: 90).
Interestingly, Alma noted that the nickname ‘Hombrote’ was intended a sign of respect 
(irespeto) to the extent that the companeros never called her ‘Hombrote’ directly. If that 
had happened, Alma was sure everyone was aware that she would have retorted like a 
‘proper’ rowdy macho. With reference to Mexico, it has been noted that, unlike Stevens 
envisaged (1973), the term macho encompasses negative and positive conceptions of 
masculinity. While being a term that refers to notions of hegemonic masculinity, ‘macho’ 
often stands for qualities such as courage and integrity (Guttman 1998, Lancaster 1993, 
Mirande 1997). Further, it can be used to refer to both men and women (Chant with 
Craske 2003, Mirande 1997). In view of this, it could be argued that Alma’s nickname 
‘Hombrote’ is a sign of female masculinity.18 As noted by Halberstam (1998), analyses of
18 Apodos deserve further analytical attention. I am however subordinating the detail and holographies of 
each part (each apodo) in order to make a point about the whole and hoping to demonstrate that the whole
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female masculinity unhinge the link between masculinity and men. Thus, the image of 
the macho companeros acknowledging Alma’s masculinity among themselves, but not 
daring to refer to Alma’s macho qualities in her presence, instantiated her contingently 
hegemonic and their contextually subordinate masculinities. The scale of detail of the 
apodo ‘Hombrote’ produces the holographic effects of female masculinity and macho 
guerrilla relationalities. Crucially, however, the gender relationality that Alma discussed 
on the day of the interview was a fact of memory, as none of her neighbours or fellow 
villagers knew of her past as La Hombrote.
The gender relationality inherent in Alma’s apodo is here taken as an example of the 
nominal holographies characteristic of guerrilla practices of naming. Gender relationality 
is but one scale of detail that defines the whole and through which complex relations are 
established. Guerrilla nominal holographies summon further elements:
‘I ask Sandra whether she had a nickname in the insurgence (en la montana). ‘Well, that is what I 
have, a general one (uno general) with which they call me everywhere (que me dicen 
dondequiera), only ‘La Blanca’ they call me’. 19
Sandra’s nickname conjured up relationalities of gender and racialisation. Disclosure of 
guerrilla secret nominal holographies was on occasions unexpected. I met Romualdo in 
his capacity of community leader. Our first meeting was uneventful, but on subsequent 
occasions Romualdo spoke eloquently about the history of his community and I asked 
him whether I could interview him on matters pertaining to histories of Q’eqchi’ 
migration to Peten and ritual practices. He finally agreed to a date and a time for the 
interview, kindly finding time for me in his busy schedule as community leader. It was 
not until the tape recorder was switched on, that I heard Romualdo’s personal history. I 
was utterly unprepared for the intensity of it all.
is an effect of scale, and that through scale switching the whole in not such.
19 ‘La Blanca’ means ‘of light complexion’, ‘fair haired’. ,
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‘I was with my cousin in Santa Lucia, Fray Bartolome de las Casa [Alta Verapaz], he took me to 
work, he told me there was a job of tapisca20 around Cantabal, Ixcan [Quiche]. We left in a car 
that gave us a lift from Raxuja [Alta Verapaz], it was a carro juletero21 we boarded, we got to the 
crossing {cruce) in Chisec, where Coban and Peten meet, and what, I think the army had already 
had a clash (enfrentamiento) before going through Chisec or before getting to the crossroad 
{cruce), as I then was a rude youngster {patojo maleducado), I had much longer hair (yo andaba 
muy peludo) than what I have now, so the car had a flat tyre, and they were fixing the tyre when 
the army arrives and they get us to show our documents and all {nos ponen a registrar y todo22), 
as I did not have ID as I was still a child {era patojo todavia), I was about fourteen and a half, 
that’s where they caught me {me agarraron), they caught me from here and they threw me in the 
comando in their lorry, and from there they blindfolded me {taparon el ojo) and they took me 
away, and they left my cousin there, they only took me away and they hit {golpearon) the people 
who were there. From there they took me to the military zone {zona militar) number twenty, I 
think, which is in Ixcan, which is in Playa Grande, that’s where they took me and that’s where 
they went on hitting me {me estuvieron golpeando) and they tied me to a pole which was there, 
this is the guerrillero that has to go and show us where the companeros of this son of a bitch are 
{hijo de la gran chingada). They were talking about me {me mencionaban alii) but they were 
keeping my face covered {me tenian tapada la card), I only had two small holes from which to 
breathe/sigh {suspirar), so from there, after like three days they got me out of there {me sacaron) 
and they took me in an helicopter up to falling {caer) [to fall rather than to land] in Cuarto 
Pueblo, so they say, as I did not even know where that was, we went down there where they used 
to have a church before but it was already all amantado, and that’s where they told me, now 
you are going to be useful as a guide {servir vos de guia), I as hombre punta24, they told me and
20 Tapiscar is the activity of harvesting maize, beans, etc.
21 Carros juleteros are pick up trucks or other vehicle that provides a service similar to the bus, i.e. they 
transport people for a relatively small fee.
22 In Spanish it is the army the subject of the sentence.
23 Romualdo possibly means ‘in ruins’ here.
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are going to be useful as a guide {servir vos de guia), I as hombre pu n ta24, they told me and they 
dressed me up as the army, as I was rather small (chaparrito), I was a rather sickly man (hombre 
enfermito) in those days, so they put a cap on me, with a shirt and some trousers, and with the 
same shoes I had on, they told me, go now, we will follow you, go now then, we will follow you 
and I did not even know what that was/what it was all about (que era eso), so for all blows 
igolpe) I was receiving I decided to go, like that, like at the north east of the field (campo) of the 
church of Cuarto Pueblo, and from there I went, we walked no more than two kilometres and a 
few metres when I hear a shot in front of me, I was thinking that those who had shot me where 
the companeros who were in the vegetation {monte) [i.e. the guerrilla], they shot the soldiers who 
were walking behind me, and as I was carrying no weapon, they only gave me a knife and 
nothing else, I was carrying no weapon, nothing, so perhaps they saw I was not carrying anything, 
the two soldiers who were walking behind me, they [the guerrilla] killed them, and as from that
25point I kept standing up/still (yo me quede parado) and they carried on hechando verga, so I 
threw myself, there was a little furrow {sanjita), so that’s where I stayed, I threw myself precisely 
in there {cabal me avente), they went on for about three hours firing there, so that’s where I 
stayed. As the noise {la bulla) stopped, I pretended I was dead (yo hice el muerto), I pretended I 
was dead and I just stayed there with my mouth down {hice el muerto y  me quede alii de boca  
abajo), it went on for something like three hours that mess {cuentazo), then they came to touch 
me (me vinieron a tocar), they were poking me with the barrel there {me punaban con el canon 
alii), luckily the soldiers did not shoot me, throw soil on this son of a bitch {hechale tierra a este 
hijo de la chingada), the officer said. Then, they threw soil over me, sticks and poles and all, in 
the small cave that was there, I fitted perfectly there {cabal cupia y o  alii), when they shot, when 
they threw granades, them, what are they called? Those who are now the ex-combatants, they 
were landing on the soldiers, and the great quantities of blood {los pocones de sangre) and the
24 Hombre punta, literally ‘tip man’
25 ‘Hechando verga’ in this context means the shooting went on.
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bodies that were blowing up (y los cuerpos que le estallaban a ellos), were falling on top of 
me/on my back, and from there they threw soil over me and they left me there. They left and from 
there, as they said I was dead, I stayed there, but how/where would one have got out of there, 
how? Who knows! {saber!). As they took me there by helicopter, and from there, I stayed there, 
the night fell, and the next day I woke up (amanecer) crying, crying, crying, I was there for 
fifteen days, in the midst of that bad smell that was there, as they had taken with them the bodies 
of the soldiers, even if in pieces but they took them with them, but I pretended I was dead there, 
and they buried me there, as I did not even have relatives who were going to account for me 
{responder a mi), so I stayed there and after about fifteen days of having stayed there, plus three 
days of having been in the [Military] Zone, it is eighteen days, after fifteen days of having stayed 
sitting there in the vegetation {monte), I was crying loud {llorando fuerte), I lowered my forehead, 
my god, what am I doing here, why are they doing this to me, I said, when all of a sudden a girl 
and a boy come out in front of me and they talked to me, and I was shaking there out of fear, that 
perhaps they were those of the army, and they said to me, we join you in your sadness {te 
acompanamos en tu tristeza), let’s go, they said, accompany us, and I went. Another girl arrived, 
a fat girl {gordona) and she held me, as I was weak and malnourished {desnutrido), she grabbed 
me and she sat me on her rucksack, and off I went, I felt we did not walk very far when we got to 
the camp, as I was going piggy back {cucucha) and I was not feeling anything, I was already 
about to die {ya estaba p o r  morirme yo), so they gave me medicines, they treated me right and I 
don’t know what they gave me/put on me {me hecharon) but I got better. A girl looked after me 
there, but I don’t know what her pseudonym {pseudonimo) was, what she was called, but as I 
survived in such a place full of mosquitos {como me salve dentro de tanto zancudero), for that 
reason they named me Mosquito there, as there they don’t ask somebody’s name, they just make
0 f \  •one up {solo a lii le inventan a uno) , ah ah, so it’s from there [that his nickname originates], and
26 ‘They just make one up’ may be taken to mean ‘they make someone up’, not just ‘they make someone’s 
name up’.
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I, while I was there en la montafia, I would tell myself where I was from (y como y o  estando alii 
en la montafia me decia, que donde venia yo), I would say I was from Peten, as I was bom here in
Peten, but my relatives were in Coban [Alta Verapaz]’. I ask Mosquito where in Peten he was
27bom. Here in Peten. I tell Mosquito that I seem to remember him telling me his mother spoke
28Mopan. ‘Yes, but she was Cobanera. So from there I would spend my time crying and crying 
{de tanto llorar y  llorar me mantenia y o  alii), but they would treat me very well and all, they 
were even giving me [military] training {entrenamientos), it was a girl who would look after me 
{solo una muchacha que me mantenia alii), she would give me my training {me ensenaba mis 
entrenamiento), there she would give me a little weapon {me daba un armita alii), for me to move 
and all that, for any eventuality, if anything should happen {cualquier cosa s i ocurriera algo)'
The conversation with Mosquito revealed the embodied states of violence and the 
prosthetics of suffering and survival. Romualdo had wanted to tell me about how, having 
survived the torture and violence at the hands of the Army, he had been rescued by 
guerrilleros/as, had acquired a nickname and later joined the guerrilla files in Peten. The 
revelation of Romualdo’s experiences was as swift and sudden as its withdrawal into 
silence. Romualdo and I never spoke of Mosquito again.
Scale of pseudonyms and nicknames, inherently relational in their bestowal, acceptance 
and signification, produce holographic effects and necessitate other information for 
completeness. Guerrilla nominal holographies contain information about the relevance of 
complex relationalities of gender (El Hombrote), ethnicity and racialisation (La Blanca, 
El Moreno), and solidarity and survival in a hostile environment (Mosquito). Other
29relational scales refer to internationalist affinity as in the case of Moscu and anti­
imperialist continentalism in the case of America. Many referred to qualities of the 
person (La Chaparra, the Short One; El Chino, the Chinese One), while others referenced
27 This is the first question I ask Mosquito since he decided to speak to me about his secret.
28 Cobanera means from the town of Coban. The term is also a synonym for Q’eqchi’.
29 ‘Moscu’ means Moscow. I was told that the inspiration for Moscu’s name came from listening to Radio 
Moscow while en la montafia (in hiding) in the jungle of northwestern Peten.
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the animals and insects found in the forest (Mosquito, Lorita, Tigrillo, Guacamaya).
Guerrilleros switched nominal scales and thus reproduced the relational effect of 
complexity. In apodo relationalities, the whole seems to splinter through the complex 
partiality of relational signification. Indeed, Mosquito noted that in the guerrilla ‘they 
made one up’, which could be taken to mean that ‘they’ made someone up through 
nominal and relational practices of fabrication of subjectivity. The complex and relational 
nominal holographies in point constantly illuminate other routes and summon other 
entities on the terrain of guerrilla secrecy.
4.6 Relational Partiality, Connective Relativisation
In addition to complexity, scale switching instantiates a plurality and partiality of 
perspectives. Plurality, partiality and complexity in turn lead to relativisation (Strathem 
1991). Guerrilla secrecy relied on specific relational partialities, the first of which I 
define in terms of a negative relationality of non-disclosure.
Jorge had been active in the insurgency since the 1960s. I had asked him to elaborate on 
aspects of guerrilla training when he said:
‘The primordial basis of man is that he be secret -  to die shattered in a thousand pieces, but never 
say who he is, neither his name, nor where he was bom, or where he lives...if they kill us, let 
them kill us, but they will never know who we are’.
Jorge’s statement is an example of the role of secrecy in the guerrilla organisation of 
which he was a long-standing, active member. Secrecy here seems to amount to a 
survival strategy and a way of staving off annihilation. In Jorge's own words, secrecy is 
da base primordial del hombre’, the primordial basis on which the existence of ‘man’ is 
predicated on a terrain marked by constant impending disembodied danger. The 
relationality of secrecy is articulated in the negative here, as one is instructed to never
178
reveal who one is. The markers of identity negatively mobilised by Jorge -i.e. that which 
should not be disclosed- are one’s name, one’s place of birth and one’s place of 
residence. All three are indeed primary identity markers in Guatemala. Since the work of 
Sol Tax and Robert Redfield I have reviewed in Chapter 1, through to the more recent 
contributions made by Norman Schwartz (1990) reviewed in Chapter 2, the anthropology 
of Guatemala has consistently argued that identity, notably ethnic identity, is not 
explicitly articulated -  that is, in Guatemala people do not objectify ethnicity as a 
property of the self. This is particularly the case for indigenous ethnicity in the sense 
that people do not state ‘I am Q’eqchi” . Rather, indigenous Guatemalans tend to 
articulate notions of identity in relation to a provenance -  they stress, for instance, the 
town or administrative region -departamento- where they are from. The latter is also the 
case for Ladino ethnicity, although Ladino ethnic identity may be more commonly 
objectified in statements such as 'soy Ladino’.
I take Jorge’s statement and its disavowals to be examples of that negative relationality of
11secrecy through which relations of non-disclosure are established. That is, I argue that 
non-disclosure, based as it is on negation, still engenders relationalities of secrecy.
‘The primordial basis of man is to be secret’, Jorge said and yet, as Jorge articulated 
secrecy in terms of a founding principle to stave off annihilation, the injunction not to tell 
was problematised by my hesitation, in that pause in our conversation when I was left to 
wonder whether the ‘man’ whose primordial basis was being discussed, was a figure 
gendered in the neutral to mean a masculinist version of “humankind” -  or whether this
30 This is particularly the case for indigenous ethnicity in the sense that people do not state ‘I am Q’eqchi’”. 
Conversely, people do on occasions state ‘We are ladinos’. I am yet unclear about the respective dynamics 
of reification and property at stake in this difference.
31 This section is inspired by the work of Michael Taussig (1999). The present analysis differs from 
Taussig’s in two substantial ways. Firstly, it does not replicate Taussig’s emphasis on the visual apparent in 
his definition of secrecy as entailing masking and unmasking. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, in 
his discussion of secrecy and initiation rituals, Taussig maintains that behind elaborate practices of secrecy, 
there is no actual secret. Conversely, in Guatemala, guerrilleros/as were not masked as Zapatista 
Subcomandante Marcos may have been, but what was kept secret in most cases did matter, both in terms of 
the relationalities that the secret engendered and the partialities it created. There were, and there still are 
secrets. Relationalities of secrecy and the secrets on which they rest, are not formalistic and, rather, 
substantial. Substantive guerrilla secrecy nevertheless had a form. Aesthetic dimensions o f guerrilla secrecy 
are examined in Chapter 7.
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primordial basis may in fact already harbour the very seeds of its undoing -  in that 
conspicuous absence of a subject gendered in the feminine whose existence this same 
primordial basis seemed to foreclose. This was Jorge’s own qualification of his 
statement:
‘Many men have fallen into the arms of death or in the hands of the enemy for loving a woman 
[...] So, when a man [...] has a relationship [sexual] with a woman, he must not disclose his 
mission, neither tell her his secrets, if he conquers her, well, that is an individual matter/his 
prerogative, but he should never tell her, I am, I have, or talk about his work’.
The negative relationality of secrecy was qualified by Jorge in terms of a further 
injunction, namely one that was gendered and sexualised. There appeared to be threats to 
secrecy, and these were, at least in the context of this interview, gendered in the feminine 
and marked by heteronormativity. It is here possible to discern the kind of partiality 
secrecy entails for subjectivities and social relations. Subjectivities and social relations in 
a terrain marked by secrecy are inherently partial, based as they may be on a negation, on 
non-disclosure or on the threat of exposure.32 As noted by Simmel (1906: 465), however, 
the relationality of secrecy is not always rendered through prohibition or foreclosure. 
Conversely, relational secrecy is often based on disclosure.
‘What we would do was that a companero would come from afar (yenia un companero de lejos), 
and we would have another one with us, but we would be already in agreement with the former, 
and we would meet him there, we would meet him on our way, and we would greet as if we were 
strangers (desconocidos), but then, as I knew already, I would say to the one accompanying me, I 
am going to be back shortly, I have some errands to attend to, you two can talk. While I was 
gone, the companero would talk to the one who was accompanying me, but this person would not 
know that I knew what he was going to tell him, so that one would not say one day that I knew
32 Partiality creates ambivalence, analysed in relation to the repressive state, Chapter 5.
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too. We would use a strategy (politico.). Later, the person who had been accompanying me would 
tell me himself, he would say to me, look, that one we met the other day, didn’t he say anything 
to you? He told me such and such a thing, and I am telling you now in confidence and trust (en 
confianza), and so we would carry on with the relationship (relation), until later, when I had 
complete trust in him (yo confiaba directamente en el), I would say to him, look, the struggle 
(lucha) is exactly so and so, our duty is to cover ourselves (cubrirnos), and it is good that you 
work in it. When I may in a position to help you with something, I will help you, don’t worry. I 
may even work in it myself at some point in the future (de repente). Some of them kept on 
thinking that I did not know anything, but they trusted me because I was a person who was not 
involved in disagreements (pleitos), in theft, just in my work, with real honesty. That is how we 
worked training (formando) people’.
Although one’s allegiance to the organisation should be kept secret, recruitment of new 
members involved a telling. Seemingly fortuitous encounters were arranged and 
prospective new members told about the organisation. The remarkable aspect of this 
specific relational moment of disclosure was that, at least in the intention of those willing 
the relation, the new member would not suspect who the person ordering the relation was. 
Although Jorge disclosed his sympathies for the insurgents, he did not expose the nature 
of his role in the organisation. In this case, then, disclosure involved at once telling and 
misleading the prospective member. In the case of selective disclosure, relationalities of 
secrecy were again marked by partiality.
Negative relationalities of secrecy and relationalities of selective disclosure occurred 
concurrently with positive relationality of secrecy based on relations of disclosure.
‘Since the beginning, the companero union organisers who would give us doctrina [political 
training] in the Southern Coast would tell us, the time will come when we will be 
persecuted...they will persecute us in the homes, in the schools, in the towns, in the hamlets, in
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the workplace. Hence, they would tell us, we have to be secretive, talk quietly, know signs’.
The scene where the importance of secrecy was first spelled out to Jorge was already a 
social context, namely one where union organisers raised political awareness among 
campesinos, i.e. agricultural workers toiling over the foreign-owned plantations of the 
Southern Coast. Jorge remembered the conversation with union organisers as a moment 
of initiation into a culture of secrecy of which he had been a participant for over thirty 
years. His first recollection was unambiguously that of a social context and the fact that 
one would have to proceed by ‘talking quietly’ and ‘knowing signs’ implied that one 
would have an interlocutor, an audience, and would be enmeshed in a set of relations. 
Secrecy, therefore, may have been about concealment and misdirection, but as a 
predicament, activity or endeavour, it inherently implied partial relationalities and a 
sociality of possible selective disclosure.
Guerrilla secrecy thus seemed to have positively engendered certain kinds of social 
relations, some of which rested on a commonality of secret semiotics, as well as relations 
engendered in the negative, and grounded on non-disclosure. Secrecy may be founded on 
injunctions not to tell, as much as on certain way of telling (Simmel 1906). In all 
instances, guerrilla positively and/or negatively inscribed relationalities of secrecy. 
Relational guerrilla secrecy did produce contingent secrets and it would be inaccurate to 
say that guerrilla secrets amounted to a formalistic device, behind which no secret 
actually lay (cf. Taussig 1999). That guerrilleros/as harboured selective and contingent 
secrets, becomes apparent retrospectively when one considers guerrilla secret 
relationalities vis-a-vis other relationalities.
‘Because they are very humanitarian (humanitarios), and even if it was just a tortilla, in those 
days they would offer it to you without asking anything in return {te la ofrecian y no te pedian 
nada a cambio), and for that has to be grateful to them, and one would feel much safer (y se 
sentia mucho mas seguro) with an indigenous person (indigena), for they would cover your 
secrets {que te cubrieran los secretos) much more than a ladino’.
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Positive and negative relationalities engendered by guerrilla secrecy were articulated on a 
terrain already saturated by other relations. Gender and sexual relations of non­
disclosure, for instance, were contingently said to pose a threat to secrecy, while 
Ladino/indigenous relations of disclosure did not, as stated in the interview abstract noted 
above. Guerrilla secret relationalities however, seemed to operate parallel and/or 
antagonistically to relations based on kinship.
‘What I would do was, when I would talk to someone, I would see what his/her opinion was (le 
tomaba la opinion), and I would say to him/her, look, I have a friend who wants to talk to you, 
but you have to be careful (<cuidate), don’t go and tell anyone (no lo vayas a contar), don’t tell 
you brothers [or siblings], or your father, until we may get to know your family very well, if it is 
convenient that they know, otherwise it is best they don’t know.’
As one was told not to let family members know about one’s association with the 
guerrilla, one could never be sure that one’s kin were not also in some way associated 
with the insurgency -  or indeed, with the army. Ramon’s case is an example of this 
predicament. Ramon told me how he ran into the guerrilla while in his teens. He started 
making purchases for the insurgents and delivering goods at secret locations. Ramon 
never told his father about his activities, as Ramon’s father was a local comisionado 
militar -  that is, he was the civilian representative of the army in Ramon’s hamlet, aldea. 
It has been documented, and widely acknowledged, that the establishment of 
comisionados militares was a counterinsurgency tool aimed at a progressive 
militarisation of the countryside, and an extension of surveillance that was initiated by the 
army in the 1980s (CEH 1999). In any case, one day, Ramon’s father found Ramon in the 
fields talking to the guerrilleros. Ramon explained the situation and Ramon’s father and 
the guerrilla commander were left to talk in private -to exchange secrets. Ramon told me 
that to this day, he did not know what was said in that exchange. However, it later 
transpired that Ramon’s father, the local comisionado militar, had been secretly passing 
information to the insurgents for some time prior to that encounter in the fields.
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Unbeknown to Ramon, his sister had already joined the guerrilla ranks and was a 
combatant in hiding. Positive and negative relationalities of secrecy engendered guerrilla 
subjectivities marked by partiality, as one would be enmeshed in relations, albeit partial 
ones.
Positive and negative socialities of secrecy did not belong to the past -  they persisted in 
the ethnographic present of my exchanges with the ex-guerrilleros/as. By way of an 
example of the manner in which the relational partiality of secrecy shaped my relations 
with the ex-guerrilla, consider that, in the course of our conversation, Ramon urged me to 
reflect on the procedure that I followed in order to get to meet him:
‘You looked for me, a companero told you to look for Ramon or Turcio, I don’t know what name 
they gave you, and today you were on your way, you had established contact with a companera 
who was going come to meet you, and you knew we were going to meet - that is how we used to 
operate’.
At the time, it seemed that I was also a part of a non-organic whole, and in some 
peripheral position in the scale of guerrilla relationalities of secrecy. In the case of my 
exchange with Ramon, for instance, he was articulating a positive relationality of 
selective disclosure, and letting me in some of his secrets. Conversely, there were many 
instances in which my interlocutors articulated secrecy in the negative. In view of this 
and recalling the initial exchange with Pedrito, it remains unclear exactly what secret 
Pedrito disclosed by ceasing to be Pedrito and where the secret actually lay, for I may 
have been the one harbouring it, not him. Relational partialities imply connective 
relativisation, but connectivity nonetheless (Strathem 1991).
4.7 Conclusion: Post-plurality and Post-Perspectivism
‘The realisation of the multiplier effect produced by innumerable perspectives extends to the 
substitutive effect of apprehending that no one perspective offers the totalising vista it 
presupposes. It ceases to be perspectival’ (Strathem 1991: vxi)
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Guerrilla scale and scale switching created nominal and relational complexities marked 
by partiality. Following Strathem (1988, 1991, 1995), I argue that the partiality of 
subjects and relations imply connections, albeit connections between subjectivities and 
socialities which are inherently partial. The partiality at issue is not strictly a product of 
the anthropologist’s deductive hermeneutic scale. Rather, the partiality at stake is the 
partiality of guerrilla secrecy, which is a social, cultural and historically specific partiality 
that is the product of a social, cultural and historical context marked by histories of 
conflict and cultures of secrecy.
In view of this, it is of interest to transpose and re-inscribe Simmel’s statement in the 
Strathemian terms that have characterised the present analysis. Secrets no longer refer to 
‘the mixture of reciprocal knowledge or lack of knowledge’ of the other (Simmel 1906: 
452, my emphasis). Rather, they refer to ‘the mixture of reciprocal knowledge [and] lack 
of knowledge’ characteristic of the partial relationalities of secrecy that marked the 
ethnographic encounters discussed here. Hermeneutic awareness of scale allows for the 
apprehension of, and related switch to, a specifically post-plural scale. Fractal graphics33, 
holography, partial connections and connective relativisation allow for both reciprocal 
knowledge and lack of knowledge to exist simultaneously, and to go beyond principles of 
non-contradiction in the multiple hermeneutics of the ethnographic exchange -  in this 
context marked by positive, negative and partial relationalities of secrecy. For Simmel, 
relations in which parties are being discreet are characterised by reciprocal acts of 
discretion. I take discreet relations in the post-plural scale of guerrilla secret 
relationalities to refer to discrete relations between subjects marked by ethnographic 
weak ontological partiality, and these discrete relations give ground to partial socialities. 
These partial subjectivities and socialities of secrecy were instantiated through 
connectedness and intermittence, and my attempt at finding the appropriate hermeneutic 
scale is intended as an exercise in post-plural and post-perspectival anthropology.
33 Fractal geometry is the scale of post-plurality.
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Chapter 5 
States of Violence and Ambivalence
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed naming practices among guerrilla combatants and 
associates and their role in the articulation of secretive and complex relationalities, 
grounded in selective forms of disclosure and foreclosure. I argued that secrecy 
challenges ‘strong’ thought and related understandings of sociality in terms of pluralities 
of discrete entities. I argued for the relevance of weak post-plural scales to describing and 
understanding the partial subjectivities and socialities engendered in guerrilla secrecy. In 
this chapter I provide a different order of post-plural contextualisation, and consider the 
ways in which violence and ambivalence figured in the narratives of ex-combatants of the 
Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, and their effects. Through the accounts of ex-combatants, I 
focus on guerrilla representations of the conflict, highlighting how entities were rarely 
viewed as monolithic, coherent and opposed wholes. Rather, imbricate violence and 
secrecy produced ambivalence and indeterminacy in guerrilla subjectivities and 
socialities.
First, I refer to the account of Luis, who, through three distinct and yet interrelated 
episodes, provided his views on violence and conflict in Guatemala. In conversation with 
Luis, violence was said to develop as a response to individuals’ displays of talents and 
aptitudes, which were deemed to contravene arbitrary and hastily fashioned rules and/or 
interdictions. The perpetrators of violence materialised in specific guises, namely as the 
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Guatemalan Army. Some episodes 
of violence were, on occasion, precipitated by the interventions of indiscreet neighbours, 
that is, by the incitement of relationalities of disclosure, predicated on the production and
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revelation of secrets. Such positive relationalities of disclosure involved the institutions 
of the nation state and of neo-imperial powers, and unleashed violent reprisals. The 
multiple embodiments of the perpetrators of violence featured plasticity and ability to 
multiply, as Army soldiers swelled in numbers. Nevertheless, episodes of violence were 
preceded by an initial propensity for debate, leniency and understanding. Guatemalan 
Army soldiers, for instance, were assigned the capacity to appreciate the value and 
accomplishment of people’s intellectual talents and creative actions, despite the fact that 
these would ultimately be deemed to deserve punishment. In all three episodes, the 
perpetrators of violence were eventually equated with, and/or made to stand 
metonymically for, the nation-state and the United States government, both envisaged as 
apparatuses of surveillance, control, extraction and destruction of human talent. Beyond 
any debate and appreciation, they ultimately quashed human intellectual and creative 
endeavours. In sum, whatever the materialisation, action and consequence, all subjects 
were granted the faculty to discern human ingenuity, but in the last instance violence 
linked to the management, incitement and production of secrecy prevailed.
As I consider how violence and ambivalence may coexist, and occupy the same 
intellectual and experiential frame in ex-combatants’ accounts, I argue that violence and 
ambivalence are implicated in the production of entities or parts viewed as discrete, and 
note how both augmentation and reduction of distinctions between parts occurred in ex­
combatants narratives. Strathem has coined the neologism ‘merographic’, an adjective 
which combines etymologically 'm ew s’, Greek for ‘part’ or ‘share’ and ‘graphic’, to 
stress the ‘the way ideas write or describe one another; the very act of description makes 
what is being described a part of something else, e.g. description (Strathem 1992a:204, 
note 21). In her discussion of English kinship, Strathem points out that domains imagined 
as discrete, for instance ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, may appear to be connected ‘by virtue of 
being at once similar and dissimilar’ (Strathem 1992a:72). Similarities are engendered 
through an effort to ‘recognise’ connections, whilst dissimilarities emerge out of 
‘recognition’ of difference (ibid), making difference to be a connection from another 
angle (Strathem 1992a:73). Merographic analogies and the connections on which they are
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predicated are partial in the sense that they presuppose ‘that one thing differs from 
another insofar as it belongs to or is part of something else’. These models of 
relationships Strathem calls ‘merographic’.
Following Strathem (1992a), I argue that ex-guerrilleros/as deployed a ‘merographic 
capacity’, insofar as ‘merographic capacity’ refers to the ability to envision partial 
analogies.1 As argued by Lury (1998),
‘Analogies are partial not only in the sense that they imply perceived difference as well as 
similarity in the making of comparison between wholes and in that sense are not complete or 
total, but also in that they make wholes (including persons) out of parts in particular ways. In this 
making, while parts of a person are part of that person as a whole or a system (such as the 
individual), they are also, from another perspective, conceived as parts of other wholes, such as, 
for example, society or nature. In this sense, things (including the individual, nature and society) 
are seen to be constructed or determined and to be inhabiting what might be termed synthetic 
culture or a culture that constructs' (Lury 1998:13, emphasis in the original).
The merographic capacity of subjects evokes weak thought in interesting ways. Working 
beyond totalising forms of contextualisation, merographic connections open up wholes, 
to reveal incompleteness, including gaps, from different perspectives. Further, 
merographic analogies summon up the partiality of the whole and the conditions of 
possibility of other perspectives, but rather than being exhausted in mere pluralisation of 
value, merographic analogies conjure new wholes, always displacing and deferring the 
idea of totality and totalising perspectives.
1 Strathem develops the notion of merographic capacity in her work on English kinship (Strathem 1992). 
Lury (1998) applies Strathem’s insights to her study of technology, notably photography, and culture and 
identity, whilst Franklin (2003) deploys Strathem’s ‘merographic connection model’ to her work on new 
genetics.
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In the case of the material presented here, a number of partial analogies produce 
merographic connections between parts. Parts such as ‘the soldier’ and ‘the guerrillero ’ 
are made to appear to belong to different and discrete wholes, namely ‘the Army’ and 
‘the guerrilla’. Simultaneously however, multiple relations are imagined between the 
parts in multiple scales. I focus on how distinctions between parts figured in ex­
combatants’ narratives, and argue that they generated doubling effects that constantly 
summoned up other subjects and other relationships. Parts and their relations engendered 
instances of duplication and diminution and may be said to function in post-plural scales. 
Indeed, despite suffering and violence endured at the hand of state agents and state- 
controlled technology, experiences of militancy in the insurgency were not exhausted in 
binary understandings of the conflict. Distinctions were deployed and exceeded through 
dissimulation, as well as being periodically dissolved. This is most apparent in the 
occurrence of doubles, doubling subjects and doubling relations in ex-guerrilleros/as 
accounts. Doubling was associated with merographic connections between entities such 
as ‘the Army’ and ‘the guerrilla’ as they were linked by practices of dissimulation, which 
in turn engendered ambivalence and indeterminacy. Merographic connections also 
appeared in ex-combatants’ discussions of their relation to their own siblings. Rafael and 
Nestor, two brothers, discussed their distinct experiences in the Army and in the guerrilla 
respectively. Whilst presenting themselves as discrete subjects with different experiences 
of the conflict, and positioned within discrete entities, Nestor recounted how during 
combat he would imagine his brother Rafael at the receiving end of the shots he fired. He 
was able to see his own kind in the Other.
In the last section, I consider how in the course of a conversation with Carlos, secrecy 
and doubling produced instances of revelation. Carlos recounted how in post-Peace 
Accords times, ex-combatants met the Army officers who had been their enemies during 
the conflict, and how each party was revealed to the other as proximate and adjunct. In 
my conclusion, I consider how doubling, simulation and dissimulation may establish 
different orders of relations between different parts and wholes and the extent to which 
merographic connections may be said to establish relations which function in post-plural
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scales. Insofar as they conjure up (new) wholes such as ‘the campesinado\ they are also 
suggestive of thick nihilism, that is, post-plural ethnographic resolutions of truth into 
value.
5.2 The Secrets of the Maya: the Theft of Stones, Knowledge and People
On one of my usual visits, I passed by Luis, an ex-combatant who had been involved in 
political organising efforts and in the guerrilla organisation for almost four decades. Luis, 
originally from Oriente but displaced to the Costa Sur from the age of five, had been a 
member of the very first FAR units that were active in the early 1960s. In 1966, 
following violent curbing of political activity among plantation workers in the Costa Sur, 
Luis migrated to Peten with his immediate family. Luis told me that while his family 
came to Peten in search of land, the main reason for the move was to escape the 
repression that was being waged at campesinos like himself who had links with the 
unions. I was asking Luis to comment on the indigenous question in Guatemala when he 
told me this story.
‘Between 1977 and 1978, Luis had met an elderly man about eighty-eight years old. The elderly 
man was Q’eqchi’ and Petenero, in the sense that he was Q’eqchi’ and had been living in Peten 
for a long time. Luis and the old man started talking about the destruction of indigenous people in 
Guatemala {la destruccion de los indigenas). The elderly man said that he did not approve {no le 
parecicC) of the murder and destruction of those people who knew the things of the Maya {sabian 
las cosas de los Mayas), as this knowledge was useful {util) for the future. The man told Luis that 
a stone had been robbed {se habian robado) from Jikal, that the indigenous people in Coban4 {los 
indigenas in Coban) were still a Maya race {era raza todavia de los Mayas) and that proof 
{prueba) of this was in that stone where the name of a Maya person who was living in the 
highlands of Coban appeared. The elderly man said to Luis that this was the definite proof that 
the Mayas were not extinct/finished {terminado) and it was a coincidence {casualidad) that on 
that engraved stone {piedra escrita) that was stolen from Tikal by the Americans {americanos)
2 Oriente refers to the East of the country, namely to the departamentos o f Zacapa and Chiquimula.
3 The Costa Sur is the Southern Coast on the Pacific Ocean.
4 As discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two, the indigenous population in Coban, Alta Verapaz is 
Q’eqchi’.
190
there appeared the name of that man and of his daughter, or rather the man’s granddaughter. In 
any case, there was the name, and the granddaughter could read/understand what was written on 
the stone. Six to eight months following the theft of the stone, the FBI arrived in Coban to take 
the indita5 with them (para llevarse la indita). They told her father that they were going to pay 
for her education, so that she could get better schooling (para que se  p reparara major), and so 
that they could educate her. These were all lies (mentiras). At the time, people were really afraid 
(item orizada) and the army accompanied those Americans and seeing an army soldier (un militar) 
was like seeing the devil (diablo), as one was only waiting to be killed by them, as that was the 
only thing they were doing/did.6 So, there is no doubt (no cabe duda) that this eighty-and-over 
indigenous man (este indigena), no, he was in fact one hundred and fifteen years old, well, at this 
age he knew for sure that if he was not to give up his daughter, the army (m ilitares) would have 
killed him. Facing this threat the man handed over (dio) his daughter and they took her away (se 
la llevaron). So the man went to approach the army (ejercito) and said that those men (esos 
hom bres) had visited and they had agreed (quedaron) to bring the man’s daughter back and the 
date had come and they had not returned her. He had not heard from her and wanted to know 
what had happened to her, trusting (conjiando) that there were soldiers (soldados) with the FBI. 
Well, he had come to let them know (avisar), as one who says, surely you must know (ha de 
saber), because there were soldiers (soldados) present when they took her away on that certain 
date, and when the date came they did not bring her back. It turns out that what they told him was 
that he should not go round claiming/demanding/insinuating (reclam ar) anything, because what 
could happen to him was that he could be killed (matarlo). So without any doubt (no cabe duda), 
they either have the girl (muchacha) alive or they killed her. I interrupt Luis at this point and ask 
whether they may have killed her after the girl revealed (revelar) what the estela. That may have 
been the case; they may have killed her after she had deciphered (decifrado) the Maya 
inscription/ tradition (leyenda). To the present day, it is not known whether they hold her alive or 
whether they killed her. But what we think, said Luis, is that they must have killed her, as the 
indios in Guatemala have never really had any defence/protection (defensa), or support from the 
law (apoyo p o r  las leyes), they have been mistreated (tratados mat). And that is where we, the 
m estizos come in, to receive the same punishment (castigo), the same suffering (sufrimiento) of 
the Maya, because some of us the m estizos do not agree (no nos p arece)  with the way in which
5 ‘Indita’ literally means the young indigenous girl. The diminutive form of indio is usually derogatory in 
that it implies a demeaning and/or paternalistic attitude towards indigenous people.
6 Army counter-insurgency activities deliberately deployed imagery related to the devil. For instance, the 
military elite group Kaibiles stationed in Peten between 1974 and 1989 trained in a military compound 
called El Infierno, or Hell, in the vicinities of Melchor de Mencos (cf. CEH 1999, Volume II, Chapter
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indigenous people (los indigenas) are treated, what they do with them, with all the 
scorn/contempt (mensoprecios). So, the way we saw the matter when we spoke to that man who 
told me this story, I said to him/I say to you (le digo yo) why did not the Guatemalan government 
allow (permitido) that she studied here, that they did not take her away, because she would have 
been very useful to the very same Guatemalan government, the indigenous girl (muchacha 
indigena) as much as the elderly man (viejito), because in them were the Maya secrets (secretos 
Mayas) that people don’t know anymore, in him there were important Maya stories (historias 
Mayas) for today’s generation (generation), so rather than supporting them, they destroyed them 
(los destryueron). I say to Luis that they seem to have stolen the estelae and the people (gente) 
too. That is exactly the case. The indigenous peoples (pueblos indigena) in Guatemala have lost 
the confidence/trust (confianza) in the law (leyes), in those who execute the law, because they are 
not fair (justos), because it’s an injustice, so it is in this way that in Guatemala very important 
things (cosas) have been/are being lost (se ha ido perdiendo) There are people who know (lo 
saben) but people are afraid (tienen temor).
The story told by Luis is a Ladino narrative on the predicament of Guatemala, as a 
multicultural country marked by the arbitrary exercise of authority and violence, 
perpetrated by the Guatemalan Army in its acquiescence to, and collusion with, United 
States imperialism. Set in Guatemala in the late 1970s, the narrative recounts how 
antiquities, knowledge and people are stolen through violence and deception by foreign 
powers, and how women, who are bearers of knowledge, are commodified, exchanged 
and appropriated in the process. In this respect, the story is as much about Ladino 
representations of indigeneity and gender as it is about the theft of knowledge and 
secrets. The story opens with the theft of a ‘Maya stone’ seen as the repository of ancient 
Maya knowledge, but a form of knowledge that is understood to be directly related to the 
present. Indeed, the names of living individuals are inscribed on the stone. The 
individuals whose names feature on the stone can read the inscription and thus can 
decipher the secrets of the Maya, which are the targets of Federal Bureau of
o
Investigation’s interest. When faced by the FBI and the Guatemalan army, the elderly
11:56).
7 Archaeologists would argue that no relation exists between the ancient Maya culture of the archaeological 
site of Tikal in Peten and contemporary Q’eqchi’ culture in Alta Verapaz or elsewhere. This, of course does 
not preclude Luis imagining a relation between the two.
8 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the agency of the United States Department of Justice and 
principal federal investigative agency. Its functions include the investigation of espionage, sabotage,
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Q’eqchi’ man decides to give up his (grand-)daughter in order to save his life. 
Interestingly, at this point the figure of the Q’eqchi’ girl is commodified and becomes the 
object entangled in a system of exchange (Rubin 1975) between the masculinist neo­
imperial powers of the FBI, the Guatemalan Army, and the girl’s father/grand-father. The 
arrangement is a temporary one, aimed at providing the girl with better schooling, and the 
elderly Q’eqchi’ man approaches the army when the girl is not returned on the agreed 
date, as it is within his right to have his (grand-)daughter/property returned. The response 
of the army is dismissal. The Q’eqchi’ man is ultimately betrayed in his trust. Up to the 
moment of revelation of the deceit, he had viewed the Guatemalan Army as guarantor to 
the transaction. The fact that there were Guatemalan Army soldiers with the FBI on the 
day the girl was taken away was no guarantee after all. The Q’eqchi’ man is ordered to 
lay the matter to rest, lest he be killed and his daughter/grand-daughter is never returned. 
According to Luis, whether the girl is alive and hostage of the FBI, or has been killed is 
an open question. There is no doubt that the FBI either holds the girl or that they may 
have killed her, in a context where certainty is inherently ambiguous. Nevertheless, Luis 
resolves that it is more likely that the girl was murdered.
Gender constructs seem to be established in terms of a system of unequal exchange and 
indigeneity seems to be articulated (from Luis’s own Ladino perspective) in terms of 
instrumentality and commodification. To an extent, both gender-in-the feminine and 
indigenous ethnicity are first reified and then circulated as part of an exchange system. 
As their worth is inherently instrumental, they should be valued, nurtured and 
‘developed’ because of their potential instrumental worth. The story acknowledges that 
the process of commodification of difference in terms of gender and indigeneity is 
inherently violent. According to Luis, death and annihilation have marked the histories of 
the relationships between indigenous people and state and/or imperial institutions. This 
history of violence, vilification and abuse, however, is indicated as the point of 
convergence between disenfranchised and violated indigenous and ladino subjects, as 
ladinos rise with indigenous subjects against the injustices perpetrated against indigenous
organised crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.
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people to challenge the ways in which archaeological artefacts, people, knowledge and 
secrets are stolen through deception by the Guatemalan Army and foreign powers. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the FBI, the Guatemalan Army, ladinos in solidarity and 
elderly Q’eqchi’ men are all laying claims to Maya secrets harboured by young 
indigenous women. It is these secrets that seem to lie at the centre of the controversy, as 
they engender antagonistic relations between masculinist international, national and local 
powers.
5.3 El AparatolThe Apparatus
Luis elaborated further on the powers of indigenous bricoleur abilities, the accusations of 
subversion they unwittingly attracted and the violence thrust upon them in a second 
parable whose main character was a young K’iche’ man.
‘In the same year, about 1970, this happened around 1970, before the story I have just told you, 
there was another indigenous person {indigena), but he was of the K’iche’ race {de raza K ’iche*). 
This happened in 1970 and the indigenous person {indigena) was 20 years old. He was young and 
in the area of Quiche, near Santa Cruz Barilla, in the direction of Chiapas, that is where he lived 
in a village {aided), I have forgotten the name of the village, but the truth {verdad) is that this 
indigenous man {indigena) went to the capital of Guatemala. He was illiterate {inalfabeto), of his 
own intelligence {de su inteligencia), he liked the matter of radiotransmission {radiotecnico) and 
he stayed in the capital for about a year, and from there he then went back to his village. In his 
village he started repairing radios to/for his fellow villagers, at the time there were record players 
{tocadiscos) and radios, there were no tape recorders {grabadoras). So he started repairing record 
players and radios, so that after two years working in this trade, on the wall {pared) of his house 
{casa) which was made of wooden sticks {varas) like that one over there, he started 
placing/arranging {colocar) record player and radio parts ipiezas) and he started connecting 
{connectar) them and covered the wall, which was about six square metres in size. I [Silvia] ask 
sceptically, that big? Yes, it was indeed as large as that. The man covered the wall with 
pieces/parts {pedazos) of radios and record players and he made them work {las pu so  a funcionar) 
and the people were very impressed {admiracion) so much so that when someone would come to 
see him to get some radio or record player repaired, he would turn on {encender) his apparatus
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(iaparato) and the apparatus (aparato) would play what one was saying {este aparato sonaba lo 
que uno platicaba). I ask whether the machine could record {grabar). Yes, it could record and 
there one could hear (escuchar) the telephones of the country {los telefonos del pais). Really? I 
say. Yes, there one could hear the radio stations/frequencies (<difusoras) of the country. I ask Luis 
whether he means the radio stations and he says yes. I am very surprised and say, really? Luis 
replies that that much he could detect (agarrar) with that thing he had put on the wall, just like 
that, with mere wooden sticks {pura varas), he had no education {no tuvo escuela), he did not 
have a teacher (maestro) to have the opportunity to learn (poder aprender). It was his very own 
intelligence {pura inteligencia de el), and you know what happened? When the army (ejercito) 
realised {se dio cuenta), a gossipy campesino {campesino chismoso) who was comisionado9 went 
to denounce {dar parte) that that man was making apparatuses {haciendo aparatos). Some 
officers {oficiales) came with a multitude of soldiers {cantidad de soldados) and went to take a 
look (fueron a ver). Yes, of course, it was an apparatus {aparato) he had made out of pieces of 
radios and record players. Well, the officers, in good spirit {de buena onda) and good people 
{buena gente), because they saw {vieron) that it was nothing bad {nada malo), they were 
impressed {admiraron) when they saw the radio, they were army officers, but the accusation 
{denuncia) that had been made against him was a bad accusation {se la hicieron mala), because 
he was being accused of being a rebel {lo acusaban de rebelde), and he did not even know what 
that was {el nisiquiera sabia que era eso). So, those officers left, but after about eight days, the 
American gringos arrived {los gringos americanos) there with him, they were from the FBI, they 
investigated the apparatus {investigaron el aparato) and asked him who was it who had taught 
him that {que quien le habia ensafiado eso), where had he gone to leam that (que donde habia ido 
a aprender), whether he had gone to Cuba, whether he had gone to Russia, and I, I, - the man was 
saying, I did not even know Chiapas, Mexico! Because a poor person (pobre) cannot go round 
travelling, can he? Of course, I say. Well, then, says Luis, those Americans {esos americanos) 
were there with about five hundred soldiers of the Guatemalan army, and what they did was to 
tell him that that the apparatus was going to be the cause of his misfortune {la causa de su 
desgracia) and the man replied, here I, he said, I repair radios and record players, I am not 
harming people {haciendole dafio a la gente), I am not stealing off anyone {no le estoy robando a 
nadie), I am not causing harm to the government {no le estoy haciendo daho al gobierno). So 
they replied that that apparatus {aparato) that he had, well that was against the government, 
because only the government could have such an apparatus to be aware {darse cuenta) of
9 Comisionados militares, namely civilian populations enlisted to guard against guerrilla activities and keep 
fellow villagers under surveillance as part o f the process o f militarization o f the countryside (CEH 1999).
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telephones at the national level and of radio stations/frequencies (difusoras). So, he said, well, 
why is not the government making the apparatus {por que no hace el gobierno el aparato)? If it is 
in the government’s interest {le conviene), it is its privilege/competence, if only the government 
can do it, {solo el lo puede hacer), well then, let the government do it {pues que lo haga) but I did 
not make it for any specific reason {pero yo no lo hice para nada), I made it because my 
thought/mental capacities {pensamiento) was/were helping me. So, they said to him, we will be 
back, and they left, and after eight days they came back, at about five in the afternoon, and he was 
not heard of again {no se supo de el), if they killed him or what {si lo mataron, o que). Did they 
take him away {lo sacaron de su casa)l -  I ask. Yes the Americans of the FBI and the 
Guatemalan army were there {andaban los americanos del FBI y andaba el ejercito de 
Guatemala), about five hundred soldiers. I say, for one unarmed man? Yes, unarmed. These two 
stories {historias) that we know {sabemos), it is only few of us [who know them], because many 
people do not like these stories, I don’t know why, I don’t know the reason {razon), people don’t 
record {grabar) the stories that are important, people don’t like to know them, but for me/in my 
opinion {a mi manera), yes, they are important, because in my view {a mi ver), if the government 
had been intelligent {inteligente), the government would have put the indita as much as the 
K’iche’ man to develop {para desarrollarles) their memory/intelligence {memoria), for the future 
of the country, but rather than developing them {en vez de desarrollarlos), they destroyed them 
{destruirlos). I ask whether perhaps the government felt threatened by such intelligence {sera que 
se sintieron amenazados de tanta inteligencia?). Luis hesitates so I add that perhaps people who 
are doing/making things {haciendo las cosas), who can {pueden) do/make things, don’t need 
anybody {no necesita a nadie) and have strength(/werza) and independence (independencia), and 
that the government may not like. This is correct {correcto). Perhaps, the [Guatemalan] 
government has an agreement/arrangement {compromiso) with the United States, what is it 
called? Because not all the United States are bad {no todo Estados Unidos es malo), it is only the 
White House {Casa Blanca), the chair (la sill a), who try to destroy {destruir) rather than develop 
{desarrollar)\
Luis’s parable constructs indigenous instrumental reason as a ‘bricoleur’ ability to 
manufacture wonderful creations through one’s talents alone, without having to be 
formally or informally taught. The protagonist of the second story is a young K’iche’ 
man who leaves his village to go to Guatemala City. There he pursues an interest in radio 
transmissions, and teaches himself to repair radios and record players. On his return to
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the village, the man establishes a trade of radio and record players repairs. He collects 
discarded radio parts and over time he reassembles them on the wall of his house. In this 
remarkable and monumental installation of discarded items, parts of radios and record 
players are connected together with wooded sticks. To the amazement of neighbours and 
fellow villagers, the ‘apparatus’ actually works. The apparatus records sound as well as 
intercepting the radio frequencies and telephone conversations taking place across the 
country. This marvel does not go unnoticed and the man is denounced to the authorities. 
When the Guatemalan Army arrives to survey the apparatus, the soldiers cannot conceal 
the wonder and admiration for this cunning installation. Nevertheless, the nature of the 
charge is too serious to be ignored. The K’iche’ man is accused of subversion and of 
being a rebel. The FBI returns to the scene accompanied by five hundred Guatemalan 
soldiers. The FBI argues that the man should not be in possession of such an item, and 
demands to know where exactly the man leamt his skills. Suggestions that he may have 
trained in Russia or Cuba are seen to be so outlandish as to merit humorous, dismissive, 
and defiant comments. The K’iche’ man points out that poor people cannot even travel to 
Chiapas, which is only a few miles away from the Quiche town where the story unfolds. 
Surely the FBI should know that much. It is indeed defiance that marks the exchange 
between the K’iche’ man and the FBI, as he argues his point and tries to illustrate that he 
is within his rights to assemble the magnificent apparatus, and that there is no malice or 
harm in his creation. The FBI’s position is, however, that possession of such an apparatus 
can only be the prerogative of the authoritarian regime and for anyone else to own it 
amounts to an implicit threat to the government. To have access to the private 
conversations taking place nationwide, on phones and radio frequencies, is the exclusive 
right of the repressive state. To no avail does the man point out that if it is the 
government’s prerogative to be in possession of the apparatus, surely they could have 
manufactured one themselves. There was no malicious intent in the assemblage, only the 
man’s intelligence and creativity. The FBI and the Guatemalan Army leave unconvinced 
and on their next visit the K’iche’ man is taken away and never heard of again.
I suggest that the status of the wonder apparatus manufactured by the K’iche’ man be
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considered in terms of its relation to secrecy. What the apparatus does is allow access to 
private, semi-public and public information that one would not be aware of, unless aided 
by one’s talents to assemble such a makeshift technology. Fortuitous access to private 
and public secrets, and to networks through which secrets circulate, amounts to a 
transgression which is severely punished by the neo-imperial foreign power and the 
repressive Guatemalan military state. It seems that only the latter have rightful access to 
secrets through surveillance, and anyone else intervening in the process of secrecy 
management can only be a rebel. This coincides with a recurrent theme in my 
conversations with ex-combatants, namely that it is the very nature of the repressive state 
that to a significant extent manufactures the subject position of the rebel, and thus draws 
unwitting individuals into a spiral of accusation, exposure and punishment. Interestingly, 
accusations very often come from fellow villagers who are enmeshed in a social fabric 
that quite literally produces insurgency through practices of denunciation, despite the fact 
that underneath the production of insurgency, there are only individual intelligence and 
ingenuity. The fashioning and functioning of the apparatus occurs in the public domain, 
as the K’iche’ man makes his fellow villagers participate in the appreciation of his 
wonderful creation. Through the production of audibility, public secrecy, and the right of 
access to information and networks so engendered, directly threatens the repressive 
state’s seeming exclusive right to surveillance and secrecy management. Likewise, it is 
the intelligent generation of audibility which induces the violent repression at the hands 
of national and foreign power. Luis’s narrative is elegantly structured, so that each 
episode he recounts leads on to another. As the parables unfold, they turn progressively 
more personal, and the last of the three stories deals with Luis’s own experiences. As the 
young K’iche’ man had the talent to assemble a wonderful apparatus out of discarded 
parts and wooden sticks, thus unexpectedly intercepting telephone and radio 
transmissions, Luis had similar bricoleur aptitudes.
5.4 El Rifle!The Rifle
Luis had applied creativity and ingenuity to the assemblage of a marvellous creation of
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his own fashioned out of the debris of a plane crash. He had collected the fragments of 
the wreckage and made a rifle. Having accidentally fired a shot, he had attracted the 
attention of his neighbours who had reported the matter to their authorities. Like the 
K’iche’ man, Luis was drawn into a spiral of accusations and was soon visited by Army 
soldiers.
‘Personally, I like to mess around (traviesar) with weapons (armas). In Sayaxchd in 1967, I 
started assembling/making a 38 calibre rifle (hacer un fusil calibre 38) out of some pieces of 
pipes (tubos) of a plane (avion) that had crashed (caer), and when I had nearly finished it, my 
father hit it hard and a shot was fired (meterle un tiro), he hit the trigger and it exploded. The next 
day the army came to the house because the neighbours (vecinos) had gone to denounce me 
(denunciar), that I was making weapons to kill (armas para matar). At five in the morning the 
army got us out of the house (nos saco el ejercito de la casa) and what the officer said to me was 
that in Guatemala it was prohibited outright (prohibido terminantemente) that a person developed 
intelligence of any inclination the person may be (que una persona desarrollara inteligencias de 
la indole que fuera), that in Guatemala nobody could invent anything (nadie podia inventarse 
nada) not even a minimum (ni lo mas minimo) because it was forbidden (por que era prohibido). 
Where did they take you? I ask. They did not find it on me, because I, being wise (como sabio), 
during the night I put the rifle in an old water well, nineteen meters deep. I tied it to a string (pita) 
and I hung it there (lo guinde), they did not find it (no lo hallaron), because if they had found it, 
they would have killed me. What the lieutenant told me was that if the Army realises (se da 
cuenta) and they find a weapon on you (te encuentran un arma), that you may have made (que tu 
la haigas hecho), they will bum you alive (te van a quemar vivo), because that is the law of the 
government in Guatemala, because that is an offence (delito). I said to him, well, I did not do 
anything to anybody, those people lied to you (mentir), I did not, and how would I know how to 
do/make things, when I am a campesino, I told them, I was raised in the monte (me he criado solo 
en el monte), I did not even have any education (yo no tuve ni escuela), that is what I told them, 
that was a lie (mentira), but he said to me, you were making that rifle (el rifle tu los estabas 
haciendo), because they came to tell, they saw you (por que los que fueron a decir, te vieron). I 
say, ah, somebody went and told them, somebody accused/denounced you (la denuncio). Yes, 
Luis confirms, and no, I said to them, I did not do anything (no he hecho nada). Didn’t you (como 
no?)? He said to me, you did make the rifle (tu lo hiciste) and at five in the afternoon you fired a
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shot (reventaron un tiro). Well then, I said to them, you look for it/find it (aqui, pues busquelo), if 
you can find it! And that is what he said to me, never again make/do anything else (nunca mas 
vas a hacer otra cosa) or try to make/do it (intentar hacerlo), because they will kill you/you will 
be killed (matar), this is the law (ley) and it is in this way that in Guatemala, the very same 
governments (los mismos gobiemos) have destroyed many intelligent people (gente inteligente). 
So, I do not agree (estar de acuerdo) with this destruction (la destruccion) because if some 
people are intelligent (si una gente es inteligente) one should use that (usar) to see whether they 
develop more (desarrollar), but if one kills them (matar), that is not right (correcto).
Luis’s tripartite narrative illustrates how a climate of suspicion and threats of accusation 
muddled the truth and produced a social context in which secrets were harboured, 
accessed, intercepted, exchanged, stolen through violence and deception, and fashioned 
through creativity, intelligence and ingenuity. While secrets engendered the constant 
threat of exposure, the repressive system of secrecy management seemed to take on a life 
of its own and intervened even when (or precisely because) there was no secret to protect, 
no malicious intent to gain access to secrets. Violence, on the other hand, never appeared 
to be ‘mindless’. In Luis’s account, the repressive neo-imperial and/or national state 
apparatus of surveillance actually engaged in argumentation and allowed for people to 
make their case. In the last instance however, violence or the threat of violence were 
always imminent, and served the appropriation, management and control of secrets. Yet, 
one resorted to telling lies to protect oneself and hid the evidence of one’s ingenuity, and 
hence of guilt, inside a well.
5.5 Binaries: jA Veneer o Morirl
In post-demobilisation times, Luis and his fellow ex-FAR associates were identified and 
indeed self-identified as ‘ex-combatants’. The term combatiente (combatant) suggests 
that guerrilla life was about military strife. Whilst many forms of engagement actually 
qualified as guerrilla activities,10 military operations were foundational experiences for 
many men and women involved in the organisation. In the ethnographic present they
10 See the account provided by a FAR Comandante, Chapter Six.
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often reminisced about ataques and ofensivas (attacks and offensives). Narratives 
focussing on the occurrence of military operations presented such temporally defined 
materialisations of the conflict in terms of a whole consisting of a binary oppositional 
relation between discrete parts. Tucan, a Kaq’chikel ex-guerrillero, recalled his 
participation in combats in the course of our conversation.
‘This is something I cannot forget because those really are moments when one’s conscience 
(iconciencia) is bom, of one being a revolutionary (revolucionario) and fighting (luchar) against 
an army. This is no easy task. In all instances, it really is a case of Victory or Death {alii si, que A 
Veneer o Morir). At that moment in the war (guerra) we had to endure it {aguantar), we had to 
do it, because that is the idea, to change the situation of Guatemala {de cambiar la situacion de 
Guatemala), so at that time of the war, between different groups {grupos distintos), it is a matter 
of life and death {vida o muerte), so that I will never forget, because I participated in many 
combats against the Army {ejercito), and not only against the Army, but also against the Army 
Aviation’.
Tucan recalled his participation in military actions as foundational for the articulation of 
political conscience and the conviction that social change ought to be fostered in 
Guatemala. He envisioned the struggle as occurring between distinct groups, namely the 
Army and the guerrilla, and involvement in military confrontation and political 
mobilisation more broadly as regulated by the seemingly irrevocable alternative between 
Veneer o Morir, Victory or Death. Whilst the conflict appeared to be structured according 
to the binary distinction between the Guatemalan Army and the guerrilla, the guerrilla 
ethos appeared to depend on the all-too significant difference between triumph and 
annihilation. Many accounts, however, problematised the status of totalities, emphasising 
instead the partibility of subjects, their course of action and their effects.
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5.6 A Desire to Exceed (Oneself)
Carlos was thirty-six years old. He was bom in the eastern region of Jutiapa and lived in 
Escuintla in infancy. During our conversation Carlos told me about his family’s move to 
Peten and noted how, as a young man, he had joined the insurgents moved by a desire to 
exceed his own condition and that of the people of Guatemala.
‘When I was about seven, we moved to Peten, and we lived in the village about twenty kilometres 
from here. My father was looking for land, and he found a place around Melchor de Mencos, here 
in Peten. That’s where I lived until I was sixteen. It is at the age of sixteen that my involvement in 
the revolutionary struggle (involucramiento a la lucha revolucionaria) began, first as support 
(iapoyo), so to speak, to the organisation (organization). In this case, the very first form of 
involvement was to disseminate propaganda (regar propaganda), during the night, because this 
was all clandestine (clandestino), and no one was supposed to see how we were intervening 
(andar interveniendo), in information gathering, purchase of foodstuff, and such like. Well, we 
did it, before joining the fronts (incorporation a los /rentes), which came later. (...) When I take 
the decision of joining (incorporarse), I decide to communicate this to my parents, but this when 
it was already the decisive moment of my incorporation. So I meet with them and I tell them, 
well, I need to speak with you both. Well, they were surprised (ellos sorprendidos). He surely 
must be thinking of marrying/being in a relationship (acompafiarse). Marrying the revolutionary 
struggle (lucha revolucionaria), I said. They were very surprised. In the end, they realised that the 
decision I was taking was the incorporation for the development (formation) of the guerrillas in 
Peten. That was something that surprised them immensely, but at the same time they said to me, 
well, it is very satisfactory for us that you may be taking this path (camino), because, for your 
information, since 1972 we also have been participating in this struggle (venir participando en 
esta lucha). I did not know that. It is something sad (triste) that you may be off, because we know 
that you are going to a war (guerra), and a war, as you know, is of casualties (muertos), injured 
(heridos) and suffering (sufrimiento). But we know that you are going to do it for all of us the 
poor (los pobres) who are suffering (padecer) in our country. So we wish you good luck (buena 
suerte), behave yourself (portate bien), with all the discipline (toda disciplina) as you have 
always done. We know you will have many successes (exitos), and do not forget us. These are the 
words that they said to me in the end. So that with their support, I took the decision to join, 
although of course I had come to that decision already, as I was saying to you before, despite the
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fact that I was a minor (menor de edad). Age was not a limit that could keep me (detener) with 
them. Instead, I longed for something more (desear algo mas), which was not only to fight for 
them, but also for the people {pueblo) who have always needed it (necesitar)’.
Carlos commented on his decision to join the guerrilla at the age of sixteen, noting the 
youthful fervour and political conviction through which he was able to transcend the 
restrictions and bounds of village life. When he reached the guerrilla camp for the first 
time, Carlos told me of how he was not the only one who had willingly exceeded himself 
and his condition. Through separate routes, over twenty new recruits who had known 
each other previously, but were unaware of their respective guerrilla collaboration, came 
together on. the occasion of their first guerrilla training. As they were acquainted with 
weapons, they began to experience a newly fashioned sense of commonality.
‘I have to tell you that it was something very pleasurable {muy agradable), because in the end we 
realised that many of us who joined {incorporarse), and it was a group of over twenty of us, in 
the end, we had all known each other before (conocidos), but because of the clandestinity 
{clandestinidad) of the organisation, we did not know in what each of us was (en que estdbamos 
cada uno) and only there we finally realised. So, there were people from different villages there, 
and that is how we started and it was very nice (bonito) to see the first rifles (fusil), although very 
few of them, of course. For we had to have weapons to make front to the enemy (enemigo), and 
the enemy in this case was the Army. So it turns out that there are about twenty rifles, and in 
additions there were only rifle carbines (carabina), Ml and there were also some shot guns 
(escopetas de un tiro), calibre 16 and 20 millimetres. Well, I was lucky because in the end the one 
who was in command there knew me and on some occasions he had made use of me as instructor 
to train (entrenar) la m ilicia ,n so in view of the degree of trust (conjianza) that there existed, he 
allowed that a rifle were given to me, one of the automatic rifles! [laughter] I was lucky in that 
instance, and certainly we begun to feel the warm manner (manera tan calida), of brothers (tan de 
hermanos), which was common among us’.
According to Carlos’ recollections, military training posited the Army as the common
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enemy for the new recruits. Nevertheless, in as much as there had been multiple and 
discrete paths leading individual recruits to the guerrilla camp, there would be manifold, 
complex and secretive practices of simulation and dissimulation through which the 
coherence of parts, wholes and their relations may periodically be sought or, indeed, 
undermined as they became embroiled in the partialities of the conflict.
5.7 Doubling and Insurgent Dissimulations: Dos Caras (Two Faces/Faced)
Nicolas was a Q’eqchi’ ex-combatant whose ex-combatant status was that of ''disperso ’, 
that is, in the aftermath of demobilisation he had returned to his family. I met him by 
chance, as we converged in the same village. Nicolas was visiting his daughter, whilst I 
had gone on this trip with Flor, who wanted to visit a relative said to be critically ill. Flor 
introduced me to Nicolas’ family and in the evening we sat outside the house to converse 
in the dark. Nicolas recounted the episodes that led to his involvement in the 
organisation, noting strategies devised to undermine the guerrilla/Army binary.
‘In 1985 there was strife (pelearse) in my parcela12 between the army and the guerrilla, and there 
were deaths, about thirteen army casualties, and for this reason they [the army] were angry (tenia 
coraje) with them [the guerrilla]. They took me to the parcela: ‘Here it’s where the postas were 
yesterday’. Ah, okay, I said to them, but I did not understand (entendia) them, I did not get the 
point (no le agarraba el rollo), for, what were ‘postas’? We say ‘postas’ when a tree is planted 
(sembrar on palo), I said to them. Well, you do not understand, now this is going to be your 
downfall (te vas a caer), son of a bitch (hijo de la gran puta). He [the Army officer] was angry 
(<enojado). Look, I said to him, I did not go anywhere (no sail). And still you have the face to tell 
me that that it’s not true (todavia tenes cara para decir que no es cierto) -  he asked. Yes, of 
course, I said to him, I am not involved in anything (yo no estoy metido a noddy.
On that occasion, the Army officer was satisfied that Nicolas was not involved in
11 La Milicia, that is, civilian supporters.
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insurgent activities. Nicolas was thus taken to Poptun to receive training as a patrullero, 
that is, as a member of the civil patrols. As Nicolas said, the Army entrusted him with the 
role of Civil Patrol Coordinator of his own village.
‘When I got to Poptun, they even gave me a duty/official post (carga)! Civil Patrol Coordinator 
(coordinador de patrulleros)\ Of the Civil Patrols?! I [Silvia] ask, in disbelief. Andale!13 
Confirms Nicolas emphatically. I explode in a loud Puchica!14 They gave me that job but I would 
work two faces (pero yo trabajaba dos caras) so that they would not pay attention to me, but 
what I was most sure of was that we have to be part of the guerrilla struggle (lucha guerrillera). 
Well, since that time I joined the guerrilla struggle (me incorpore a la lucha guerrillera). In the 
Civil Patrols we would just go around (pa' arriba y pa’ abajo), what’s going on, there is nothing 
happening, and if anyone armed comes, what do we do, mucha? Well, we don’t do anything (no 
hacemos nada). In any case, today we see this hamlet (aldea) is free, but the day will come when 
the war will plunge upon us (va a llegar la guerra sobra de nosostros), and that was how it was 
(asi fue). It always arrived/got there [it came upon us] (llego siempre). I went to la montaha in 
1985. As I was already asking questions about what was happening/may happen (que se pasara), 
well, I am clear (estar claro), for there are times one does not know what to think (hay veces pues 
que no halla como uno), but when one is clear (entonces de estar claro), we decided to go, as we 
already used to go and visit the compaheros (siempre me pasaba a ver con los companeros). My 
family knew that I had stayed behind [en la montana\, but they did not know whether I was alive 
(mi familia sabia que aqui me quede, pero no sabia si todavia vivid). I was in the Mardoqueo 
Front, with Comandante Pedro. About twenty-five companeros [Q’eqchi’] from the same hamlet, 
we all joined (nos incorporamos). Some were able to endure it (aguantar), some left’ (my 
emphasis).
As a guerrilla sympathiser, Nicolas infiltrated the system of counter-insurgency. As he 
described it in the course of the interview, for a time prior to joining the guerrilla files en 
la montafia, he would ‘work two faces’ as apathetic Comisionado Militar and active 
guerrilla informer. Practices of dissimulation were in fact not exclusive to the guerrilla,
12 Parcela is a plot of cultivated land.
13 Expression that indicates assent.
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and rather a domain o f  counter-insurgency artifice extensively deployed by the Army.
5.8 Doubling and Counter-insurgent Simulations: Botas de Hule15
Nestor said that he was absolutely certain that the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes had no 
links whatever to the site of Las Dos Erres, where the Army massacred an entire village 
in December 1982 (CEH 1999, ODHAG 1998).16 Nestor said:
‘We had a camp (campamento) north of Palestina and we had planned an action (<accionar) on the 
Libertad-Subin road, and thus we had to pass in the vicinity of Las Dos Erres [later the site of a 
massacre], where we would habitually pass by. But what we would do was to avoid it (evadir) 
[the settlement], so that we would not be seen (ver), or we may go by at night, but we never let 
ourselves be known there {nunca nos dimos a conocer alii) and people never knew about the
14 Colloquial expression indicating, in this instance, surprise.
15 Literally, rubber boots. They were distinctive of guerrilla attire.
16 The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH 1999: 347-411, Case Study No. 31, Annex 1, Volume 
1) notes that the village Las Dos Erres was founded in 1978 under the aegis of FYDEP and its colonisation 
policy. In early 1982 the guerrilla entered the neighbouring town of Las Cruces to hold a political meeting 
and purchase supplies. The Army responded by installing a military outpost (destacamento) in Las Cruces. 
Following the massacre in the village Josefinos in April of the same year, the area became progressively 
more militarised. Army recognisance actions in the village of Las Dos Erres also became more frequent. In 
September 1982 FAR carried out an attack against military objectives in Las Cruces. The Comisionado 
Militar of Las Cruces requested that the village of Las Dos Erres put forward individuals who may take 
part in the activities of the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, but the request was rejected. Rumours begun to 
spread that the villagers of Las Dos Erres may be guerrilla sympathisers. The Army searched the village 
and found a sack with the letters ‘FAR’ inscribed on it. The sack belonged to one of the founders of the 
community, Federico Aquino Ruano and thus bore his initials. Nevertheless the sack was said to amount to 
proof o f guerrilla activity in the village (CEH ibid). About a month later, and as recalled by Nestor in the 
course of our conversation, FAR carried out an ambush on the road to Palestina. The Commission for 
Historical Clarification notes that the Army responded by sending a platoon of eighteen men of the Kaibiles 
Unit, namely the special branch in charge of commando operations. These were joined by forty other 
Kaibiles. On 6 December 1982, the 58 Kaibiles entered the village dressed as guerrilleros. The 
Commission for Historical Clarification notes that the order was that the fifty-eight Kaibiles wear olive 
green shirts, civilian trousers and that they carry ordinary weapons. The massacre begun in the early hours 
of 6 December, as the Kaibiles disguised as guerrilleros killed the infants first. Rape, torture and further 
killing followed. The dead were thrown in a well and by 7 December 1982, the entire population of the 
village with the exception of a child had been murdered. The Kaibiles also kept two girls alive for three 
more days. The girls were made to dress in the same attire adopted by the Kaibiles in their disguise to 
reinforce the perception that the massacre had been carried out by the guerrilla. According to the 
Commission for Historical Clarification, an eye witness to the massacre, i.e. an ex-Kaibil, commented on 
the added verisimilitude attained by having the two girls with them thus: ‘/a guerrilla siempre carga 
mujeres\ that is, ‘the guerrilla always has women with them’ (CEH, ibid). The girls were raped and 
eventually murdered. In the mid-1990s forensic anthropologists identified the remains of 162 individuals in 
Las Dos Erres, whilst the Commission for Historical Clarification ascertained the identities of 178 of the
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guerrilla (la gente nunca supo). Nevertheless, they had desire/intention to collaborate in practice 
(deseo practico) because the Army really tested them (probar). According to the information we 
have, the Army dressed themselves up as guerrillero (el ejercito se vistid de guerrillero), entered 
the community, the people welcomed them (recibir), they gave them food (le dio comida), and 
the Army, in order to confirm (confirmar) that they were guerrilleros, grabbed the Comisionados 
Militares and they killed them right in front of the people [villagers]. When the soldiers who had 
dressed up as guerrilleros retreated (retirarse), they go and dress as the Army (vestir de militares) 
and return (regresar) to suppress the people/village (reprimir el pueblo) saying why had they 
allowed that their Comisionados Militares be killed (por que habian dejado que mataran sus 
comisionados militares). This was the justification (justificacion) for further violence’.
The narrative of the Army dressing up as the guerrilla was a common theme in my 
conversations with people in Peten. Many had commented on the indeterminacy and 
ambivalence in the Army/guerrilla distinction. Arguments that whilst there may be 
guerrilleros in the Army ranks, the guerrilla may be made up of Army officers were 
common. In my conversation with Nestor, I spoke of an ‘image confusion’ (confusion de 
imaged) and Nestor set out to qualify how any confusion was the product of specific 
counter-insurgency tactics deployed by the Army to confound the population, and, 
crucially, to mystify the guerrilleros/as. As Nestor said:
‘There were other cases. In the guerrilla we used botas de hule exclusively and the Army used 
botas de hule to confound (confundir) people, or to confound us (nosotros mismos), that it had 
not been the Army that had passed by a certain place. Or else, they would dress, or would arm 
themselves with the same arms as us. But many succeeded (lograr) in 
identifying/discerning/discriminating (identificar) [between the two], because the Army soldier 
(soldado del ejercito) and the guerrilla soldier (soldado guerrillero) were not the same (igual) in 
the way they treated people (forma de tratar la gente). There was a form/manner (forma), it was 
the form/manner that people would identify (identificar), and how people would identify the 
Army. Because whilst the Army may be dressed like a guerrillero (estuviera vestido de 
guerrillero), the manner (trato), the form in which to address (forma de dirigirse) a campesino, 
and poor people (gente umilde) was completely different. For we never threatened them
victims (CEH ibid).
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(iamenazar), we never pointed a rifle to an unnarmed civilian (civil desarmado), we would speak 
with them in a form/manner (forma), like this, soft (suave), without affecting them (afectarlos) 
[detrimentally]. On the contrary, soldiers address (dirigirse) civilians undermining them (hacer 
de menos), they treat them with contempt’.
Practices of simulation and dissimulation complicated the binaries on which the conflict 
was predicated, chief among them the distinction between the guerrilla and the Army. 
Nevertheless, Nestor was adamant that the practices of simulation deployed by the Army 
failed complete mimesis. Despite the cunning deployment of guerrilla attire, the Army 
never mimicked guerrilla ethics correctly, and that is where the categorical distinction 
lay.
5.9 Doubling in Combat: Brothers
Nicolas had a brother who also joined the guerrilla. As he noted, their fates were to be 
remarkably different.
‘I had a brother, he stayed [in the guerrilla] and died. He was working (trabajar) [in the guerrilla], 
he was working with some compas of the village. They were carrying a sewing machine 
(maquina), to sew waterproof clothing (costurar ropa de repelente) which was being used for the 
war (guerra). This took them a few days, but they did not realise, or perhaps someone went to tell 
(avisar), and when they came out they fell in the trap (caer en la trampa). The military got them. 
I looked out for them for fifteen days. I looked for them again in the capital when the Peace was 
signed, but I could not see them, we never saw them again’.
Nestor also had a brother, Rafael. I got to know them both, and one day I asked whether 
they would like me to interview them together. Nestor and Rafael kindly agreed, and on 
the day we all went to their home and conversed together for a while. Rafael, whose 
background I was not well acquainted with, began by telling us about his experiences.
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‘We used to live in a village in Peten [the site of a massacre] at the time, I was a bit off the rails 
(desacarrilado) we could say, I liked drinking too much. My brothers were already organised 
(estar organizado) [in the guerrilla], we used to talk a bit, we celebrated the triumph of the 
Sandinistas which was freeing itself (librarse) in Nicaragua, and we would identify with that war 
(guerra) and would comment that it would be good that something similar would occur in 
Guatemala. However, my brothers were already organised [in the guerrilla], but they never said 
anything to me, perhaps because of the situation, and for the fact that they had to be very discreet 
(muy discretos). They thought it was impudent (descocado) that I should be so drunk (pasado de 
copas). They feared I would talk to people who may harm us (jugar una mala pasada), so they 
resolved to never say anything to me. That is how in 1979 I left the village and headed south. I 
was twenty. And where I was, in the south of the country, in the course of an action of the army 
(operative del ejercito), they captured me (capturar) to go into military service, and my brothers 
stayed on in Peten. I was in the army for thirty months. Army training was a bit rough (brusco). 
The reality is that in the Army the training is not very professional (professional), I don’t know if 
things are different now, but at the time the training was quite rough. My brothers in the guerrilla 
had training that was superior to that of the Army. I took a course (sacar un curso) in Jutiapa, in 
the Military Zone there. The course was called Curso de Tigre [Course of the Tiger]. In that 
course one would leam some elements (elementos), for instance, what they called ‘Sonido de 
Olores’ [The Sound of Smell/Scent]. One would be taken to a place and they would play things 
(sonar cosas), and they would put meat to roast (asar came), and grass (hierba), and one would 
have to identify the smells. But this was not an intense course. Afterwards they sent me to the 
area of operations, which is what they called it, they sent me to Nebaj.17 We were in Nebaj for six 
months between 1979 and 1980. We were the first soldiers to get there, on the landing strip north 
of Nebaj, and that is where we installed a destacamento. We had no contact with the guerrilla. We 
would be told that they would come, they would send us papers/messages (mandar papeles), and 
people would inform us that the guerrilleros were over there, but personally; our compania never 
had a confrontation (enfrentamiento), with the exception of an unsuccessful attempt (conato), 
where they [the guerrilla] put a claymore [Claymore mine] and slightly wounded a soldier. 
Afterwards we went to look for them, but there was no trace (rastro) of them. That was all. The 
matter got progressively more intense (agudizarse), our compania was called ‘The First Fusileros 
Tojiles’ (la primaria de fusileros Tojiles), and was relived by ‘The Third Fusileros Jaguares’ (la
17 Nebaj, in the departamento of Quiche, is one of the three municipios o f the Ixil triangle (c.f. Stoll 1983). 
The area was the site of the most virulent counter-insurgency campaigns of the conflict. The guerrilla group 
operating there was the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) (CEH 1999).
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tercera fusileros Jaguares), from Jutiapa. Of those six-hundred-and-sixty soldiers that made up 
the Jaguares, only fourteen returned to the Military Zone. The rest were annihilated (aniquilar) by 
the compos [the guerrilleros]. Luckily I did not take part in any counter-insurgency action, 
because now I would regret it (doler), if had done it. That is, my ideal has always been a 
revolutionary one (mi ideal siempre ha sido revolucionario), but where I was I could not do 
anything against the current of the army (la corriente del ejercito). Now I am happy that I can be 
of use in some tasks related to the party. I think that the best thing my brothers did was not 
allowing me to join (incorporate) [the guerrilla], because I may not be alive today if I did’.
Following Rafael’s account, Nestor confirmed that many of the reasons why he and his 
brothers had not involved Rafael in the organisation was because they would not 
willingly recruit a relative in the organisation unless the relative displayed the necessary 
will and conviction. Nestor then recounted how they had reunited in the mid-1990s.
‘We met in front of McDonald’s, El Tecolote, in Guatemala City in 1995. And since the day we 
met, we have not parted (cuando nos juntamos, no nos despegamos). At times, when I was in 
combat, (estar combatiente), I remembered them, not just him [his brother, who is present], but 
also my other brother who was also taken to military service (el servicio). When I was in the 
combat line (linea de combate), I would remember them and as I was in the midst of combat, I 
would think, I may be shooting one of my brothers (a lo mejor me estoy tirando con uno de mis 
hermanos). As there were many [soldiers] from Oriente (orietanos)18 in the military files in 
Peten, I would often hear the eastern inflection in their voice (la voz caballita). And one day I had 
an altercation (maltratar) with one of them, there were about five meters between us, and cabal,19 
I worked out (atinar) that he was from Oriente (orientano), and he even told me his name. I did 
not want to tell him mine, but he was mistreating me (maltratar), he would say, with you, I will 
kill ten guerrilleros. I have already killed five, and with you it will be six. Dale, pues, dale [get 
on with it], I would say to him, and I left him there. What I would think was, that the likelihood 
(a lo mejor) was that it was my brother in front of me (con un hermano estaba yo en frente). He 
[the soldier] was from the compania Tojil and in 1983 we annihilated a whole compania, and it 
was the Tojiles. We had a three-hour long combat, we [the guerrilla] were two compafiias, and
18 Eastern regions of the country.
19 Expression meaning ‘precisely’.
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they were one. We rounded them up and annihilated them (aniquilar). Some got out alive because 
they fled, or rather, the platoon (peloton) who was with the head (jefe) of the compania managed 
to escape the confrontation, and the rest were left there (el resto se quedd alii)’.
Nestor recalled how in the midst of combat he had seen his own brother in the enemy 
standing about five metres away from him. Through a merographic analogy, he had seen 
his own kind in his nemesis. The merographic analogy created a connection between two 
seemingly discrete entities, namely the Army and the guerrilla, through the image of his 
brother facing Nestor during combat. The merographic effort was one of envisaging a 
connection, that is a scale of sameness, in what presented itself as difference, that is, as a 
connection from another angle (cf. Strathem 1992a).
5.10 Proximity and Adjunction
Carlos told me that following demobilisation procedures, some ex-combatants had gone 
to meet Army officers they had fought against during the war. Accompanied by 
MINUGUA military personnel, they entered the Zona Militar, that is, the military base. 
The encounter between the ex-guerrilleros and the Army officers engendered the 
articulation of merographic analogies by both parties, and produced a series of reciprocal 
revelations. Disclosures revealed how the parts of seemingly discrete entities had been in 
complex relations to each other. Early on in our conversation, Carlos posited a series of 
distinctions between the guerrilla and the Army, and the Army officers and the soldiers. 
Carlos said:
‘Well, I think that in our case, [in the aftermath of demobilisation], the majority of people could 
talk to them [the Army] (la mayor parte de la gente, si, venimosy nos podemos platicar con ellos 
[el Ejercito]), we shook hands (nos estrechamos la mano), because in the end, as far as I am 
concerned, the point was to understand that in those times, to undertake/sustain an offensive 
activity (activida ofensiva) was just and necessary (justo y necesario), to be hostile to them (pues 
hostil en contra de ellos), but today this is no longer possible, although one never stops carrying
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on (mantener) feeling that anger (coraje), in the memory of all they did/perpetrated, verdacH But 
in this case, this is more towards those high rank officers {altos oficiales). For instance, if you 
meet a high ranking officer you know that he intervened (intervenir) in that war that is no longer 
{finalizar), and that in one way or other they are responsible for many instances of violations of 
human rights {hechos de violaciones de los derechos humanos). And it is not the same for the 
soldiers (soldados), because soldiers go [into the army] for three years and then they leave, 
whereas the officer, in order to graduate as officer, they spend a period of seven years directly in 
the Army for their training (formation). So this is where, in the end, in one way or another, one 
feels rejection (rechazo) for another, a rejection we still hold, because we know that in one way 
or other, we have to carry on erasing it (borrando)'.
Carlos then proceeded in his account of how he had met high-ranking Army officers in 
post-demobilisation times.
‘So I recall that soon after I demobilised (<desmovilizarse), I met some colonels of the Military 
Zone of Cobdn [Alta Verapaz]. Indeed, there I met the second in command (segundo jefe). And 
then I also met another colonel who was third in command (tercer jefe). I had that opportunity. 
So, they tell me, okay, but where exactly were you mostly, and at that exact moment a friend 
approaches and calls out ‘Oswaldo’. They knew of ‘Oswaldo’ [one of Carlos’s pseudonyms], so, 
you are Marvin T&nchez [his first name]? [They ask]. Correct (cierto), I reply. In that case, we 
have heard of you (hemos sabido de vos). Of course, I say to them, for you keep your intelligence 
(iinteligencia), you of the military still have it intact! We know you move round a lot, they say to 
me. Of course, that’s correct, I say to them. And when are you going to come and visit us? When 
the opportunity may arise, and indeed, rest assured, we come and visit there (llegar). And that’s 
how it was, I arrived there some time later. And when I got there and was there with them, only 
the second and third in command were present. Of course, I was accompanied by an official of 
the military corps of the United Nations Verification Mission to Guatemala, should problems 
arise. And so we got there and when they saw us, well, [they were] happy, well, welcome, they 
say, here we are, did you want to speak to us? Of course, we come to visit you, not just to see 
(ver) you, we come to converse a bit (platicar un poco). And after three minutes that we were 
there talking, everything stopped, the Colonel sprung up, the Second in Command, and left to 
welcome the Colonel of the military base, first in command. He had been told we were there. Go,
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pass them to the office, he tells them, and so we went all the way there, inside their office, inside 
the comandancia '.
I sense the strained and chilling aspect of the story and say to Carlos, you entered the lion’s den.
Yes, that’s where we stayed for a time, in the comandancia, that’s where we conversed and they 
were, I can tell you, very cordial. The only provocation came from the second in command, who 
says, You, were you ever here? For good or ill (ni a buenas, ni a malas)? Never, I say to him. 
Never did they send me to carry out an action here, I say to him, my superiors never sent me. And 
neither did you have the capacity to bring me here by force (traer aqui a puro huevo).
Carlos was an extremely confident and charming man, with a characteristic propensity 
for irony and wit. But when he recounted of his visit to the Military Base, he seemed, 
suddenly, profoundly vulnerable. Nevertheless, he pressed on with the story and 
proceeded to reflect how merographic connections between the two discrete domains of 
the guerrilla and the Army were articulated in post-demobilisation times. Carlos referred 
to a merographic analogy from the perspective of the Army.
‘That’s exactly how I said it to them/what I said to them (Asi se lo dije.va). So, as I was saying, 
the second jefe was the one who said that, not the third jefe. The first jefe, what he expresses is 
that a lot of work was needed at the level of the Army officials, because there was still great
20 An example of Carlos’ subtle sense of the absurd unravelled as we discussed formacion militar, that is, 
the military training he had received en la montafia. During our conversation, I asked the most audacious of 
questions: did you ever know where the arms you were given in 1981 came from? Carlos politely said, 
never, never, these were very delicate matters, you understand, so we would endeavour not to even ask 
where they were from. I suddenly became very conscious of the blunder, and added that the reason for the 
question was to ascertain who supported and indeed who did not support FAR. Although this was not in 
any way redeeming, Carlos ever more graciously replied that, o f course, he understood what I meant, but 
reiterated that as far as he was concerned, he never dared inquiring about the source of the arms he handled. 
I was mortified, but not sufficiently so, and to avert disgrace, I resorted to referring to something another 
ex-combatant had said. I pointed out that I had been told the very first arms of FAR, the very first that were 
handled, came from Vietnam. When I said this, I used a peculiar expression. I referred to the weapons in 
the diminutive and endearing form, las primeritas que se manejaron, as if  arms were tender, precious 
beings. Here I was literally repeating what I had been told on a different occasion by an ex-combatant who 
had envisaged the first inflow of arms to come from Vietnam. Carlos chuckled at my remark and with 
sarcastic composure said, si pues, sin duda alguna pues\ Yes, of course, no doubt about it. I learned 
eventually that if he never asked, I should not ask either.
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rejection (rechazo) towards us and he asks me if on our part this is also the case. Well, yes, I say 
to him, there is also that, but that is what one has to work on to strengthen this process we are 
currently experiencing, it is a commitment (compromiso) which in the end we have to uphold, 
you and us, and contribute with our attitude (actitud) so that it may progressively get stronger 
ifortalecer). Excellent, he says to me. But I want to tell you something very special, he says to 
me. Of an opportunity that arose when we are called, he tells me, to a meeting in Honduras, they 
called us, and they did not tell us that with whom we were going to meet, but when the plane was 
about to land, they tell us, you will now have the opportunity to meet Officers of the guerrilla, of 
the URNG, who come to dialogue with us. I was very surprised, he says (Yo sorprendido, dice). 
And it transpires that, this is a meeting of Army Officers (oficiales del E jercito), I am talking 
about colonels, about officers, some captains (capitanes), so he says that his surprise was that 
there he meets some of his very best friends, of a time when he was a students in an institute, and 
that best friend of his then is whom we know as El Moreno M6ndez, Rodolfo Sanchez21
Manolo!221 cry out, and Carlos and I laugh.
So then, he says, it is incredible (increible) to see you here, and imagine, he says to me, I would 
have never believed, after all that, that he would be so totally leftwing (totalm ente de izquierda), 
and I would be rightwing (derecha), because he was in the guerrilla, and I was integrated here in 
the Army. We stayed there with them for a good spell (bonito rato), drinking soft drinks (aguas). 
In what we can, here we are going to help you, and here in the vicinity, with trust (con conjianza), 
here are the telephones of the military zone, should you need them, and in that, we get ready to 
leave. On our way out they stop us, there, at the checkpoint at the entrance, and again, for the two 
of us who were demobilised combatants (desm ovilizados), Tucan and I, they say, and your 
identity papers (su identification)! They say. Look, I say to them, I am Marvin Tanchez. And 
what is your profession, they say to me. (Y su profesion, me dicen). Well, up to not long ago, it 
was guerrillero  (bueno, hasta hace poco  tiempo, era de guerrillero), I say to them. Now, I don’t 
know, because I don’t know exactly to what profession I will dedicate myself. The guy laughed. 
So then, what? Are you going to keep us here detained (detenidos)? No, que les vaya  bien. Okay, 
gracias. And so we left’.
21 Nickname, Pseudonym, Name and Surname.
22 Pseudonym.
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Carlos recalled how during a secret meeting between Army officers of the guerrilla and 
the Army, the guerrilla and the Army had revealed themselves by a merographic 
connection as marked by both their proximity to each other and their respective 
belonging to different domains. Carlos concluded thus:
‘There was also another opportunity, which also was very interesting, during the phase of 
demobilisation (desmovilizacion). Having already demobilised, and the com paneros being [back] 
in the hamlets (aldeas), there were some provocations (provocaciones) on the part of the some 
units of the army (unidades del ejercito) against some desm ovilizados. So they came and 
informed our companeros. We then spoke to the Army and the Army expressed a commitment to 
patrol (hacer una giro) the various areas and gather (reconcentrar) again the desm ovilizados, the 
populations who may be there and who may have been incorporados com batientes, in an attempt 
to begin establishing and maintaining a contact (contacto) with the population and specify to 
them what the functions of the army would be from then on. So, we went, we went with them, 
there were two coroneles, one who was second in command Ricardo Saguierre, was the second in 
command of the Military Zone of Puerto Barrios. There was also the second in command 
lieutenant colonel Gonzales, who was the second in command of the Naval Base of the Atlantic.
They were very impressed by the fact that the population, when one stopped to observe, would 
come to hug me (abrazar), would take off my rucksack to carry it themselves, and could not stop 
conversing {platicar) with me. And they said, Carlos, you are well known around here (eres 
conocido p o r  aca). No, not really, I reply. No, they say, one can see they know you (se conoce 
que te conocen), and that they appreciate you (apreciar) very much. And how did you achieve 
(lograr) all this? It has been an enormous sacrifice (sacrificio), I say to them, I think that what is 
most exact (exacto) is to have fought for reasons so just (justo) that this population has suffered 
(padecer), that is how. Well, I can tell you that they [the Army officers] did not feel too secure 
(tranquilo), how shall is say this? They were feeling bad (mat), for the fact that although they 
were the highest authorities (autoridades mdximas), they were not regarded and treated in the 
same way. But it was obvious/inevitable (logico), that the population would express this, verdacH 
And on we went together, and with MINUGUA. Yes, we know we are under surveillance 
(controlados), but this I can tell you, that the conditions which have been created in our country
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have to be strengthened. And I think that this is the process in which we have been, to the extent 
that should they not respect us, this may cause a new conflict. But I think that the conscience 
(iconciencia) has been, on our part and on the part of the army, that it does not suit us 
(icorresponder), that we do not really have the conditions, nationally or internationally, to develop 
a new war (guerra) ’.
5.11 Guerrilleros and Soldiers, Sons of the Campesinado
Maynor, an ex-combatant in his fifties told me about his conversion to Roman 
Catholicism in post-Peace Accords times. In his account, merographic connections 
between the domain of the Army and that of the guerrilla conjured up the effect of a 
different domain where the distinction was no longer valid. Maynor referred to ‘e l  
ca m p esin a d o ', the cam pesin o  p e o p le  and noted how both guerrilleros/as and soldiers 
belonged to it. In the scale of the ‘c a m p es in a d o ’ different orders of connection of affinity 
and difference appeared. Maynor said:
‘Bueno, now I am going to tell you. I am persevering (perseverar) in the Church, albeit with some 
sorrow (pena). Because those people who are more backwards (la gente que es mas atrasadita) 
are already saying, look, he is in the Church because he is afraid (tener m iedo), but I don’t know 
fear any longer (y yo  el miedo s i ya  no lo conzco), I am no longer afraid (miedo y o  no le tengo). 
Respect (respeto), yes, for everyone. I talk to soldiers, to anyone, I respect anyone, but I no 
longer fear anyone (tener miedo). But, respect, yes (M i respeto si). No anger (coraje). Everyone 
is free, and God will give to everyone, depending on his or her life on earth. And more so/worse 
with the army (peyor con el ejercito). If I reach the knowledge that the army, the soldiers were 
not culpable/guilty (si llego a l conocimiento que el ejercito, los so ldado no tuvieron la culpa). 
No. They put the soldier there, they told him, this needs to be done, and it’s an order. Well then, 
those who are truly responsible for that are the Governments of the time, those who were in office 
at the time, and the high military ranks (los altos je fe s  militares). The soldier is below (el so ldado  
esta abajo), executing orders issued by superiors (cumpliendo ordenes a los jefes). If he does not 
execute orders, they pass him to the left (si este no cumple ordenes, lo pasan a la izquierda) 
because he does not do his duty (porque este no cumple), this is a sign (send) that he supports the 
guerrilleros. But the soldier is son of the campesinos (pero el soldado, es hijo de los campesinos),
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it is not his fault {culpa), while the superior is son of the rich {el jefe es hijo de un rico), and 
orders are executed and are not to be challenged (y ordenes se cumplen y no se discuten). Hence, 
this is my dialectics (dialectica), it is not the army’s fault because they are humane people {gente 
humana) and all soldiers come from the campesinado (y todo el soldado viene del campesinado). 
That is where they come from. Soldiers come from the campesinado {del campesinado viene el 
soldado). Yes, this is how I explain this to you {si, esoyo se lo comento asi)\ (my emphasis).
5.12 Conclusion: Merographic Analogies
Guerrilla struggle, as Tucan, Nicolas, Carlos, Nestor and Rafael imagined it, was not 
strictly a confrontation between discrete entities, such as the Army and the guerrilla. 
Rather, in guerrilla representations of the conflict, violence and ambivalence were closely 
linked and produced numerous connections. Guerrilla subjects displayed merographic 
capacities, as they negotiated connections between and among discrete domains, with 
Nicolas belonging to both as a Comisionado Militar, guerrilla informer and later 
combatant. Nestor was able to see his own kind, in the guise of his brother, in his 
nemesis, namely the Army soldier standing five metres away from him. These 
guerrilleros noted how the Army had attempted to mimic guerrilla merographic abilities, 
and as part of counter-insurgency tactics tried to appear as the guerrilla, to confound the 
perception of domains of the population, and the guerrilla themselves. The merographic 
abilities of the guerrilla and the population were greater than those of the Army, in their 
capacities to see and replicate connections and distinctions. The sensory training Rafael 
received in the Army aimed to prepare him to both smell and hear distinctions, but as he 
conceded, the guerrilla surpassed the Army in this respect. Through merographic 
connections, domains were augmented and supplemented, revealing them as adjunct. 
When Carlos and his parents revealed (to each other) their distinct trajectories of 
participation in the guerrilla, the ‘guerrilla’ as a domain widened. In turn, in post 
demobilisation times, it was revealed to Carlos how those who had been his leaders in the 
guerrilla struggle had been close to the same Army officers he had fought against. The 
latter was not only Carlos’s revelation of adjunctiveness and connection: the experience 
of the high ranking Army officer who recounted the story had at first been merographic, -
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he met the Comandante guerrillero only to find they had been best friends at school. 
Merographic connections and the ability to entertain partial analogies generated new 
domains, in which connections were reconfigured. Thus, according to Maynor, the 
soldiers and guerrilleros/as both belonged to the campesino people, whilst army officers 
and the rich occupied a different domain. The ability to imagine merographic connections 
is suggestive of thick nihilism -  post-plural ethnographic resolutions of truth into value. 
In the next chapter I explore the expansion and contraction of value in guerrilla moral 
orders and scales of relatedness.
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Chapter 6 
Sociality, Substance and Moral Orders
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I explore processes of constitution of guerrilla sociality and relationality. I 
argue that from accounts given by members of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes there 
emerge a number of perspectives on their experience of guerrilla life. Different 
perspectives may be said to offer different scales through which guerrilla sociality was 
imagined -  by those who participated in it. Plurality of perspective, and of scale, reveals 
guerrilla practices through which multiple socialities and moral orders were brought into 
existence during the struggle, each entailing distinctive forms of differentiation and 
conjunction among combatants. In view of this, I argue that guerrilla sociality was 
constituted through multiple modes of relatedness and consider how guerrilla 
perspectives on sociality thus revealed may be connected to those imagined by 
anthropology through the notion of weak thought.
First I discuss how in the account provided by a FAR Comandante, the guerrilla was 
envisaged as an entity composed of three substances, namely ‘information’, ‘logistics’ 
and ‘combatants’. A tripartite distinction was also drawn between different aspects and 
modalities of struggle, namely ‘armed struggle’, ‘the political struggle of the masses’, 
and ‘the political-diplomatic struggle’. Each substance, as each strand of insurgent 
activities, was part of an all-inclusive vision provided by the Comandante. The 
Comandante also commented on the necessity of managing production, reproduction and 
circulation of substances, and the difficulty in coordinating the pace of different fronts of 
struggle. I argue that the management of the three substances, which were envisioned to 
make up the guerrilla, coincided with the articulation of multiple socialities and moral 
orders. Further, I note that the comprehensiveness that characterised the vision of the 
Comandante, with its distinctive lexicon and modalities of division, multiplication and
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connection, was never replicated in parts or as a whole in my conversations with ex­
combatants. Conversely, the Comandante's vision may come across as partial and 
incomplete when contrasted with and complemented by the vision of guerrilla sociality 
offered by ex-guerrilleros/as. Switching from the scale inherent in the Comandante's 
perspective to that of the combatants, it appeared that ex-combatants envisioned guerrilla 
sociality as a moral order based on sameness and sharing. This point was made with 
reference to the ways in which activities were organised in clandestine life. For instance, 
most ex-combatants remembered enduring hunger and malnutrition during the war and 
commented on the constant lack of proper food provision. Nevertheless, they recalled 
how all available food was shared. Food preparation was also referred to as an instance in 
which everybody was truly the same, as men and women regardless of rank had to part- 
take in food preparation. Ex-combatants recounted how tamales guerrilleros were made 
with just maize and water, often with not even lime to properly cook the com. Tamales 
guerrilleros had often no salt, as salt was difficult to acquire unless funds and channels 
for purchase and delivery were available. Life in the guerrilla was remembered as a moral 
order established through homogenising practices based on sharing. Such a moral order 
was one of many which coexisted simultaneously, some enduring in time more than 
others.
As an example of an ephemeral moral order, and one geared towards the regulation of 
specific scales of difference of gender and sexuality, I refer to marriage practices among 
guerrilleros/as. Whilst in Peten I met a small number of ex-combatants who spoke of 
how they or others had married ‘by arms’. Marriage practices in insurgent movements are 
well documented (Bames 1991, Bhebhe and Ranger 1991, Kampwirth 2002, Kriger 
1992, Randall 1981, Urdang 1979, West 2000 Wilson 1991).1 Here I refer to the account
1 Discussion of marriage practices in insurgent movements is commonly related to broader analyses of 
gender relations. Bhebhe and Ranger et al (1991) and Kriger (1992) deal with gendered experiences of 
soldiers in Zimbabwe’s liberation war. Bames (1991) addresses gender dynamics and the articulation of 
oppositional responses in colonial Zimbabwe in the early to mid^O1*1 century, whilst Kesby (1996) 
addresses gender relations in the context of experiences of insurgency and counter-insurgency in Zimbabwe 
between 1972 and 1980. Urdang (1979) documents the experiences of women in the PAIGC files (African 
Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) and liberated villages in Guinea Bissau. 
West (2000) addresses women’s experiences in FRELIMO and interdictions concerning sexual relations 
with men in Mozambique. Kampwirth (2002) discusses women’s experiences and marriages practices in 
revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Chiapas, complementing earlier analyses such as
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of marriage practices in the guerrilla offered by a FAR Comandante, and compare it with 
the account given by Alma, one of the guerrilleras/os who were married ‘by arms’. I 
discuss the disjunction in the two accounts and consider the extent to which guerrilla 
sociality was envisioned through a specific idiom of relatedness and was said to 
constitute a family. ‘Marriages by arms’ were ultimately abandoned, however, and I 
conclude by noting possible reasons for their fleeting character. Whilst life in the 
guerrilla was often qualified through the merographic analogy of ‘family ties’, gender 
and sexual relations were recognised to be unruly and to constantly exceed moral orders 
placed upon. Further, their ordering need not have aided in the management of the three 
guerrilla substances. Rather, attempts at regulating gender and sexual relations potentially 
undermined guerrilla sociality and relationality, as well as the parental authority of the 
comandancia.
Some ex-combatants reflected on their experiences of struggle, highlighting a shift from 
the moral order based on sharing, which they saw as distinctive of social life en la 
montana, with the rise of an individualistic post-demobilisation ethos. Cande connoted 
the ethnographic present as entailing a certain moral disorder, as in a disregard for 
guerrilla moral orders based on equality and sharing. The transition from a communal to 
and individualistic form of life that punctuated her account was exemplified in her sense 
of betrayal of those companeros/as who had died en la selva (in the forest) without even 
having been granted proper burial. Whilst guerrilla socialities and their substances and 
moral orders emerge as multiple and complex, thus revealing pliability and temporal 
dimensions, I argue that they supplement the perspective on sociality and subjectivity of 
an anthropology that moves within the horizon of weak thought.
Randall’s (1981) work with Sandinista women. This literature draws attention to both the articulation of 
gender relations in the context of the development of guerrilla movements and the management o f gender 
relations during times of conflict. The marriage practices and related moral orders articulated at different 
points in respective histories of struggle discussed in this literature are as heterogenous as the different 
contexts of struggle.
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6.2 Las Tres Puntas de Lanza2IThe Three Points of the Spear
1 sought a meeting with one of the Comandantes of FAR for some time, and finally 
managed to arrange to see him. I approached the meeting with a degree of apprehension, 
and prepared as thoroughly as I could. The Comandante in question had lived for over 
sixteen years in Peten, en la montana. Many ex-combatants had mentioned his name and 
had described him as the man who, while not strictly at the forefront of the organisation’s 
public profile, was in fact the one who knew the history of FAR in Peten in greater depth 
than most. For years he had been the strategist of guerrilla operations and had spent more 
time in clandestine life with the frentes guerrilleros than many other members of the 
mando [military command]. The Comandante had been a member of the first FAR. His 
political biography stretched back to 1962. Early on in our long conversation, the 
Comandante offered his views on the nature, goals and means of the guerrilla struggle, 
and specifically of the political and military programme of the Fuerzas Armadas 
Rebeldes. The guerrilla struggle undertaken by FAR was made up of ‘tres puntas de 
lanza\ three tips of a spear. Each tip of the sharp implement amounted to a great task, an 
undertaking that the guerrilla had to carry out. Each task provided nutrimiento, or 
nourishing for the organisation and the struggle. The first nourishing substance was 
‘information’, the second ‘logistics’ and the third ‘combatants’. As the Comandante 
argued,
‘There were three great tasks (tareas) during the war that people had to carry out. First, 
information (informacion), all possible information. For our people (nuestra gente) lived in 
hamlets, in villages, in cities, in towns, everywhere, and they would mix with the Army (y se 
mezclavan con el ejercito), somehow they would intermingle (entremezclarse) with the 
institutions of the state (las instituciones del estado), and in other places (lugares) where we 
would not be able to get access (tener acceso). So, in this manner we were able to organise
2 The ‘three points of the spear* is a metaphor that works at two distinct levels. First, it refers to the triad of 
nourishment: information, supplies and combatants. Second, it refers to the three different components of 
the struggle, namely armed struggle (lucha armada), the political struggle of the masses (lucha politico de 
las masas), and the dimplomatic struggle (lucha diplomatica).
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nets/networks of information (redes de information). The other great task (tarea) was logistics (la 
logistica). In the rural areas we were able to develop what we used to call ‘war economy’ (la 
economia de guerra). So we would organise the people to plant crops (siembra), to plant rice, 
beans etc, and also to have logistic brokering (corredores logisticos) which may bring all 
production (production) where we may need it, and specifically to sustain (mantener) the 
combatant forces (fuerzas combatientes), the military units (las unidades militares). And the last 
great task out of three was to have new combatants (tener nuevos combatientes), because the 
development [of the insurgency] we were not going to achieve it on our own (porque el 
desarrollo no lo ibamos a lograr nosotros solos), it was not going to be a guerrilla of twelve men 
(no eramos una guerrilla de doce hombres) who was going to achieve it all. No. We did not think 
that would be the case. A guerrilla has never triumphed in this manner (nunca una guerrilla ha 
triunfado tampoco asi), but rather with the mass incorporation of the population (incorporation 
masiva de la poblacion). On this account, then, we were able to sustain ourselves (mantenemos) 
over decades, and were able to recover in the aftermath of hard blows (golpes duros). For we 
always had new combatants (nuevos combatientes), always. Many would join (porque teniamos 
nuevos combatientes siempre. Se incorporaban muchof.
According to the Comandante, the third point of the spear, namely the incorporation of 
new combatants to the struggle, was a structured and graded path. New combatants had to 
undergo a scrupulously rigid process, with ascending steps that were sealed off from 
lower ones. First, individuals would become milicianos, that is', civilian recruits who 
would be deployed for tasks deemed by the Comandancia to be paramilitary in nature. 
The process allowed only those deemed to be the most trustworthy and able of 
individuals to progress to the higher echelons. The next step led to the ‘guerrilla locales', 
or local guerrillas. These groups were entrusted with the task to carry out military 
operations that were local in scope. Members would work the land during the day, and 
would not leave their village of residence. Finally, there were individuals who were
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selected from the local guerrillas. They made up a more permanent, better-trained group 
whose operations were not tied to a village or community and could instead move across 
local jurisdictions. Although there was coordination among the levels in the instance of 
specific operations, each grade was, in principle, independent and closed off from their 
respective lower counterparts. Comandante Manolo explained the process to me as 
follows.
‘We were able to carry out a graded scale of activities (escala de actividades) with the new 
combatants. First, [they would be members of the militia] milicianos and would do all the para­
military work (trabajo para-m ilitar), from distributing flyers {lanzar volantes), to aiding as us 
guides, or developing collateral activities {actividades colaterales) related to all military 
activities. That was their first step/grade {escalon) and we always tried to ensure that they passed 
through all the steps/grades so that they may reach our combatant files (fuerzas combatientes) as 
persons who had been already tested {personas y a  probadas). We did not grab the first person 
who may say, I want to come with you, and put them in a regular unit {unidad regular). No. 
Never. [...] That was a basic requirement {requisito muy basico) for us. So they would first be 
members of the militia {ellos prim eros fueron milicianos). Then, in an ascending scale {escala  
ascendente), the local guerrillas would be organised {se organizaban guerrillas locales). The 
local guerrillas were companeros who would already take part in combats {combatir), but at the 
level of their own communities {a nivel de sus comunidades). These local guerrillas worked in 
their communities {comunidades), and for example, if there were five localities {localidades) or 
five hamlets {aldeas), then each one would be part of a general plan/planning (planificacion 
general) and would undertake some specified activities, but already with arms {pero ya  con 
armas). So they would engage in some small disturbance to the army {pequefios hostigamientos 
al ejercito), they would place some landmine {mina) where a lorry would transit, or they would 
undertake whatever sabotage activity {actividad de sabotaje), but always in their own jurisdiction 
(jurisdiccion). When we would draw a general plan (plan general), each one of them would
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undertake some activity within the whole of that general plan, but at their own level (nivel), at the 
level of their own hamlets (aldeas). Then we would somehow organise the territory in various 
smaller territories {el territorio en varios territorios pequenos), for instance, [...] let’s say that 
there were localities {localidades) scattered everywhere, there were small hamlets (pequenas 
aldeas) everywhere. We could divide the territory within a general plan and each one of them 
[smaller territories] would undertake some activity {actividad). This territory would then have 
numerous hamlets (y luego este territorio tenia varias aldeas). Of the best local guerrilleros 
(guerrilleros locales), of the very best we would make up a military unity who would be much 
better trained {unidad m ilitar mucho mas preparada), [a unit] much larger and much more 
permanent (permanente), verdad. Conversely, the communities/villages {com unidades) would 
undertake military activities {actividades militares) and during the day they would work the land 
{trabajar la tierra), they would carry on in their communities {seguian en sus comunidades), 
while the others made up a chosen/selected unit {unidad) of the best [combatants]. This unit was 
more permanent. But it would still have a jurisdiction (jurisdiccion), and we would call them 
territorial troops {trupas territoriales). Then, we had a much larger unit made up of the best 
combatants out of the territorial troops, and which made up the principal files/forces (fuerzas 
principales), verdad, so, as you can see, these were various categories of forces {varia categorias 
de fuerzas)  [...] This mobile-strategic force {fuerza m ovil-estrategica), that is what it was called, 
could act in any of the territories, in accordance with the characteristics of the operation 
{operaciones) which they would be planning to undertake, in accordance with a number of other 
things. For instance, if it [the mobile strategic force] was to act in this territory, then the 
permanent force {fuerza perm anente) would be of support, with all the local communities/villages 
{comunidades locales). In the end we would design {desenarse) everything in such manner. As 
you can see, this presents you with a plan {esquema) which does not allow just anybody who may 
want to try to reach just any point, because here one needed people tried and tested {gente 
experimentada, probada) who would not run away at the first Army bombardment {bombardeo
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del ejercito), say. We needed experts, we needed specialists, we needed talented people, good 
officers, good combatants, and good troupe more generally, and who would be able to achieve its 
objectives’.
According to the Comandante, combatants, i.e. one of the three substances of the 
guerrilla, represented a whole that was divided into parts. Parts were graded in ascending 
order. Through a process of selection, grades led to a force which, whilst decreasing in 
numbers, would be assigned greater mobility and scope of action. In the descending 
direction, the grades augmented in size to encompass larger numbers of associates, but 
became both more localised in terms of their operations, and less intense in the kind and 
rate of insurgent activities allocated to them. By division and grading of combatants, one 
of the three guerrilla substances contracted so as to be preserved as much as it was 
possible. In turn, through graded multiplication, agency and movement of guerrilla 
substance was maximised. From the holistic perspective deployed by the Comandante, 
division and multiplication of substance nourished the organisation and the struggle. 
Processes of division and multiplication of combatants, forces and territory revealed in 
the Comandante's master plan were secret. They were not envisioned by the combatants I 
spoke to but partially. Nevertheless, awareness of substance permeated the accounts 
offered by ex-combatants. They revealed the perspective of one part of what the 
Comandante had deemed a whole, and specifically the perspective of a part constitutive 
of one of the three guerrilla substances Comandante Manolo had imagined. Some 
combatants spoke of substance and nourishing when recalling their guerrilla experiences. 
Carlos for instance, had told me how guerrilla military and political training constituted 
nourishing.
‘We would establish what we would call political, politico-military schools (escuelas politicos, 
politico-m ilitares). There we would form/train (formar) all our combatants militarily. One would 
have to know how to carry out an ‘annihilation ambush’ {em boscada de aniquilamiento), a 
‘curbing ambush’ {emboscada de contencion), an ‘ambush of provocation’ {em boscada de
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ostigamiento), all those types of military action. So we would train (capacitarse) and at the same 
time, we would study the tactics of the Army. The better our knowledge of them, the easiest it 
would be to hit them (golpear). They would do the same, they would study us, how we would act, 
and if we were not proficient/alert, they would inflict damage on us. That would happen when we 
fell into a routine of doing things. In the schools they would also talk to us about the conjuncture 
the country was in (la coyunctura que en el p a is  se  manejaba). We would gain awareness of the 
economic problems, the social problems which in one way or other affect or affected the 
population. So we would consider all this and history as well (historia), so our consciousness 
would increase and rise (elevar la conciencia), as would the morale of the revolutionaries. I can 
say to you that this was our chief source of nourishment (nuestro principal alimento). And this is 
what still keeps us here at present, verdad}'.
Carlos noted how guerrilla training nourished military dexterity, political conscience and 
revolutionary conviction among the guerrilleros/as. Interestingly, however, despite the 
common idiom of substance, no other ex-combatant I had the opportunity to meet spoke 
in terms that may resemble, in part or in its entirety, the master plan of the Comandante. 
In our conversations, ex-combatants never envisaged the whole frame, or used the same 
lexicon and imaginary deployed by the Comandante in his remarkably integral and all- 
encompassing vision. Up to this meeting, my vision was an ensemble of fragments, as 
were the visions of the companeros/as. By the time the conversation with the 
Comandante had come to an end, I began to think that, despite the illusion of wholeness, 
partiality imbricated the account.
‘As I was saying to you at the beginning, we needed to feed ourselves/to nourish ourselves of 
information (necesitabamos nutrim os de inform ation), nourish ourselves of combatants, verdad, 
(nutrirnos de nuevos combatientes), hence it was in the more densely populated areas (zonas mas 
densamente pobladas) that we had our population (teniamos nosotros poblacion). A further 
element that influenced [the process] was the location of military objectives (donde estan
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ubicados los objetivos militares). We would not be making war here around these lagoons, where 
there is nothing, not even the Army (nosotros no ibamos a hacer la guerra en estas lagunas, aqui 
no hay nada. N o estaba el ejercito tampoco). The Army would concentrate in this area, then 
where the Army was there would be our war fronts (ahi donde estaba el ejercito, a lii estaban  
nuestros fren tes de guerra). Now, as our organisation was a clandestine one (clandestina), there 
were communities where there was never war (guerra) [...] The work of recruiting was not one 
of saying, hey you, are you coming? No (pero no era un trabajo de reclutar, vos, te venis, no). It 
was a political activity, one of training (capacitor) the compaheros and companeras. One would 
give talks (platicas) by night, by day, there was nothing [unusual], they would carry on with their 
usual routines, but the front was there, and they would join that front, or the nearest front. We 
developed activities of organisation (trabajo organizativo) in the whole of Peten. [...] We did not 
expect to achieve all three things everywhere, for instance, in eastern and central Peten, what we 
had the most of there was combatants, and very little supply of provisions (abasto). In the 
Q’eqchi’ villages (comunidades q ’eqchies) in Alta Verapaz [in the 1990s, when the Frente Panzos 
Heroico was established there], there was balance. There were combatants, supply of provisions 
and a great deal of information (alii hubo combatientes, hubo abasto y  mucha informacion). In 
San Luis and the whole of that area [southern Peten], what happened was that we did not have 
many combatants, for a very straightforward reason. Because those were the last organising 
efforts which were undertaken, and there was no longer time to train combatants. Those were the 
last places where we achieved [political] organising, because they were going to be deployed as 
the starting point to penetrate Izabal (penetrar a Izabal). But in order to penetrate Izabal, we had 
to go through these places, and we needed to meet bases of support (bases de apoyo) [...] Within 
the military forces there were excellent companeros who were not combatants, but who would 
penetrate the communities (penetrar a las comunidades). And they would be the ones who would 
be there for months on end, politically working through the people (trabajando politicam ente la 
gente) [organising people politically]’.
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Comandante Manolo deployed the expression ‘three points of the spear’ on different 
registers. The ‘three points of the spear’ referred to the triad of nourishment and 
substance: information, supplies and combatants. Further, the expression referred to the 
three different components of the struggle, namely armed struggle (lucha a rm a d a ), the 
political struggle of the masses {lucha p o lit ic o  d e  las m a sa s), and the diplomatic struggle 
{lucha p o lit ic o -d ip lo m a tic a ). Despite coordinating efforts, the different parts at times 
proceeded at different pace. The different fronts of the struggle produced different 
subjects of struggle.
‘We thought the political strategy {la linea politico)  had three important axes {ejes). The first was 
armed struggle {lucha armada), where we endeavoured {pretender) that people join 
{ in co rp o ra te )  the struggle in increasing numbers. The second axis was the political struggle of 
the masses {lucha politico  de las masa), and the third was the participation of our organisation in 
the political-diplomatic struggle {lucha politico-diplom atica). The axes were three points of the 
spear. We were discussing las Tres Puntas de Lanza, let us return to the issue {tema). The other 
line, within the political line {linea politico), was the political struggle of the masses {lucha 
politico  de las masas). All of those sectors {sectores) that in one way or other we had influenced, 
they headed {encabezar) the mass movement [social movements] in the countryside and in the 
cities: the unions’ movement {movimiento sindical), the movement of colonists {movimiento de 
pobladores), the movement of the churches {movimiento de las iglesias). All that the masses 
could do. Why, then, was I saying ‘tres puntas de lanza'l Because each had its own objective in 
the struggle {objective de lucha) and each of them would develop its activities independently 
{separado) of the others, but in coordination {coordinacion). Each had its own way {su propria  
form a) of doing things, those of the military struggle with arms and the masses with their political 
revindications. The third point [of the spear], was the political-diplomatic struggle/diplomatic 
politics {la po litico  diplom atica), that is, to tell the world what was happening in Guatemala
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because here there was a circle (cerco) of mis-information (disinform ation), and to obtain 
support. So, each of them in its own direction (cada uno p o r  su lado) would undertake its own 
effort (esfuerzo). None was more important than the other; all went to towards the same goal 
(tema). What would happen however was that at times armed struggle would go very far ahead 
(la lucha arm ada se  nos iba muy adelante). Or at times it was the struggle of the masses (la lucha 
de las masas), or the political-diplomatic work (trabajo politico-diplom dtico) had its objectives 
and would achieve them. The idea was to stimulate each other (estimularse entre si), because the 
companeros of the masses/social movements would be happier (mas contentos) to take the streets 
in the knowing that there was a war and that we were supporting them. They would have more of 
an incentive (proposito) to get out [overtly struggle] knowing that inside there would be a whole 
range of activities that would support them (respaldar) vis-a-vis the international community. 
And beyond the tres puntas de lanza, there was the fourth stage, namely negotiation 
(negotia tion), negotiation as a further weapon of the struggle (una arm a mas de la lucha). But 
this was within URNG. We turned the negotiating table (mesa de n ego tia tion )  into the 
continuation of the battlefield (la continuation del campo de b a ta lla )\
6.3 Guerrilla Sociality and the Inception of Relatedness
Multiple fronts and subjects of struggle however, soon presented the guerrilla with the 
task of ordering the relations among themselves and with others, notably with the 
population. This gave rise to the establishment of social relations of ‘affinity’. Affinity 
came to be qualified in multiple ways, and progressively, the guerrilla was envisaged in 
terms of family relations. Comandante Manolo explained:
‘I am going to tell you about a case (caso), which is also funny (sim patico). One day we met 
some persons who were cultivating crops. Crops (siembras). This was in a territory where the 
army would not venture, where nobody would venture, we alone had control over everything (el
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control de todo). They were planting crops (sembrar). Obviously, they got very frightened 
(iasnstarse) because they saw us coining wearing uniforms (nos vieron uniformados). So, we 
asked them what they were doing there, why were they sowing, and in Guatemalan territory, 
when they were Mexican, they were indigenous Choi (cuando ellos eran Mejicanos, ellos eran 
indigenas choles). So they told us that they had been evicted from their communities, large 
landowners stole (robar) their land and they evicted (expulsar) them from Mexico, and they 
arrived at the border (linea fronteriza), on the Usumacinta [river], and what were they doing? 
Moreover, here there are laws that prohibit logging (talla de los arboles),3 and one was not 
allowed to plant crops. In any case, they would see that over to the other side [of the river 
Usumacinta] there was plenty of land, so in clandestine manner (clandestinamente) they started to 
cut the forest (lumbar la montana) and began to plant crops (sembrar). It had been some time 
since they had started doing this. But what else could they do, they had nowhere else to go. So, 
we told them that it wasn’t a problem, that they could carry on doing it, however there were no 
guarantees that we could guarantee their life there (garantizar su vida alii), because the Army 
would reach the area and they would annihilate them (porque el ejercito llegaba y  los iba a 
aniquilar). Well, with the understanding/agreement (compromiso) that they could carry on 
planting, they became our friends (se hicieron amigos nuestros). Well, there was an interest 
(interes), namely planting crops, but this allowed us to be able to cross to their side [of the river] 
(pero esto nos posib ilito  a nosotros p a sa r  a l lado de ellos), verdad, and establish a good 
neighbourly relation (relacion de buena vecindad). On the side where they had their village, one 
day a woman was about to give birth (estar dando luz), and there was nobody who could assist 
her (atendier), and we had a doctor with us, so we crossed the border and took him to the hamlet 
and he helped with the delivery (atender el parto ), verdad. From that moment onwards, relations 
of mutual help (ayuda mutua) were established in many respects, verdad, that resulted in many of
3 Comandante Manolo is referring to the FYDEP-related legislation of the mid-1960s discussed in Chapter 
Two that prohibited logging north of Paralelo 17.
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them crossing the border (frontera). They would come to plant crops over here. But we were 
worried that if the Army arrived, they would experience problems there, so they asked us whether 
we could defend them (nos pidieron que nosotros los defendieramos). But we could not do that, 
we would go back and forth, of course, that was an area that we controlled, but we could not 
dedicate ourselves to looking after/protecting people, could we? So they asked us that we teach 
them how to use arms, and whether we could give them some for them to defend themselves 
(defensa). That we could do, so [we passed on] a few escopetas, a few little rifles (rijlecitos), so 
that they could feel a bit safer, mostly for defence, because they weren’t war/combat arms (armas 
de guerra), and we would not have given them combat arms anyhow, but with a rifle, an 
escopeta, they were feeling better already (ya se  sintieron mejor). We taught them how to use 
them, and gave them some ideas as to how they could defend themselves in the event the Army 
should get there. This established an excellent relation (una excelente relacion) with them. Later 
we would go by, and they would guarantee some sort of corridor to get the things (cosas) for the 
guerrilla through from Mexico. At times they would volunteer to help us with their animals, with 
their mules, that is, a very good neighbourly relation (relacion de buena vecindad), as we would 
say. But as this was the area where our guerrilleros  would get to on occasions following a 
combat, there we had a hospital, a school and a training camp (campo de entrenamiento). We had 
everything there. That was our base (zona base). So our guerrilleros would get there, and these 
com paneros begun to cross the border more often, in groups, with families. There was coming 
and going of people, back and forth and it became more and more our base. A daring guerrillero  
(osado guerrillero), I would say, fell in love with (se enamoro) with the M ejicanita4 on the other 
shore, and would go and see her. They fell in love so much that the guerrillero  brought her over 
to Guatemala. So the family of the guerrillera  wondered what had happened. He had taken her 
with him, so that established some familial ties of support (lazos fam iliares de apoyo) to the 
companera  who was going to Guatemala, and of course for the son-in-law (yerno). Those familial
4 Young Mexican woman.
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ties were always very good, because they identified people with the struggle (esos lazos 
fam iliares siem pre fueron muy buenos, p o r  que identijicaban a la gente con la lucha). At the 
same time, in those places, there was great [Army] repression (represion), to the extent that entire 
families (familiar enteras) would go to la montana to hide. That is where we developed plans of 
defense and production (planes de defensa y  de produccion), because we could not be left there 
with no food (estar sin comer). Further, one had to defend oneself from the army, so we made 
plans for them. At the beginning, we defended them, but it was best to teach them how to fight 
(luchar) so that they could defend themselves. We could not carry on defending people, or we 
would not have reached our objectives. In that way, entire families joined (integrarse). In the 
villages, in the local guerrillas ([guerrillas locales) and even in the permanent forces (fuerzas 
perm anentes), one would see entire families there [...]. Each family would grow, to the extent 
that it would then mix (mezclar) with the other families (las dem as fam ilias) and you would see 
the nephew married to the daughter of Fulano, so one would become related [through kinship 
ties] (emparentarse). That was common and I don’t think it was negative. On the contrary, it was 
very positive, it established ties (lazos) which would allow us to win over that large family (ganar 
esa gran fam ilia), to attend to it politically (atenderla politicam ente), because not everybody 
would be in the guerrilla front, they would disperse across the organisation. The only negative 
aspect was that information may run up and down, that would happen and it was inevitable 
(inevitable). Occasional leaks of information (fuga de informacion) were managed, but those ties 
of friendship (lazos de am istades) and family links/ties (nexos fam iliares) we were able to make 
good use of (aprovechar) to establish corridors of organisation (corredores de organizacion). 
[...] And we carried on considering ourselves a large family (gran fam ilia), because not only ties 
of familiarity (lazos de fam iliaridad) were established, but also, through political work, we would 
make the companeros see the fraternity/amity (hermandad) which we had among us all (tener 
entre todos), to recuperate a series of moral values (valores m orales) which would allow 
(permitir) that the relations among companeros, between couples (parejas) and with the
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population would be excellent (excelente). For instance it was absolutely forbidden to touch even 
a single fruit of a tree which would not be ours, of which would belong to a person who had not 
given it to us. In all instances one had to buy it. If the campesino  would give it to you, that was 
different. And still, it would be shared among all (y aim asi se com partia entre todos). 
H erm andad  [fraternity/amity] was the affection (afecto) and the affinity (<afinidad) which existed 
among the companeros. For instance, I was in Peten for very many years, and that was my people 
{esa fu e  mi gente), although I was bom elsewhere. But imagine spending sixteen years en la 
montana, and having numerous combatants as I did, combatant whom I saw iyer), formed 
(formar), educated (educar), trained (entrenar) and those I took to combat (llevar a l combate). 
By necessity (necesariamente) nexus of great friendship (amistad) are established. Clearly, it is a 
very healthy friendship (am istad muy sana), as it does not hinder (obstacular) the military line of 
command that there exists {la linea de mando m ilitar que existe). But one ultimately holds great 
fondness for them {llegar a tener mucho carifio), affection {afecto). As times goes by, as they say, 
they had children and their families, and their children were also my combatants. I had two 
generations of combatants {dos generaciones de combatientes tuve yo ), the parents and the 
children {los padres y  los hijos). So I would see the young man {muchacho) and I would ask how 
is your father, perhaps his father was older, or had a problem with his leg or something and could 
no longer be the combatant he had been before. He is there and he sends his regards, [the young 
man would say]. And I would later visit the ex-combatant, as my brother {ya como mi hermano). 
We had been together (juntos) for a long time, and he had his children and they were now 
combatants, even officers {oficiales). So the relation/relationship {relacion) extended over 
generations {generaciones). How could one not have fondness {carifio) for these people? 
Moreover, that was your family for so many years {ademds esa fu e  tu fam ilia  durante tantos 
a n o s)\
The Comandante noted the multiple ways in which the guerrilla was akin to a family. For
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one, guerrilla forces established kinship ties with civilian populations who would 
converge in the areas under guerrilla control. Further, following violent counter­
insurgency actions, the population of entire villages sought refuge in the forest leading to 
families joining the guerrilla files. As families mixed with each other and became kin, a 
specific form of guerrilla relatedness developed. Guerrilla hermandad (fraternity/amity) 
provided a further mode of articulation of relatedness, to the effect that the guerrilla itself 
may be thought of a large family. As noted by Carsten (2000:2), ‘relatedness’ may be 
usefully deployed ‘in opposition to, or alongside “kinship” in order to signal openness to 
indigenous idioms of being related rather than a reliance on pre-given definitions’. 
‘Relatedness’ conveys a distancing ‘from a pre-given analytic opposition between the 
biological and the social on which much anthropological study of kinship has rested’ 
(Carsten ibid). Framing guerrilla sociality in terms of relatedness thus seems particularly 
apt, as it allows for different deployments of idioms of ‘family ties’ as they occurred 
simultaneously in guerrilla discourse. As the Comandante noted, there were parents 
whose children had also joined the guerrilla. Thus, there were two generations of 
combatants and as the Comandante pertained to the generation of the parents, he 
considered them to be his siblings. Hermandad, in the sense of fraternity and amity, 
permeated the sociality of guerrilla relatedness. In point of fact, guerrilla sociality and 
relatedness developed a distinctive and enduring moral order based on sharing. In turn, 
practices around sharing of substance functioned in complex ways and produced effects 
of sameness and difference.
6.4 Tamales Guerrilleros and Sharing Substance
Ruben spoke of a memory common to many ex-guerrilleros/as when he noted that some 
activities in the guerrilla were predicated on sameness. He recounted how tasks such as 
washing one’s clothes and preparation and consumption of food had to be carried out by 
all.
‘Nobody would wash the clothes (ropa) of others. There were beautiful {lindo) things in the 
guerrilla. To go to combat {ir a l combate) and do work in the kitchen {trabajo de cocina) was the 
same {era lo mismo), verdad, and serving others {sevir) was forbidden {prohibir). That is, we had
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to share (com partir), everything was shared (en comuri). Furthermore, in the case of Cande, she 
was an expert in making tortillas (hechar tortillas), nevertheless, she was never viewed as a 
person who would make tortillas. My brother was also an expert at making tortillas. One would 
share everything, in all instances (en todo caso se  com partia), verdad, one would help out, one 
would contribute so that activities may be undertaken and accomplished. Many things would thus 
be undertaken on the grounds of physical re-considerations (reconsideraciones puram ente  
fisicas), let us say, not everything would be strictly the same. That is to say, well, the load is of 
fifty libras5, are we going to distribute it to everyone the same (miramos pare jo j!  No. Instead, at 
times, for physical issues (cuestiones fis ica s), there we would reconsider, where that companero  
is able to carry fifty libras, he will carry fifty libras. The companeros are able to carry twenty- 
five libras, then they carry twenty-five libras. Alternatively, there would be a standard measure, 
where the libraje  would be thirty, and from there one would ask for volunteers, for those who 
would manage (aguantar) five libras  more, those who would bear twenty more, would carry 
twenty more. Because by the same token (igual), there were some companeros among us, 
including myself, who were physically much weaker (debit) than a woman, for there were 
companeros who were much stronger than of any of us. Things would be measured (medir) that 
way, so that there would be equity (equidad) and no mistreatment (maltrato). The companeros 
would work in communications (comunicaciones), in medical service (sevicio medico), they had 
greater talents (mejores abilidades). There were excellent com paneros, but one would notice 
(notar) that the companeros had better abilities to do that kind of work. Likewise (al igual), there 
were excellent women combatants (excelentisimas combatientes), and many of them died in 
combat. It was the same. Merly, for instance, died in combat.’
As both the C om an dan te  and Ruben had noted, food was scarce, but it was always 
shared. Cande commented on this as follows:
5 One libra is 0.454 kilos.
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‘It was very difficult, because at times, we had to carry bolas de masa6 to eat. They were cooked 
bolas de masa, we would call them ‘tamales',7 but it was only cooked masa, and at times there 
was no food at all [...]. At times we would eat, at times we would not. It was the same with 
water, sometimes we would find water, and sometimes we would not. We would set up camp for 
one or two days, but most of the time we would walk and walk and walk, carrying one’s food 
(icomida). Because in the beginning, in the years from 1981 to about 1986, we would not have the 
luxury to eat some beans (frijol), or sugar or oil. It was mostly cooked bolitas de masa which we 
would call "tamal p e lu d o There [en la montana] everything was shared (compartido). There 
were squads (escuadras), each with six combatants, and each platoon had four escuadras. So 
everyone would take turns {era turniado). For instance, if it was that platoon’s turn, they would 
arrange tasks with the escuadras. Everything was shared, the work in the kitchen {trabajo de 
cocina), guard {la posta), gathering wood for fire {ir a traer lend), anything really, everyone had 
to do what it was their turn to do’.
Despite scarcity, ex-combatants recalled how any available food was shared and a sense 
of commensality established. In the case of food, and tamales guerrilleros in particular, 
to share meant to divide one substance of the guerrilla, as well as the activities related to 
its production, among all. Through division and distribution of equal parts, the effect of 
sameness was achieved, regardless of other scales of difference such as rank, gender and 
ethnicity. Thus, division of substance in this instance created sameness. Ruben 
commented on other practices related to circulation of substance, notably those aimed at 
making substance move and circulate with the guerrilla forces. With regard to 
transportation of load, Ruben noted how to share was to divide the load among the 
combatants, but not to do so strictly in equal parts. Instead, to share weight was to begin
6 Masa is maize cooked in water with a pinch of lime and ground.
7 Tamal is a prized food in Peten. It is made out of maize, and contains meat, achiote (bixaceae bixa 
orellana), and/or beans. The tamal is wrapped in banana leaves and boiled or steamed. ‘ Tamales peludos' is 
an ironic and euphemistic expression that places emphasis on the meagre quality of the tamales
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with a standard unit and increase or decrease the load carried by individuals by and 
established part, to accommodate differences among them. The differences at stake were 
not those in the scale of rank, status or gender, but rather those of a perceived 
capacity/ability to physically endure an increase and/or decrease in load. Furthermore, 
individuals would take on increases in load voluntarily. With this scale, the guerrilla 
created difference of an embodied kind, as in the distinction between physically stronger 
and weaker combatants, and a mode of agency, as in the acquisition of greater quotas of 
load for transportation by those who would be able and willing to do so. The circulation 
of that composite guerrilla substance that was ‘logistics’ was thus made possible. Further, 
related production of scales of sameness and difference conjured up an overall effect of 
equity. From the perspective of the ex-combatants, these practices were foundational to 
the establishment of guerrilla sociality. Insofar as guerrilla sociality was grounded on 
specific practices of sharing and on the establishment of related dimensions of sameness 
and difference, the ex-combatants acknowledged the partiality of the sociality they 
endeavoured to create and maintain during the years en la montana and of the moral 
orders that sustained it. Guerrilla socialities and moral orders based on sharing substance 
differed from the socialities and moral orders that connoted the lives they had led before 
joining the struggle, and those they were to live following demobilisation. Sociality 
predicated on sameness and equity was partial in a further sense in that it coexisted with 
other guerrilla moral orders which produced sameness and difference in different scales.
6.5 Matrimonios Por las Armas/Marriages by Arms
Ruben discussed the moral order based on sharing substance and the effect of sameness 
equating both with an ethos central to guerrilla life. However, he also commented on 
other coexisting moral injunctions, notably those that concerned scales of gender and 
sexuality, and gender and sexual relations among combatants in particular. He noted that 
gender and sexual moral orders had changed over time. Ruben said:
‘As I was saying, [in the guerrilla] there were beautiful things and others very hard (duras). At 
guerrilleros.
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the beginning, it was forbidden (prohibido) disrespect (faltar de respeto) a companera, for 
instance, talking to her about sex (hablarle de sexo) or asking her to sleep with you (pedirle que 
se acostara con uno), verdad. At the beginning there were rules (principios), that one could not 
disrespect a companera, one would have to maintain a boundary (limite). I did not live in that 
time (esa epoca yo no la vivi), but I have been told about it. Many of the comandantes would joke 
about what used to happen as a result [of the rules]. One day, someone was nearly executed by 
firing squad for something like that. Well, someone was nearly executed because he had sexual 
relations (relaciones) with a companera. He was already on his way to trial (juicio), because then 
FAR had a very tough (fuerte) set of disciplinary rules (reglamento) which would be upheld 
(respetar). Well, luckily (de buena suerte), he was rescued by the companera who took it upon 
herself to save him. She said to the other officer (oficiat), sos un cabron, you are a cabrons if you 
execute the boy (elpatojo), and I will tell everyone that you also slept with me (acostarse), ah, so 
you stitched yourself up (te jodiste). So no, he must not be executed (no hay que fusilarlo) 
[laughter]. All these things I am telling you, they all fit within a trajectory (trayectoria). Later on, 
in my era (en mi era), in my time (epoca), this continued in the same manner, but perhaps a bit 
more flexible. You could talk to a companera, but you cannot talk to the companera who is 
already in a relationship with a companero and you have to lean to respect her (respetar), verdad. 
That is why the casamientos por las armas [weddings/marriages by arms] occurred (para eso se 
dan los casamientos por las armas). That is what they were called. They were symbolic 
(simbolico) and somewhat juridical (algo juridical), so to speak, among ourselves (dentro de 
nosotros). It held great honour (honra) and great respect (respeto) for us. So we began to that, to 
marry by arms’.
Ruben recalled how a young man who was later to become a prominent leader of FAR 
had come close to be executed for having slept with a companera. So strict were the rules
8 Cabron in this context may be translated as ‘fool’.
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of conduct ordering gender and sexual relations in the early FAR, that a breach would 
have been punished with death by firing squad. The companera in question, however, had 
come to the rescue of her lover and manipulated the strictures of the rules to her 
advantage and to the benefit of her young companero, whose life was spared as a result. 
By the time Ruben joined the guerrilla files, Ruben argued rules of conduct had been 
relaxed. Sexual relations among men and women were allowed, and yet, they still 
required some ordering. That is why casamientos por las armas, that is, ‘marriages by 
arms’ were instituted. Alma, a combatant in her late thirties, had been one of the few who 
got married ‘by arms’.
‘I asked Alma whether she had a relationship en la montana (se acompafid en la montana) and 
whether she did something akin to la pedida. In Peten, it is customary but not obligatory for the 
family of a young unmarried man or young unmarried woman to visit the house of prospective 
suitors and ‘ask’ (pedir) a man or woman in marriage for their offspring. I asked Alma whether 
when she got together with her partner they [the couple] informed anyone (es decir informaron a 
alguieri), such as a military chief (jefe militar) of the event. Alma replied that she did. I asked 
who she informed, whether she informed Nestor and she replied that no, at the time Nestor wasn’t 
there, he was down south. I said to Alma that I understood many informed Nestor. Nestor was 
like a father for many people (papa). In her case, at the time it was Comandante Mendez, as he 
was still alive and was there, so there were marriages then, marriages by arms, but there also was 
free union too (entonces, alii existian casamientos tambien, por las armas, y existian union libre 
tambien). This was the first time I heard of ‘marriages by arms’ and I hesitated, repeating, 
marriages by arms... (casamientos por las armas)... who got married by arms, that you may 
remember (quien se caso por las armas, que Usted se acuerdej! Someone whom people would 
call Magali got married, Magali and, I don’t know who it was, Noemi, I don’t remember who else 
who was there. I also got married by that (yo tambien me case por eso). So Alma revealed she 
had married by arms as well and added that yes, that is, it was like a marriage similar to that
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which occurs in civil life (si, o sea que alii era como un matrimonio parecido a lo que se da en la 
vida civil), that is, if an unmarried woman goes just like that (que si una muchacha se va solo 
asi), well, she has much less, less support (pues tiene menos, menos apoyo), as she has not 
respected her elders/superiors (o no respeto a sus mayores), we could say, (podriamos decir), so 
the matter there was the same (entonces la cuestion alii era lo mismo), verdad, it was similar to 
that (era parecido a eso). I asked Alma whether it was for that reason that there were ‘marriages 
by arms’ (y por eso 'matrimoniospor las armas”) and she replies yes. I asked what the name of 
her companero was and Alma replied it was Eagle (Aguila). So she had a marriage by arms (asi 
que hicieron un casamiento por las armas) and everyone was there, everyone (todos estuvieron 
alii, todos estuvieron), the whole front. I asked Alma whether in civil life, with her current 
partner, Alma did something similar to la pedida. Yes, when we met, we were novios for a time 
(si, y cuando non conocimos, estuvimos un tiempo de novios), although it was known to my 
parents (aun que estaba a conocimiento de mis padres), but I always had the idea that they would 
give me the opportunity that I would converse9 more (pero yo siempre mantenia la idea de que 
ellos me dieran la oportunidad de platicar mas), that I would relate myself to him more to see 
whether it was to my convenience/liking or not (relacionarme mas con el para ver si me convenia 
o no), because in some cases what happens is that the unmarried man enters directly (porque en 
algunos casos, lo que se da es que el muchacho entra directo), and the parents decide for her/of 
her (y los papas deciden de ella), verdad, so in my case (entonces en el caso mio), it wasn’t like 
that (no fue asi), verdad, they gave me the opportunity (me dieron la oportunidad) and when I 
considered that it was to my convenience/liking with the [unmarried] man (y cuando yo considere 
de que me convenia con el muchacho), I told my father, I told him (yo le dije a mi papayle dije a 
el), verdad, so, his parents went to talk to the house [of her parents] and all that (entonces, ya los 
papas de el fueron a hablar a la casa y todo), we reached an agreement (ya nos pusimos de 
acuerdo), well, first of all, el permiso [permission] (bueno, mas que todo el permiso), already
9 In Peten, to converse implies intimacy.
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formal (ya formal), since then we were officially novios [officially engaged] and all that {que ya 
fuimos novios oficiales y todo), verdad, that is the first time they entered [the house] (fue cuando 
la primera vez que entrarori). The second time [they visited] it was already to establish the dates 
for the wedding (ya la segunda vez fue para poner fechas para el matrimonio). I asked Alma 
whether she thought la pedida was something that was in the woman’s interest or not. I explained 
that on occasions I had been told by women who were not ex-combatants that the event of la 
pedida was something they had endured (la pedida mucho le costo), because they could not 
decide (porque ellas no pudieron decidir), what I meant was that a person entered to ask for them 
and spoke directly with the father and mother (la persona entro a pedirlas y hablo directamente 
con el papa y la mama) and the women I had spoken to felt they did not have any part in the 
process (ninguna parte en el proceso), they were simply handed over (y que solo ellas fueron 
entregadas). There were some such cases (hay unos casos de esos). Yes, this did happen, but not 
in her cases, Alma noted. I added that in other cases/instances it [la pedida] was a guarantee for 
the woman (garantia para la mujer), because I was told that if something happened between the 
couple (la pareja), for instance if there were episodes of violence (episodios de violencia), the 
parents had the right to get their daughter out (los padres tienen derecho a sacar a la hija), that is 
to say, that in that case/event, it was like a form of security (feguridad) for the daughter, the fact 
that the parents had handed her over (la entregaron), verdad? Alma confirmed that was indeed 
the case, verdad, that was why la pedida existed, verdad, because one leaves under the gaze of 
the parents (por que uno se va en vista de los papas), verdad, because in any event that may occur 
in one’s life (porque cualquier cuestion que sucede, ya en la vida de uno), verdad, in the event 
that the man made a mistake/got the wrong partner (que a lo mejor el hombre se equivoco de 
pareja), then in this case the woman (entonces aqui la mujer), verdad, can, she has the 
aid/protection/guardianship of her parents, because it is under their gaze that she left in the first 
place (puede, tiene el amparo de los papas por que en vista de los papa se ha ido), verdacH 
According to Alma there were similarities between civilian and guerrilla life, but there were also
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differences. A life as the one that one lives here (por que una vida que se vive acd) [in the 
ethnographic present], one has friendships and all that, one gets on well with people and all that 
(uno tiene amistades y todo, se lleva con la gente, y bueno), verdad, but during the life en la 
montana one would see oneself as brothers and all that, very united (ahi uno se veia como 
hermanos y todo, muy unidos), yes, what one would have and what the other would have would 
be shared, everything (si...lo que tenia uno y lo que no tenia el otro se compartia, todas las 
cosas)\
According to Alma, ‘marriages by arms’ were akin to de jure and de facto unions in civil 
life where individuals were accompanied and supported by their parents and families in 
their choice of a partner. In Alma’s account, ‘marriages by arms’ augmented the sense in 
which the guerrilla was a family. The assent and witnessing of the union on the part of 
the guerrilla family represented a guarantee for the partners, notably for the woman. As in 
civil life, eloping with a partner or entering a relacion informal, that is a ‘informal 
relationship’ was considered reckless in that the partners, notably the woman, would not 
be able to count on the support of their family in the event of a dispute between them, 
domestic violence or other issue which may be the ground for separation. Through 
''matrimonios por las armas’ a number of merographic analogies were articulated, for 
instance the merging of the two domains of ‘guerrilla life’ and ‘civil life’ and the 
establishment of a sense of contiguity of the moral orders relating to both. According to 
Alma, marriages by arms constituted a safeguard for women combatants, as they would 
be able to appeal to the parental authority of the comandante in the event of a crisis. 
Nevertheless, as Ruben noted, matrimonios por las armas were a short-lived practice. 
Ruben explained:
‘So we begun having marriages by arms, but soon afterwards, the couples would begin to 
fight/argue (pelearse), they would split up (dejarse), and so we simply could not continue on such 
a course. So, it was announced, okay muchachos, what we really do not want is that one day 
someone may shoot somebody else (alguien le meta un tiro a alguien) for such a matter. So we
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will maintain the same principle of respect (principio de respeto). As for the companera, well, let 
her decide whether she wants to be with her companero or not, if she wants to leave him, but 
nobody should be duplicitous (hacer el duple). Rather if they want to split up, let them split up, 
but they should make it public (que lo publiquen), and if they later want to be in a relationship 
[formal] (juntarse) with someone else, they may do that if they wish. So there would be public 
announcements (anuncios publicos) about who was splitting up and who was not (dejarse) and 
some of them were very funny (chistosos). I will tell you about an anecdote (anecdota). There 
was a companero, a veteran, whom we would call Chano and there was a companera who was 
much older (muy avanzada de edad), verdad. So we would call this Chano ‘el clandestino’ [the 
clandestine one], because of his clandestine relations (relaciones clandestinas). So, Chano, in 
clandestine manner (clandestinamente) and so that no one would realise (percatarse), begun 
having sexual relations (relaciones sexuales) with the companera, and she would correspond 
(corresponder). One day, however, for sure she must have sent him away (de piano ella lo 
cacho), saying that he was simply amusing himself (simple y sencillamente estaba pasando el 
tiempo). So, during a gathering of the forces, and with the procedure we used to use, she said, I 
ask to speak (pedir la palabra), and she was told, do speak companera, come to the front (pase al 
frente). So she stepped in front and said, companeros, I just want to declare/inform you that as 
from today I am the wife (esposa) of the companero Chano, and please, nobody bother me from 
now on (y que por favor nadie me moleste). That was the joke of the year (la broma del afio), and 
Chano did not know what to do with himself (no hallar donde meterse). In any case, they were 
not together for long after that. So, one would say, companeros, we inform you that, or, I wish to 
inform you that I have finished my relationship with Fulano, so that there would not be problems. 
But the point was not, oh, so that someone else may follow (para que venga otro), someone else 
may come and speak10 to me (hableme otro). No, the point was simply, it was a manner (forma) 
that the compos adapted (adaptor), their own manner (forma propria), so that they would not be
10 Conversing again implies intimacy.
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disrespectful to anyone (para no faltarle de respeto a nadie). So if people wanted to be in a 
relationship, they would no longer tell the comandante, but they may announce it in public. Okay, 
so the companero has come to the decision of being in a relationship with the companera and that 
was it. This was to avoid that any other companero may be disrespectful to her by mistake 
(iequivocadamente). Now, as for couples splitting up, announcements were not very common. 
Everyone would realise very quickly that they had split up, or that they had an argument/fight 
(rapido todos se enteravan que se habian dejado, se habian peleado), verdad [laughter], but that 
is how it would happen. Marriages by arms were abandoned because one could not go around 
marrying people, and one could not make fun of authority (no se podian estar casando, no se 
podian estar burlando de la autoridad). So to avoid that authority should be undermined (evitar 
que se burlaran de la autoridad), it was best not to marry (era mejor no casarse). Lead your life 
(hagan su vida), behave according to the regulations (comportense de acuerdo al reglamento), 
careful in making mistakes (cuidado con cometer errors), and nothing would go wrong (y nada 
pasa). We don’t bother you (molestar) and you do not bother the collective (colectivo), the 
organisation (organizacion) and the companeros. That is how that changed, according to the 
circumstances (fue cambiando palautinamente) ’.
Comandante Manolo had married the combatants ‘by arms’ and commented the 
marriages and on the reasons for their quick demise as follows:
‘Marriages by arms (matrimonios por las armas). Comandante Manolo is surprised by my 
question. Well, that occurred at the beginning, it did not work out (funcionar). What happens 
when you have an area under your complete control (zona de tu completo control), you have to 
organise the economy (la economia) there, production for the war (produccion para la guerra), 
not just the combatants, but the people who produce in the very same space (alii mismo). That 
also makes you consider what to do with all those children, for instance. For children are not
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going to be left to the wild (nihos no van a quedarse de silvestres). You have to make plans for 
their education (education) their training (formation), because this people will join/be part of 
(integrarse) society. And how could they without an education? Then, that made us consider 
social life (vida social), it made us think about the children, the elderly, women, hospitals, 
schools and many other things. And we resolved to create (formar) our own institutions (nuestras 
proprias instituciones) in those living conditions (condiciones de vida), verdad? So, as they were 
many people, we had to organise (organizar) and regulate/establish norms (normar) the life of 
everyone. And that is how we, leading on from a certain tradition (a partir de cierta tradition), 
and this has not been written/recorded anywhere, we had to elaborate our own civilian laws (leyes 
civiles), you understand. Those civilan laws allowed us to have a degree of control (tener un 
control) over our people. However, these civilian laws, this control, were established not merely 
to organise our own people, but also to avoid (evitar) any infiltration from the enemy (infiltration 
del enemigo). Anyone who would violate those norms, was also violating security (seguridad), 
and that could not be (eso no podia ser). For instance, we could not allow that a girl (muchacha) 
from around here should arrive and marry (casar) a guerrillero. And who is that girl? Why does 
she come to the guerrilla? Who sent her? What for? (y quien es esa muchacha? Ypor que viene a 
la guerrilla, y quien la mando? Con que proposito?). Could she not be someone who has 
infiltrated the files (infiltrada)? We had all the right (tener el derecho) to ask those questions and 
we had all the right to guarantee the security (garantizar la seguridad) of our organisation, you 
understand. So that is why those norms (normas) were not written down (estar escritas) almost 
anywhere. They were forged (plasmar) in our military regulations (reglamento militar) [...]. 
Those norms safeguarded us (garantizarnos) over many years; they gave us a degree of 
organisation (cierta organization), a degree of coordination (cierta coordination), and a degree 
of control (cierto control) over our people [...]. As for civil laws, the comandantes had the 
authority (potestad) to carry out marriages (hacer matrimonios), I held them myself, the task was 
deemed to be my responsibility (a mi me toco). And 1pasar por las armas', don’t think it meant
246
that I was executing them by firing squad {que los estuviera fusilando). No, it was a symbol 
{simbolo). The comandante of the guerrilla unit married the companeros who had decided to live 
together {vivir juntos), to be a couple {ser pareja), well, they had the right to do that. We did not 
deny {negar) that to them. Of course, they had to uphold many rules {cumplir muchas normas). 
But later on, ‘pasar por las armas’ also meant a festivity of the guerrilla (festividad de la 
guerrilla). Two lines of companeros would assemble, verdad, and they would hold their arms up, 
and the companeros [who were getting married] would go by underneath [the arms]. [That meant] 
that the whole of the guerrilla accepted the fact that they were a couple {ser pareja), in other 
words, the whole of the guerrilla gave them their blessing {darle su benedicidn) and accepted the 
fact that they were husband and wife {marido y mujer). That is what it was. I did that twice, we 
did it twice. However, we then realised that very often our combatants and our people who would 
join {integrarse) the guerrilla, they brought their whole villages {aldea) to the guerrilla. That is, 
they went to the guerrilla with their customs {costumbres), with their traditions (tradiciones), with 
everything. Something important should be said about this, and I will illustrate it with an 
example, so that we may understand each other [...]. In the village the companera, or the woman, 
has very few options {opciones) to be free to choose who she is going to marry {casar), very few. 
Because the villages {aldeas) are very dispersed/far apart (dispersas), or because Fulano has 
already eyed her up {hecharle el ojo) for her to be his wife {su mujer). But the first requirement 
{requisito) is that he should have a good cultivated plot/harvest {siembra), that he should have 
money {dinero), that he should be able to support her financially {mantener). In other words, it is 
a contract {contrato). And although she does not love him {querer), she goes with/follows him. 
But she goes to live with him because he can support her financially {mantener). He will give her 
clothes, he will give her many things, that is, it is a relationship {relacion) which is not grounded 
in affection {carifio) and love {amor). As you know, in relationships {relaciones de pareja) in 
everyday life {muy corrientes), well they first get to know each other {cmpezar conociendose), 
they go out together {salir juntos) and then they feel that they are having a relationship {sienten
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que estan teniendo una relacion entre ellos). It is a process (proceso). In this case however, it is 
not like that. Thus, a companerita11 who has not had many options in her own village, now can 
choose (escoger) who she will marry [de jure] (casar), with whom she will marry [de facto] 
(juntarse), because there would not even be de jure marriages (por que nisiquiera habia 
matrimonios). So, in the village of the [guerrilla] front there was a young man (muchacho) who 
eyed her up (hecharle el ojo) and he said to her to go with him. Before she could not choose 
among many, there were no options, due to the repression/violence (represion), for whatever 
reason. And they would get to a village in resistance (aldea de resistencia),X1 and they would 
relate (relacionarse) to everyone there, and there they would truly live a community life (vivir en 
comunidad). So she would see all those handsome young men (hermosos muchachos) who were 
there, and she would look at her husband, and she would realise that he did not meet all the 
conditions (condiciones) of someone she would like to have as a husband. So the next day she 
would get together with someone else. Just like that, she had compared her husband with the 
others, and she realised that he did not meet all the requirements, that she had no other option 
than marrying him [de facto] (juntarse) in civil life {la vida civil), verdad. So, what would happen 
was that as these were relationships that were not grounded (<cimentadas) in affection {carifio) and 
love {amor), and rather in material conditions {condiciones materiales), the first marriages [held 
in the guerrilla] were among these people, more or less, and would fail {tronar). And eight days 
later the marriages {casamientos) had dissolved {disuelto). And all that, of having got them to 
‘pasar por las armas’, that had been all in vain. So we opted for not doing it like that. In time, the 
companeros would choose their partner (pareja), and those were more stable relationships 
{relaciones mas estables), but we never again ventured in being ridiculed {quedar en ridiculo)
11 This is the diminutive form of companera and may be taken to imply either youth or simple mindedness.
12 ‘Aldeas de resistencia’ refers to the Comunidades de Poblacion en Resistencia (CPR), literally 
Communities of People in Resistance. There were three different bodies of CPR in Guatemala: CPR Costa 
(on the Pacific Coast and associated with ORPA), CPR Sierra (on the mountains of Quiche and associated 
with the EGP), and CPR Peten (associated with FAR). The CPR always presented themselves as civilian 
population under army persecution.
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even! [laughter]. In doing marriages which were not going to last for anything (durar nada)\ With 
the effect that the political authority (autoridad politico), the authority of the organisation 
(organization), of the comandante, of the people would be compromised (comprometer)\ Well, 
no, we resolved not to have them [marriages by arms] again. Since then, the relationship was 
different, if there were people who had lived together for some time and they decided to get 
married [de facto] (juntarse), and wanted to have a ceremony (ceremonia), well then, they could 
get married (casarse), so the comandante had the necessary authority (toda la autoridad) to 
marry them (casarlos). That was the history (historia)’.
Through marriages by arms one of the guerrilla substances, namely ‘combatants’, was 
divided and combined according to scales of gender and sexuality. Marriages by arms 
joined a male and a female combatant into a couple, thus setting the individuals 
concerned apart from the rest of the combatants in as much as gender and sexual relations 
were concerned. Through a merographic analogy, guerrilla sociality and relationality 
were imagined to be akin to a family. Moral orders based on sharing were articulated in 
conjunction with familial practices such as marriages by arms, where an authoritative 
figure, usually a comandante, would take on the parental role of witnessing and 
sanctioning the union. The community would also be joined in familial and communal 
terms, as they witnessed the union of the couple in the celebrations. Marriages by arms 
were however short-lived. Whilst the merographic analogy of ‘family ties’ continued 
through the years of struggle, as did the ethos of hermandad (fraternity and amity) and 
sharing, gender and sexual relations demonstrated certain unruly quality. As they 
exceeded and undermined the moral order(-s) placed upon them, guerrilla moral orders 
adapted to mould themselves in accordance with the excess of gender and sexuality. To 
safeguard the authority of the comandancia, rules progressively relaxed and were 
replaced by a more flexible notion of ‘respect’. ‘Respect’ suited the merographic image 
of the family, but extended it, as respect was due not only to superiors, but to any 
companero/a.
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Alma, Ruben and the Comandante had offered different perspectives on marriages by 
arms. Alma had noted that they provided a degree of continuity between the experiences 
of social life within and outside the guerrilla. Ruben pointed out that they had juridical 
validity in so far as the combatants were concerned. Through humorous anecdotes, 
however, he argued that in matters of emotional and sexual relations between men and 
women, flexibility of moral orders were more appropriate than strict codes, rules and 
procedures. The Comandante had also underplayed the significance of the practice and 
noted that marriages by arms had been ephemeral and ultimately unsuccessful. 
Nevertheless, Alma, Ruben and the Comandante converged in their consideration of 
marriages by arms as part of a much broader and significant undertaking, namely that of 
fashioning social institutions in the guerrilla. They all acknowledged to be engaged in the 
creation of a doubling of the society they had left when joining the insurgency. They 
attached different values to this process of creation of sociality, and to the unions and 
separations thus engendered. The duplicate society of the guerrilla may resemble the 
society they laboured to protect themselves from. Nevertheless, the guerrilla replica was 
distinct, in that it functioned on moral orders based on commensality, hermandad and 
respect. Whilst there may be replication, there was also re-invention. Guerrilla 
reinvention however, presented itself to me as marked by melancholy. In Butler’s 
reworking of Freud’s work on the subject, melancholia connotes a ‘refusal of grief and 
the incorporation of a loss, a miming of the death it cannot mourn’ (Butler 1997:142).
‘If melancholia designates a sphere of attachment that is not explicitly produced as an object of 
discourse, then it erodes the operations of language that not only posit objects, but regulates and 
normalises objects through that positing. If melancholia appears at first to be a form of 
containment, a way of internalising an attachment that is barred from the world, it also establishes 
the psychic conditions for regarding “the World” itself as contingently organised through certain 
kinds of foreclosures’ (Butler 1997:143).
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Steeped in guerrilla post-plurality, but overwhelmed by melancholy and harbouring my 
own secrets, I ventured to ask Ruben about the heterosexual logic that seemed to mark 
any discussion of gender and sexual relations in his account and in the accounts of other 
ex-combatants.
‘I asked Ruben whether the logic that regulated sexual relations in the guerrilla was primarily 
heterosexual (logica de heterosexualidad). Ruben says that there was only one case he could 
recall, of an excellent officer (excelentisimo oficial). I respect him very much as an officer. In 
how he presented himself, he was not homosexual (su presentation, pues no era que fuera 
homosexual), verdad. We experienced a very delicate situation, because the companero joined in 
the capital, and arrived in the guerrilla fronts [in Peten] and gained prestige (cobrar mucho 
prestigio) on the grounds of his personality (antes su personalidad), his respect (su respeto) and 
attitude (actitud) towards women and towards the compafieros. So he got to graduate as 
lieutenant (graduarse hasta de teniente) and headed a front in the area of Narajo, La Libertad. 
This companero was an excellent officer, but whilst being an officer he made undue propositions 
(algunas proposiciones no idebidas) to a companero, and this companero denounced him. So 
when this happened, the whole unit was very indignant (la unidad se indigno demasiado), 
knowing that a homosexual was in command (un homosexual los estava dirigiendo). The compos 
felt betrayed (se sintieron como traicionados los compas), there was lack of political maturity 
(falta de madurez politico). So the companero, for having made an improper proposition 
(propuesta inadecuada) to this other companero, turned so incandescent (candente) that the 
comandante had to intervene, and those of us in charge of security had to take him out of Peten, 
because the compafieros were very angry (muy molestos), because of that machista attitude (por 
la misma actitud machista), or whatever you may want to call it. But the companero was an 
excellent (excelentisimo) and extremely good officer (calidad de oficial). We suggested (pedir) to 
him whether it may best that he got out (salir), in order to avoid problems, and he himself said
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that he would prefer to leave Peten. Work for him was arranged in the city, so he carried on 
working as our companero in logistics. That was the only case we had then. Later on, with the 
others, things were very different. In the case of the companero whom you know well, nobody 
was bothered or offended (reprocharse)'.13
6.6 Moral Disorders: Mourning the Dead in the Ethnographic Present
Cande was thirty-nine years old. She was bom in Santa Rosa and was one of the first 
women to join the guerrilla struggle in Peten. She told me that her parents came to Peten 
between 1960 and 1968 and settled in a village where they spent years working the land, 
at times renting a plot, or agarrando,14 with no security of any sort in terms of land 
tenure.
‘My parents (mis padres), one was unaware of many things {uno ignoraba muchas cosas), but my 
parents and their siblings (pero mis papas y sus otros hermanos), they has been working in that 
[the guerrilla] since before {desde antes venian trabajando en eso), and gradually they started 
disclosing to my mother (declarandole a mi mama), well, my father [began disclosing] what he 
was working on. And as we grew up, it was explained to us on what he was working on, and they 
started deploying us (utilizar), that is, unconsciously we were already contributing to that work (o 
sea, inconscientemente ya nosotros aportdbamos en ese trabajo), but we didn’t know what we 
were doing. Afterwards, my father began to explain to us to what ends/why we were fighting, so 
that in Guatemala there may one day be a better life for the people {el pueblo), not only for those 
who fought, and that is how they gradually deployed me as messenger {mensajera), I was first 
messenger delivering correspondence to a place, and learning a few things concerning arms
13 The person Ruben referred to in his concluding remarks was a prominent gay activist in the 
ethnographic present. In 2000, with the Grupo Promotor Colectivo Gay-Lesbico, he had organised the first 
public rally for lel respeto a la diversidad sexual’, that is ‘respect towards sexual diversity’ in Guatemala
City. Ruben noted with appreciation the companero's radicalism, adding: ‘I may not identify, but I do not
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(algunas cosas de armas), like that, guns, things like that, I worked on that for a time, that was 
my beginning. And as I was saying to you, my father used to converse a lot with us, he would 
gather us and explain to us what the causes were, and why [the struggle] was undertaken (nos 
reunia y nos esplicaba cual eran las causas, y el porque se hacia), because of the situation, that 
is, power in Guatemalan is held by few, isn’t it (por la situacidn, o sea elpoder en Guatemala lo 
tienen unos cuantos, no)? And that every day it kept getting worse for the poor, and that is how I 
started, I could say that all my family, for the whole of my family got involved in it, in those 
things (y asi es que yo pues empeze, podria decir que toda mi familia, por que nosotros, toda mi 
familia se metio en eso, en esas cosas). I was fourteen, between fourteen and seventeen years of 
age when I was working on that, I would make tortillas, I would deliver mail, I would make 
purchases for the compafieros who were already en la montana. It was in mid-1982 that I joined 
(incorporate) the clandestine struggle directly was in mid-1982. No, I am sorry, in 1980. 
Because at the time, before the beginning of 1980 there was a group who went abroad to train 
(preparase), so in that group was me, and then the group went to the monte to train more people. 
So I joined one of those groups, with a compa who died, whose name was Androcles, whose 
pseudonym was Androcles. And with Nestor, whom you know.
Cande trained in Cuba and when she returned to Peten she was a combatant and also 
worked in communications. When she got in a relationship with a companero, she told 
the officer in her platoon. During her years in the guerrilla she said she had always 
commanded respect.
‘I have to tell you about respect (respeto) of how one may command the respect of others (como 
uno se da a respetar). When I started, there were no women. In the group where I was there were 
only men, I was the only woman. I would go round in a small patrol (patrullita) and when we 
would get together with the other groups to train, I felt at ease (sentirse lo normal), nobody
accuse you (acusar), nor I vilify you (agrear) and least of all attack you (atacar)\
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disrespected me ever, I felt the compafieros of my patrol and the others appreciated me greatly, 
they admired me (admirar) because I was involved [in the guerrilla]. When I went to Cuba, the 
group who went with me was very fond of me (carifio) and they would support me. During the 
training we would stand in huge trenches (trincheronas) and I could not jump high enough and 
get out, so the same compafieros would help me so that I could get up’.
I asked Cande what had meant for her to be en la montana and her grief and melancholy 
submerged us both.
‘What did it mean for me to be en la montafial Look, as I said, at the beginning my father would 
tell us many things, the majority of us who were en la montana believed so strongly (creer tanto) 
in [revolutionary] triumph {en el triunfo), and we were so resolute (decididos) and with so much 
conviction (convencidos), that if in any instant we should commit {ortorgar) our lives, this would 
have been for something just (Justo). That is why I tell you, it gives me sadness (tristeza), I start 
to cry, at times out of anger (coraje), at times out of sadness {tristeza), for all our compafieros 
who gave their lives (vidas), they gave their lives out of conviction {convencidos), so that those of 
us who would survive would continue [in the struggle], and would serve as examples with our 
people and with all the people. All of us who were there were moved by this ideal, that there 
would be change {cambio), for our children and for everyone’s children. Regrettably, for reasons 
I do not entirely understand {comprender), that was not achieved {llevar a cabo), because other 
countries who had the revolution already, lost it, and that did not help us. I believe that if we had 
triumphed, we would not have been allowed to live either, because the powerful {poderosos), 
they have the power {poder), and what rules is money {lo que manda es el dinero). That is why I 
tell you that I was clear and convinced of [the necessity of] the struggle, of change, but now I am 
upset {molesta), because when the Peace was signed, there was an item [in the Peace Accords]
14 Occupation and use of land with no legalised land tenure.
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that said that we would be able to go and look for our combatants who were left dead (quedarse 
muerto) and that we would be able to give them Christian burial (cristiana sepultura), and now 
that is not possible. [...] They say there is no money for it, and that the established deadline to 
carry out this work has already passed. What really hurts (doler), is that while our compafieros 
gave their lives for the people (mientras nuestros compafieros dieron su vida por este pueblo), 
now ‘traga quien tiene mas galio’]S, and the [deceased] compafieros lay forgotten (olvidados), 
and I am left with nothing. [...] I don’t know how to explain it (no sabria explicarme), I don’t 
know, handing over the weapons (entragar las armas) caused something like emotion/sentiment 
in me (me causo como una cosa de sentimiento), and since then I began to feel for those 
compafieros who died, I began to feel, like the one who says, I will go there, and you stay here 
(yo me voy aca, y tu de quedas alii). I cried when I left la montana (salir de la montana), I cried 
because I also had taken such fondness/appreciation to the forest (le agarre tanto aprecio a la 
selva), because the forest gave us a roof, gave us food, gave us water and the weaving that was 
part of our life (por que la selva fue lo que nos dio techo, quien no dio comida, quien nos dio 
agua, quien nos dio el tejido parte de nuestra vida), and when the demobilisation happened, and 
we got out from there, it was difficult for me (costar), it was difficult for me to accept this life 
change (cambio de vida), because, one does not know what one will find here [in civil life], 
exiting a system (sistema), so to speak, and entering a new one. For now it would be very difficult 
for us to go and visit these compafieros who were left buried (enterrados), some of them, at least. 
For others the army took with them, and who knows what happened to them.’
For Cande, leaving la montana was to leave a ‘system’ to enter a new one. Cande 
discussed her experiences at demobilisation as entailing a detachment or parting from a 
complex set of relationships to persons, objects and the environment, all of which had 
participated in the interlacing that was guerrilla life en la montana. At this point of
15 Those who can drink more, drink more.
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dissolution and disassembling, guerrilla sociality and relationality appeared as a whole 
constituted by parts which included the deceased compafieros buried in the forest. Their 
death had not marked the end of their relationship. Rather, death marked a sense of 
permanence and durability of guerrilla relationality and its continuity, so long as those 
who survived carried on in the struggle spurred on by,16 and on behalf of, those who had 
been killed. Guerrilla sociality between the living and the dead was made possible by 
their mutual coexistence en la selva, that is, in the forest. The connection could be 
sustained and reproduced as long as the sociality in the forest may itself be maintained. 
Other ex-combatants had implied that what was also necessary was that there exist those 
who may recall where the dead lay. On demobilisation, Cande envisioned the inception 
of dissolution of guerrilla sociality as a moment of splitting, as in the division between 
the deceased compafieros/as who were left in the forest, and those moving on to a life 
and a system outside of it. The temporality of this perspective conjured up assemblage, as 
in the dead increasingly appearing as bundles of guerrilla relationships, and 
disassembling, with guerrilla relationality progressively resembling a ‘vanishing whole’ 
(cf. Strathem 1992b). I have argued that guerrilleros/as envisaged their experiences en la 
montana as grounded on moral orders based on sharing, commensality and relatedness. 
Cande argued that the process of disassembling of guerrilla subjectivities and sociality 
entailed forgetting the dead with the relationalities and moral orders they had come to 
stand for. Unwilling to part-take in what was for her a progressively more ravenous and 
greedy ethnographic present, and unable to sustain her relations with either the living or 
the dead, Cande felt she had been left with nothing. Cande had laboured strenuously to 
avoid the disclosure of this sense of diminution. For months she had amiably and yet 
firmly exerted ethnographic refusal and rejected any relation with me. Encouraged by her 
brother, she eventually accepted to speak of the scale of disappearance and diminution 
through which her attachments to the guerrilla whole were articulated at the time.
6.7 Conclusion: Weak Description and Thick Nihilism
In ex-combatants’ accounts, guerrilla sociality and relationality was predicated on
16 This point was made explicitly by Macario, whose thoughts are discussed in Chapter 7.
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multiple merographic analogies and intersecting moral orders. Through production, 
reproduction and circulation of guerrilla substances, central dimensions of guerrilla social 
relations were generated. Equitable distribution among all of scarce food provisions 
produced relationalities of homogenisation, and a moral order based on sameness. 
Merographic analogies that established connections between domains such as ‘the 
guerrilla’ and ‘the family’ provided the ground for further moral orders grounded on 
interdependence and authority. With short-lived practices such as ‘marriages by arms’, 
idioms of familial relatedness grounded an attempt at ordering gender and sexual 
relations. Nevertheless, gender and sexuality appeared to be connoted by excess and 
instability, and any attempt at disciplining them was acknowledged to ultimately 
challenge the parental and military authority of those entrusted with the task of governing 
them, and thus the guerrilla project as a whole. ‘Marriages by arms’ were supplanted by a 
notion of ‘respect’ which was sufficiently permeable and flexible to accommodate the 
excess of scales of gender and sexuality, and that ensured the authority of the 
comandancia would not be ridiculed and undermined. Guerrilleros and guerrilleras with 
their different perspectives and scales produced multiple models of sociality and 
relatedness. Guerrilla models appeared to depend on division and connection of parts and 
wholes, and disassembling and reassembling of the social realm. Insofar as these 
processes occurred in temporal frames, they also conjured up the effect of malleability, as 
the guerrilla replica displaced the broader society and periodically re-invented itself. The 
labour of imagination at stake in these processes, with its models of sociality and 
relatedness, replicates and is replicated in the post-perspectivism imagined by 
anthropology through the notion of weak thought. Eschewing simple enumeration of a 
plurality of discrete wholes, both guerrilla imagination and the imagination of weak 
thought elicit a multiplicity of interpreting subjects marked by the immediacy of their 
historicity, the deferrals inherent in their constant shifting in perspectives, and thus in 
constant re-articulation. There thus seem to be a partial, tentative and provisional 
correspondence between guerrilla merographic analogies and the weak description of 
anthropology, as well as between the positive, rearticulatory thick nihilism of weak 
thought, and that of guerrilla resolutions of truth into value.
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As noted by Cande, guerrilla socialities and moral orders based on sameness and sharing 
were being replaced by individualistic frames in the ethnographic present. In her view, 
this amounted to a form of betrayal of those combatants who were left dead in the forest 
without even having been given proper burial. A consideration of the multiple frames 
deployed by ex-guerrilleros/as in their discussion of their experiences of struggle 
suggests the complexity and plasticity of guerrilla socialities, relationalities, subjectivities 
and moral orders and the thick nihilism inherent in ethnographic switches between and 
across moral orders and their scales. In the next chapter I recast these questions in terms 
of anthropological/ethnographic post-plurality and anti-foundationalism and reflect on the 
aesthetics of ethnography and anthropology, weak description and thick nihilism through 
the concept-metaphor of ‘prosthetics’.
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Chapter 7 
Prosthetic Aesthetics
‘Gaps seem to give us somewhere to extend: space for our prosthetic devices. Absent expertise, 
the features of a distant kinsman, a glimpsed spirit elicit their imagining while also eliciting the 
perception that all images are borrowed images. A sense of excess or insufficiency, then, of lack 
of proportion, of connections being partial suggests] we could extend the perceptions 
themselves’ (Marilyn Strathem 1991:115-6).
‘We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility’ (Heidegger ([1962] 
2002:39).
7.1 Introduction
This chapter is intended to be a reflection on thin, thick and weak forms of description 
and theorising, that is, on the aesthetics of ethnography and anthropology. The aim is to 
provide a ‘cultural description’ of cultural categories such as ‘subjectivity’, ‘personhood’, 
‘embodiment’ and ‘agency’, and not a ‘sociological analysis’ (Strathem 1988: 274). I 
envisage the task by reflecting on the aesthetics which underpin theoretical models and 
the processes through which theoretical models emerge. To address the labour of 
imagination that theory and ethnography entail, I propose an engagement with 
‘prosthetics’, as a critical tool and a concept-metaphor (Moore 1999, 2004) of 
considerable imaginative potential, and one which lends itself to a series of (re- 
)inscriptions and (re-)articulations.
There exist numerous sites of articulation of ‘prosthetics’ in the imagination of 
anthropology and cultural theory. ‘Prosthetics’ evoke debates over relations between the 
organicity of the body and the in-organicity of technology (cf. Downey, Dumit and 
Williams 1995, Gray 1995, Haraway 1991, Stone 1996, Zylincka 2002). From this
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perspective, ‘prosthetics’ suggests meditations on the status of the nature/culture 
boundary usually resulting in both augmentation and excentricity of the agentic prosthetic 
subject. In point of fact, prostheses are often understood to mark the liminal space 
between the organic and the inorganic, the animate and the inanimate. The relation 
between inorganic prostheses, more or less permanently attached to organic bodies, 
suggests a series of questions concerning the type of sociality that may be established 
between organic humans and inorganic technology and the kinds of embodied subjects 
that may be said to emerge in the context of organic/inorganic interactions. Further, 
through a questioning of dualisms, prosthetics suggests reconfigurations of what may be 
understood by ‘embodiment’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘agency’.
It is in the work of Donna Haraway (1989, 1991, 1997) that a groundbreaking attempt has 
been made at rethinking the relationality of humans and machines. It is Haraway’s 
contention that the interaction between the two is not unidirectional, or indeed, 
anthropocentric. Rather, Haraway suggests that humans and machines are both produced 
through mutuality of interaction. Agency is thus posited as a product of mutual 
interworkings of the human subject and the machine, and this insight in turn leads to a 
reconfiguring of the subject in terms of a cyborgian imaginary.
‘A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our most important political 
construction, a world-changing fiction [...] The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience 
that changes what counts as women’s experience in the late 20th century. This is a struggle over 
life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion’ 
(Haraway 1991:149).
In Haraway’s cyborgian imaginary, the hybrid cyborg is enmeshed in fact and fiction, to 
the extent that the boundary between lived reality and representation appears to be a 
perspectival effect, and optical illusion. The cyborgian subject is further defined as a 
normative, if simulated, effect of Foucauldian bio-power (Haraway 1991:163) and
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Western hegemonic teleology. The cyborg’s hybrid and illegitimate conception 
engenders the possibility of a counter-hegemonic political strategy.
‘By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorised and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are all cyborgs. The cyborg is our 
ontology; it gives us our politics... The cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the ‘West’s’ 
escalating dominations of abstract individualism, an ultimate self untied at last from all 
dependency, a man in space... The cyborg skips the steps of original unity, of identification with 
nature in the Western sense. This is its illegitimate promise that might lead to subversion of its 
teleology as star wars... The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and 
perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence’ (Haraway 1991:150-1).
The cyborg is thus a subject who/which, having merged the organic/mechanic interface 
and transgressed speciation narratives, allows for reconfigurations of subjectivity and 
agency that are not entirely dependent on, but may be still spuriously related to, Western 
metaphysical traditions. The cyborgian subjects presented by Haraway eschew dualism 
and naturalism and are endowed with cyborgian agency and heteroglossia.
Haraway’s conceptualisation of the human/mechanic interface has been very effectively 
explored in the work of the performance artist Stelarc. In the context of the ‘Third Hand’ 
project, for instance, a mechanical limb is grafted onto/into the artist’s stomach and leg 
muscles. During the performance, Stelarc’s body is also attached to a computer system so 
that Internet users can remotely determine the movement of Stelarc’s prosthetically 
enhanced bodily extension. The overall effect is that of decentring Stelarc’s control over 
his own movements, so that the artist’s body is no longer ‘his own’. Fleming (2002:95) 
argues that Stelarc’s performances with ‘the body-as-an-action-system’ subvert Cartesian 
notions of control and centricity through ‘corporeal decentrings’ enacted in the complex 
and multiple spatial and chronological site of the wired environment. The subversion of 
the autonomous agent is said to amount to ‘subversion without inversion’. Partly in
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reference to Stelarc’s work, Moore (1999a: 162) notes that ‘all forms of technology are, of 
course, prosthetic and, this accounts in part, for their symbolic role in the construction 
and mediation of identity, particularly gender identity’. The mutuality of articulation 
between the organic and the inorganic, the human and the mechanic has its confluence in 
the figure of the cyborg and its hybrid, illegitimate and heterodox condition. In its 
complex relation with Western metaphysics, that is both within the horizon of Western 
metaphysics and also substantively and ideationally beyond it, the cyborgian subject is a 
‘weak’ subject, or a subject marked by weak thought.
In a rather different exchange, ‘prosthetics’ have been conceptualised in terms of notions 
of presence and absence, with factual or imagined prosthetic extensions as supports to a 
body which is understood as lacking factual or imagined limbs/bodily parts (Hogle 2003, 
Nelson 2001, Kurzman 2001). ‘Prosthetics’ have thus been deployed to illuminate a 
number of trajectories such as the prosthetic role played by the mujer may a (Maya 
woman) in propping up the Guatemalan state (Nelson 1999, 2001), or the prosthetic body 
of workers as the sites of capital accumulation (Harvey 1996, Haraway 1993), and related 
to the latter, the prosthetics of supervision in maquiladora factories (Wright 2001). 
Objecting to the deployment of the term ‘prosthetics’ in these analyses, Kurzman (2001) 
notes that the metaphor of ‘prosthetics’ presupposes certain normative ideas of bodily 
wholeness and completeness, thus implicitly relying on the body of amputees as the 
ground, ‘or silent site of creative discursive frameworks’ (Kurzman 2001:374). As 
Kurzman states, ‘[pjrosthetic imagery assumes a defective body in need of propping up 
and absence and lack are implied in the use of the image of the amputee’s body’ 
(Kurzman 2001:375). Interestingly, Kurzman (ibid) adds that the metaphor of prosthesis 
is not ‘about disrupting the construction of subjects “on the ground”, or the site of 
establishing discursive frameworks for body politics, nor is about subaltern subjects as 
agents. It is about our inability to deal with physical difference, impairment and 
disability, and about the difficulty of thinking outside of our singular concept of the Body 
and its relationship to subjectivity’ (Kurzman 2001:384). The use of prosthetic metaphors 
in anthropological analysis thus appears mired by normative assumptions about the body 
and notably by ‘the preconception of impairment and disability as a lack of bodily and
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subject presence’ (Kurzman 2001:383). Instead, Kurzman proposes to think critically 
about the way ‘we all naturalise able-bodiedness as a subject position tied to one 
particular body’ and develop instead frameworks that, by thinking about impairment, 
may allow for theorisations of ‘multiple bodies, subjectivities, forms of ability and 
mobility, and ways of being whole’ (Kurzman 2001:383-4), and, I wish to add, ways of 
being in parts.
Whilst technology-endowed cyborgian prosthetic ex-centric subjects may at times be 
predicated on an unacknowledged monism which often undercuts the very conditions of 
possibility of prosthetics (Malik 2002), and normative a priori or supplemented 
wholeness may be presupposed in conceptualisations of prosthetics-as-presence/absence,
I would argue that prosthetics aesthetics have important imaginative potential. The 
cyborgian subject operates as fact and fiction, science fiction and social reality (Haraway 
1991). Further, in the prosthetic subject presence and absence may come to presuppose 
each other in complex existential embodied trajectories so that subjects may exist in 
composite wholes, or indeed in parts. Through the concept metaphor of prosthetics, with 
the recovery of gaps and cyborgian interactions that the concept metaphor allows, it may 
be possible to hold within the same frame the phenomenology of the prosthetic subject 
and the scale of her supplementation.
Prosthetic aesthetics were conjured up during my fieldwork in different contexts and 
scales of engagement. The ethnographic moment that connoted the realisation of multiple 
and complex naming practices and related relationalities among ex-guerrilleros/asl 
revealed that names amount to a prosthetics of guerrilla subjectivity and sociality. 
Through the deployment of different names, (ex-)guerrilla subjects were able to extend 
themselves to fashion different orders of agency and connection. Further, through names, 
presence and absence presupposed each other in specific ways. Discarding a name may 
make a subject disappear so that she may be able to embody a new pseudonym, and 
hence a different incarnation. With nicknames, ‘the same’ subject may acquire a further 
prosthesis and one that mainly functioned within guerrilla secret socialities and
I I have discussed this ethnographic moment in Chapter Four.
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relationalities. When Mosquito recovered his guerrilla nickname in the course of our 
conversation, he activated a guerrilla prosthetic extension that pertained to the realm of 
guerrilla secrecy. Just as swiftly, through ethnographic refusal, he deactivated it. In a 
different scale, ex-combatants often referred to joining the guerrilla organisation as a 
moment of incorporation or ‘incorporation’.2 The term was to me extremely powerful in 
that it evoked a sense in which each guerrillero/as may be part of a corporeal guerrilla 
whole and may in turn represent a partial prosthetic embodiment of the guerrilla. Through 
accounts of incorporation, I was made to imagine bodies in parts, embodied/corporeal 
parts and wholes, and multiple orders and scales of attachment and connection. In other 
words, I imagined the guerrilla through prosthetic aesthetics.
In what follows I wish to highlight a further aspect of prosthetic aesthetics, and one that 
is presupposed in the cyborgian subject as much as in the subject marked by presence and 
absence, namely the prosthetic subject and her phenomenology. Csordas (1994:11) 
argues that ‘[t]he dominance of semiotics over phenomenology, and hence concern with 
the problem of representation over the problem of being-in-the-world’ has marred 
anthropological analysis and is reproduced in the seemingly categorical distinction 
between ‘language’ and ‘experience’ (Csordas ibid). Drawing on Husserl (1964, 2002), 
Heidegger ([1962] 2002) and Merleau-Ponty ([1962] 2002), anthropological approaches 
informed by phenomenology draw attention to the experiential and embodied quality of 
subjectivity and sociality (cf. Csordas et al 1994, 1999, Jackson et al 1996, Rapport 2002, 
2003). As argued by Rapport (2003:220),
‘It is important to reiterate that these three kinds of knowledge -  self, world and other -  are bound 
up together, mutually implicated. Also, that these knowledges are personally embodied; they are 
the possession and creation of distinct individual organisms. Also that such mutually implicated, 
personally embodied knowledge is not a fixed or stationary phenomenon but one in continuous 
process of being and becoming. Finally, the identity of the organism and its environment -  the
2 To incorporate, Middle English incorporaten, from Late Latin incorporare, incorporate to form into a 
body (OED 2004).
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organism-plus-environment -  can be said to be dependent on the ongoing process by which that 
organism comes to know itself. The organism is the knowledge of the world, is the order it 
creates of and around itself (Rapport 2003:220).
Within the horizon of weak thought and phenomenology, strong categorical distinctions 
between ‘experience’ and ‘representation’ are weakened. Moreover, with Heidegger’s 
specification that ‘[w]e can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a 
possibility’ (Heidegger ([1962] 2002:39), I wish to discuss phenomenologies of the 
ethnographic encounter and its prosthetics and forms of being-in-the-world.
In the conclusion I suggest that the relation between guerrilla prosthetics and 
anthropological prosthetics may be tentative and temporal replicas of each other. Through 
the establishment of a relation of equivalence between the anthropological prosthesis of 
the tape recorder and the guerrilla prosthesis of the rifle, the guerrilla and anthropology 
borrowed each other’s images, to constantly extend, re-inscribe, supplement, and defer to, 
each other and their relations. Such temporal processes of corporeal re-inscription make 
subjects and descriptions prosthetic as well as weak, that is, marked by weak thought. 
Subjects and their descriptions may be always incomplete, ever partial and yet constantly 
augmenting and diminishing in and through their prosthetic aesthetics. Prosthetics thus 
allow for (re-)figuring and (re-)configuring linkages and sites of analysis, representation 
and experience, thus (re-)casting prosthetics in anthropological and cultural theory, and 
as a detour, in the practice of ethnography.
7.2 Prosthetics and the Phenomenology of the Ethnographic Encounter
‘Alma and I meet again, about two weeks after our first brief encounter. Alma was allocated her 
own lote (plot of land) and vivienda (house), but prefers to live with her mother, father, siblings, 
partner and her own children on her father’s lote. The family built a large kitchen with wooden 
walls and techo de corozo (palm roof). The sleeping quarters are large enough to accommodate 
everyone, including visiting researchers. For our conversation however, Alma takes me to her
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own house. We walk through the village for about five minutes, and then stop, while she undoes 
the knots of the rope that keep the wooden door shut. There is ash in the fogon, a sign that fire has 
been lit at some point in the past, but a hen is now sleeping in it. It is clear that people seldom 
come by or use the premises. There are no utensils or items of every-day use. We sit on the 
benches whose stilts are buried in the ground. I set up the tape recorder, take out the cigarettes 
and Alma and I smoke, while I explain the nature of my visit in greater detail. The long 
conversation that ensues is punctuated by our smoking Rubios Azules.3 Alma recounts several 
episodes related to her time en la montana and I am mesmerised by her gripping story-telling. 
While Alma’s house and the cigarettes mark the inter-subjective space of our encounter, and the 
tape-recorder grants all manner of prosthetic extensions to us both, there are other items that gain 
prominence as her narrative unfolds’.
In order to re-route concept metaphors and meta-theories of prosthetics, I propose to 
consider an ethnographic encounter with Alma, the ex-guerrillera engaged in giving form 
to embodied subjectivity in my presence. The analysis therefore takes its lead from a 
conversation with the ex-guerrillera intent on the act of telling stories about her time en 
la montana during our ethnographic encounter. The fictional quality that I hope to 
highlight is not that of the content of what is being said, or what is being remembered. 
Rather, I wish to point to the phenomenological dimensions of the ethnographic 
encounter and the multiple processes through which embodiment, subjectivity, agency 
and anthropological knowledge come into being and are supplemented through a number 
of prosthetic mediations.
The labour of ethnography entails the deployment of self (Ortner 1999) as much as the 
use of distinctive paraphernalia. The place of objects in the practice and representation of 
ethnography has been noted by Stocking (1983) and Clifford (1980, 1988, 1992, 1997) in
3 Rubios is a brand of cigarettes produced in Guatemala. They are cheaper than imported brands. Cigarettes 
of whatever brand and label are viewed as superfluous items in Peten. Men often go to the local tienda and 
purchase one or two at a time. Most men and women, however, smoked with me thus engaging in specific 
prosthetic relations.
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their insightful remarks on the role played by the tent in Malinowski’s fieldwork in the 
Trobriand Islands. Clifford (1992) notes that Malinowski’s tent functions in his work as a 
defining icon of ethnography, producing a regulatory conceptualisation of ethnography as 
a ‘practice of co-residence’. Conversely, the paraphernalia of my fieldwork was mainly 
the stuff of travel. Rucksack, hammock, mosquito net, toothbrush and toilet paper marked 
the itinerant and transitory quality of the ethnographic encounter as much as a clinging to 
specific ‘technologies of the self (Foucault 1988). The items were also suggestive of 
multiple conceptualisations of the experience of ethnography in the way they seemed to 
figure a shift from ‘single-sitedness’ to ‘multi-sitedness’ (Marcus 1998).
The chiclero hammock I borrowed was made of thick enough Iona4 as to be impenetrable 
to insects and was often remarked to be the token of Petenero identity. The Peten and the 
Petenero identity in question were those of the early- to mid-twentieth century, namely 
times characterised by the mass extraction of chicle. The sap of the chico zapote tree 
(Achras zapota), also known as oro bianco, or ‘white gold’, made the fortune of the 
United States chewing gum industry. It also allowed for the accumulation of wealth and 
status for a number of prominent Guatemalan/Petenero families (Schwartz 1990, see 
Chapter 2). The chiclero hammock, as a prosthetic attachment to the resting body of the 
chiclero, was a reminder of the bodily practices associated with the extraction of labour 
and resources for the purpose of capital accumulation (Jameson 1991, Martin 1992, 
Taussig 1981, 1987, Limon 1994) characteristic of Peten up to the mid-twentieth century. 
That the chiclero body and its prostheses were of archival rather than contemporary 
ethnographic relevance was signalled in the ethnographic present by the diorama exhibit 
one could view in the INCAP museum in Flores. There one could find the display of a 
‘Disappearing Peten’, including the chiclero hammock arranged in a taxidermic, faux- 
jungle setting for the consumption of tourists as much as justification of the work of the 
‘environmentalist’ non-governmental organisation that financed it and maintained it. 
Nevertheless, the prosthetics of labour and human and natural exploitation had changed. 
The motosierras (chain saws) and los camiones (lorries) of the illegal logging industry 
were more topical and relevant prosthetics of capital accumulation in Peten in the
4 Lona in Peten is a thick cotton fabric.
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ethnographic present and featured prominently in people’s everyday discussions and 
preoccupations.
During my time in Peten, I also acquired an ‘amaca guerrillera', or ‘guerrilla hammock’. 
Acquaintances told me that a group of ex-guerrilleros/as disabled by injuries suffered 
during the conflict were putting the skills they had acquired during their time in the 
insurgency to use in post-demobilisation times and were making hammocks. I said I 
would very much like to buy one and weeks later the hammock arrived from Guatemala 
City. La amaca guerrillera (the guerrilla hammock) was a large rectangular piece of 
waterproof fabric, which I was assured, would keep out rain and insects, and regrettably 
retain the heat and humidity within. I never used la amaca guerrillera while travelling to 
and from communities, because I thought it would be safer to conceal obvious signifiers 
of insurgency.
Rucksack, hammock, tape recorder, cigarettes and camera and the other prostheses of my 
fieldwork were complex sites of multiple mediations. Their activity and idleness defined 
the prosthetic quality of my ethnographic practice. For instance, my propensity for 
‘hearing’ rather than ‘seeing’ seemed suited to my activities on the routes of guerrilla 
secrecy and determined the primacy of the tape recorder in my exchanges with the ex­
guerrilla. The tape-recorder seemed to function in less intrusive and more intimate ways 
than the prosthetic eye of a camera may do. Unlike with images, I felt I could produce 
anonymised recordings self-sufficiently, that is, secretly. Nevertheless, my prosthetic 
hearing entailed its own anxieties, mainly to do with that disturbing and most prosthetic 
of associations with orejas, in the literal sense of ‘ears’ and the metonymical sense of 
‘informer’. With the story of the apparatus recounted by Luis in mind,5 and the implicit 
warning that (anthropological) bricoleur abilities to hear and record the conversations of 
post-Peace Accords ex-guerrilla secret socialities may provoke violent reprisals, I took 
Luis’ advice seriously and hid the evidence, namely the tapes, ‘inside a well’. The tape 
recorder of my fieldwork functioned as the prosthetic extension of the ethnographic 
embodied subjects whose agency now extends beyond the immediacy of the encounter.
5 1 discussed this story in Chapter 5.
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Ex-guerrilla ex-centric and hyper-agentic subjects fully realised the prosthetic potential 
inherent in the ethnographic encounter and its prostheses. Ex-guerrilleros/as re-drew the 
boundaries between us subjects and our prostheses accordingly. They conjured up the 
image of technologically enhanced, ex-centric prosthetic guerrilla subjects and their 
experiences and noted how ex-centricity and prosthetic embodiment also pertained to 
anthropology. In so doing, they gave a form to the phenomenology of the ethnographic 
encounter.
7.3 Guerrilla Phenomenology and its Prosthetics
As Alma and I smoked Rubios Azules in her abandoned house, she began to recount 
stories about her time in the guerrilla. Guerrilla phenomenology and its prosthetics slowly 
emerged in Alma’s story telling. I was captivated.
‘I am going to tell you [a story] (contar), I remember that once, when I left, once I went to 
Mexico, I got back in [into Guatemala], and when I got back in, I thought I was going in the 
direction of Dolores, but at that time they were going to establish the Panzds Herdico Front in 
Alta Verapaz, so the Captain who was in that front would say to me, let’s go. The captain was in 
love with me (enamorado de mi) and was courting me (me estaba enamorando) but the truth was 
that I had not yet decided what to do about him (estdbamos en veremos con el). We passed by a 
camp (<campamento) and I realised that he had, well, he had a girl (chava), well, before, and there 
he met up with the girl and I saw that he stayed on (se quedo) with the girl there and I did not like 
that, so I told him definitely no (ya no) [nothing would happen between them]. Then we left that 
camp and proceeded on our course (marcha) and he tells me, let’s go [to join his own front] and I 
tell him no, and he asks why and I tell him it is not in my interest (no me conviene) to go, and he 
was a bit hard pressed (presionado) because he wanted to take me there, but as I was stubborn 
(necia), I would jump (brincaba) [in frustration and anger] when I considered that I had my 
reasons, I would say no, I want to go the other way, to the FAR Front, my front, I won’t leave it
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for anything (yo no lo dejo nipor nada). And he, obstinate (terco), as obstinate as that. In the end, 
I did not go [with him]. Two to three months went by and eventually he rested his case (se 
convencio). I went as far as the river Santa Isabel, and from there I made my way back to the 
FAR [Front]. That’s where I stayed. With time, something like eight to ten months later, I can’t 
remember well, the other front needed to be strengthened and they sent almost everybody [in the 
FAR Front] that way. We went and I was the one in charge of setting the route (rumbera) because 
I knew the area, I was taking all that crowd (gentio) with me in that direction, feeling quite sad 
(triste), as at times I would forget the routes (rumbos), and we would proceed kind of lost (algo 
perdidotes) at times, but we would carry on nonetheless. We got together with the others, and on 
one of those occasions there were some compos6 who were ill with dengue7, and I had a problem 
with my tonsils and they had to go and attack an Army base (destacamento) which was there in 
Fray [Fray Bartolome de las Casas, Alta Verapaz], so they told me, you are not going, you are 
staying behind. So we stayed on with those who were ill, all of those who were ill and a medical 
officer who stayed with us. Three days later, the guys were supposed to be back on the fourth day 
and most of us were already feeling better and I was also feeling quite well again, so they sent us, 
go and wait for the guys. We went. I remember we were picking nances,8 and while we were 
doing that a girl came out on her way to fetch water, and the compa who was with me started 
courting the girl (enamorar a), but the girl would not take much notice of him (le daba lado), and 
we were carrying our handful of nances, we gave some to the girl as a present and carried on. So, 
I say, there was a house in that direction, I say to him, I will go there to try and get a bag because 
my little hat, the hat that we would wear, that’s where I was carrying the nances in. I am going to 
look for a bag, I say to him, and I left my ammunition belt (cinturon) behind, my rifle and 
everything, and I go just like that (me voy asi), as I was wearing a brown t-shirt, a civilian one 
(particular), I put that on and that is it, when I get this close to the house I see a woman
6 Compos is short for compafieros.
1 Dengue is an illness similar to malaria.
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approaching and she says to me that [one word is unclear in the recording] and she keeps on 
looking at me {me quedd viendo), and I notice that behind the house, that’s where the soldiers are, 
and I make my way back quickly and I say to the other compa, that’s where the cuques [soldiers] 
are, I say to him, and we left quickly, we left. So, what of the nances? I had a handkerchief, and 
we left the little wrap with the nances tied to a tree, and on our way back we went to pick it up, 
with some tortillas that that girl had given us as a gift, we went to a hill {cerro) to wait for the 
others and we started to eat, when I see that the group (grupo) was over there, that’s where the 
compas are, I say to my companion, and he just keeps on looking {se queda viendo), I stood up, 
and I was whistling and whistling at them and they did not even take notice, imagine {fijese), 
there in the terrain free of vegetation {alii en lo puro limpid). Stoop down, my companion told 
me, that’s the cuques [soldiers], he told me, and I was stubborn, until finally I threw myself to the 
ground. He would tell me, it’s the cuques [soldiers]. We will see, I told him, anyway, we walked 
down the hill to go and see. We were just getting near when we heard the bangs {cuentazos), they 
[the soldiers] had clashed with the other [guerrilla] group, those who were coming to meet up 
with us {venian al contacto con nosotros). And precisely {cabal), it was the Army. And there the 
noise/exchange of fire {cuenteyo) started. So, I say, they fell onto the guys {le caieron a los 
muchachos), I tell my companion, and they must have caught them by surprise, so I say, let’s get 
in there, and we bash {les damos) the cuques [soldiers]. From behind? I [Silvia] ask. Yes, from 
the rearguard, seriously, so they come up against us and the others are free. So we got in there, 
and precisely from the rearguard we started shooting. So, the other compa tells me, here we 
should proceed by saltos vigilados, because there could be more of them in that direction, and so 
we were proceeding like this, he would advance a bit and I would stay still supporting him from 
behind, from there, he would take on guard and I would go ahead, and that’s how we were 
proceeding when, {cabal) we fell right into an army ambush which was right where we had left 
the nances and where they had seen us! And that’s where we went back to!? And that’s where
8 Nances are berry-like fruits thatg row in the wild.
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they were waiting for us, and precisely when we were going through a nice clean stretch of 
grazing land (potrero), I eyed a little house that was on the small edge, so that people would not 
see us (para que no fuera a ver la gente), when I see a shadow (sombra) this big and I realise that 
it was the army, I turn and the shooting is just behind me in my direction (y son los cuentazos 
atrds de mi), and I threw myself to the ground fast (yo corriendo me tire a tierra), there was a 
fence there, and I threw myself in the direction of the fence, I stand up again (me vuelvo a parar) 
and I jump into a stream that was there, and the other compa who was with me, well he also 
started unleashing lead [shooting] (rempujar plomo), and so we started, and what? It’s when we 
start to withdraw that another Army group comes out, like that, to cover us [in the sense of siege, 
not protection], and they almost got us encircled (casi nos teniamos encerrados). It was just the 
two of us, and that’s when we started unleashing lead [shooting] (bolarles plomo) and proceeding 
ahead, and they were shooting back, we were just about to jump across a huge furrow (ibamos a 
cruzar un sanjon bien grande), because there are very ugly furrows in Alta Verapaz, when they 
threw a mortar (tiraron un morterazo), and I almost fell ahead of myself, ahead of where I was 
going, so I came back on myself, and the other [compa] on his way back from jumping across the 
stream fell near me, so the expansive wave (onda espansiva) [result of the explosion] threw me 
on my mouth in the direction of the furrow (me tiro de boca para el sanjon), and that’s where I 
got the problems with my spine, up to this day I suffer from problems with my leg, and there, I 
could not get away, I was feeling watery (me sentia aguada) [in the sense of unsteady], I felt my 
feet becoming watery (sentia que me se aguadaron los pies) had already no strength left (ya no 
tenia fuerza), and the other compa did not want to leave me behind, come, he said to me, he was 
giving me his hand so that I could get out, and I was not even able to stand (yo ni pararme podia), 
in the end I got across a stretch of land that was there, where there was milpa9, the milpa was nice 
and small (chiquitita estaba la milpa), and on we went, let’s go, he said to me, and the compa was 
dragging me (me llevaba a jalones), I was feeling that my legs had no strength anymore, and the
9 Milpa is any stretch of land where maize has been planted.
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cuques [Army soldiers] behind us unleashing lead (volandonos plomo), they almost killed us (casi 
nos mataron), they pushed us towards the Chiniq river, that’s what they call it in Alta Verapaz, 
and I say to the compa, you go, I am going to stay here {yo aqui me quedo), that’s where I am 
going to stay {aqui me voy a quedar) because I don’t want to die drowning {porqueyo no quiero 
morir ahogada), I say to him, it’s better this way and I am going to throw lead from here, you go. 
He did not let me do that/leave me {no me dejo), what he did was throw me in the water {lo que 
hizo me tiro al agua), and we, I mean, he threw himself and he pushed me, and I was going 
behind him, and that way, we got to the other side swallowing water {tragando agua salimos al 
otro lado), and to hell we went {y nos fuimos a la fregada), and they did not catch up with us 
again. In the meantime, the unit with which the army had clashed, I mean, those compos started to 
manoeuvre, and the row/stir up with them started (yya empezo el alborote) and they got them off 
our backs. But all this was outright chaos {Ah, pero todo eso fue la fregada!). We did not go 
through there, the trouble {tenquello) started at about two, at about two PM, and it finished at 
about six PM, as it was already getting dark, and they started, I was really unwell {yo iba bien 
fregada), I recall I got to the house of some collaborators {colaboradores) at about eight-nine 
PM. I recall that they gave us food, and from there the big gossip arose {y de alii el gran chisme), 
that they had killed me {que me habian matado), and as in those days the army started putting 
women in their files, well they started to say that so-and-so [Alma] had been killed {empezaron a 
decir mataron a Fulana) and all that, and as many people, civilian people, knew me, they would 
say, they killed so-and-so, they killed so-and-so, and the compos would say to them, no, that’s not 
true {no es cierto), that’s where she is, but no that can’t be because we saw her, the army showed 
her to us, no, that’s where the compa is, she is around, she is well, bring her here for us to see, to 
see whether it is true {a ver si es cierto), they [ordinary people] would say. Later, little by little, I 
started to appear {despues apoco apoco fuiyo apareciendo), Ah! Well, that’s true, so who was it 
that the army had with them?! They had a girl who looked like you, they would say, and so on, 
but in reality it wasn’t so. I say to Alma that from what she tells me, it is clear the people in the
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villages (<comunidades) cared for (querian) her and the other compos. Yes, they care for us (nos 
queriari), Alma said. Many people got to know me. I had many acquaintances (mucha gente 
conocida) in those days. I ask whether this means that one was not in total clandestinity (a 
clandestino total). No, Alma replied, people knew us, we were not totally en la montana as it was 
said (nos conocian, nosotros no andabamos totalmente en la montana como decian), we were in 
there, in the community/village (nosotros estdbamos metidos en la misma comunidad). [...] There 
are many, many stories [...] and for that problem that I had there [being injured by the explosion], 
I already had problems, and later I did not have the same physical endurance I had before (la 
misma resistencia fisica como tenia antes), the legs were bothering me a lot, I could not run 
anymore, I was facing considerable difficulties. That’s how they later got me out (asi fue como 
despues me sacaron), I did not want to leave, I remember that, there on the border [the border 
between Guatemala and Mexico] I met up with Nestor and I told him, I do not want to leave, look 
Nestor. Yes man (si hombrel), he said, but if you don’t go/get out, you are going to be even more 
screwed up (jodida), I am going to recommend you to the companeros there, learn some job, 
learn to drive, all that, he said to me, and if it is the case that you really don’t like it and you can’t 
get used to it (si en caso totalmente no te parece, no te vas a hallar), I am going to send for you, 
you come back again. With time, I got used to it. There is a great deal I like recounting (hay una 
mayoria de cosas, me gusta contarlas). Sometimes, when I get together with the guys, we start 
telling these stories, yes, that’s the way it is’.
I thank Alma for taking time out to speak to me and turn the recorder off. However, Alma 
begins to recount another story. The form or aesthetics of her narrative also seems 
prosthetic, in that it is punctuated by gaps which lead to further attachments, further 
images and experiences.
‘Once the news came that a group (grupo) [group of guerrilla combatants] that had gone the San
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Pedro Carcha way failed in their mission/got hit (fracasaron), and a compafiero arrived looking 
for us, saying that they had taken out (sacado) a wounded compafiero, and the boss {jefe) said to 
us, who wants to go that way? So, there was a sargeant there who was the uncle of the guy 
(muchacho) who got wounded, I’ll go, I said and he said to me, let’s go, it was about ten in the 
evening, we had just got there, very tired (bien cansados), we have to go right now because the 
compa is wounded, so we left there and then, on foot. At about two o’clock in the morning we 
stopped walking, we rested for a while, and then we started walking again, we stopped again at 
about two in the afternoon, we were possibly (quizas) near the road, and in that place where we 
were the night fell, then at night we crossed the road and we started walking again in the night (de 
noche, a caminar Usted)\ At about one in the morning, that’s when we stopped for a while, and 
from there again, up to where the compa was, he was in that Sierra Machama, there in Alta 
Verapaz, that’s where the compa had got himself into (estaba metido el compa), we went to get 
him, and we were going back, but when we were on our way back we meet up with the other 
group (grupo) that was around there and when we were about to cross the river, that river, what is 
the name of that river that is near Fray.. .what’s its name? It’s the same as the one here, the Pasion 
river, what do they call it, perhaps I will remember later on, of having crossed it so many times, I 
can’t even remember now! Anyway, in crossing this river, the river was extremely high (lleno), 
very high, who dared throw themselves to the other side (quien se avienta al otro lado)l It is very 
dangerous for one to throw themselves in a haste like that, because there may be (a lo mejor) the 
Army on the other side, they would stir one up {se lo atizan a uno)\ Who are the best swimmers? 
Because I had learned to swim quite well, I tell them, well, I can jump in (yo me aviento), and that 
Leon was there, I jump in too he says, and that Angel says, me too, so good, the three of us. The 
first one to throw himself in was that Le6n, that one was really good in the water {ese si era 
bueno para el agua), he threw himself from there, and from there the other compa jumps in, and 
what? He had not even got half way into the river that he started to shout that he was drowning! 
Ah! I started to be afraid {a mi me empezd a darme miedo), as when a river swells up, it
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penetrates up into the vegetation {se mete asi entre la palazon), and there was indeed a big tree 
{palo) there, this size, and I went to climb/hang myself from {aprenderse) that tree always 
looking to the other compa and shouting to the others that they got him some help {que le dieran 
ausilio), and I started to climb up that tree, that tree had a hole/cavity like this, and I grabbed the 
hole to lift myself up, when I see that that’s where there was a huge curled up snake {cuando veo 
yo, alii estaba una gran culebrona enrollada) in there, I lost hold of the tree and fell [in untidy 
fashion] into the water {yo me desprendi del palo y cahi amontonada en el agua), and I say, how 
to get out? And Leon says to me, as the river did a turning, and the compa was shouting and he 
was disappearing [in the water] and every now and again he would appear, he says to me [Leon], 
let’s go to the turning, perhaps we still manage to find him, and we said, just get this [to me], 
there in the grazing field {potrero), we were running, and a man {don) heard the screams {gritos) 
and he went with his canoe {cayuco), and he dragged the compa out and he [the compa] pulled 
through {salid), but very frightened {espantado), horrible, there. Later on with the man’s canoe, 
the man had no idea who they were {quienes eran) [who the people he had helped were], ah, they 
said to him {le dijieron), could you do us the favour of taking us to the other side, and the man 
{don) could not refuse (y el don no podia decir que no), out of obligation {porque 
obligadamente), 10 that’s where it is, the canoe and the oar, everything, the boys {muchachos) 
went first, and from there we all got to the other side. I ask Alma whether they had any equipment 
and she yes. I then ask her whether they were carrying all the equipment with them when all this 
happened and she replies that no, they had left it behind. I say to Alma that she seems to 
remember many things. Many things indeed.. .once, but this was here in Peten, they sent us to get 
some uniforms, here, on the way to Belize, I went with a compafiero, it was only two of us, we 
went, and on the shores of the river Mopan we set camp {acampamos), early the next day we left
10 It is unclear why the man was in no position to refuse to take the guerrilleros/as to the other side. It may 
have been a matter of politeness, but it could also have to do with the fact that although Alma said the man 
had no idea who he was talking to, in fact the very (certainity or) uncertainty, and hence fear, may have 
precluded the possibility to refuse the favour.
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again, the compafiero got to the other side [of the river] and went to get a canoe, and we both
jumped (inos zampamos) into the canoe with the rucksack and all, and the rucksacks were very
heavy, we were carrying a load of uniforms (puros uniformes traibamos), and the only thing I
said, I am going to take off my boots, so there I was only with my equipment when, what the hell
{que puchica), I see that the canoe capsises half way across the river {a medio rio da vuelta el
cayuco), and we fall in the water (y nos vamos al agua pues), and I have no idea about how (yo ni
se ni como), but the only thing I did was grabbing hold of {agarrar), secure (asegurar) my rifle,
but from there I don’t remember (pero de alii no recuerdo), get this ifijese) [to me], I put a
shoulder string of the rucksack here, the other here in the middle, and I have no idea of how I
managed to swim, but the reality is {la verdad es) that I did manage to get out, and the leather
boots {las botas de cuero)u , the two pairs of boots, they were gone, mine and the other
compafiero's and we were so sad {y nosotros tristes)\ What are we going to do now?! Well, we’ll
have to walk barefoot {nos toca caminar descalzos), there was that plant {sarsa dormilona), how
it would scratch one’s feet, very bad {bien feo). And I say to him, I am not going to be able to
withstand walking like this {yo no voy a aguantar a caminar asi), I am going to get myself into
that house, and be it only a pair of old shoes that they may give me {aun que sea un para de
zapatos viejos que me den), because I am not going to be able to bear it barefoot {pero yo
12descalza no voy a aguantar), so we got ourselves into a manaquea , waiting for the late 
afternoon {tardecita), and from there I got near to the house and the group of youths {la 
chamaquia) who were there realised very quickly that I was barefoot, and what happened to you?
13And to your shoes? I left them over there, and from there I spoke to the man {sefior) and they
11 The fact that the boots were made of leather is important. Resources were so scarce in the guerrilla that 
most combatants wore rubber boots, or botas de hule. As discussed in Chapter 5, botas de hule were a 
signifier of insurgency.
12 A manaquea is a stretch of land where one finds manaca, i.e. a type of palm with narrow branches very 
common in Peten. Manaca is used for roofing nowadays, as the more longlasting leaves of guano become 
increasingly hard to find.
13 Surprise at seeing someone barefoot suggests that this episode must have happened relatively close to a 
main town with Ladino population, e.g. Melchor de Mencos. In the rural areas people, especially women,
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had a pair of boots, an inside out pair of boots {botas al reves) [laughter], oh my god, an inside 
out pair of boots (a par de botas al reves), but this is how in the end we managed to get hold of 
some shoes, and that’s how we carried on walking, but well fucked up (pero bien jodidos todos) 
at times we had to take off the boots, we would carry them by hand and we would walk barefoot, 
and on like this’ [...] There are so many stories from la montana, so many things happened, like 
these, and many more’.
I focus on the prosthetic aesthetics of Alma’s narrative in part to highlight the prosthetic 
form that her account and narrative took, in that every story she recounted conjured up 
the incompleteness of the account and the narrative movement towards a further episode. 
Through the concept-metaphor of prosthetics, I also want to reflect on the aesthetics of 
the subject her accounts presupposed. Through Alma’s account of her being-in-the-world, 
Alma gave a sense of the experiential and embodied character of her time en la guerrilla. 
She referred to numerous prosthetic attachments such as her hat, boots, rifle and 
ammunition belt and those she found along the way such as the bag to carry the nances 
and the canoe to cross the river. As Alma lost attachments and acquired new ones, her 
agency was expanded and/or contained. Paraphrasing Strathem (1991:115-6), gaps and 
intermittencies gave Alma somewhere to extend. Alma’s story telling also extends 
anthropology and conjures up a space for anthropological prosthetic aesthetics, as 
anthropological perception is extended and made into an augmented sensory field. This is 
a field of sensory augmentation and extended agency that allows anthropology to borrow 
images, for instance those indeterminate images of the Army and the companeros/as that 
even Alma confounded, the embodied experience of combat, and of guerrilla embodied 
subjectivity more broadly. This fabling of the world and of the subject, agency and 
prosthetic extensions entrusts Nietzsche’s maxim that ‘we must go on dreaming’ with 
renewed poignancy. Ex-guerrilla fabling of the world was enabled and sheltered in the 
ethnographic present by the disused dwelling offered by Alma as much as it was 
activated through the anthropological prosthetic extension of the tape-recorder. Siezing 
upon phenomenology as possibility (Heidegger [1962] 2002:39), both guerrilla and
are often barefoot.
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anthropological prosthetics allowed for the articulation, repetition, circulation and 
supplementation of guerrilla and anthropological fabling, and the mutual borrowing of 
images.
7.4 Entregar las Armas y  GrabadorasfHanding over Arms and Tape Recorders: The 
Guerrilla and Anthropology Borrowing Each Other’s Image
During the course of my fieldwork many ex-guerrilleros/as expressed the pain and sense 
of loss they had experienced in the demobilisation camp at Sacol, when the order was 
issued that they should hand over arms. If it had not been for the weapons, they argued, 
they would not be alive in the ethnographic present. Manuel explained:
‘To surrender the weapons was the hardest thing (lo mas duro), for us, to leave them, after so 
many years that one had carried it (lo cargo) [the rifle], one carried it, so, more than any other 
thing, one would defend oneself with it (uno con eso se defendla), if it hadn’t been for this, one 
wouldn’t be telling what we really lived/experienced (lo que vivimos) and suffered (sufrimos). 
The most arduous of stages (la etapa mas dura) was when we said, here it is, for that was the 
hardest part (lo mas duro)'.
Manuel handed over his rifle but kept his hammock and his tent (carpa). The tent, a 
rectangular piece of thick water-proof fabric was spread across his patio when I visited 
him. It was being used to dry frijol (beans) in the sun. Macario also spoke eloquently 
about the time leading up to the Peace Accords and the eventual decommissioning of 
weapons. In his concluding remarks, he likened the tape-recorder, that is, the prosthetic 
tool of anthropological labour, to arms, that is, the prosthetic tool of guerrilla labour. This 
was no simile that restricted its signification to the realm of representation. Rather, it was 
part of his attempt to evoke the phenomenology of loss and its embodieness at stake in 
decommissioning, and one in which I was to part-take. Macario elaborated on guerrilla 
and anthropological prostheses thus:
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‘There were companeros who were 4bases', they may pass (pasar) as combatants now, but in 
reality they were not combatants, they were base, or milicia. They would look after/the weapons, 
in the buzones, in the ground (bajo tierra). They were the contact (contacto) towards the Mexican 
border. Look Silvia, when in 1988 I joined in earnest {meterse de lleno), already carrying an arm 
iya de tomar un fusil), the vision (vison) was to give grounds to profound social change {profundo 
cambio social), to establish a revolutionary government {gobierno revolucionario), a government 
with equity (equidad) for all, that was our idea, because we knew that the was the only way 
{forma) to bring forth structural change, and that it is why I got involved {meterse). I saw 
companeros cry, I saw very sad companeros due to the situation they had experienced {vivir). I 
was young (joven), I had not experienced it, but of course, I lived in poverty (vivir en pobreza), 
yes, but had not experienced all that they had experienced. On entering the campamentos 
[guerrilla camps], the situation there was very difficult (dificil) en la montana. They would give 
you a rifle but they would not give you a uniform {uniforme), one would have to see what to do 
about a uniform, one would get one’s boots {botas) and would start to walk. But this [hardship 
and lack of resources] was not important, because what mattered was the spirit of the revolution 
{espiritu de la revolucion), to foster change {cambio). That is why I joined, because I saw the 
injustice in which the people {elpueblo) lived. So my spirit {espiritu) was above all revolutionary 
{revolucionario), to make changes {hacer cambios) and so that no more innocent people {gente 
inocente) would die. The years went by, and from 1990 onwards, one began to talk of a possible 
peace settlement. For us that was very difficult {dificil), because we had the experience of the 
peace settlement in Nicaragua, and in El Salvador. And we would say, will it be the same? But in 
the end, that idea began to be introduced. What was most difficult was that in actual fact the 
Comandancia took very radical decisions in the centre, and the combatants and las bases were 
almost not taken into account in signing the Peace Accords {la comandacia tomo decisiones muy 
radicales en el centro, a los combatientes, y a las bases casi no se les tomo en cuenta en la firma 
de la paz). Nevertheless, the decision [to sign the Peace Accords] was from the bottom up {de
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abajo para arriba). I worked in the area of logistics, and I was a political organiser. We would 
receive information concerning the [negotiation] proceedings (procedimiento) and the 
contemporary situation. We would go and tell las bases and work with them. Of course, we 
would receive suggestions (,sugerencias), but the suggestions were very few. We found that very 
painful (dolernos), signing the Peace Accords that is, with all the problems in our country, and 
knowing that it was unlikely that politicians would deliver (cumplir). The first Accords were 
signed, and us, still as combatants of URNG, we would not believe it (creer), and we did not feel 
satisfied (satis/echos). The Accord on the Ceasefire was signed, and believe me, when the United 
Nations Mission to Guatemala [MINUGUA] arrived, for us it was even more difficult. They 
arrived in the campamentos [guerrilla camps] and they would tell us that if twenty soldiers should 
approach, and there were thirty of us, we should not fire at them (dispararle), because we would 
be violating their rights (violar sus derechos). And if we captured a soldier, we had no reason to 
harm him (hacerle dafio). And this [was said to us] when we knew that if they [the Army] should 
capture a compafiero or ourselves, they would dismember us in pieces (hacer pedazos). It was 
very difficult, and we would say, is this really how things are (si esto es asi)l In any case, we 
were clear (estar claros) about our vision (vision), and we had to accept that moment (momento), 
Silvia, the whole situation. And believe me, when the signing of the Peace Accords happened on 
29 December 1996, instead of feeling satisfied (sentirse satisfechos) of that mission, we felt very 
sad (sentirse muy triste). For us that was not a reason to cheer (gritos), it was not a happy 
occasion (alegrias), as if to say, good, it has ended (acabarse), mission accomplished (mision 
cumplida). No. The tears rolled (se nos rodaron las lagrimas), we looked at our rifles (miramos a 
nuestros fusiles), we remembered the companeros who had fallen (nos acordamos de los 
companeros que habian caido). And believe me, it was difficult, remembering and saying, have 
we done well (bien), have we erred (hacer mal), well, if it is for the good of the country (pais), 
that’s fine, but if this turns against us (si esto llega a dar un giro), we will be those 
responsible/culpable for it (culpables), because believe me, many things can be done with a rifle
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in hand (porque creeme con un fusil en la mano, se pueden hacer muchas cosas).
I say to Macario that many companeros have said that to me. They said that it was very difficult 
for them {le costo muchisimo) handing over the arms (entregar las armas), the very act of 
handing them over, of going to leave them. Some did not go to leave them, they gave their rifle to 
another companero/a, so that they would leave it on their behalf because they could not face the 
act. Macario agrees.
What was extremely difficult was that one would remember (recordar) companeros, those who 
had been companeros. I will tell you something. One would remember the companeros who died, 
and who always, when they were on the point of dying {que ya para morirse), would say to you, 
Silvia, I am leaving (yo me voy), you go, and continue in the struggle (sigue la lucha). It is 
difficult to forget, wounded companeros, hearing them cry (oirlos llorar) and say, well 
companeros, you go and fight (hagan ustedes la lucha). That is not easy (facit) and we, those of 
us who had healthy arms (brazos buenos), healthy legs (piernas buenas), and yet tired of walking, 
because one would walk, we could carry on with the struggle. We had already gathered 
(concentrarse) in the campamentos [demobilisation camps] to hand over our rifles (entregar 
nuestros fusiles), but as I was saying, that was something very difficult to believe (creer) and to 
accept (aceptar). In any case, there were some companeros who were already very tired 
(cansado), which must be said. I was tired too, but I still had the spirit (espiritu). [...] At the same 
time, the tears (las lagrimas) [would roll], because at times one cries inside/intemally (llora uno 
internamente), because one cannot hold back/resist it (no puede resistirlo), let the Peace be 
undersigned (que se firme la paz). But many companeros would say to me, look compa, if the 
singing of the peace does not happen this year, or next year, I will leave, and indeed, many left. 
Six months to the signing of the peace, many companeros left. They could not withstand it 
anymore (aguantar), war is not easy (la guerra no es facil). That is why when civilians (gente
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civil) at this moment, many have said to me, look comandante, because that is what they call me 
here, and I was never [a comandante] and I have told them that, if you need us and if you want to 
make war, we’ll come with you, if this government [the FRG government] does not deliver 
(cumplir), let’s make war {hacer la guerra), we will go/join. So I say to many of them, compos, I 
am very grateful, but you do not know in earnest what a war is, a war is not fought with 
conscience alone {una guerra no se hace solo con consciencia), in a war one needs strong 
political training (formacion politico), having a psychology but for a clear objective of what you 
are undertaking/doing (tener una psicologia pero por un objetivo claro de lo que tu estas 
haciendo), and not just that they should give you a rifle and that they should teach you how to 
handle it {manipularlo) and how to shoot. Within, it is not a matter of destroying but rather of 
doing (por dentro no va aquello de destruir sino de hacer). [...] We were exhausting ourselves 
(nos estabamos desgastando), militarily and economically and in what were human resources 
(material humano). Every day people had more fear (miedo), day by day people wanted less 
struggle (cada dia la gente tenia mas miedo, cadad dia la gente queria pelear) because they 
feared retaliation, given all that had happened and the campaign the Army had undertaken to 
destoy us. I think that was a political moment characterised by very clear thinking (pensamiento 
claro) on the part of the Comandancia, alii si, up to having to kick us out from la montana (hasta 
que nos sacaran a patadas de la montana), to come out with our heads high (salir con la frente 
en alto), there they [the Comandancia] really deserve great praise, despite the pain in our heart 
(iaim que con el dolor en el corazdn), and everywhere (y en todo). But I think that it was better 
this way, than having to leave by fleeing (era mejor asi, que salir corriendo), believe me, the 
tears flooded out of us (se nos derramaron las lagrimas) when it was announced that we were 
going to hand over our rifle, the rifle that had been our life companion (nuestro fucil, que habia 
sido compafiero de la vida). The point is that it was not easy to take off your tool (quitarte tu 
arnes) with all your equipment (equipo), take out your mosquito net (pavilion), your tent (carpa), 
place everything there, knowing that they were going to bum it (quemar), handing over your rifle
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to the point that they would count the ammunitions (balas). It was very difficult, and one would 
say, might it be that as I hand over my rifle {sera que al entregar a mi fusil), it is possible that 
they could come and kill me (es posible que me vengan a matar), a series of things would arise in 
one’s mind {le venian a la mente a uno), and that is why many companeros, what they have said 
to you is true {es cierto), one would give one’s rifle to one of the new companeros [more recent 
recruits], and would say to them, look, you go, because I cannot do it’.
Macario talked of the pain and sense of loss inherent in the process of decommissioning. 
The order to hand over arms induced dismemberment, as the guerrilleros/as parted from 
their prosthetic extensions. Decommissioning procedures such as counting ammunitions 
were experienced as a violation of the integrity of prosthetically enhanced guerrilla 
embodiment. The process of dismemberment evoked by Macario did not apply just to the 
guerrilla: it was to fully engulf anthropology. The exchange between Macario and I 
concluded thus:
‘Silvia, you work with this tape-recorder, and I think you really love your tape recorder, and the 
day you will return to England, you will take it with you {tu trabajas con esta grabadora, creo 
que la quieres mucho, y el dia que te vayas a Inglaterra te le la vas a llevar). I reply that I have 
the tape recorded on loan from the University. Macario is very surprised and says, imagine that 
{imaginate)\ I say, the tape recorder is not even mine. Macario says, that is too bad {peor). In any 
case, it is your work {trabajo), they gave it to you for that, like they gave me a rifle {por eso te la 
dieron, como a mi me dieron el fusil) and that is why you are very fond of it {le tomas mucho 
carifio), because the rifle I carried was not mine {porque ese fusil que cargaba yo no era mio), but 
handing it over, and in good condition {buenas condiciones), knowing that you were handing it 
over but you had grown fond of it. Like your spectacles Silvia, they are useful to you {servir) and 
it is not easy when someone tells you, look, I give you a passport so that you may go {a parte que 
por darte un pasaportey que te vayas), you give me your spectacles {dame tus lentes). When you
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know that those spectacles are being useful to you/you need them (servir), that they can be much
more useful than that which they are offering to you, well, if you hand it [the tape recorder, the
♦
spectacles or the rifle] over is because you have no other option (si lo vas a entegar es porque te 
encontras obligada), you have no other way out (no tienes otra salida). That is to give you an 
example of the situation we experienced/lived through (eso es para ponerte un ejemplo, de la 
situacion que vivimos). With the companeros we would say, compos, are we going to see each 
other again (sera compos que nos vamos a volver a ver)l Will we (sera)? Compos, what will be 
of us (que va a ser de nosotros)?’
Macario suggested that I thought about the situation the companero/as had experienced at 
demobilisation by establishing a relation of equivalence between their rifles and my tape 
recorder. Macario had a rifle, I had a tape recorder. As I would want to take my tape 
recorder with me when I went back to England, they would have liked to keep their rifles, 
that is, the prostheses which had made guerrilla survival possible during the conflict. 
Endowed with the tools of our work, we had acquired prosthetic embodied subjectivity 
and grown fond of our respective prosthetic attachments. Macario was surprised to hear 
the tape recorder was not my own. This revelation perhaps unsettled the presupposition 
that gringas may own their own prostheses. With the knowledge that I had the tape 
recorder on loan, that is, that it belonged to others, Macario established a renewed sense 
of commonality between us. Both of us had to maintain our prostheses in good order, and 
this made parting from them the more painful. Handing over one’s rifle would be as 
painful as leaving one’s tape recorder behind. Macario emphasised the point referring to 
another of my prostheses, and specifically, to my spectacles. He argued that they were 
useful to me to see the world and that anything that may be offered in exchange for them 
would not be satisfactory. Even a passport, the prosthesis of mobility across multiple 
borders, would not be acceptable, as one would only agree to such a transaction when 
given no other option. With no alternative, the guerrilla handed over their prostheses. 
Macario’s powerful image did not just instate a relation of equivalence between his 
prosthetic embodiment and experience and mine. It also established the conditions of
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possibility for the guerrilla and anthropology to borrow each other’s images in the 
phenomenology of the ethnographic encounter. The result was ‘a sense of excess [and] 
insufficiency, of lack of proportion and of connections being partial’ (Strathem 
1991:115-6), as much as extension of our perceptions.
7.5 Conclusion: The Aesthetics of Weak Thought
The concept-metaphor of ‘prosthetics’ conveys the complexities inherent in the aesthetics 
of anthropological and cultural theory, and the practice and experience of ethnography. I 
have noted that during the course of my fieldwork I imagined the form of the accounts 
and narratives of ex-guerrilleros/as as prosthetically marked by the constant additions of 
more parts. Additions occurred through positive and negative relationalities of ex- 
guerrilla secrecy. Narrative parts took the form of unexpected revelatory additions, 
hastily added adjunctions and expressive tangible silences and retractions. Guerrilla 
narratives supplemented themselves and each other in secretive prosthetic articulations. I 
also began to think prosthetically about ethnographic subjects, both in terms of the 
prostheses that made our encounters possible, and the aesthetics of the guerrilla subjects, 
revealed in the course of ethnographic exchanges. The ethnographic moment of 
realisation of the complex naming practices relied upon by ex-combatants was 
underpinned by prosthetic aesthetics, in that subjects seemed to be contextually and 
temporally engaged in re-fashioning themselves anew, through the attachment of names, 
pseudonyms, and nicknames. Thus they extended their agency, and gave form to guerrilla 
secrecy, whilst I learnt to envision ethnographic prosthetic attachments, and extend 
anthropological agency in the process. Further, guerrilla subjects, agency, and 
embodiments, appeared in their prosthetic forms, as ex-combatants related their struggle, 
and their lives, in the ethnographic present, conjuring up all manners of attachments and 
connections. I have argued that prosthetics are implicated in the ethnographic encounter 
in complex ways, and that they also give a form to anthropological aesthetics. In and 
through prosthetics, the guerrilla and anthropology borrowed each other’s images, to 
establish temporal and partial connections. Loosely paraphrasing Moore, and thus 
thinking prosthetically to an extent, prosthetics ‘is an aesthetic in the straightforward
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sense that it is a way of approaching the world, a perspective. Thus, it is simultaneously a 
mode o f knowledge and an idiom, a form for the expression of knowledge’ (Moore 1997: 
68-69, my emphasis). Prosthetics give a form to a post-plural anthropology. With 
constant deferrals, re-articulations, the temporality of their form, the transience of their 
borrowings, thrown-ness (Geworfenheit) (Heidegger [1962] 2002) and historicity, 
prosthetics also constitute the aesthetics of weak thought.
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Conclusion
In the thesis I set out to explore the relations between histories of violence and 
cultures of secrecy in Peten, northern Guatemala, in the aftermath of the 1996 Peace 
Accords signed by the Guatemalan government and guerrilla insurgents. Informed by 
ethnographic research among displaced constituencies with experiences of militancy 
in the guerrilla organisation Rebel Armed Forces, I aimed to trace the contours of 
dispersed and intermittent guerrilla social relations; histories of govemmentality in 
Peten; and their relation to state-sponsored violence, insurgency and repression. I also 
dealt with the incitement and replication of ambivalence in social relations; the 
production of socialities and subjectivities marked by secrecy; guerrilla ethics and 
aesthetics of sociality established through generation and circulation of substance and 
multiple modes of relatedness; and phenomenologies of guerrilla prosthetic 
embodiment and subjectivity. In short, I set out to accomplish what Fardon (1990) 
deemed the ambitious and crisis-inducing programme of writing ethnography.
Noting historical contextualisations of Guatemala provided through the discipline of 
anthropology, I pointed to instances of out-contextualisation in anthropological 
analytical and representational practices. I argued that in the context(-s) of Guatemala, 
anthropological writing, and its reliance on tropes of indigeneity, settlement and place 
produced normative accounts of complex social realities and dynamics. Further, I 
noted that anthropological knowledge may be deeply implicated in the constitution of 
the ‘field’ of theory, practice and representation that is ‘Guatemala’. Drawing on 
Strathem (1992, 1999), I aimed to highlight processes through which ethnographic 
subjects out-contextualised anthropology and its anthropologists during my fieldwork, 
at once exposing anthropological presuppositions, bringing into stark relief the labour 
of fabrication that coincides with the anthropological endeavour, and the ways in 
which anthropology may be consumed, reinterpreted, displaced -  and indeed out- 
contextualised -  by ethnographic subjects.
The emphasis on processes of out-contextualisation seemed particularly relevant as I 
aimed to bring into view what I argued had been deemed ‘out of context’ by multiple 
anthropologically and govemmentality-informed discourses, namely the region of
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Peten and related violent histories of displacement. Through the artifice of shifts in 
perspective and scale, I tried to reveal the (deferred) centrality of Peten to an 
understanding of histories of violence and conflict, experiences of insurgency and 
counter-insurgency and related cultures of secrecy. In so doing, I furtively brought 
violence and conflict within the realm of perception, mimicking the partial, 
fragmentary and secretive modes of disclosure and foreclosure that marked the 
revelation of experiences of the conflicto armado during my fieldwork.
In view of the complexity and plurality of ethnographic socialities, subjectivities and 
their histories, I resolved to confront anthropological models and presuppositions. I 
suggested that anthropology and its knowledge practices be subjected to critical 
scrutiny. The task was critical and constructive in orientation and aimed to demolish, 
re-imagine and rebuild, and to do so in ways that were partial and weak. To some 
extent, my critical posture borrowed images from the guerrillas. The Nietzschean 
anthropology I envisaged may seek to demolish the logocentrism and self- 
referentiality of Western metaphysics and its structure(-s), as the guerrilla in Peten 
had sought to bring down a system of governance with its neo-imperial ties to re-build 
sociality anew. In point of fact, the Rebel Armed Forces had not deferred the labour 
of reassembling of the social realm to a post-revolutionary aftermath. Rather, the 
experience of the guerrilla had produced specific articulations of subjectivities and 
socialities during the insurgency. Guerrilla insurgent subjectivities were refashioned 
on a terrain marked by secrecy and traces lingered in the ethnographic present. 
Anthropological critical modes thus intertwined in the realm of representation with 
guerrilla ethnographic modes through which subjectivities and socialities may be 
obliterated, suspended, refashioned and reassembled anew. Histories of violence and 
conflict were shown to be deeply implicated in guerrilla secret socialities and 
subjectivities. In turn, the social and cultural field appeared as a site of ever- 
increasing secrecy-imbued plurality and partiality.
Deconstruction, Weak Thought and Scales of Post-plurality
Moving from Derrida’s critique of metaphysics (Derrida 1970) and noting the 
(deferred) centrality of anthropology to Derrida’s arguments, I proposed to elicit 
‘structure’, ‘scandals’ and ‘events’ in the field of hermeneutics-informed 
anthropology and to subject anthropology’s appeals to plurality, partiality and
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relativisation to critical scrutiny. Following Rabinow (1983), I noted that traditions of 
social and cultural anthropology have historically been predicated on the recognition 
of alterity. The entrenchment of a disciplinary preoccupation with difference has 
produced numerous epistemological positions and related knowledge practices which 
have sought to identify, describe, explain and often enfranchise multiple culturally 
marked Others. Through anthropological knowledge practices, social and cultural 
realms and social and cultural subjects have appeared plural, complex and relative. 
However, when, following Derrida, anthropology is located within the history of 
Western metaphysics, it is clear that traditions of anthropological enquiry have 
imagined plurality, partiality and complexity to be the culturally specific 
manifestations of a universal human condition, cognitive structure or interpretative 
capacity.
Since Nietzsche and Heidegger, the progressive weakening of Western metaphysics 
and the erosion of its foundations of thought have made these presuppositions 
problematic. Further, they have engendered the conditions of possibility for 
anthropology to move beyond the enumeration of potentially infinite partial 
perspectives grounded in strong universalist assumptions. In an effort to apprehend 
and represent the shifts in perspective engendered in the context of a weakening of 
‘strong thought’, I considered what presuppositions may make partial subjectivities 
and socialities amenable to experience, reflection and representation. Informed by the 
work of philosopher Gianni Vattimo, I argued that the concept-metaphor of ‘weak 
thought’, that is a mode of thought that takes leave from strong categories of 
traditional Western metaphysics and accepts post-Nietzschean lack of foundations, 
absence of certitudes and demise of truth, holds important theoretical and imaginative 
potential for anthropology. Anthropology that accepts the weakening of Western 
metaphysics -  imagined as the advancement of nihilism -  may apprehend and 
represent constant shifts of partial perspectives in anti-foundational terms, thus also 
realising anthropology’s nihilist vocation.
I argued that the traces of ‘weak thought’ and the realisation of the nihilist vocation of 
anthropology might be suggested in the work of anthropologist Marilyn Strathem (cf. 
Strathem 1971, 1980, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1999). I suggested that Strathem’s texts may 
be read as ‘weak’ in the nihilist sense of the term, in that they eschew strong
290
metaphysical claims to delineate fictionalised experiences of reality instead. Insofar as 
they may be said to defy ‘strong thought’, scientism, objectivity and realism, 
Strathem’s texts make the artifice of anthropological knowledge as explicit as the 
tentative and provisional character of anthropological analysis and representation 
(Rapport 1997:658).
The point of convergence in the theoretical strategies and knowledge practices 
deployed by Derrida (1970, 1974) and Strathem (1971, 1980, 1988, 1991, 1995, 
1999) may be found in their respective projects to elicit, understand and represent the 
constant play, permutation and shifts in perspectives which lie at the core of structure 
and context-making. Whilst Derrida focuses on the history of Western metaphysics 
and its structure-making intellectual practices, Strathem calls upon the history of 
anthropology, with its models of society and the person, to reflect on anthropological 
practices of contextualisation and their effects. Derridean ‘play’ and Strathemian 
‘shifts in partial perspectives’ precipitate reflections on knowledge practices ,and 
theoretical models, and reveal how to ‘centring’ there may correspond specific 
‘decentring’, whilst contextualisation and commensurability creation may be tied to 
forms of out-contextualisation and incommensurability creation.
Taking Derridean and Strathemian analytical and representational strategies under the 
aegis of Vattimo-inspired weak thought, I argued that ‘weak description’ and ‘thick 
nihilism’ may be relevant to an anthropology of histories of violence and cultures of 
secrecy in Peten, Guatemala. Whilst deconstruction allows for a consideration of the 
place of anthropology within Western metaphysics, and Strathemian anthropology 
suggests the provisionality and tentativeness of anthropological labour, weak thought, 
with the Nietzschean and Heideggerian genealogies that are inscribed on it, infuses 
anthropology and its knowledge practices with temporality and historicity. Weak 
thought provides the horizon for anthropological theory and ethnographic writing to 
move beyond subtle and crass universalisms. Further, it allows anthropology to 
apprehend and represent the constant shifts in perspectives and related partialities that 
marked my encounters with the ex-guerrillas, as well as the ways those ethnographic 
subjects marked by experiences of insurgency constantly exceeded their own frames 
and the frames place upon them.
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Conflict, Secrecy, Subjectivity and Sociality in Peten, Guatemala
I have suggested that it was the experience of fieldwork which made the interrelated 
questions of partiality, pluralisation and relativisation appear critical to understanding 
and representing multiple and complex processes of contextualisation and out- 
contextualisation in Peten on my meandering routes through histories of violence and 
cultures of secrecy. Furthermore, it was the ethnographic encounter and its partialities 
-  in the form of retractions, refusals, foreclosures, disclosures and revelations -  which 
compelled me to confront the multiple, complex and partial scales of guerrilla secrecy 
and to seek an adequate theoretical, hermeneutic and representational frame through 
which shifts in perspectives may be apprehended and represented. Anthropological 
weak thought is thus bome out of the proliferation of partial perspectives of the 
ethnographic encounter: it’s commonly construed as equivalent with the concrete, but 
in fact is the most abstract and theoretical of ‘fields’.
To understand and represent my encounters with the ex-guerrilla in Peten, I pointed to 
ethnographic moments of selective disclosure and foreclosure. I discussed guerrilla 
naming practices in the insurgency, and argued that these were critical to the 
articulation of partial guerrilla subjectivities and socialities. As I followed the 
proliferation of names and relationalities of guerrilla secrecy, I noted the ways in 
which subjectivities and socialities may be marked by the experiences of violence and 
conflict in complex ways. Violence, surveillance, and the control of secrets by state- 
agents and neo-imperial powers, instantiated ambivalence and indeterminacy in 
subjectivities and social relations. In turn, the revelation of complex practices of 
insurgent simulations, and counter-insurgent dissimulations, abated the coherence and 
distinctiveness of entities and the distinctions between them -  as in the case of the 
categorical distinction between the Army and the guerrilla. In the scale of guerrilla 
secret socialities and relationalities, the guerrilla established merographic connections 
between and among entities, thus revealing entities to be similar and dissimilar, 
distant and adjunct. Furthermore, processes of augmentation and contraction were 
figured in accounts of the guerrilla whole as composed of three substances, namely 
‘information’, ‘logistics’ and ‘combatants’. Considering different perspectives on 
guerrilla substance, I noted distinct modes of expansion and diminishment, as well as
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differentiation and conjunction. Guerrilla sociality and relationality appeared to 
encompass multiple forms of relatedness and entailed multiple moral orders. The 
idiom of kinship permeated the guerrilla whole and produced orders of sameness and 
difference among combatants. In turn, guerrilla sociality developed distinctive modes 
of relations based on long-lasting principles of sameness, respect, equality and 
hermandad (affinity/amity), enacted through practices such as commensality. Whilst 
early attempts at regulating the scale of difference of gender and sexuality through the 
creation of institutions such as ‘marriages by arms’ were short-lived, through modes 
of relatedness and moral orders, the guerrilla envisioned a long-lasting mirror image 
of the broader society. Guerrilla disassembling and reassembling of the social realm 
and the production of a guerrilla replica of society involved not just replication, but 
also re-invention. I have argued that partiality, complexity and relativisation, as they 
arose during my fieldwork, should be represented in post-plural scales, that is, in a 
mode of thought that focuses on connections and relations, thus foregoing appeals to 
discrete entities, unified subjects and social wholes. Whether or not the scale of post- 
plurality and weak thought may be said to underpin my account of guerrilla 
subjectivities and socialities -  as they arose in the course and the contexts of my 
fieldwork -  I have argued that they presuppose a form: that is, they are underpinned 
by prosthetic aesthetics. Out of the phenomenology of the ethnographic encounter, 
subjects revealed themselves in and through their prosthetic extensions. As we 
discussed loss and acquisition of our prostheses, anthropology and the guerrilla 
borrowed each other’s images in and through our prosthetic extensions and prosthetic 
imaginings. Thorough the transience, tentativeness and thrownness (Heidegger [1962] 
2002) of these borrowings, anthropology and the guerrilla gave form to each other, 
and by extension, gave form to the scale of post-plurality and weak thought.
From the partial perspective of philosophy, weak thought suggests a critique of 
anthropological models of subjectivity and sociality, the knowledge practices that 
sustain them, and universalisms that underpin them, to point to the conditions of 
possibility of weak and nihilist inflections of anthropological knowledge. Weak 
thought thus advocates the articulation of anthropological knowledge practices which 
acknowledge their temporality, provisionality and partiality and, crucially, which 
reflect on their own historicity, or their thrownness, to use a Heideggerian term. Weak 
thought offers the opportunity to relinquish connections as both neurosis and nostalgia
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to a ‘strong’ subject imagined in all manner of scales of difference and sameness, but 
predicated on universalities of human condition, cognitive structures, and/or 
interpretative faculties. Anthropology that borrows an image from philosophy, and 
locates itself within the history of Western metaphysics may prosthetically and ex- 
centrically extend to apprehend and represent subjects and socialities in post-plural 
scales. Further, an anthropology that accepts the weakening of Western metaphysics -  
imagined as the advancement of nihilism -  may apprehend and represent constant 
shifts of partial perspectives in anti-foundational terms, thus realising its nihilist 
vocation.
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PLATE 3 -  ‘Colonos’ (Samayoa Rivera n.d.:4).
300
PLATE 4 -  ‘A Tzuul Taq'a in the Lowlands’, Peten, 2000. Don Luis had dreamt the 
name and place of residence of the local Tzuul Taq ’a. Photograph by Silvia Posocco.
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TIME-SERIES FOREST CHANGE, LAND COVER/LAND USE CONVERSION, AND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVING FORCES IN THE PETEN DISTRICT, GUATEMALA
A PROJECT UNDER THE NASA - ESE - LCLUC SCIENCE PROGRAM
PLATE 6 - ‘Peten as Star Wars’. This montage illustrates the ‘Time-Series Forest 
Change, Land Cover/Land Use Conversion, and Socio-Economic Driving Forces in
surveys/surveiIs forest changes and social life.


PLATE 10 -  Ex-combatant harvesting maize and inspecting crop failure, Peten, 
2000. Photograph by Silvia Posocco.
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PLATE 11 -  ‘Temporalities’. Peten, 2000. Photograph by Silvia Posocco.
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